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ABSTRACT
This thesis is based on a comparative study of the strategy formation process 
in nine Irish small/medium enterprises (SMEs). The study adopted a 
longitudinal-processual approach which is still rare in the literature. A  
conceptual framework was developed from the literature based on three main 
variables - entrepreneurship, context and history. Realised strategy was seen 
to be the result of the interplay between these elements over time. The use of 
this framework facilitated the development of the study’s main contributions.
A m o n g  these contributions, the study identified, and distinguished between 
two types of entrepreneurs - 'the pragmatic’ and 'charismatic’ types - based on 
orientation towards risk, underlying personalities and world views. The study 
also revealed a phase pattern of strategy formation - an early fluid, quasi- 
strategic phase linked through a 'defining episode’ (usually a crisis) to a more 
formal and focused strategic phase. This phase model is developed in the 
study and presents a perspective on strategy formation in S M E s  which departs 
from the normative rational planning model that still tends to dominate in the 
literature on SMEs.
A m o n g  its other findings, the study highlights h o w  the risk-taking capacities 
of entrepreneurs are seen to change over time due to both intrinsic and 
extrinsic influences; the study reveals h o w  entrepreneurial effectiveness varies 
more generally over time and tenure; and attention is drawn to some of the 
'darker’ elements in the entrepreneurial personality. The implications of these 
and other findings for future research and practice are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the process of strategy formation through a 
comparative analysis of nine Irish S M E s  (small and m e d i u m  sized 
enterprises) in a variety of commercial contexts. The primary concern of 
the study is to identify and analyse the main factors that impinge on this 
process.
Rationale for the research project
The inspiration for this research can be traced to the researcher’s 
educational background and employment record. The author has worked in 
the S M E  sector, and the finalisation of M.B.S. thesis in entrepreneurship 
prompted a desire to carry out further research.
Entrepreneurs form an important group of people in present-day society. 
The high status of entrepreneurs is indicated by the public interest in, and 
fascination with, figures such as Richard Branson and Anita Roddick, w h o  
have become media celebrities in today’s world. Governments have 
attempted to foster an ‘enterprise culture’ through the provision of training 
programmes and education for enterprise. The 1980’s was characterised by 
an increasing interest in entrepreneurship as an academic field. David 
Gumpert (1982, p. 50) notes that ‘suddenly entrepreneurship is in vogue.’ 
This surge of interest in entrepreneurship is understandable, considering the 
role of small business in most economies. Entrepreneurs are widely 
perceived to personify creativity; they come up with big ideas and build the 
organisation. They take the initiative and devise n e w  solutions to old 
problems. They start vibrant n e w  companies, turn around failing 
corporations, and shake up staid ones (Gilder, 1984). Although Robert D. 
Reich (1987, p. 78) talks about the ‘myth of the entrepreneurial hero’ and 
substitutes the ‘team as hero’ in other words, collective entrepreneurship, 
the popular view of the entrepreneur is still valid. A  belief in the
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entrepreneurial spirit has penetrated both the academic and corporate 
circles. Small enterprise development is important for m a n y  economies 
and the recognition exists that the individual is a key actor in the whole 
entrepreneurial process.
The importance of the small and medium sized enterprise sector in the 
Irish economy
S M E s  are a worthy research topic for a number of reasons. A n  emphasis 
on the development of indigenous industry has been a feature of Ireland’s 
industrial strategy since the watershed Telesis Report of 1982 and the 
subsequent White Paper on Industrial Policy. This approach was endorsed 
by the government in its Review of Industrial Performance (1990) and 
more recently by the Culliton Report (1992), the Moriarty Task Force
(1993) and the Task Force on Small Business (1994). While 
acknowledging the importance of foreign grant-aided industry, policy 
makers have targeted indigenous industry as a panacea for Ireland’s 
economic ills. The Culliton Report (1992, p. 67) argued that:
If industrial policy is to be successful in helping to generate a 
competitive industrial structure which can sustain long-term 
employment growth and improve living standards, the focus must 
shift decisively to indigenous companies. The view of Porter is that 
in Ireland the shift has been ‘too little too late’ and that there has 
not been a full commitment to the slow process of developing a 
broader base of indigenous firms. W e  consider Porter’s basic 
conclusions are correct despite the efforts undertaken to promote 
indigenous industry.
Today, it is increasingly difficult for Ireland to attract foreign investment, 
as seen by the recent diversion of major projects from Ireland to Scotland. 
Ireland is not a low-wage, low-cost economy. This has posed difficulties 
for traditional industrial policy. Large scale, foreign companies are 
extremely vulnerable to changing economic conditions, as the recent 
closure of Packard in Tallaght, Ireland has shown. The failure of such a
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large corporation can have catastrophic effects on local communities and 
constitutes a serious blow to economic performance at both local and 
national level.
There has been m u c h  debate on ways in which to improve the climate for 
enterprise in Ireland. The recent White Paper on Education has 
emphasised enterprise and innovation; a plethora of ‘start your o w n  
business’ courses have been established to encourage a m o v e  to self- 
employment. The I D A  is moving away from general grant assistance 
towards a more selective approach of assisting companies that exhibit 
potential. There is also a shift towards repayable incentives (see The Task 
Force on Small Business, 1994). This is part of the re-direction in Irish 
industrial policy. Mechanisms such as grant aid, tax incentives, small 
business programmes, and other instruments of Irish national policy, have 
been used to promote industrial development. The Irish government has 
attempted to stimulate entrepreneurship by fostering an environment 
conducive to individual enterprise, risk-taking and action.
Entrepreneurs and the population of small firms have been somewhat 
neglected in economic and regional development theory. They have been 
overshadowed by theories of economies of scale and the orientation to big 
companies (Sweeney, 1995, p. 2-112). However, they are becoming 
central to regional development policy in some countries such as Germany, 
Japan and the US. The S M E  forms a strong dimension of policy in 
Ireland. In spite of the dominance of large organisations in m a n y  
countries, ne w  and small firms continue to provide a good return to the 
economies. The small firm sector has a crucial role to play in industrial 
development. It serves a variety of purposes, be it that of preserving 
competition, sponsoring innovation, providing an alternative career path, 
generating employment or meeting new market needs (The Task Force on 
Small Business, 1994). Small firms also supply an industrial infrastructure 
that has links with larger enterprises.
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Academic studies of the strategy process in SMEs
A n  initial literature review revealed a poor understanding of the strategy 
formation process in the S M E  context.
The lack of focus on small/medium sized firms in the strategy literature
The role of S M E s  (small and med i u m  sized enterprises) has received little 
explicit attention in mainstream strategic management literature. Most of 
the cases in the best k n own strategy textbooks have dealt with large, 
powerful firms such as IBM, Honda, Ford, Wal-Mart, etc., rather than 
small or m e d i u m  sized firms. For instance, Murray (1984, p. 56) has 
claimed that:
Strategy and its implementation is most usually studied 
in formally organised mature organisations. Our research 
suggests that strategy formulated at pre-launch stages is of 
vital long term significance for the organisation and 
deserves far more attention that is traditional.
Olson and Bokor (1995) have claimed that information about the strategic 
behaviour of entrepreneurial firms has been limited. Although numerous 
strategy studies have been conducted since Chandler (1962) and Ansoff
(1965), most of them have focused on large firms. Robinson (1982) has 
proposed that efforts must be undertaken to develop a greater understanding 
of strategic management in small firms.
This preference for large firms and lack of focus on smaller firms is based 
on m a n y  factors. The complexities of large firms are seen as intellectually 
fascinating, compared with which the small firm is basically simple, all-too 
familiar, lacking challenge. This view has pervaded business schools, 
management consultancies and top industry circles (Boswell, 1972). It is 
often said that small firms do not need strategy; they can pursue other
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routes to business success. According to Porter (1991) that view is 
erroneous. H e  has argued that, on the contrary, small business owners 
have to see their environment with particular clarity, and have to stake out 
and protect a position they can defend. Unlike large firms, small firms 
cannot rely on brute force, throwing resources at problems (Porter, 1991, 
p.90). There is a growing sense that the Irish S M E  in the 1990s is facing a 
more challenging environment and the discipline of strategic management 
m a y  have m u c h  to offer to the smaller firm.
The lack of focus on process in the strategy literature generally, and 
particularly in the SME context
Strategy process research is concerned with understanding h o w  strategies 
actually form in organisations, whereas strategy content research is 
concerned with identifying and describing the type of strategy adopted by 
firms. Process research is not as well established or as voluminous as the 
field of strategy content research (Pettigrew, 1992). Empirical studies to 
date on strategy process have focused on a few, large, mature firms. For 
example, Mintzberg and Waters (1982), Pettigrew (1985) and Blair and 
Boal (1991) studied strategy formation processes in a chain of grocery 
outlets, a manufacturing group, and health care organisations, respectively. 
These studies dealt with decision making and change. Pettigrew’s study 
(1985) characterised the process of strategy formation as one of change.
H e  focused on the strategic development of ICI, one of the U K ’s largest 
manufacturing companies.
The lack of focus on strategy process is even more marked in the case of 
small and me d i u m  sized organisations. Strategic processes and small firms 
are both legitimate domains of enquiry, but they tend to develop in 
isolation. There is a relative paucity of systematic, research supported 
findings in this area, (i.e. the process of strategy formation in small and 
m e d i u m  sized firms) in journals such as the Administrative Science
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Quarterly and the Journal of Strategic Management. Over the past ten 
years, not one article has been published in these journals relating to 
strategy formation processes in the smaller firm. Hendry et al., (1995, p. 
21) claim that:
A n  in-depth investigation of h o w  strategy unfolds has been rare in
the small firm sector Specialist journals have either emphasized a
‘black box’ view insensitive to the inner workings of the small firm, 
or have pressed normative assumptions that smaller firms should 
imitate the comprehensive - and potentially stultifying - management 
approaches of large firms.
Very few studies have concentrated upon the process of strategy formation 
in small or m e d i u m  sized firms (see for example, Gibb and Scott, 1985; 
Hanlon and Scott, 1995; Hendry et al., 1995; Murray, 1984). Hanlon and 
Scott (1995) have observed that m u c h  of the literature on strategy process 
and the small firms has concerned the rational, planning model, which has 
described h o w  firms should go about formulating their strategies. Hanlon 
and Scott (1995, p. 19) have claimed that:
Barring a few exceptions (see, for example, Gibb and Scott, 1985), 
research on h o w  strategies are actually formed in entrepreneurial 
small firms is virtually non existent.
The focus, or niche strategies of Miles and S n o w  (1978), as well as Porter 
(1980) seem to surface again and again in studies of the S M E .  Empirical 
studies aimed at identifying ‘success’ and ‘failure’ have been included in 
the strategy content category (Hanlon and Scott, 1995). A  problem with 
this stream of research is that there has been a preoccupation with strategy 
content, rather than strategy process. B o u w e n  and Steyaert (1990, p. 648) 
claim:
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Content knowledge concerns what to do, process knowledge 
describes how. In the study of small and m e d i u m  
sized enterprises the emphasis, up to now, has been mainly on 
collecting content knowledge - rules of thumb or techniques. This 
knowledge is of limited value since the number of things to do and 
the number of situations is endless.
It is perhaps wise to comment on w h y  process-sensitive research is so 
necessary. Bouen and Steyaert (1990) suggest that process knowledge 
allows entrepreneurs to deepen their understanding of their o w n  behaviour 
and of organisational processes. Critical reflection produces new, 
applicable knowledge. Insights can be generated into the organising 
process and entrepreneurs can use such knowledge to improve their 
performance as architects of their firm. As a result, a process-centred 
paradigm for understanding the formation of strategies in S M E s  shows 
promise.
The lack of focus on SMEs over time
The start-up and early phase of development of a n e w  venture seems to be 
of particular interest to small business researchers. For instance, Murray’s 
(1984) study looked at the process of strategy formulation and 
implementation in the entrepreneurial new venture. While there is n o w  
substantial research on the start-up process, research on h o w  strategy forms 
and changes over time in S M E s  seems to be sparse.
It has been claimed that there is an over focus on small start-ups (Hendry 
et al., 1995) which is a negation of the lessons to be gained by studying 
small firms that have a longer and richer history. It is easily forgotten that 
m a n y  small firms are not new and are more than five years old. The 
literature in general suggests that between a third and a half of all n e w  
firms fail within four to five years (Cromie, 1990). In Ireland, a study of 
grant aided firms showed that 5 6 %  had gone out of business nine years
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after start-up. Ireland is above the European average in terms of small 
business failures (Fitzpatrick and Associates, The Task Force on Small 
Business, 1994). Data on mortality rates for S M E s  underscores the need 
for researchers to go beyond their fixation on start-ups and pay greater 
attention to the smaller, more mature firms. This shortcoming of the 
literature is alarming because of the importance of small companies to the 
economy in general and to technological development in general. This 
research takes a fresh look at the topic of strategy formation in S M E s  by 
adopting a longer time frame. The research goes beyond the start-up stage 
and stays with a few companies for as long as ten years. The concern is, 
therefore, with foundation and early history, with tracking the development 
of strategies in the small firm over the longer term.
The potential to learn from small enterprises
Recent theoretical arguments affirm the importance of the smaller 
enterprise to national economies. A  perception in the literature is that 
large, bureaucratic firms suffer from structural and political barriers to 
information flow which hinders innovation. It has been advocated that 
larger corporations (Hendry et al., 1995) should learn from, or even 
duplicate the advantages of, smaller organisations. M a n y  organisations, 
such as IBM, have recognised the benefits that limited size or 
‘fragmentation’ can bring. M a n y  established firms have been subject to 
efforts of ‘intrapreneurship’ aimed at rekindling risk-taking, innovation and 
flexibility (Burgleman and Say les, 1985). The trend towards downsizing 
and the de-construction of large companies allows companies to concentrate 
on their core activities and subcontract non core activities; this enables 
them to reduce their fixed cost base and flatten their organisation 
structures, so ensuring quicker response times to changes in the 
marketplace (Burns, 1996). Charles Handy (1989) predicts that there will 
be a growth of the ‘shamrock organisation’ in larger companies, the three 
leaves being core staff, temporary staff and part-time staff, to ease them
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over peaks and troughs in work. Smaller organisations will supply 
specialist services. In his book ‘The Empty Raincoat’, Charles Handy 
(1994) advocates business federalism. In H a n d y ’s model, a small, central 
core organisation monitors the performance of highly autonomous business 
units. It transmits information to knowledge workers w h o  often work 
outside the traditional organisation. In this way, efficiency is increased. 
With the erosion of job security and the increasing popularity of 
homeworking and teleworking, the number of small firms is likely to 
increase (Bums, 1996).
That even large companies are interested in implementing the spirit of 
entrepreneurship and in gaining the advantages of thinking like a small 
business, shows that research on small firms holds promise.
The purpose of this research
Given the importance of the S M E  sector to the Irish economy, and in the 
light of the lack of attention given to strategy processes in SMEs, the 
purpose of this research is to address this weakness in the literature.
The main research purpose of this study is explore h o w  strategies form and 
change in S M E s  over time and the key factors at work in the process. This 
study draws upon concepts from different streams of literature in the search 
for a greater understanding of the underlying process.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis starts with an introduction to the topic of strategy formation 
processes in SMEs; a rationale for the study of the topic is offered and the 
structure of the thesis is outlined. The S M E  tends to be neglected as a site 
for the study of strategy process in favour of the large firm. S M E s  are a 
worthy research focus because of their importance to the Irish economy.
The S M E  sector is vital to the social and economic well being of Ireland.
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Fostering the development of an indigenous S M E  sector has become an 
important objective of Irish public policy. If Ireland is to alleviate its 
unemployment problem, it is no longer realistic to depend on the large firm 
sector. The S M E  sector serves a variety of valuable purposes, such as 
preserving competition, sponsoring innovation, providing flexibility or 
generating employment. The high failure rate of business start-ups 
underscores the need to focus on both small and small, mature firms. To 
survive beyond the first five years of existence represents some kind of 
achievement from which something m a y  be learned.
The objective of the first chapter is to review the diverse directions of 
strategy process research. This involves an inclusive examination of the 
concept of strategy and the factors that shape strategy. The chapter 
presents a brief review of the two major schools of thought in the strategic 
management literature: the planning and the process schools. There is 
evidence of a paradigm shift in the strategic management discipline. The 
concept of entrepreneurship is sometimes perceived as inimical to the 
concept of strategic management, and the utility of strategy to the small 
firm is often questioned, but these notions m a y  be outdated. This study 
counts among its influences the work of Mintzberg (1978), w h o  suggests 
that strategy is rarely formulated in a synoptic manner and then 
implemented. Instead it is often characterised by informality, learning-by- 
doing, and by chance occurrence.
Chapter two summarises the literature pertaining to strategy formation 
processes in the S M E  context. A  broad conceptual framework is developed 
from the literature review which is based on three main variables, 
leadership, context and history, and their interactions over time. This 
framework allows for the consideration of a wide variety of factors that 
impinge on the strategy formation process. The adequacy of existing 
approaches to explain strategy formation processes in S M E s  is also 
examined in this chapter.
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The literature review reveals that the vast majority of researchers 
concentrate on the substantive issue of leadership. The literature on 
strategic management and entrepreneurship tends to glorify the role of the 
leader/entrepreneur in the development of the organisation. The leader is 
seen as instrumental in forging a distinctive culture for the organisation 
which, paradoxically, enables the firm to achieve success and hinders the 
firm’s ability to adapt. A  first research theme is therefore to establish the 
role of the founder in the strategy formation process in SMEs. The role of 
contextual forces on the strategy formation process is underpinned by the 
debate on voluntarism and determinism. Thus another research question is 
to establish whether contextual factors lead to variations in the strategy 
formation process. Another research agenda is to explore the unique forces 
that inhibit and facilitate the formation of strategy in the S M E .  This study 
also draws upon organisation theory literature since it deals with constraints 
or obstacles to change. A  question that emerges from this literature stream 
centres on the role of history or early social processes in the development 
of the S M E .
Chapter three describes the study’s research methodology and method. The 
study is located in the subjective/interpretative m o d e  of analysis. It was 
shown that prior studies on the strategy formation process in large firms 
adopted an inductive, qualitative, longitudinal approach. This approach 
was used successfully to generate theory. Researchers such as Pettigrew 
(1987b) and Mintzberg and Waters (1982) constitute the main 
methodological influences on this work. In other words, this study is 
guided by the state of the field. D u e  to the limited amount of research on 
strategy formation processes in SMEs, the inductive case method for 
discovering theory from data is adopted. Nine cases were selected. The 
nine firms range between 7 and 20 years old, with 2 to 120 staff and 
concern a variety of industries. Over 30 interviews were conducted, 
supplemented by archival material and secondary research. Through the 
use of the case method, considerable attention was focused on emerging
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themes, such as the often neglected cultural and historical influences on 
small firm behaviour. The chapter also indicates a number of features that 
m a y  be of interest to researchers using case studies to investigate strategy 
process issues in the S M E  sector and elsewhere. Firstly, the use of 
comparative case studies assists in the process of generating theory from 
data. Secondly, the issue of confidentiality is vital. Gaining the trust and 
confidence of those under investigation is of major importance.
Chapter four presents the data that describe the strategy formation process 
in Irish SMEs. Four cases are described in this section: Fiacla, QFS, RTI 
and M c K e o w n .  These cases are included here since they were used in the 
latter stages of the research to probe certain issues in depth (such as 
phases, leadership and crises). The remaining five case studies are to be 
found in the appendices.
Chapter five presents an analysis of the case findings. The analysis centres 
on the role of leadership, contextual and historical variables in the strategy 
formation process. In terms of conceptual development, this study shows 
that there are variations in the personas of entrepreneurs, some but not all 
fit the heroic mould. The characteristics of two main types, ‘the 
charismatic’ and ‘the pragmatic’ were outlined. Learning and change are 
features of the entrepreneur’s and the firm’s development. The 
entrepreneur matures along side with the firm and gains n e w  skills, new 
knowledge and ne w  roles. The entrepreneur’s attitude to risk often changes 
over time and his or her credibility with key stakeholders is undermined 
due to the incident of crisis. Crisis is a c o m m o n  feature in the 
development of S M E s  and has both functional and dysfunctional effects.
Chapter six, the final chapter, assesses the contribution of this study and 
discusses its implications for future research and practice. In addition, the 
unique issues that emerge naturally from the research are discussed. The 
thesis concludes with an acknowledgement of the limitations of this
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research. Three main contributions were asserted in this concluding 
chapter. Firstly, this study has expanded the strategy process literature by 
taking a model generally applied to the large organisation (leadership, 
context and history) and transferring it to the small firm sector with some 
refinements. A  highly voluntaristic approach is generally adopted in 
entrepreneurship. It is assumed that the entrepreneur, by sheer force of his 
personality, can influence strategy and outcomes. Within entrepreneurship, 
there is a predominance of the choice perspective (Child, 1972) and it is 
assumed that the process of forming a strategy is proactive, deliberate, 
rational and under the control of the entrepreneur. This study found that 
although the founder plays a major role in the strategy formation process, 
his role is circumscribed by history and context. In contrast to most 
personality-based studies in entrepreneurship, this study found that the 
strategy formation process was a multi-dimensional rather that one­
dimensional process. This study assigned importance to the role of history 
in the strategy formation process. The concept of ‘history’ referred to the 
founding history - the history of the firm to date and it also incorporated 
the incidence of defining episodes or crisis. At certain stages, the 
entrepreneur was faced with inertia and the firm tended to be undermined 
by crisis. There was some limited evidence to support the notion that firms 
in the high-tech sector were subject to greater constraints in the formation 
of strategies than firms in the low-tech sector. The second main 
contribution of this research was the proposal of a phase model of the 
strategy formation process. This was made possible by the use of a broad 
conceptual framework. The third main contribution of this study centred 
on the findings in relation to risk. This study has expanded the personality 
trait theory by adopting a processual perspective on entrepreneurship. Trait 
theorists define the entrepreneur in terms of personal attributes, such as the 
ability to take risk, and static terms of reference are generally used. This 
study found that there were different types of entrepreneurs: the pragmatic 
and charismatic entrepreneur w h o  were primarily distinguished by their 
fundamental world views and attitudes to risk. The former sought to
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minimise risk whereas the latter displayed a greater willingness to assume 
risks, thereby conforming to the typical stereotype of the ‘bold risk taker’. 
In addition, the entrepreneur’s attitude to risk varied over the course of 
business development. Entrepreneurship is seen therefore in dynamic 
rather than static terms. Risk in entrepreneurship can be seen, not just in 
terms of a a personality variable but also in terms of a situational variable. 
Leadership capacity is not purely defined by personal attributes, but is 
shaped by organisational context and history.
Lastly, this study has gathered information on the strategy formation 
process in an Irish context, which is important given that most strategy 
process studies are predominantly American and British in orientation.
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CHAPTER ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF STRATEGY FORMATION 
MODELS
Introduction
In this chapter, the concept of strategy formation is explored. This chapter 
focuses on the process school of thought since this study and analysis is 
located within the process view of strategy development originating with 
Mintzberg (1978; 1987, 1990b) and further developed by Pettigrew (1985). 
It will be shown that the great bulk of studies in the strategy field concerns 
the normative, rational planning model which seek to describe h o w  firms 
should go about formulating strategies. While both large and small firms 
m a y  devise formal plans, several alternate models of strategy formation 
exist which will be described in this section. Bearing in mind that process 
related research in the S M E  context focuses almost exclusively on the 
planning model (Hanlon and Scott, 1995) the more recent models appear to 
hold promise in their ability to explain h o w  strategies form in firms, and 
especially in small firms. The literature on entrepreneurship tends to lag 
behind strategic management in terms of explaining h o w  strategy forms in 
SMEs, and therefore researchers in the S M E  field have m u c h  to learn from 
this discipline.
The planning school of thought
The discipline of strategic management has its historical roots in the 
normative (planning) model of strategy (Hanlon and Scott, 1995). 
Mainstream research on business strategy has traditionally treated strategy 
formulation as a rational process, based on the objective analysis of the 
environment, of resources and the objective evaluation of alternative 
choices (see for example, Ansoff, 1965). There is by no means universal 
agreement on the concept of ‘strategy’. However, Chandler’s (1962, p.
13) definition of strategy is a typical one in the planning school of thought;
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it is a careful, future-oriented statement of intent:
Strategy is the determination of the basic long term goals of 
an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action 
and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying 
out these goals.
Terms associated with the planning school of thought include strategic 
planning, strategy formulation and strategy implementation (Chaffee,
1985). Definitional problems occur in addressing the concepts of strategy, 
and strategic planning, particularly in relation to the small firm. Strategy 
in relation to the S M E  has been defined by Bamberger (1980. p. 1) as 
follows:
...broad frameworks of behaviour which guide the company 
providing both opportunities and constraints for 
operational decision making.
Under this definition, there is no implication that strategies are either 
tightly or coherently formed. Gibb and Scott (1985, p. 598) shed light on 
the issue of planning versus strategic planning by defining planning as 
follows:
Planning is thus seen as the process by which management sets 
out where it is determined to go, identifies the means of getting 
there and coherently focuses its operational activity on the 
necessary tasks.
Strategic planning would seem to imply ‘a more systematic and more 
formal approach’ (Gibb and Scott, 1985, p. 599) to establishing strategy. 
Defining strategic planning more tightly means making judgements about a 
number of factors including: the degree of formalisation necessary, the role 
of forecasting as a basis for planning, the necessary time horizon, the 
degree of flexibility to be built into the process, the management of the 
process, and the techniques associated with bringing it about (Gibb and
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Scott, 1985). S o m e  researchers have advocated that strategic planning in 
the small firm is desirable and associated with success (Bamberger, 1980; 
Timmons, 1978). However, there is by no means, universal agreement 
that planning is either necessary or desirable (Karger and Malik, 1975).
Still (1974) found that small firm owners/managers do not engage in 
systematic planning. Planning in the small firm is frequently only a mental 
activity of the owner and is informal, sporadic and closed.
The terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ are often used in connection to strategy 
and refer to the explicitness of strategies. It is believed that formal 
strategies are more associated with m e d i u m  and large-sized firms than 
small ones. Miller and Toulouse (1986) propose that the complexity of 
projects in large firms requires diverse functional experts to get together to 
solve problems. A n  explicit, codified strategy is needed to coordinate and 
focus the efforts of second tier managers. In smaller organisations, an 
informal strategy often suffices. Mintzberg (1973) claims that smaller 
organisations tend to have unexplicit, intuitively derived strategies that 
reside mainly in the mind of the C E O .  The strategy is rarely written 
down. Time horizons m a y  be very short as managers react in an 
unplanned and piecemeal fashion to conditions.
The planning approach is at odds with a growing number of commentators 
w h o  see strategy making as an imprecise and substantially emergent process 
(Mintzberg, 1987; Pettigrew, 1985). The growing disenchantment with 
strategic planning has been given expression by writers such as Mintzberg 
(1978; 1994), Peters and Waterman (1982) and Quinn (1980). The 1980s 
and 1990s has constituted a separate period of progress as regards strategic 
management.
Three main features can be ascribed to the planning school of thought. 
Firstly, the planning model is mechanistic in the sense that strategy is 
designed and refined to ‘fit’ a relatively stable and predictable environment.
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The organisation is viewed as a rational machine which sets goals, 
formulates and implements plans in order to achieve objectives. Morris
(1988), for instance, criticises textbook strategic planning as being 
mechanistic and super-rational. Secondly, the planning model is hierarchial 
in the sense that a step-by-step approach to planning is taken. Writers in 
this school of thought advise strategists to select a mission statement, 
formulate goals, choose between alternatives, design and then implement 
the strategy. A  top-down approach to planning is taken. Managers at the 
top of the hierarchy plan strategy and the lower levels are responsible for 
its execution. The linear model, as described by Chaffee (1985), is 
implicit in m u c h  of the strategy literature; strategy is viewed as deliberate, 
methodical and sequential with a heavy emphasis on planning. The linear 
model is also voluntaristic (Hanlon and Scott, 1995) in the sense that it 
allows for proactive, purposeful choices made by the C E O .  S o m e  authors 
have labelled this approach the ‘normative’ or ‘prescriptive’ approach since 
the overriding concern has been with h o w  organisations should formulate 
strategy as opposed to h o w  organisations actually m a k e  strategy (Hanlon 
and Scott, 1995).
Thirdly, the planning school of thought sees strategy making as an 
adaptive, rather than inventive, process. The adaptive model, as described 
by Chaffee (1985), is where a match between the organisation and its 
environment is developed. Under the systems view of organisations, as 
described by Astley and V a n  de V e n  (1983), the manager’s basic role is a 
reactive one; he forecasts environmental trends and adapts strategy 
accordingly. The adaptive model is therefore deterministic. Recent work 
by Hamel (1996, p.69) advocates the notion of ‘strategy as revolution’ 
where a company revolutionize the way it creates strategy. Hamel (1996) 
argues that strategic planning is a calender driven ritual in most companies 
and few of an industry’s conventions are ever challenged, rendering 
strategy making largely extrapolative. Adaptation suggests that the 
organisation is continually striving to keep up with an environment that has
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moved ahead of it, whereas the concept of ‘invention’ suggests that changes 
in strategy m a y  be encouraged and m a y  occur before changes in the 
environment are experienced by the firm.
Interest in the planning model of strategy waned in the mid-1970s for 
several reasons, but mainly because it did not work and it did not reflect 
reality. Interestingly, those w h o  choose to examine h o w  firms actually 
make strategy are virtually unanimous in their rejection of the rational, 
planning model (Bower, 1970; Mintzberg, 1976; Nutt, 1984). Nutt (1984, 
p. 446) in a study of 78 organisations, concluded that: ‘nothing remotely 
resembling the normative methods described in the literature was carried 
out’. Such findings led Hanlon and Scott (1995, p. 20) to claim that ‘it 
appears that these models are incapable of explaining strategic behaviour in 
large firms as well as small.’
W h e n  conditions are predictable, a manager can perhaps anticipate changes 
and m o v e  the organisation towards its desired end. But in today’s world of 
uncertain conditions and rapidly changing product markets, the manager is 
simply unable to dictate the response of the organisation. Peters and 
Waterman (1982) stressed the need for fluidity or ‘adhocracy’ as a wa y  of 
corporate life in rapidly changing times. They advocated the achievement 
of ‘results first’ or ‘small wins’ which rejected the inflexibility of 
systematic planning. They found that most innovation arose outside of the 
strategic planning system. The impression given by the planning school of 
thought is that of well-informed leaders w h o  can choose between clearly 
articulated alternatives. Huff and Reger (1987, p.215) argued that:
The planning approach as a whole, however, can still be 
chastised for advocating an overly heroic approach to 
strategic management; it has been too optimistic about 
the possibilities of synoptic, rational analysis.
It has also been too far removed from the specific problems 
of the individual organisation trying to find some w a y  of 
achieving competitive advantage over similar firms.
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A  major problem with formal planning (Mintzberg, 1994) was that it 
tended to drive out vision and learning. Mintzberg (1994, p. 113) argued 
that formal plans were often devised as a facade to impress outsiders and 
reflected an ‘obsession with and illusion of control’. Strategic planning 
attempted to formalise and institutionalise the entrepreneurial function in 
the mature organisation, with the result that it tended to displace the 
entrepreneurial impulses that led to success (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982). 
Mintzberg and Waters (1982) found that planning often came after strategy 
formation. W h e n  Steinberg’s grocery chain developed its first plan, it was 
really justifying, elaborating and making public a strategy that was already 
based on its leader’s vision. Quinn (1989, p.55) found that m a n y 
companies appeared to have cohesive strategies but that these strategies 
‘seemed to come from somewhere other than the formal planning process.’
The process school of thought
The process school of thought is based on entirely different precepts than 
the planning school of thought. Mintzberg’s (1978, p. 935) offers a 
succinct definition of strategy which clearly places him in the strategy 
process school of thought:
Strategy in general and realized strategy in particular, will
be defined as a pattern in a stream of decisions.
Mintzberg (1978) suggests that strategy is something that is found after the 
fact. H e  sees strategy as a form of retrospective rationalization; it is built 
up step by step, it is something that is best learned over time. Defining 
strategy in this w a y  allowed Mintzberg (1978) to consider strategies as 
intended, a priori guidelines as well as strategies as evolved. In his view, 
realised strategies are the product of intended and emergent processes; not 
all intentions are realised, and not all realised strategies are carefully pre­
planned or fully under the control of management. This definition of
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strategy necessitated the study of decision streams in organisations over 
time long enough to detect the development and breakdown of patterns. 
Mintzberg (1978) also suggested that strategy can be inferred, despite the 
lack of any intended strategy. Mintzberg (1979, p.l) argues that there are 
certain conditions that support the emergent m o d e  of strategy formation:
W h e n  the central purpose of an organisation is to innovate, the 
result of its effort can never be predetermined....so it cannot 
specify a strategy in advance, before it makes its decisions. A n y  
process which separates conceptualization from action - planning 
from execution - impedes the flexibility of the organisation to 
respond creatively to its uncertain environment.
Mintzberg (1979) argues that the concept of strategy formulation loses its 
meaning among firms in complex dynamic environment where sophisticated 
innovations are required for survival. There are different meanings 
attached to the term ‘strategy’, so it is important to be clear about what 
constitutes strategy. Mintzberg’s simple definition constitutes a step 
forward, since most definitions of strategy typically sees it as a plan. 
Mintzberg’s (1978) definition is perceived to be particularly suitable for the 
study of small firms; for instance, Murray (1984) argues that it is critical in 
studying small ventures to allow for this richness of definition.
Quinn (1980) and Mintzberg (1987) highlighted the inadequacies of the 
traditional two-stage model, with its tendency to separate the thinking and 
action stages of the strategy process. In their view, the execution of 
strategy was not just subsidiary to strategy but was part of its very essence. 
The concern for ‘soft’ issues, the political, cultural, visionary and learning 
elements of strategy, has challenged the prescriptive and rational focus of 
earlier work. Very often, objectives are unclear, intended objectives are 
not followed, and even when strategists seek to consciously meet the stated 
objectives, they are subject to the same cultural, social and psychological 
limitations as any individual. Power in strategy making has illuminated 
m u c h  of the non-rational behaviour of managers. The question of h o w
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knowledge and skills are gained over time also entails a process perspective 
to firm growth. Strategy formation is not simply a rational, analytical 
process but often reflects bounded rationality, politics and power, culture 
and chance (Mintzberg, 1973; Pettigrew, 1977, 1992; Quinn, 1980). All 
these factors are idiosyncratic to the firm. However, with the exception of 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985), all these writers have focused on large, 
rather than small, organisations.
In the planning school of thought, the internal processes of the organisation 
have remained largely unexplored. Instead, the economic context of 
strategic choices was the focal point, giving rise to Porter’s (1980) five 
force model of competitive strategy. Process researchers have shown that 
decisions are rarely based on full information or made by such rational 
processes. Competitive advantage was seen as being rooted in the 
company’s ability to learn, to innovate, implant vision, renew, and leverage 
relationships. There was a growing recognition that internal processes and 
competencies were directly linked to competitive advantage. With 
industries growing more volatile, and product life cycles shortening, the 
search for sustainable competitive advantage has shifted away from industry 
analysis and market positioning to internal capabilities. In simple terms, 
firms competing in the same industry often fare differently depending on 
the unique skills each possess. This shift was reflected in the resource- 
based view of the firm in the strategy field with its focus on ‘firm-specific 
advantages’ (Leavy, 1996).
The term ‘process’ is an elusive term, one that is not easily explained. It 
generally refers to h o w  decisions were arrived at, and h o w  strategic change 
is implemented. V a n  de V e n  (1992) argued that process often focused on 
actions and h o w  things changed over time. Pettigrew and Whi p p  (1991, p. 
12) argued that:
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....the hallmark of the process approach is that strategy 
does not m o v e  forward in a direct, linear w a y  and not through 
easily identifiable sequential phases...The pattern is m u c h  more 
appropriately seen as continuous, iterative and uncertain
Strategy process research has a generalized concern with action, movement, 
dynamism, growth and development, change, time and outcomes 
(Pettigrew, 1992).
The great bulk of contributions by process scholars has been in the study of 
decision making and strategic change (Eisenhardt, 1988; March and Simon, 
1958; Mintzberg, 1978; Pettigrew, 1985, 1992; Quinn, 1980). A  strategic 
decision is defined by Eisenhardt (1992, p. 17) as one which ‘is important 
in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents 
set. ’ Since the strategy of the firm at any point simply reflects countless 
decisions that have taken place over the years (Mintzberg, 1978) moving 
from a ‘plan’ to a ‘decision-based’ view of strategy makes practical sense. 
These process researchers adopt an approach which is sensitive to the 
political and cultural modes of analysis, and is neither overly-voluntarist 
nor overly determinist in world view. M a n y  of these researchers are 
concerned with describing what firms do, not with what they should do.
The next section describes the main perspectives of the process school of 
thought: the perspectives of incrementalism, politics, culture and learning.
The perspective of incrementalism
‘Incrementalism’ is a logical, experimental approach to the development of 
strategy and has been accounted for as the outcome of not only political 
processes (Pettigrew, 1977, 1985) but also learning (Mintzberg, 1977). 
Quinn (1978, 1980, 1981) is sceptical of the planner’s ability to devise 
goals and formal strategies, due to political and cultural barriers to change. 
His prescriptions tend to dwell on the need to make small, incremental 
changes and wait for feedback before making further changes. H e  sees a
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close link between strategy formulation and implementation. H e  argues 
that incrementalism had its o w n  logic that well served the strategy maker.
Firstly, Quinn (1978, p. 17) suggests that it is impossible to achieve the 
level of integration demanded by most strategic planning systems.
Secondly, creating change within organisations depends on the effective use 
of politics. Executives implement strategy in a piecemeal manner to build 
a power base for their ideas. Thirdly, management has no control over 
external events, such as oil crises and frame-breaking innovations, which 
can precipitate crisis decisions. Recognising this, top executives attempt to 
keep their options open and have a strong incentive to postpone final 
commitments as long as possible. This creates the acceptance, 
understanding and commitment that is needed to implement strategies 
effectively. Finally, Quinn (1980) argues that it is impossible to adjust a 
strategy radically in the short run. The typical organisation has resource 
commitments which allows it to absorb only a few major changes at once. 
Quinn (1980) argues that attempting to pursue multiple goals will strain the 
organisation and will meet with resistance.
The political perspective
Several studies raised important challenges to the view that strategy could 
be planned and implemented in a rational manner. The political 
perspective raised a debate on the distinction between formulation and 
implementation of strategies (Steiner and Miner, 1977). Since the 
publication of Cyert and M a rch’s (1963) influential book ‘The Behavioural 
Theory of the Firm’ the political nature of the business firm has been a key 
component in the literature (Allison, 1971; Aharoni, 1966; Bower, 1970; 
Hardy, 1996; Murray, 1978; Narayanan and Fahy, 1982; Pettigrew, 1977; 
Pfeffer, 1981; Perrow, 1986; Quinn, 1980). In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, various writers explored the political dimension of decision making. 
Strategy is often a matter of controversy within the firm since m a n y
24
different views m a y  be held. Given that strategy m a y  involve m a n y  
functions and professions, as well as major uncertainties, it is bound to be 
a choice area for the advocacy, battles and negotiations, to which writers 
such as Bower (1970), Pettigrew (1977) and Pfeffer (1981) in the process 
school of strategy give such great importance.
Studies on organisational politics were important for drawing attention to 
the wa y  in which strategy was connected to the majority in an organisation 
not just senior management (Mintzberg, 1983). B o w e r ’s (1970) study on 
capital investment decisions suggested that executives choose among 
alternatives based on their sponsor’s track record. Pettigrew (1977, p. 80) 
argued that: ‘strategy formulation can be understood as a process of 
political decision-making.’ Strategic change is likely to threaten the 
existing distribution of organisational resources as represented in salaries, 
promotion opportunities and control of tasks, people, information and new 
areas of business. Others m a y  see it as an opportunity to increase their 
power, status and rewards in the organisation. As a result, it can be 
important to mobilise power and generate demand for change, or else 
modify the preexisting demand, in the formulation of strategy (Hardy, 
1996).
In advancing the logical-incrementalism model of strategic change, Quinn 
(1978, p. 17) suggests that it is impossible to achieve the level of 
integration, and consensus for change, demanded by most strategic 
planning systems:
It is virtually impossible for a manager to orchestrate all internal 
decisions, external environmental events, behavioural and power 
relationships, technical and informational needs, and actions of 
intelligent opponents as that they come together at a precise 
moment.
As an alternative, Quinn (1989, p.46) has offered his model as a ‘proactive
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management technique’ for integrating both the rational-analytical and 
power-behavioural aspects of strategy formulation. A  highly political 
process of mutual influence and bargaining was observed by Aharoni
(1966) and it led Narayanan and Fahey (1982) to suggest that strategic 
processes can be studied as a series of ‘evolving coalitions.’ Allison’s 
(1971) study of the Cuban missile crisis explained government action as a 
‘political compromise’ or the ‘outcome’ of organisational capabilities.
M a n y  studies viewed politics in negative terms; organisations were seen to 
be rife with conflict which acted as a constraint to action. For instance, 
Murray (1978, p. 963) described strategic choice as a ‘negotiated 
outcome.’ The work of Kanter (1983), however, marked the beginnings of 
the ‘empowerment’ notion which had more positive connotations for the 
political perspective. Kanter (1983) demonstrated that it was possible to 
create a culture that was hospitable to innovation and enterprise. Making 
power accessible to organisational members and promoting employee 
involvement helped make it possible for people to exert more leverage in 
organisations and initiate innovation.
All these studies have shown the impact of political factors on managerial 
action in large organisations, and the implicit assumption is that decision 
making in smaller organisations is less political. Pfeffer (1992, p. 30) 
remarked that the smaller simple organisation is less political since it is 
characterised by ‘less internal inter-dependence and less internal diversity.’ 
The lack of a hierarchial structure and functional departments along with 
sole ownership and control, is perceived to reduce political influences on 
strategy in the small firms. For instance, Buchele (1967) argues that 
smaller firms are often closely held by the C E O ;  frequently the C E O  is in 
a position to decide everything himself. Bird (1988, p. 443) remarked that:
...the impact of the leader’s intentions will be greater at the birth of 
an organisation, when the influence of external stakeholders, 
corporate structure, politics, image and culture have not yet been 
established.
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Quinn (1980) suggests that broad participation in strategy making is needed 
in large organisations in order to motivate managers, achieve consensus for 
change and build comfort levels for risk taking.
In general, studies highlighting the political nature of the process has 
helped to highlight some of the limitations of the rational planning model of 
strategy. The role of political forces in the strategy formation process in 
the smaller firm seems to be an under-researched area.
The cultural perspective
The limitations of the planning perspective has also been highlighted by 
those researchers emphasising the cultural nature of strategy. The concept 
of culture, generally referring to shared values and beliefs that characterise 
organisations (Schein, 1985), has become a central concern of those 
interested in strategy processes. According to Schein (1983) the founder’s 
beliefs can be transformed into collective beliefs over time through the 
m e d i u m  of values. Values are connected with moral and ethical codes and 
determine what people think ought to be done. Founders, by virtue of their 
position and personality, fulfil a unique role in the early history of their 
organisations.
The 1980s brought a great interest in the notion of culture, particularly 
since m a n y  came to realise that the competitiveness of m a n y  high 
performance companies, like the Body Shop, He r m a n  Miller and Marks 
and Spencer, seemed to be based on the ability to foster high-commitment, 
high-involvement corporate cultures (Deal &  Kennedy, 1982; Peters and 
Waterman, 1982). In the 1980s attention gradually shifted away from the 
use of planning techniques and external analysis of the industry 
environment, to a concern with the internal sources of competitive 
advantages. In their book ‘In Search of Excellence’, Peters and Waterman 
(1982, p.26) argued that ‘excellent companies had gotton the w a y  they are
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because of a unique set of cultural attributes that distinguished them from 
the rest. ’ They gave advice on h o w  to create ‘excellent’ companies 
through the use of symbols, role models, communication and rewards.
The explicit assumption was that it was possible to manipulate and change 
the culture of the organisation. A  n e w  emphasis was placed on the 
implementation of strategy and superior implementation was perceived to 
be rooted in strong corporate culture. Others have found that the values 
underpinning organisational culture were m u c h  less amenable to change 
than was previously thought (Zucker, 1977) and that it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to alter the culture of the organisation. M o r e  recently, Collins 
and Porras (1996) examined a wide range of successful and long lasting 
companies such as General Electric, Procter and Gamble, and Johnson and 
Johnson, and found that they were generally characterised by enduring 
philosophies or a cherished core ideology that remained constant.
This n e w  emphasis on the internal sources of competitive advantage led to 
a focus on leadership, and in particular, the role of the visionary leadership 
(Bennis &  Nanus, 1985). The term ‘vision’ is an ambiguous one; some 
viewed vision as having a picture of the future marketplace, others saw it 
in terms of a technology or product vision (Collins, and Porras, 1996). 
Major change was often linked to visionary leadership (Bennis and Nanus, 
1995) which was inextricably linked with culture. Westley and Mintzberg 
(1989, p. 19) argued that vision was not just equated with an idea, ‘a 
private mental image’, they were more concerned with the vision 
‘articulated’ and ‘communicated in words and actions’. Strategic vision 
was part style, part process, part content and part context. Visionary 
leadership depended on the use of language and metaphors, it involved the 
unique qualities of the leaders, sociological dynamics and the luck of good 
timing. Wesley and Mintzberg (1989, p. 30) argued that good leaders ‘are 
products of their times, of their followers, of their opportunities.’ Noel
(1989) allowed a large role for the C E O  in the organisation. H e  found that 
the values, obsessions or compulsions of the C E O  to address certain issues
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over others, such as quality or financial issues, influenced the future 
direction of the company.
Culture was seen as both an enabling and constraining force in the 
company’s search for competitive advantage. Pettigrew’s (1985) study of 
change in ICI suggested that it was important to be sensitive to both 
political and cultural issues. It was difficult to marshall the commitment 
and energy needed to create radical change, particularly since it challenged 
dominant ideologies and the interests of dominant groups. Pettigrew (1985) 
suggested that the management of meaning - the manipulation of symbols, 
language and beliefs - was central in legitimising change. This took the 
form of appointing managers sympathetic to one’s viewpoint, hiring 
consultants, changing the reward system, altering structure, promoting a 
n e w  openness, which all helped overcome forces for inertia in ICI. This 
process of change was a protracted one; it was a complex mixture of 
changes in the core beliefs of top decision makers, followed by changes in 
structure, systems and rewards, with business strategy changes emerging 
and implemented rather more slowly.
A  recent study by Green (1995) distinguished between the ‘structural static’ 
perspective and the ‘interpretative’ perspective. The ‘structural static’ 
perspective views culture in terms of static behaviours constraining change; 
a normative orientation is inherent in this perspective since the focus is on 
h o w  corporate culture can be manipulated to improve company 
performance - often by a lone individual. The key issue for organisational 
architects is h o w  to lever culture into excellent shape. The ‘interpretive’ 
perspective, on the other hand, redirects attention to the w a y  people 
collectively make sense of the world in which they live. This view of 
culture, unlike the constraint view favoured by structuralists, places people 
at centre stage (Green, 1985). Culture can be shaped through symbolic 
means rather than by technical levers such as conventional reward systems. 
The terms used in the literature such as cognitive models or interpretative
29
schemes (Huff and Schwenk, 1990), mental maps (Huff, 1990), theory of 
business (Drucker, 1994) organisational paradigm (Johnson, 1988), 
ideologies (Pettigrew, 1985) and dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis,
1986), m a y  differ somewhat in emphasis, but all converge around the 
recognition that managers hold a set of shared beliefs and assumptions; 
these beliefs are deeply held and are not therefore easily manipulated by 
simply adjusting reward systems or the organisational structure.
Writers w h o  adopt an interpretive perspective of culture propose that there 
are compelling reasons w h y  organisations remain within the confines of 
existing strategy even though the time for change has come. Because 
culture is often linked to the values and personality of the founding 
entrepreneur, since these values becomes institutionalised over time, it is 
not a simple matter to alter deeply entrenched beliefs about the source of 
company success. Plans fail to get put into practice because they conflict 
with powerful ideologies or mental models. Johnson (1993, p. 63) argues 
that the consequence of responses by culturally bound managers is 
‘strategic drift’ which in time requires major reform. Hedberg (1981) 
argues that it m a y  take shared trauma or the experience of crisis to help 
management alter culture and so unlearn deeply entrenched attitudes.
The concern with culture has further challenged the rational and 
prescriptive focus of the planning school of thought.
The cognitive perspective
Since the mid-1950s the ideas of Herbert Simon, N o a m  C h omsky and 
others have inspired growth of cognitive science where h u m a n  knowledge 
holds a particular position. Cognition is seen as information processing 
and rule-based manipulation of symbols. Knowledge is abstract, task- 
specific and oriented towards problem solving (Roos and Slocum, 1994).
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The cognitive perspective has inspired substantial theory development is 
strategic management, related to the social cognition of organisations and 
the cognition of individual managers. Several writers see the environment, 
not as a neatly packaged, objective reality ‘out there’, but as enacted and 
interpreted environment (Huff, 1982; Isabella, 1990; Smircich and 
Stubbart, 1985, Weick, 1987). Contexts can be changed, or their meaning 
interpreted and managed, and processes can be fashioned and played out in 
ways that favour certain outcomes (Leavy, 1992). Decision makers 
construct simplified mental models in dealing with complex problems 
(March and Simon, 1958); they m a y  be subject to selective perception 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) and without such simplifications, managers 
would become paralysed by the need to analyze extensive data (Weick, 
1979, Daft and Weick, 1984). This duality of simplicity versus the 
complexity in a given environment, raises problems for managers.
Central to the cognitive perspective is the appreciation that managers often 
interpret the environment and make decisions in the light of cultural norms. 
Writers such as Prahalad and Bettis (1986), Drucker (1994), Isabella (1990) 
and Johnson (1992) show h o w  culture is a barrier to learning and change. 
Plans fail to get put into practice because they conflict with overriding 
ideologies (Schein, 1983), cognitive maps (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) or 
mindsets.
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) propose that organisational members have a 
shared perception of the world, an organisational-wide, ingrained 
knowledge: the ‘dominant logic’. This affects the ‘wa y  in which managers 
conceptualize the business and make critical resource allocation decisions’ 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986, p. 490). Such conceptualisations and resource 
allocation decisions m a y  endure in organisations and develop into ‘cognitive 
rigidities’ due to conventional wisdom and past experiences. Similarly, 
Johnson (1993, p. 63) argues that the consequence of responses by 
culturally bound managers is ‘strategic drift’ which in time requires major
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reform. Reger and Huff (1993) projected the concept of ‘dominant logics’ 
further by proposing that strategists w h o  work in the same industry 
environment are likely to develop shared perceptions of the competitive 
environment over time. C o m p a n y  executives interact with each other, 
share the same sources of information, hire from the same labour pool and 
frequently hire the same consultants (Huff, 1982). There is a dearth of 
organisational theory concerning young entrepreneurial firms. However, 
one study by Bouen and Steyaert (1990) found that the concept of 
‘dominant logic’ emerged as important in their in-depth case study of a 
young high-tech firm. They viewed the emergence of the new 
organisation as a process of social construction.
M a n y  writers suggest that organisations are more likely to persist with past 
strategies rather than change in response to environmental stimuli. 
Organisations tend to experience strong pressures towards ‘strategic 
persistence’ due to potent psychological, political and structural forces over 
a period of time (Lant, Milliken and Batra, 1992) . Huff, Huff and 
Thomas (1992, p. 56) describe inertia as follows:
The level of commitment to current strategy, reflecting individual 
support for a given w a y  of operating, institutional mechanisms used 
to implement strategy, monetary investments and social expectations
Hedberg (1981) argues that it m a y  take shared trauma or the experience of 
crisis to help management alter culture and so unlearn deeply entrenched 
attitudes. The most c o m m o n  perspective on crisis has been to see it 
breaking old strategic recipes, challenging belief systems and over-turning 
existing power structures (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tushman et al. 1986). 
Managers involved in a change need to undergo an alteration of their 
cognitive structures (Benne, 1976) that facilitates and supports the need to 
change, the process of changing and the maintenance of what has been 
changed. The frame of reference - the perspective through which people 
view an event - shifts (Starbuck, 1976). Theorists propose that testing
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assumptions is crucial if the organisation is to survive. According to 
Isabella (1990, p. 8):
...as change unfolds, different assumptions and orientations
are required, at different times in the process.
To some extent, hiring consultants can influence strategic change by 
bringing different perspectives to the organisation. Hiring people w h o  
remain outside the culture of the firm is another w a y  of encouraging a 
critical examination of the organisation’s key assumptions (Smircich and 
Stubbart, 1985). Prahalad and Bettis (1995) propose that organisations 
need to ‘unlearn’ the dominant logic of the past.
In using concepts from cognitive psychology, researchers in strategic 
management have given insight into what goes on in the mind of decision 
makers in organisations. In raising fundamental questions about the ‘real’ 
and ‘the perceived’, this work lends further support to the view that 
strategy is not the product of a rational, planned process. For these 
researchers, the image of the C E O  sitting in a office, objectively assessing 
the environment, devising alternatives, choosing the most optimum course 
of action and then implementing it, just does not fit with the complex 
reality of decision making and change.
The ‘strategy as learning’ perspective
Since the mid 1980s, some management academics have m o ved beyond the 
issue of culture to investigate the way that organisations acquire knowledge 
and learn (Whipp, 1993). Organisational learning tends to be viewed in 
cultural-interpretative terms. The ‘strategy as learning’ notion has grown 
to become one of the most powerful themes in the current strategy 
literature (Mintzberg, 1990). Interest in organisational learning has been 
driven by the contention that it m a y  provide firms with sustainable
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competitive advantage (Arie de Geus, 1988, Senge, 1990). D e  Geus 
(1988, p. 74) argues that ‘learning is not a luxury. It’s h o w  companies 
discover their future.’ Organisational learning (Wick and Leon, 1995) 
underpins all current theories on h o w  to improve business success whether 
through re-engineering, total quality management, fast cycle time, 
commitment to ne w  product development or high growth. Without 
learning, any attempts at improvement fail.
Distinctions are made in the field of organisational learning between single 
loop and double loop learning (Argyris and Schoen, 1978), adaptive and 
generative learning (Senge, 1990), higher and lower level learning (Fiol 
and Lyles, 1985) and first-order and second-order learning (Levinthal and 
March, 1993); these distinctions all converge around the notion that the 
learning processes that foster efficiency in social systems are not the same 
as those that foster change. For instance, single loop learning involves 
detecting and correcting errors so that the organisation can carry on with its 
present objectives. Double-loop learning involves making changes to the 
organisation’s underlying norms, policies and objectives. Double-loop 
learning tends to be associated with strategic renewal and paradigm shifts.
In the words of Arie de Geus (1988, p. 71), the real purpose of strategic 
planning is ‘not to make plans’ but to challenge the ‘mental models’ that 
decision makers carry in their heads. This view is echoed in Nonaka’s 
belief (1991, p. 97) that creating ne w  knowledge means to ‘re-create the 
company and everyone in it in a nonstop process of personal and 
organisational self-renewal. ’ However, experience-to-date suggests that 
most social systems find it difficult to achieve the appropriate balance 
between exploitation of existing knowledge and exploration for new 
knowledge that are essential for their long run stability and survival 
(March, 1991). Arie de Geus (1988, p. 74) pointed out that organisational 
learning is a slow process:
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In fact, the normal decision process in corporations is a learning 
process, because people change their o w n  mental models and build 
up a joint model as they talk. The problem is that the speed of that 
process is slow - too slow for a world in which the ability to learn 
faster than competitors m a y  be the only sustainable competitive 
advantage.
Interest in organisational learning has stimulated a search for h o w  to 
improve and accelerate the learning process within organisations. D e  Geus 
at Shell found that the key to survival was the ability to experiment. The 
initial tool used to foster learning was ‘scenario analysis’ whereby 
managers were encouraged to think through h o w  they would manage in the 
future under different possible scenarios, which helped challenge their basic 
assumptions about the industry. Nonaka’s (191) distinction between tacit 
and explicit knowledge suggested different ways of creating knowledge. 
Tacit knowledge is gained through observation, imitation, practice and 
includes shared mental models and beliefs. Moving from the tacit to the 
explicit is a process of articulating one’s vision of the world. Nonaka 
(1991) suggested that crisis challenged employees to re-examine that they 
take for granted. Hendry et al. (1995) found that crisis was a significant 
force in triggering change and ne w  learning in the S M E .  Crisis first 
introduces ‘unlearning’ by loosening attachment to the past (Hendry et al., 
1995). Nystrom and Starbuck (1984, p. 54) claim that:
Encased learning produces blindness and rigidity that m a y  breed 
full-blown crises. Our studies of organizations facing crises show 
that past learning inhibits n e w  learning. Before organizations will 
try ne w  ideas, they must unlearn old ones by discovering their 
inadequacies and then discarding them. Organizations in serious 
crises often remove their top managers as a w a y  to erase the 
dominating ideas, to disconfirm past programs, to become receptive 
to n e w  ideas and to symbolize change.
However, it was suggested that learning and renewal could be gained in a 
m u c h  less painful and reactive w a y  (de Geus, 1988; Nonaka, 1991). Using
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one’s imagination through the use of figurative language, metaphor and 
analogy were all seen as inventive ways of fostering n e w  learning (Nonaka, 
1991).
Taking an organisational learning perspective means seeing a firm’s 
strategy as something emergent rather than preordained (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Mintzberg (1994) cogently outlined the difference between the strategy-as- 
leaming and the strategy-as-planning perspectives. Mintzberg (1994, p.
107) argued that strategic planning was conservative in nature, it was really 
‘strategic programming’, the articulation and elaboration of strategies, or 
visions, that already exist. It often promotes strategies that are extrapolated 
from the past or copied from others. Mintzberg argues that the planning 
school of thought is based on certain assumptions that are open to question: 
planners assume that it is possible to forecast the future and separate 
formulation from implementation. Instead, turbulent conditions create 
havoc with carefully designed plans and strategy formulation precludes 
learning-by-doing. According to Mintzberg (1994), learning plays a crucial 
role in novel strategies. The strategy-as-learning perspective involves 
strategic thinking - which is unpredictable and beyond formal planning:
Strategic thinking, in contrast, is about synthesis. It involves 
intuition and creativity. The outcome of strategic thinking is an 
integrated perspective of the enterprise, a not-too-precisely 
articulated vision of direction (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 108),
The strategy-as-leaming perspective involves capturing soft data such as 
gossip, heresay as well as judgement and intuition, not just hard data from 
market research and accounting statements; it is flexible enough to deal 
with uncertainty and remains open to change. It involves seeing strategy as 
a process of logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1978; Mintzberg, 1977). The 
organisational learning model incorporates the idea of ‘bounded rationality’ 
(Simon, 1955; 1956). A  few studies in relation to the S M E  have found 
that learning is a significant part of company development (Gibb and Scott,
36
1985; Hendry et al., 1995).
It is obvious that all organisations learn. The challenge for theorists is not 
so m u c h  to create learning organisations but to help them learn faster and 
more effectively (Schein, 1989). Practising managers have a difficult time 
trying to apply organisational learning concepts to everyday operations 
(Garvin, 1993) probably because it is an elusive and abstract concept. 
Another challenge for this research stream is to develop valid measures of 
learning outcomes.
The applicability of strategic management to the small firm: 
the concept of strategy formation:
The entrepreneurship literature seems to lag behind the strategic 
management literature in that it tends to focus almost exclusively on the 
rational, planning model (Hanlon and Scott, 1995). Here, researchers 
argue the case for, and against, planning in the small firm. A n  issue to be 
addressed is whether the concept of strategic management is compatible 
with the concept of entrepreneurship. A n  extreme view to be found in the 
literature is that concepts of management and entrepreneurship are polar 
opposites (Zaleznik, 1977). Managers were perceived to be concerned with 
routine behaviour, standard operating procedures and the supervision of 
functions, whereas entrepreneurship was concerned with the creation of 
new situations which could not be dealt with by means of experience or 
routine. Entrepreneurs are also seen to have a symbolic function to fulfil; 
they represent freedom, creativity, dream-building - the personification of 
the American dream (Czarniawska-Joerges and Wolff, 1991).
Nodoushani (1991) argues that the current enthusiasm for entrepreneurship 
is based on an ideological foundation that is useless for managers and 
management scholars. H e  claims that entrepreneurship is an extension of 
avant-gardism to the business world. The ideology of avant-gardism was
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first used in relation to art in the 1820s and is based on two fundamental 
principles:
(1) the possibility that its representatives conceive themselves as being in 
advance of their time and,
(2) the idea that there is a bitter struggle to be fought against an enemy 
symbolizing the forces of stagnation, the tyranny of the past and old 
forms and ways of thinking.
According to Nodoushani (1991, p.23):
...what makes the ideological crusade of entrepreneurial ism so 
unique is a sense of anti-management bias which stems out of the 
spirit of avant-gardism. In essence, entrepreneurialism is an 
extension of avant-gardism to the corporate and business world
The author portrays avant-gardism as a sense of contempt for the 
communal or corporate life; it incorporates an anti-management 
temperament; it is based on an outdated view of innovation - the lonely but 
creative hero. The belief in the lack of integration of the individual within 
the organisation is part of this ideology of avant-gardism. Nodoushani 
(1991) seems to reject entrepreneurship, advocating instead the concepts of 
team venturing and intrapreneurship. The individualism of 
entrepreneurship, he argues, contrasts with the realities of everyday life and 
group structures.
The value and applicability of strategic planning for the small firm seems in 
doubt for some researchers (eg. Bhide, 1994, Patterson, 1986). Bhide
(1994) has noted that small and entrepreneurial firms focus on doing rather 
than on formal strategic planning, with action based largely on intuition. 
Entrepreneurs are extremely sensitive to the perishable nature of the 
opportunities they identify in a rapidly changing environment. To take the 
time to plan under conditions of high uncertainty m a y  result in the loss of
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that opportunity (Bhide, 1994). Patterson (1986) suggests that resource 
constraints, in terms of management time as well as financial resources, in 
small and entrepreneurial firms is an obstacle to strategic planning in the 
uncertain conditions. However, such confusion over the value of small 
firm planning m a y  stem from notions of strategic planning and 
entrepreneurship which are outdated.
Entrepreneurship seems to have both positive and negative connotations.
The term ‘entrepreneur’ encourages the use of over-simple stereotypes, 
such as the bold, risk-taking hero (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982) of 
organisational life. Yet, the m u c h  more negative image of the entrepreneur 
as a deviant or an unstable personality also exists (De Vries, 1990). The 
notion of entrepreneurship is sometimes used to support outmoded 
conceptions of the entrepreneur as an intuitive, disorganised, impractical, 
creative loner w h o  has to learn the c o m m o n  sense skills of management 
and the ability to delegate. This view is implicit in the literature on stage 
of growth models (eg. Charan, Hofer and Mahon, 1980). The notion of 
strategic management was traditionally used to denote formality, rationally 
planned strategies and goal seeking behaviour. Strategic management has 
been moving realistically and healthily away from ‘the myth of the rational, 
neutral, hierarchical goal seeking system’ and towards a recognition that all 
organisations are permeated with conflicts, ambiguities and diverse 
purposes (Watson, 1986, p. 6). The view put forward here is that the 
nature and quality of leadership (strategic or entrepreneurial) is crucial, 
regardless of the size or type of organisation. The challenge for the 
entrepreneur is to retain and build on his or her unique strengths.
In taking exception to the traditional view of strategy, Mintzberg (1990) 
has been one of the most articulate and influential. Mintzberg (1978) 
makes the insightful distinction between strategy formulation and strategy 
formation. This distinction m a y  be an important one in relation to S M E  
since it is widely accepted that small firms have even less control over their
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environments than larger, more well established firms. The term ‘strategy 
formation’ illustrates that strategies can form either explicitly or implicitly, 
that what is intended is not necessarily what is realized. Mintzberg’s 
(1978) contention that the formation of strategy is multi-faceted led him to 
distinguish between intended, emergent and realized strategies. The 
implications for this research is that strategy may be formed in a deliberate 
manner, it may emerge over time or may contain both deliberate and 
emergent elements.
Research domain of strategic management in the 1990s: 
content, context and process
The 1990s constitutes a further period of progress. The backlash against 
the planning school of thought has abated somewhat. Instead of dismissing 
the preoccupations of scholars in the planning school of thought, some 
researchers seek to combine the best of the old with the new. Pettigrew 
(1985; 1989; 1992) proposes that the domain of strategic management 
consists of three major components and their interactions:
(1) The context or environment (general, industry or organisational 
specific) in which decisions are made.
(2) The strategic content of the decision itself (the substance of the 
strategy).
(3) The who and how of the decision-making process. Here, the focus
is usually on the CEO or the top management team and how decisions 
are formulated and implemented.
(4) The outcomes/performance of those decisions.
In the past, studies have dealt mainly with strategy content research 
(Pettigrew, 1992). This is not surprising given that studies of strategy 
content tend to be linked with the planning school of thought. Some 
researchers have argued that process and content are inter-linked (Huff and
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Reger, 1987; Mintzberg, 1978, 1987, 1977; Pettigrew, 1992; Quinn,
1980). Pettigrew (1992) regards the ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘why’, the 
‘content’, ‘process’ and ‘context’ as inseparable. This view may be 
relevant in the case of the smaller firm, where content and process are 
likely to be intertwined.
The term ‘content’ refers to the ‘what’ of strategic decisions; it is 
concerned with the type of strategic decision or the actions taken by an 
organisation. Content models focuses on the linkages between conditions 
(in the environment and the organisation), strategies (e.g., generic/novel) 
and results (Fahey and Christensen, 1986). Focusing on content, however, 
sometimes ignores the role of the human agent in forming and 
implementing the plan. Process focuses on the processes by which actions 
are decided and implemented. The ‘how’ of change can be understood 
from an analysis of process (Pettigrew, 1992). An analysis of the major 
forces that give rise to strategies can be encapsulated under the label 
‘context’. There are two aspects of context: the inner and outer context of 
the firm (Pettigrew, 1992).
Summary
This chapter has presented a brief review of the various models of the 
strategy formation process. Strategic management has progressed beyond 
the rational, planning model of strategy. Although process research has 
constituted the minor tradition in strategic management, well developed 
precedents have been established. Recent concepts from the strategy 
process field include culture, learning, politics and incrementalism which 
may, or may not, drive the strategy formation process in SMEs. Although 
much has been written on the nature of strategy process research, little of 
has focused on the small and medium sized enterprise. There is still 
imperfect understanding of the strategy process in SMEs.
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There has been a paradigm shift in the strategic management field and the 
old ‘myth of rationality’ has been considerably undermined. In its first 
incarnation, the study of strategy was inherently rational and underpinned 
by notions of voluntarism. The main task of the strategist was to assess the 
environment, predict the future of the organisation and align the strategy of 
the organisation with its internal strengths and weaknesses and external 
threats. High expectations were held of the application of sophisticated 
planning tools and techniques.
The 1970s saw a reaction against the mechanistic and rational nature of 
strategic planning, with writers such as Mintzberg (1987), Quinn (1989) 
and Pettigrew (1977) drawing attention to the ways in which strategy was 
not rational. Early studies of organisational politics were important for 
drawing attention to the way in which change initiatives were connected to 
the majority in an organisation, not just senior management (Mintzberg, 
1983). Mintzberg (1978, 1994) argued that strategy did not evolve neatly 
from careful analysis and implementation. The contribution of the process 
school of thought has been manifold and allowed for an appreciation of the 
‘softer’ elements of strategy such as culture, learning and politics. 
Mintzberg’s (1987) distinction between strategy formation and strategy 
formulation may be an important one, particularly in relation to the SME, 
to innovative organisations and to entrepreneurial new ventures.
Pettigrew’s (1977) work had important contextual nuances which suggested 
that factors outside of the leader’s control impinged on the strategy 
formation process. It was suggested that the entrepreneurship literature 
lagged behind the strategic management literature in terms of explaining 
how strategy developed in the smaller firm. The compatibility of strategic 
management concepts with the concept of entrepreneurship was also 
explored.
All these perspectives provides a rich tapestry upon which to address the 
research problem of this study. A real opportunity exists to explain how
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strategy forms in SMEs by being ‘theoretically sensitive’ or open to recent 
concepts in the strategic management field. Having reviewed a range of 
important perspectives on the strategy formation process in large firms, the 
next chapter explores the literature pertaining to the SME sector.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE LITERATURE ON STRATEGY
FORMATION PROCESSES IN THE SME
Introduction
While much has been written on the nature of strategy process research, 
little of it has focused on the small and medium sized enterprise. This 
chapter undertakes a more focused literature review in order to identify the 
principal factors likely to influence the strategy formation process in SMEs. 
The literature review is undertaken for two main reasons:
(1) First, by taking an inter-disciplinary approach, a more complete 
framework for thinking about the process of strategy formation in small 
firms is offered. The overall purpose of the first two chapters is to 
propose a conceptual framework for the study of the strategy formation 
process in SMEs.
(2) A second role of the literature review is to identify the main research 
questions and an appropriate research design, from a critical evaluation of 
the current state of the field.
The literature is organised under the following headings (1) leadership (2) 
context (3) history and (4) process.
(1) Leadership
The role of the founder
The literature suggests that the way in which companies pursue different 
types of strategies may be due to variations in leadership. The theme of 
leadership is a central ingredient in explanations of the strategy formation 
process. Here, many scholars have raised questions such as: ‘What makes
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a good leader?’, ‘How much control does he or she have in determining 
outcomes? and ‘What is the role of the entrepreneur in influencing 
outcomes?’. The individual is seen as a key actor in the whole 
entrepreneurial process, with motivation, competency and networking 
perceived as vital (Cromie, 1994). A strong vein of voluntarism runs 
through most accounts of both leadership (Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Kanter, 
1983; Kotter, 1990; Peters and Waterman, 1982) and entrepreneurship with 
great emphasis placed on the heroic leader, the omnipotent and omniscient 
CEO (for a critique of this literature see Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; 
Hendry et al., 1995; Leavy and Wilson, 1994).
Mintzberg and Waters (1982, p. 495) concentrated on the role of the 
founder in forming strategy, in particular, the personality and vision of the 
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur was seen as ‘the bold decision maker, fully 
in control, who walks confidently into an uncertain future.’ The founder of 
Steinberg’s grocery chain was clearly seen as a strategic leader, who had to 
define, maintain and protect product-market domains and adapt to changing 
environments. The success of the grocery chain was attributed to the 
unique abilities of its entrepreneur. Mintzberg (1990) therefore views 
strategy formation as a visionary process for entrepreneurial firms.
Kimberly (1980) argues that creation is a time when individual personalities 
have an unusually strong influence on organisational outcomes. Hambrick 
and Mason (1984), among others, argue that an organisation and its 
strategies are a reflection of its top managers. Control is often closely held 
by the owner in smaller firms, so frequently the CEO is in a position to 
decide everything for himself (Buchele, 1967).
Various studies (De Vries, 1990; Gibb and Scott, 1995; Murray, 1984; 
Schein, 1983; Hanlon and Scott, 1995) show that the entrepreneur plays a 
key role in influencing the culture, strategy and performance of the new 
organisation. Gibb and Scott (1995) argue that the process of new 
product/market development depends, to a great extent, on the personal
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judgement of the entrepreneur. Culture provides some novel and useful 
concepts which can be used to explain strategy formation in entrepreneurial 
small firms. In explaining how the entrepreneur interprets a situation, it 
assists in explaining how different patterns in strategy formation may arise 
in small firms. Hanlon and Scott (1995, p. 33) propose that the 
entrepreneur alone provides the initial vision; culture has a profound impact 
on ‘not only how we see the world, but also what we see.’ Schein (1985) 
sees the building of an organisation’s culture as the ‘unique and essential 
function’ of leadership. Senge (1990, p. 10) claims that:
Few acts of leadership have a more enduring impact on 
an organisation than building a foundation of purpose 
and core values.
Murray (1984) argues that the ideals that drive successful firms generally 
originate in the aims of the founding entrepreneur and are propagated 
through time. He suggests that there is a connection between the 
entrepreneur and the corporate personality, such as defender, analyzer, 
prospector, reactor (Murray, 1984). This ‘imprinting’ of a corporate 
personality takes place during the early stages of development and is 
unlikely to be easily discarded even after the entrepreneur has bowed out of 
a maturing company. For instance, for the ‘prospector’, maintaining a 
reputation as an innovator in product and market development is important 
whereas analyzers watch the actions taken by the leaders in their field 
before taking action. The importance of leadership in the strategy 
formation process in the SME context seems to be universally recognised. 
This is a contrast to the strategic management literature where the 
importance of leadership is less universally recognised (Edelman, 1988; 
Joerges and Wolff, 1991; Lieberson and O Connor, 1972).
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The Entrepreneurial trait theory
The literature on entrepreneurial traits is both well established and 
voluminous and indicates the importance of leadership in the strategy 
formation process. Trait theorists use two very simple conceptual 
frameworks as the bases for constructing their theories (Gartner, 1989):
(1) ideas about the differences between entrepreneurs and non­
entrepreneurs, or
(2) ideas about the differences among types of entrepreneurs.
This stream of research is similar to the ‘great man’ theory (Kahn et al., 
1964) of leadership which places undue emphasis on the psychology of the 
individual. The theory suggests that entrepreneurs and leaders are distinct 
from everyone else and by the sheer force of their personalities can 
influence the strategy of an organisation and shape the future direction of 
the organisation. There have been many attempts to isolate the 
characteristics of entrepreneurial people, based on the conviction that these 
‘rare and inspired’ individuals are bom and not made (Leavy, 1996, p. 10). 
Some of the qualities regularly attributed to the entrepreneurial personality 
have been high achievement motivation, need for autonomy, power and 
independence (McClelland, 1962, 1975, 1987).
Entrepreneurial risk-taking
Many writers have asserted, and continue to assert, that risk bearing is a 
prime characteristic of the entrepreneur (Liles, 1981; McClelland, 1961; 
Mill, 1848). The term ‘risk’ can be defined as ‘the perception that any 
given course of action might possibly produce a negative result’
(Brockhaus, 1980, p. 370). Starting a business is a risk situation since 
success cannot be predicted with certainty and it carries favourable or 
unfavourable consequences. Cantillon (1755) first outlined the importance
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of the entrepreneur as a bearer of uncertainty. Frank Knight (1921) 
formulated his theory of entrepreneurship upon the foundation of risk and 
uncertainty. The entrepreneur bears the responsibility and consequences of 
making decisions under uncertainty. Knight (1921, p. 310) claimed that:
The venture itself may be of the nature of a gamble, involving a
large proportion of unpredictable factors.
Knight emphasised the key distinction between insurable risks and non­
insurable uncertainty. He saw risk as a subset of uncertainty. Risk implies 
knowledge of the objective probability that an event will occur whereas 
under conditions of uncertainty no such calculation can be made; 
uncertainty is unmeasurable and therefore, not insurable. The entrepreneur 
was an individual who could assess, evaluate and accept risk. He was a 
man of confidence with the disposition to act courageously upon his ideas, 
whereas his more timid counterparts were otherwise incapacitated. The 
elasticity of the supply of self-confident people is, in Knight’s view, the 
most single determinant of the level of profit and the number of 
entrepreneurs.
Researchers are, however divided as to the risk-taking propensity of 
entrepreneurs. Drucker (1985) is prominent among those who dispute the 
risk-taking propensity of entrepreneurs. He argues that entrepreneurs 
(1985, p. 23) ‘take risks, of course, but so does anyone engaged in any 
kind of economic activity.’ Instead, entrepreneurs are described as 
individuals who define the risks to be taken and they then seek to minimise 
them as much as possible. Drucker (1985, p. 23) is also to the fore in 
questioning the existence of a distinct entrepreneurial personality: 
‘Entrepreneurship, then is behaviour rather than personality trait.’
There is some debate as to whether entrepreneurs are low, moderate or 
high risk-takers. Palmer (1971) argues that the entrepreneur will correctly 
interpret the risk situation and determine policies which will minimise the
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risk involved. As entrepreneurs scan the environment for opportunities, 
they will simultaneously seek to exploit opportunity and avoid risk. 
Brockhaus (1980) suggested that the entrepreneur has such a high belief in 
his ability to achieve business goals, that the perceived possibility of failure 
is relatively low. In other words, the entrepreneur’s perception of risk is 
low. More recently, studies by Brockhaus (1987) and Sexton and Bowman 
(1983) did not provide conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between 
entrepreneurs and risk-taking propensity. Brockhaus (1987) found no 
statistical difference between a group of entrepreneurs and a group of 
managers on a number of personality traits. Ray (1993, p. 347) considers 
that the search for a prototypical entrepreneur has been ill-conceived and 
considers that:
There is no empirical evidence or conceptual base to say much, if 
anything about entrepreneurs and risk-taking.
Ray (1993) considers that risk in entrepreneurship may be better understood 
as a strategy and contextual variable rather than a personality variable.
For instance, a high technology firm may be faced with more risk than 
service sector firms (Deakins, 1996). Equally, if the firm grows it is 
possible to reduce financial risk through the issue of shares. The 
conflicting findings suggest that a fresh look at the issue may be warranted. 
Deakins (1996, p. 11) noted that:
... issues such as the extent to which the small business owner 
assesses, accepts and transfers risk have not yet been 
explored in research
He suggest that it is more helpful to see the entrepreneur as a ‘risk 
manager’ in the process of entrepreneurship, instead of focusing too closely 
on the role of the entrepreneur as some form of calculated risk-taker. The 
implications for this research is that it may be useful to explore how risk is
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managed in the strategy formation process.
Typology research
Typologies of entrepreneurs have been developed to make sense of the 
heterogenous population of entrepreneurs. Some of these studies are 
summarised in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Studies on Small Business and Entrepreneurial Typologies
Author (s) Description of Entrepreneurs
Birch (1987) Income substitutors and Builders.
Chell and Hawworth (1992) The entrepreneur 
The quasi-entrepreneur 
The administrator 
The caretaker
Smith (1967) Craftsman and Opportunistic
Homaday (1990) Craft, Promoter and Professional 
Manager.
O’ Farrell (1986) The Graduate Founder.
The Satisficer Opportunist. 
The Ambitious Opportunist. 
The Craftsman Entrepreneur.
Studies by Smith (1967) and Birch (1987) propose similar types of 
entrepreneurial figures. Birch (1987) describes ‘income substitutors’ as 
individuals whose main concern is to make a reasonable living. Typically, 
their enterprises reach a limited size of a few employees. ‘Builders’, on the 
other hand, are driven from the outset by an ambition to create a business 
that will be a significant force in the business world. Smith (1967) 
proposes two main types of entrepreneurs, the craftsman and the 
opportunistic model. The craftsman entrepreneur is motivated by a desire 
to do the type of work that he wants to do, whereas the opportunist wishes 
to build an organisation. These types reflect the difference between the
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small business and the entrepreneurial firm. Smith (1967) also found some 
limited evidence to support the existence of another type of entrepreneur - 
the inventor. The major concern of the inventor entrepreneur is to build an 
organisation, not as an end in itself, but rather as a vehicle to allow the 
invention and production of various products. The systematic differences 
in entrepreneurs may have a bearing on the strategy formation process; for 
instance the inventor may be interested in a company strategy of new 
product development or diversification.
A more recent study by Chell and Haworth (1992) identified four types: 
entrepreneur, quasi-entrepreneur, administrator and caretaker. The 
prototypical entrepreneur is alert to business opportunities, this type is 
proactive, restless, ideas-oriented, highly innovative and a high profile 
image maker. The quasi-entrepreneur is not as opportunistic and shows 
more restraint. At the other end of the spectrum is the caretaker, who is 
reactive rather proactive, this type may take opportunities but not 
regardless of current resources. Caretakers have a strong disinclination to 
grow the business and are content to pursue their trade or occupation. The 
administrators do not feel comfortable with the entrepreneurial mode of 
management. They are prepared to relinquish control of the administration 
by partnering or hiring someone to fill the skill gap. This type is 
concerned with building existing business, rather than pursuing new 
opportunities. Chell and Haworth (1992) allowed for the possibility of 
movement between categories. For instance, it was possible for the ‘quasi­
entrepreneur’ to become an ‘entrepreneur’ through the normal process of 
experimental learning. These writers argued that the business owner must 
be aware of his or her personal development over time and the need to 
acquire skills and key competencies if the business is to grow.
Hornaday (1990) proposes three types: the craft, the promoter and the 
professional manager. The values which motivate each type of business 
owner are loyalty to the firm or career, independence and personal control,
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innovation and organisational growth. O’ Farrell (1986) developed a 
typology of Irish founders based upon quantitative data such as turnover, 
product mix, use of agencies and export orientation, attitudes to growth, 
trade unions, government, state agencies, the wider community and so on. 
For instance, the graduate founders are distinguished by their knowledge 
and use of state incentives and advice.
The results of studies on both traits and types of entrepreneurs are 
inconclusive: there seems to be as much variation among entrepreneurs as 
there is between entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs. According to Alder 
(1995, p. 207) ‘there is nothing different about a leader excepts he thinks 
like a leader. ’ The ever widening list of attributes and types suggests that 
the only indisputable characteristic common to entrepreneurs is that they 
are homo sapiens. However, recent work by Chell and Haworth (1992) 
suggests that a new focus on process rather than just personality may be 
warranted and may generate fresh insight.
The utility o f the trait perspective
Most new venture research looks at people, concentrating on the 
personality, education and experiences of the founder (Hisrich, 1986; 
Sexton, 1982). Other work suggests that the personality trait theory adopts 
an overly heroic approach to entrepreneurship and that too much faith is 
placed in the entrepreneur’s degree of control over strategy making 
processes. Aldrich (1990) claims that the traits or supply perspective has 
reached ‘a dead end’. These theorists are sceptical of associating the 
success or survival of the firm with the attributes of individuals, and 
instead look at the role of the environment in determining outcomes. 
Sarason (1972) suggests that while the role of early leaders may be critical 
during organisational birth, as the organisation matures, it develops norms, 
acquires a history and identity, and the importance of the person at the top 
diminishes in explaining organisational outcomes. The role of the
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entrepreneur in influencing organisational outcomes seems to be a 
controversial one in the literature.
The theory of entrepreneurship does not seem to have developed in parallel 
with the literature on leadership, in the sense that the entrepreneur is still 
defined mainly by traits, and the performance of the firm is perceived to be 
intimately linked with the entrepreneur. Psychology’s focus on the 
individual does not preclude its recognition of the fact that the environment 
is a joint determiner of behaviour as well. Psychologists are not ‘hard’ 
determinists, they are ‘soft’ determinists (Low and Macmillan, 1988).
Social psychologists recognise the influence of environmental factors in 
shaping personality and that traits have a limited influence on specific 
people in specific situations (Gartner, 1989). However, the personality 
based studies are still divorced from the wider business context.
The implications for this research is that a move away from the simple trait 
approach towards a more dynamic approach to the study of strategy 
formation processes may be warranted. Perhaps adopting a more 
contextual and processual approach to this type of research may be fruitful, 
particularly since trait research has resulted in equivocal findings (Chell, 
1985, p. 51) with no clear evidence of any single trait which could 
distinguish successful entrepreneurs from unsuccessful ones.
The dark side of the entrepreneur
Entrepreneurial trait theorists tend to ascribe positive and virtuous qualities 
such as daring, need for independence, need for achievement and so on to 
the entrepreneurial personality. The entrepreneur is rarely depicted in 
negative terms. However, some studies have revealed the dark side of 
entrepreneurship and have outlined the obsessive, narcissistic and insecure 
nature of the entrepreneur. Some studies suggest that the influence of the 
entrepreneur on the strategy formation process is not always benign. These
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more clinically oriented studies (de Vries, 1985;1990; Collins, Moore and 
Unwalla, 1964) are concerned with looking at the exercise of 
entrepreneurship in the arena; these studies are concerned more with 
process rather than just personality, with explaining entrepreneurial 
behaviour rather than simply documenting the phenomenon.
In these studies, the entrepreneur’s background is given closer scrutiny.
For instance, Collins, Moore and Unwalla (1964) found that entrepreneurs 
had difficulty in dealing with authority figures and accordingly did not 
function well in the context of bureaucratic organisations. This dislike of 
authority figures stems from early childhood experiences. The 
entrepreneurial life was stimulated by, and became a remedy for, the 
psychological traumas or material deficiencies of childhood.
Moreover, these studies describe the ‘dark side’ of the entrepreneur (Kets 
de Vries, 1985, 1990). Many entrepreneurs counteract feelings of low self­
esteem, inferiority and helplessness through excessive control and activity. 
These individuals like to be in control and appear antagonistic to authority. 
This personality can manifest itself in an over-centralisation of power and 
irrational, dysfunctional behaviour. Other researchers (Hendry et al. 1995; 
Mount, Zinger and Forsyth, 1993) propose that the entrepreneur’s need for 
control over the venture can affect the strategy formation process: the 
entrepreneur’s desire for independence or unwillingness to share authority 
may be a stumbling block to further evolution. There is a growing 
awareness in the literature that leaders who are a driving force in the 
business world are sometimes driven by insecurity. De Vries (1990) 
suggests that these types of entrepreneurs are rarely strategists acting 
according to rational principles. They do not carefully analyze the business 
environment, preferring to rely instead on instinct. Although they may 
have a master plan, its rationale is driven by the individual’s ‘inner theatre’ 
(Kets de Vries, 1990, p. 876). Hence, impulsive leaders are capable of 
entering new markets while abandoning others at a whim, putting a sizeable
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portion of the firm’s capital at risk. All these studies seek to link 
personality with behaviour and organisational outcomes which represents a 
progression towards a more dynamic approach to the study of 
entrepreneurship.
A political perspective
Various studies suggest that the role played by the entrepreneur in the 
strategy formation process is not always in the best interests of the firm.
The personality trait theory has given rise to the stereotypical view of the 
entrepreneur as a power-seeking individual. One of the distinguishing traits 
of the entrepreneur was his desire for power (Collins and Moore, 1964; 
Kets de Vries, 1985) which tended to be dysfunctional and led to certain 
patterns arising in the strategy formation process.
A challenge facing firms is that they must resolve issues of autonomy and 
control. Various problems are associated with sole ownership. In one 
study, the founder’s personality was seen to take on great importance (Kets 
de Vries and Miller, 1984) and an autocratic, essentially top down planning 
approach was taken. Because of his dominant and isolated position within 
the organisation, the entrepreneur rarely received, or valued, feedback from 
his employees. Kimberly and Miles (1980) argue that inflexible, defensive 
CEOs can be a major cause of strategic stagnation. Founders may be 
committed to methods of the past, and fail to recognise the need for 
strategic renewal (Miller and Toulouse, 1986).
Hendry et al., (1995) claim that the dominant personality of the founder 
can be an obstacle to a small firm’s development, leading to crisis of 
control and customer dependence. The company is particularly prone to 
failure through the perpetuation of outdated founding assumptions about 
what is the source of organisational success. Whereas large firms can 
remove executives this is less practical in the owner-managed firm. As a
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result, a new perspective is not as readily forthcoming as it needs to be and 
renewal can be delayed (Hendry et al., 1995). Most commentators suggest 
that the entrepreneur inhibits the development of a management cadre (e.g., 
Stanworth and Curran, 1973). Entrepreneurs may see the firm as an 
extension of themselves and resist handing over responsibility to others. 
They neglect issues of succession and do not develop a second tier of 
managers.
It is argued that for firms to adapt and innovate they must delegate 
authority for decision making and hire professional managers (Miller,
1983). Lindell (1991) suggests that there is an urgent need for top 
managers to change their style in small entrepreneurial firms during a 
business life cycle. Delegation avoids overtaxing the CEO and puts more 
initiative in the hands of the lower level managers who are close to the 
markets, enabling them to exploit opportunities for growth (Miller and 
Toulouse, 1986). However, if it is the case that entrepreneurs crave 
power, then a modification in behaviour or personality is difficult. A 
quantitative study of 79 entrepreneurs on succession planning and power 
(Peay, Dyer et al., 1989) found that entrepreneurs who need personal 
power are likely to have trouble turning over their positions of power to 
someone else. Personal power is expressed through a desire for authority 
and control over others.
A dynamic process perspective
A question that the literature review raises is whether entrepreneurship is a 
property or a process? The literature tends to define entrepreneurship in 
static ‘trait’ terms of reference but it may also be seen as a dynamic 
process. The ‘trait’ theory focuses exclusively on the inherited traits of 
the individual and suggests that the individual is born with his personality 
and there is little that can be done to change it. To quote Fiedler (1965, p. 
115):
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It was surely easier to change almost anything in the job 
situation that a man’s personality and his leadership style.
While the entrepreneur must be prepared to acquire skills, many skills are 
learnable, whereas behaviours which underpin the entrepreneurial profile 
are much less learnable (Cheli and Haworth, 1992). However, other 
researchers adopt less static terms of reference. This may have 
implications for the strategy formation process, for instance a founder with 
problems ceding power may eschew growth rather than share power. If, 
on the other hand, the founder is capable of changing his innate preferences 
and style, then patterns may be different.
Lamont’s (1972) seminal piece compares technical entrepreneurs with first 
versus second generation ventures and his conclusions support the notion 
that entrepreneurs not only learn from experience but profit from it:
Learning is the property of almost all business activity. Applied to 
technical entrepreneurship, it means that experienced entrepreneurs 
exhibit substantial learning when they form a second technology 
based venture. Usually their experience is reflected in a business 
having a product orientation, substantial internal financing and a 
balance of essential business skills.
Gibb and Scott (1985, p. 621) conclude that the process of development in 
the small and medium sized firm is ‘characterized by a great deal of 
learning by the owner manager and is considerably influenced by his 
personal appraisal, knowledge and attitudes.’
Some researchers advocate that a more dynamic perspective of 
entrepreneurship should be taken and they emphasise the leader’s capacity 
for learning and change. According to Deakins (1996, p. 20), 
characteristics are not stable and change over time. There is a danger that 
the personality trait theory can ignore other issues such as the environment,
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culture, gender, social class, education, age, all of which have a bearing on 
the entrepreneur’s behaviour. Trait theory has diverted attention away 
from the ability of entrepreneurs to learn and gain from their business 
experiences. In the words of Deakins (1996, p. 22):
There is now a need for re-focusing research away from the 
emphasis on picking successful entrepreneurs or picking 
winners, to identifying the key issues in the learning 
and developmental process of entrepreneurship.
A social development approach encourages one to believe that behaviours 
can be acquired over time which in turn modify the personality (Rotter and 
Hochreich, 1975). In this way, researchers (Chell and Haworth, 1992) 
tentatively suggest that one need not take the personality profile as given. 
They suggest that the key to personal development is self-awareness and an 
honest self-appraisal. Constructivism is a social psychological theory of 
personality in which traits are construed as categorising concepts which 
classify observed behaviours (Hampson, 1988). It enables connections to 
be made between meaningful acts and the personality traits of the 
incumbent. Since accounts of behaviour are given in context, detailed 
explanations of the incumbent’s behaviour are possible.
The study by Hendry et al., (1995) is one of the few SME field that adopts 
a social development perspective on leadership. They found some 
indications that the fortunes of SMEs may be more closely tied to personal 
life cycles than the strategy literature in general acknowledges.
There is much evidence to suggest that periods of personal development 
and change coincide with start-up and periods of significant transitions in 
new firms (Gersick, 1991). O’ Farrell (1986) proposes that the freedom of 
the entrepreneur to start a company becomes hindered by the financial, and 
other obligations, of the typical Irish male/female life cycle. Between the 
ages of twenty-five and forty-five, most individuals get married, purchase a
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house and start a family. Hence, they acquire the cost burden of a house, 
the upbringing of children, education and insurance (O’ Farrell, 1986). 
When the entrepreneur starts a family, the security of his children is related 
to the security of his career, and therefore, career security becomes more 
important to the entrepreneur (Liles, 1981, p. 42). As a result, the 
effective capacity for starting a company increases between twenty-five and 
thirty (Liles, 1981) and decreases as the person grows older. The notion 
of studying leadership capacity across the duration of tenure is a relatively 
recent concept in the literature (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Thus, key 
words in discussing entrepreneurship seem to be flexibility, learning, 
change and personal development.
The influence of the entrepreneur on the organisation, on its strategy and 
outcomes, has been the subject of much debate in the literature. On the 
one hand, attempts to explain organisational outcomes are very person- 
centred in orientation; the suggestion is that patterns in the way strategies 
are formed over time depend on the traits or typology of entrepreneur. On 
the other hand, other researchers tend to understate the importance of the 
individual on organisation outcomes. The personality trait theory is highly 
voluntaristic which contrasts with the more deterministic assumption 
underlying other studies, where strategy is shaped by a wide range of 
variables, not just personality variables. Leadership is seen as a symbolic 
process that must be understood and evaluated in context. These studies 
are outlined in the following section.
(2) Context
A question raised by the literature review is whether the strategy formation 
process is determined by personality variables and the leader’s personal 
development over time, or whether outcomes are determined by 
circumstance, by context and by prior history. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
are prominent among those who argue that context has a deep impact on
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organisational action and outcomes. Pettigrew (1985) is another important 
contributor to the contextualist perspective. There is a growing awareness 
in the literature that leadership is a symbolic force (Czarniawska-Joerges 
and Wolff, 1991) expressing the hope of control over destiny. 
Czarniawska-Joerges and Wolff (1991) suggest that organisation theory 
should shift its attention to the study of contexts in which a given role 
acquires dominance. This belief in the leader as a causal factor in bringing 
about change, according to Edelman (1988, p. 65) is erroneous:
...the assumption that leaders have caused the events for which they 
take responsibility is reductionist because it ignores the 
consequences of historical developments, material conditions, and 
interpretations of those conditions. Except as minor elements of a 
complex transaction, leaders cannot provide security or bring 
about change.
The voluntarism-determinism debate
The question of the relative influence of leadership and context on strategy 
formation is rooted in the underlying debate between voluntarism and 
determinism to be found in organisational studies. In order to assess the 
potency of leadership in the strategy formation process, the concepts of 
voluntarism and determinism are highly pertinent. A definition of the 
voluntarism is provided by Burrell and Morgan (1978, p. 6) as meaning: 
‘that man is completely autonomous and free-willed.’ The determinist 
view, in contrast, ‘regards man and his activities as being completely 
determined by the situation or "environment" in which he is located.’
Both the strategy and entrepreneurship literature is characterised by a 
voluntarism-determinism dialectic view of organisational adaptation 
(Aldrich, 1979). The voluntaristic perspective, which is implicit in much 
of the entrepreneurship literature, assumes that strategy is the result of 
choices and decisions taken by leaders. The deterministic perspective
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argues that leader’s choices are constrained by the external environment 
and consequently, that the formation of strategy is the result of 
environmental forces. This dichotomy has been, and remains, a persistent 
controversy in the literature.
The concept of a system influencing the form of the environment it 
occupies has been noted by many system theorists (Ackoff, 1974). The 
basis of this argument is that organisations do not have to adapt to an 
external environment but can take actions to shape their environment.
Child (1972), an early proponent of the voluntaristic perspective, argues 
that decisions as to the location of the organisation, the customers it serves, 
the products or services it offers, the types of employees it recruits, all 
determine the boundaries of the firm’s environment. These decisions 
determine the effectiveness of the organisation. Bennis and Nanus (1985) 
postulate that major changes in an organisation’s direction can be attributed 
to visionary, transformational leadership.
In contrast to the voluntaristic theses underlying many studies on 
leadership, other researchers embrace a more deterministic view of 
leadership. Ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979) 
maintain that leaders are relatively helpless in the face of environmental 
forces. The relationship between the organisation and its environment is 
akin to Darwin’s notion of natural selection, in which populations of 
organisations are subject to a process called ‘survival of the fittest’.
Economic approaches tend to focus on the external (market) determinants 
of change. Most argue that organisations have to respond to changes in 
demand and supply if they are to survive. Bain’s (1956) discussion of 
barriers to entry such as economies of scale, switching costs, 
differentiation, government involvement, and so on, suggests that 
entrepreneurial activity is limited in certain industries. In highlighting how 
industry forces shape strategy and performance, Porter (1980; 1985) lends
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support to the determinist perspective. Porter (1980), for example, 
suggests that optimal strategies exist for an organisation depending on the 
industry life cycle stage.
Business planners in the 1980s advocated the use of planning tools such as 
SWOT analysis, the Boston portfolio matrix (Abell and Hammond, 1979) 
and Porter’s (1980) five force model of competition, in analysing the 
environment. Many of the tools tended to give primacy to the environment 
in shaping strategy. Achieving a ‘fit’ with the industry and the 
organisation was the primary concern of content theorists. The internal 
processes of the organisation remained largely unexplored and most models 
of strategy were devised on the basis of a stable, predictable environment 
that dictated change.
Other researchers also see the external environment as the prime mover of 
change. Institutionalists (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) suggest that 
organisations are influenced by normative pressures which are placed on 
them. These pressures emanate from the state and other regulatory bodies. 
They predict that once change is legitimated by powerful organisations 
within sectors, the dependent organisations will respond by incorporating 
the required changes. The organisation’s need to reduce resource 
dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) has been proposed as an 
explanation for conformity. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 149) use the 
term ‘isomorphism’ to refer to the constraining forces that force an 
organisation to resemble others in the same sector. Authors such as Huff 
(1982) and Spender (1989) argue that sectors are informed by ‘dominant 
logics’ or ‘recipes’ that limit decision-making at firm level. All these 
studies suggest that contextual features play a large part in determining 
change, or alternatively the formation of strategy.
A slight trend towards determinism can be found in the entrepreneurship 
field. The view of the firm as a product of its environment suggests a firm
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that is vulnerable to market forces, such as the unexpected loss of a key 
customer (Hendry et al., 1995). Small firms are generally seen as having 
limited impact on the marketplace (Carson, 1985) and to be literally at the 
mercy of market forces. A literature has evolved in entrepreneurship that 
emphasises the role of strategy and industry variables in company success 
(Covin, 1991; McDougall and Robinson, 1990; Sandberg and Hofer, 1987; 
Murray and O Gorman, 1994).
The seminal study by Sandberg and Hofer (1987) emphasised the role of 
the environment, together with strategy, on the performance of the firm.
A surprising finding was that a weak link existed between the 
entrepreneurial personality and company success. They advised small firms 
to enter industries in the development or growth stages of evolution, or 
ones with heterogenous products, supply shortages or evident 
disequilibrium. They advised firms to use strategies or enter industries that 
would create barriers to subsequent entry. Sandberg and Hofer (1987, p. 
12) postulate that the trait theory is ‘incomplete, probably inaccurate in its 
priorities and possibly even wrong.’ Other authors have argued that the 
selection of the correct environment is a determinant of growth. Many 
authors view the choice of a niche strategy (Broom and Longenecker,
1979; Buchele, 1967) as an integral part of the small firm’s success, since 
the firm avoids direct competition with large firms.
A study by Murray and O’Gorman (1994) found that high growth 
companies were positioned in market segments which had high growth 
rates. They concluded that growth in the SME was driven both by 
management and the market. This study highlighted that the choice of 
market, ‘where to compete’ and the nature of the strategy, ‘how to 
compete’ (product differentiation, unique personnel policies, innovation, 
flexibility, high product quality, new plant and equipment) distinguished 
high growth from low growth firms. Market selection was a critical 
decision particularly since this choice was not subject to frequent change.
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Some researchers, such as Pettigrew (1985), place themselves somewhere 
in-between these polar perspectives of voluntarism and determinism. For 
instance, Miles and Snow (1978) tend to underplay the role of leadership in 
the process of change. Researchers tend to avoid the issue by claiming that 
the firm can be conceived as influencing, and influenced by, the 
environment. It is hoped that this key debate on the primacy of leadership 
may be illuminated by the author’s study of Irish SMEs. This debate 
provides a rationale for the conceptual framework proposed at the end of 
this chapter, since it was deliberately chosen to avoid the extremes of 
voluntarism and determinism. The interaction of entrepreneurs and their 
contexts was seen as a problem to be studied, using a processual 
perspective.
(3) History
Some studies highlight the constraints that an organisation faces which arise 
from its history; this challenges the voluntaristic approach to 
entrepreneurship. This perspective is not frequently mentioned in the 
mainstream literature but since it challenges a basic paradigm in 
entrepreneurship, it should not be ignored.
Constraints to change
Several writers emphasise the role of history in circumscribing an 
organisation’s scope for future change. Lawrence (1984) argues that an 
organisation’s history is crucial to its future development and organisations 
can only be understood in the light of their early phases. Selznick (1957) 
proposes that early political and social processes largely determine 
organisational strategy and patterns of subsequent activities.
Stinchcombe (1965) emphasises the importance of founding conditions.
The ‘imprinting hypothesis’ postulates that the character and structure of an
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organisation that are formed during its creation persist, despite changes in 
the environment. Kimberly’s (1975) work on rehabilitation organisations, 
and the creation of a medical school (1979), demonstrates that foundation 
plays an important role in shaping the future direction of organisations. 
Kimberly (1979) argues that the personality of the founder, the 
environment at founding and nature of initial decisions, have long lasting 
effects on organisational structure and behaviour. Creation is a time when 
individual personalities have an unusually strong influence on organisational 
outcomes. In a study on the establishment of a medical school, Kimberly 
(1979, p. 438) observes that:
just as for a child, the conditions under which an 
organisation is born and the course of its development 
in infancy have important consequences for its later life.
Boeker’s (1988; 1989) studies on the evolution of strategy from founding 
suggest factors that may perpetuate given strategies. He argues that the 
conditions under which an organisation emerges can explain persistence in 
strategy. Results indicate that conditions at founding, including the extent 
to which initial strategy (i.e. first mover, fast follower, low cost producer, 
or niche) is dominant, the distribution of functional influence and whether 
it is aligned with the dominant strategy, a firm that is owned by its 
founding managers, helps form the initial strategy by building internal 
consensus around a given approach. Boeker (1988) observes that most 
organisations do not significantly alter the strategies they establish during 
start-up. Young organisations are set on a course that may be difficult or 
costly to change (Boeker, 1989). Investments are made in people, 
technology and assets that they are unable to change because they are too 
myopic or resource poor. Managers must recognise that they operate 
within constraints, many of which come from the initial establishment of 
structures, routines and repertoires that become institutionalized over time. 
A recent study (Tucker, Singh and Meinhard, 1990) investigated the effects 
of founding conditions on organisational change. The conclusion was that
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organisations are imprinted by founding conditions but also have a 
propensity to change. Tucker, Singh and Meinhard, (1990, p. 197) 
conclude that:
...explanations of organisational change requires 
contending simultaneously with the effects of events 
that occurred earlier in the organisation’s life, as 
well as with changes in current environmental 
threats and opportunities.
This echoes Pettigrew’s (1992, p. 10) view that:
The past is alive in the present and may shape 
the emerging future....but there is no assumption 
of predetermined timetables, of ordered and 
inevitable sequences and stages.
Several researchers (Boeker, 1989; Kimberly, 1979; Stinchcombe, 1965) 
consider change to be a rare event and emphasise the fact that past history 
can shape and fashion the future direction of the company. The imprinting 
perspective tends to be ignored by the strategy and entrepreneurship 
literature for various reasons. Ecologists pre-suppose that a dominant 
strategy is present from the outset, when, very often, start-up companies 
lack well defined strategies. Imprinting theory is narrow in its focus and 
tends to highlight only a small part of a complex phenomenon. The 
emergence of a new paradigm, organisational learning (Senge, 1990a), 
suggests greater scope for change and development. Recent perspectives 
on organisational learning distinguish between single-loop learning and 
double-loop learning (Argyris, 1977). Single-loop learning is the most 
basic form of learning (such as learning by trial and error) and results in 
minor changes that are within the traditional scope of the organisation’s 
activities. Double-loop learning occurs when the organisation is willing to 
question its long held assumptions about customers, capabilities or strategy. 
It requires a fundamental change in the company’s strategy and its way of
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looking at the world.
One perspective emphasises the endurance of founding strategies and the 
opposing perspective emphasises organisational learning and change, 
illustrating yet another dichotomy in the literature. A study on the 
formation of strategy in the small firm may help resolve some of these 
conflicting accounts in the literature.
(4) The process and its patterns
The central research agenda is to explain how strategy forms in the SME 
and to examine patterns of continuity and change in that process over time. 
Various models, such as life cycle or stage of growth models, chart the 
growth of the firm over time and discuss changes in growth patterns, life 
cycles, managerial style, ownership structures and degree of planning.
A dominant theme is the literature on the small firm is that of a ‘stage’ of 
‘life cycle’ model of growth which describes the growth of the firm from a 
small unit to a large corporation. This theory suggests that distinct patterns 
are evident in the course of an organisation’s development. This theory 
suggests that there is a movement from an entrepreneurial to a 
professionally managed organisation which has become a source of 
controversy among theorists. It suggests that the role of the founder is 
circumscribed as the company matures, acquires a history and changes its 
ownership structure.
Proponents of life cycle theory (Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Greiner, 1972) 
argue that there is a fixed series of stages in firm evolution. For instance, 
the initial stage stresses the individual entrepreneur with a business idea. 
The second stage is usually concerned with the division of managerial 
tasks, since the entrepreneur can no longer exercise total control. In the 
remaining stages, the firm takes on the general character of a larger
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company with a board of directors, working relations with trade unions, 
and exploitation of sophisticated marketing, management and production 
techniques.
Life cycle theory encouraged the view that firms should move from an 
entrepreneurial mode to a professional management mode in the growth 
stage (Greiner, 1972; Charan, Hofer and Mahon, 1980). The 
professionally managed organisation is defined by Charan, Hofer and 
Mahon (1980, p.3) as one that:
(a) permits delegation of authority
(b) utilises formal information analyses and an intra-firm consultative 
process to make decisions, and
(c) is free from dependence on certain key individuals
(d) displays a certain interchangeability among its components.
The Charan et al. (1980) study is normative and prescriptive and suggest 
that the principles of formality, neutrality, rationality and so on constitute 
ideals to which the entrepreneur aspires. The study gives guidelines on 
how to manage transitions: the entrepreneurial organisation has to be 
dismantled and its characteristics of strong centralised leadership, informal 
controls, lack of planning and interpersonal loyalties are to be replaced by 
the principles of ‘professional’ scientific management.
The validity of life cycle theory has been frequently debated in the 
literature and its weaknesses have been highlighted. Watson (1995, p. 36) 
questions the forcing of firms into ‘the straightjacket of an evolutionary 
model which poses some kind of natural trajectory for firm to follow’. 
Watson (1995) questions whether principles such as formality and 
rationality really exist in the large organisation. He argues that stage 
models gives support to outmoded conceptions of organisations as entities 
that moves from an early fluid and disorganised state into a rationally
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planned, tightly integrated and formalised system (Watson, 1995). Watson 
(1995) states that stage of growth models encourages the use of over simple 
stereotypes of firms at different stages of growth. He is forceful in his 
criticism of the stages approach saying that the distinction between 
entrepreneurship and management is misleading and dangerous. He points 
out that the language used has pejorative overtones, it encourages a naive 
way of looking at business change and draws attention away from the 
importance of management in firms of any size. He argues that there are 
grounds for abandoning the notion of a transition from an entrepreneurial to 
a professionally managed firm. Drucker (1954; 1974) also stated that the 
separation of the managerial from the entrepreneurial function should be 
avoided.
The implicit assumption underlying these phase models is that an 
organisation will grow large and formal. This assumption is belied by the 
finding that many small Irish firms remain small and do not make the 
transition to medium or large firms (The Task Force on Small Business, 
1994). The inexorable growth-or-fail assumption underlying life cycle 
models is also questioned (Stanworth and Curran, 1976). In addition, 
Greiner’s (1972) model, like most stage of growth models, tends to 
emphasise internal re-organisation and ignore contextual issues. The 
stage-of-growth perspective is a highly positivist one and the small firm is 
seen to behave in highly predictable way. Stanworth and Curran (1976) 
remark that the object of theory construction is the generation of law-like 
propositions concerning the growth process.
Various writers have suggested that as organisations become larger, the 
process of strategy formation becomes more formalised (Ansoff, 1965; 
Charan, Hofer and Mahon, 1980; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982). Again, 
the implicit assumption underlying these phase models is that an 
organisation will grow large and formal.
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Ansoff (1965) claims that as organisations grow, they require broader 
managerial participation in strategy making, more explicit strategies and 
plans that guide, co-ordinate and motivate managers. Strategy making then 
becomes a more co-operative, formal and analytical process. Child (1984) 
claims that a large and complex organisation will need to apply 
bureaucratic principles to a greater extent than small and simple ones.
Other studies also suggest that the increased size is associated with greater 
planning. Firm size is generally associated with greater available 
resources and increased internal differentiation which leads to increased 
planning (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Mintzberg, 1973).
One of the few studies conducted on the strategy formation process in the 
entrepreneurial organisation to date reveals two distinct patterns: the 
entrepreneurial mode and the planning mode (Mintzberg and Waters,
1982). The former is characterised by informality, creativity, strong 
visionary leadership; entrepreneurs are guided by intuition and possess an 
intimate knowledge of the business. The planning mode emerges as an 
inevitable result of larger organisation and a more formalized structure. It 
is a more formal, more stable and more systematic method of managing a 
business, but pays a large price in terms of less innovation and less vision. 
As the organisation ages, it becomes more formalised to the point where it 
becomes stifling and may replace the initiative of the founder.
Many criticisms of stage models of growth have been offered and there is 
no consensus as to what these phases are (Watson, 1995). The literature 
suggests patterns in the firm’s development, but it is unclear as to the 
nature of these patterns and studies reveal little about the processes of 
transition across phases or stages. Perhaps a fresh look at the issue is 
needed in order to identify and explain patterns in the development of the 
SME.
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Major research questions that have emerged from the literature review
The literature just reviewed suggests that leadership, context and history 
are the three key elements that impinge on the strategy formation process in 
SMEs (see the summary classification of the literature in Table 2.2).
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Table 2.2: Classification of studies on strategy formation processes
Feature Area of 
study
Conceptual approach
Leader The role of 
the founder 
in shaping 
strategy.
The ‘heroic’ leader (as indicated by Peters 
and Waterman, 1980; Bennis and Nanus, 
1985; Kanter, 1983; Kotter, 1990; Pettigrew 
and Whipp, 1991; Hendry et al., 1995). 
Archetypes (Sexton, 1989; Smith, 1967).
The personality trait theory 
(McClelland, 1961).
The social development perspective (Rotter 
and Hochreich, 1975)
Context External
context:
Internal
context:
Voluntarism and determinism.
Market selection
(Murray and O’ Gorman, 1994).
Barriers to new competition (Bain, 1956). 
Model of extended competition (Porter, 1985). 
Industry ‘recipes’ or ‘dominant logics’
Huff (1982) and Spender (1989).
Isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978).
Politics (Pettigrew, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981). 
Culture (Johnson, 1992; Green, 1995). 
Organisational Learning (Argyris, 1977;
Senge, 1990; Mintzberg, 1994).
Cognition (Huff, 1982; Isabella, 1990; Weick, 
1987).
History The role of 
historical 
factors in 
shaping 
strategy.
Constraints to leadership effectiveness. 
(Leavy and Wilson, 1994)
Imprinting theory (Boeker, 1989).
Patterns 
of the 
process
The role of 
temporal 
factors in 
the
formation of 
strategy.
Deliberate and emergent modes.
(Mintzberg, 1982).
Life cycle theory (Kimberly and Miles, 1980). 
Stage of growth models (Charan, Hofer and 
Mahon, 1980).
Evolution and revolution (Greiner, 1972). 
Entrepreneurial and planning mode (Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1982).
Logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1980).
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The literature review has shown that the entrepreneur is generally depicted 
in ‘heroic’ terms; qualities such as daring, need for achievement, 
independence, with all their emotional overtones of being good and 
desirable, are generally attributed to the entrepreneurial personality. 
Attempts to explain organisational outcomes tend to be very person-centred 
in orientation: the entrepreneur is seen to have a profound, and often 
enduring, impact on the strategy, structure and culture of the new firm. 
Likewise, the literature on leadership in the strategic management field has 
defining leadership in terms of traits, but has progressed beyond a concern 
with attributes to a concern with leadership vision, leadership styles, 
leadership behaviour and the role of context in facilitating or constraining 
leadership capacity. Some researchers suggest that greater attention should 
be focused on entrepreneurial behaviour, on the exercise of 
entrepreneurship in the arena, rather than on traits. Recent studies suggest 
a more dynamic role for entrepreneurs through an incorporation of political 
and learning perspectives. For instance, entrepreneurs are expected to 
learn and gain from their business experiences, adopt new goals, change 
their management styles and share power rather than have it centralised in 
the hands of the owner/manager.
Despite the predominance of studies on the role of the entrepreneur in the 
strategy formation process, other studies suggest that strategy is shaped by 
a wide range of variables, not just personality variables. Researchers such 
as Pettigrew (1977) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) highlighted the impact 
of context on organisational life. Their work was underpinned by the 
debate on voluntarism-determinism to be found in the literature. There is a 
small, but growing literature in entrepreneurship that is sensitive to context 
and based on slightly more deterministic assumptions. For instance, a 
study by Hofer and Sandberg (1987) proposed that outcomes do not depend 
on the personal attributes of the founders but on strategy and industry 
variables. In addition, the literature review on life cycles/stage of growth 
models suggested that the strategy formation process can be described in
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terms of patterns, but the literature is unclear as to the nature of these 
patterns and does not fully explain why a transition is made from one life 
cycle phase to the next.
Certain questions arise from the literature review which centre on the role 
of the entrepreneur in the strategy formation process and the role of context 
in facilitating or inhibiting entrepreneurial behaviour. In addition, 
the literature review suggested that an examination of patterns in the 
strategy formation process over time may be warranted. The main research 
questions are presented as follows:
(1) What role does the entrepreneur play in shaping the strategy of the 
enterprise and how does this role change over time?
(2) How important are the personal attributes of the entrepreneur in 
influencing the formation of strategy?
(3) Are there moderating influences, such as contextual and historical 
forces, on entrepreneurs and their role in the strategy formation 
process?
(4) Can patterns or phases in the process be discerned?
(5) Which of the ‘strategy as planning’ and ‘strategy as learning’ 
perspectives comes closest to describing and explaining the character of 
the process?
A conceptual framework for the study of the strategy formation 
process:
The literature review suggested that the strategy formation process was 
influenced by the interaction of three main variables: leadership, context 
and history (see Table 2.2). The first chapter showed that the dominant 
perspective in the entrepreneurship field has been the rational, planning 
model which is based on a number of assumptions. Inherent in this 
perspective is the assumption that the entrepreneur is in control of strategy
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formation; it also assumes that planning is necessary and desirable, that it 
is possible to predict the future, to objectively analyse the environment and 
formulate a strategy in advance of implementation. However, there are 
many other explanations of how strategy forms in SMEs and therefore it is 
important to adopt an open-minded outlook in relation to this research 
topic. The process school of thought contends that strategy is rarely 
formulated in a synoptic manner and then implemented. Instead, strategy 
may be the result of a deliberate or emergent process or contain elements 
of both. A focus on strategy formation widens the conceptual lens beyond 
planning to consider both the deliberate and emergent elements of the 
process.
In addition to identifying the three main variables of interest as leaders, 
context and history, then the literature review also highlighted the need to 
view the process of strategy making through a perspective that is much 
wider that just rational planning. The conceptual framework developed for 
this study reflects these requirements and is presented in Figure 2.2. It 
takes as its main point of departure Mintzberg’s (1987) distinction between 
strategy formulation and strategy formation. It recognises that strategies 
are formed through the interaction over time of three main variables - 
entrepreneurship, context and history. The main focus of the empirical 
enquiry will be to attempt to explain the realised strategies of the 
companies under study without any preconceptions as to how those 
strategies were formed (i.e. by planning or learning, deliberate or emergent 
processes or otherwise). The concern is not so much with the micro­
dynamics of particular discrete decisions or episodes as with the overall 
development of the organisations - as reflected in the patterns of continuity 
and change in realised strategies over time.
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Figure 2.1: A conceptual framework for the study of the strategy 
formation processes
Context —»
Entrepreneurship —»
History — >
-► Strategy
Realised
This conceptual framework is similar to that used successfully by Leavy and 
Wilson (1994) in their comparative study of strategy formation processes in a 
number of large Irish organisations. It is used here for the first time in the 
study of SMEs. The framework is underpinned by the contextualist 
perspective on social action of Pettigrew (1985; 1989) which seeks to link 
context, process and outcome in the study of strategy formation and change. 
Pettigrew’s (1985; 1989) perspective is characterised by a number of broad 
principles which are as follows:
(1) it involves multiple levels of analysis in connecting context, process and 
outcome, using economic, political and cultural modes of analysis.
(2) it involves an underlying theory of social action that is neither over­
voluntarist nor over-determinist in world view.
(3) it involves longitudinal case-based research strategies that allow patterns of 
continuity and change to be observed over time (Leavy, 1992).
This is the kind of underlying perspective which has guided this study and will 
be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
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Summary
This chapter has presented a review of the literature pertaining to strategy 
formation processes in the SME. A conceptual framework, based on the 
literature review, has been developed based on three main elements: 
leadership, context and history. The literature review has suggested that 
the way in which strategies are formed over time in SMEs may well vary 
according to the interactions between leadership, context and history.
Since the psychological studies of the 1950s, the theme of leadership has 
been a key issue in the study of strategy. Early studies have focused on the 
personality traits and typologies of entrepreneurs. Although many 
researchers still hold romantic views on the desirability of strong leaders, 
this view can be criticised for being incomplete, overly static and overly 
voluntaristic. It tends to neglect the potential for learning and change on 
the part of the individual, as well as the role of context in determining 
outcomes.
Very few attempts have been made to synthesis the ‘great man’ and 
‘environmentalist’ views of leadership, although studies have found that 
strategy, industry variables and market selection all play important roles in 
determining organisational outcomes. The role of leadership in the strategy 
formation process has been a contested one in the literature.
The literature revealed the importance of ‘historical’ influences on strategy 
formation processes. The term ‘history’ refers to constraints faced by 
organisations as they seek to develop a strategy. Organisation theorists 
have highlighted constraints to change arising from history and have 
challenged the view of the eternally flexible organisation. The major 
contribution of organisational theorists has been that an early consensus 
develops around a particular strategy which is retained, the ‘imprinting’ 
hypothesis. A major criticism of this theory is that it does not incorporate
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recent perspectives on organisational learning. The theme of phases or 
patterns being embedded in the organisation has emerged as a dominant 
theme in the context of the small firm. This theory has also been a 
subject of controversy in the literature. Life cycle theory has been 
underpinned by the assumption that an organisation will grow large and 
formal at some stage and that the role of the entrepreneur is circumscribed 
by the inexorable march of time.
Chapter one and two of this thesis have reviewed a range of theories and 
perspectives relevant to the study of the strategy formation process in 
SMEs. Table 2.2 provides a helpful summary for the reader. The 
literature review has not only formed the basis from which the main 
research questions and the conceptual framework have been developed, but 
the range of perspectives reviewed has also contributed to ‘theoretically 
sensitising’ the researcher for the inductive work to follow, without undue 
‘premature categorisation’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994) of data. The next 
chapter describes the research methodology adopted for the purposes of 
examining how strategy forms in SMEs.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DESIGN AND 
METHODS
Introduction
The main question that the research seeks to answer is how do strategies 
form in small and medium sized enterprises and what are the key factors at 
work. The study is concerned with identifying patterns in the strategy 
formation process and establishing whether these vary according to 
leadership, contextual and historical variables. As C. Wright Mills (1959, 
p. 159) puts it:
Social science deals with problems of biography, of history and
their intersections within social structures.
C. Wright Mills observation applies to the discipline of strategic 
management, it is highly useful, and should have significant explanatory 
value when applied to the strategy formation process in SMEs. It was 
found that existing theory on strategy formation processes in SMEs was 
inadequate and inconclusive. The majority of studies on SMEs adopted the 
rational planning model. The literature was found to be divided on many 
issues, for instance, it gave mixed messages on the role of the founder.
The few studies on strategy process in the SME category tended to focus 
on new start-ups rather than firms with a much longer, richer history.
This research attempts to describe the process of strategy formation based 
on a detailed observation of nine companies over time. The data obtained 
was retrospective in nature, based on respondents’ attitudes, their 
perceptions of the key decisions taken and their interpretations of how the 
company developed over time. Mintzberg’s (1982, p. 466) argues that the 
study of strategy making is ‘...the analysis of the relationship between 
intended and realised strategies’. Following this line of argument, the
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researcher here searched for realised strategy and drew upon the work of 
Mintzberg’s (1982, p. 446) to ascertain: ‘whether the strategies are 
deliberate (intentions are realised), when unrealised, and when emergent 
(patterns are realised without intention)’. The inductive case study method 
is seen as the most appropriate research method to achieve the objectives of 
this study. The inductive approach allows the researcher to be 
‘theoretically sensitive’ (Miles and Huberman, 1984) to many different 
concepts while remaining open to the possibility of new information or 
surprising findings. Looking at the strategy formation process from only 
one perspective would have narrowed the scope of the research and the true 
value of the findings would have been lost. Induction involves the 
movement from the particular to the general (Pettigrew, 1985; 1989) and 
the central thrust of this approach is to ‘let the data speak for themselves’ 
as far as possible. Research that is exploratory in nature, concerned with 
theory-building rather than theory-testing, description rather than 
prescription, demands that the researcher comes as close as possible to the 
realities of the situation.
It is believed that the inductive case-based approach offers greater scope 
over other methods (such as questionnaire) to explore the strategy 
formation process. Concepts such as traits are measurable up to a point, 
even if some of the measurement techniques can be perverse (for a critique 
of the techniques used to measure entrepreneurship see Homaday, 1987 and 
Wortman, 1986); other concepts such as strategy formation, learning and 
change, are more complex, more diffuse and more subjective. The 
possibility of these concepts being measured through the instrument of a 
questionnaire is problematic.
This study was guided by process researchers such as Bower (1970), 
Burgelman (1985), Pettigrew (1973, 1987) and Mintzberg and Waters 
(1982) who all used the inductive case-based approach. The study involved 
a two stage design in which nine cases were used to identify the main
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categories of interest and four of the nine cases were taken for more 
intensive examination of the strategy formation process. These four cases 
generated a richer insight into significant issues (such as change in the 
founder’s perception of risk over time, the ramifications of crisis, phases in 
the process of strategy formation) that emerged from the data. Companies 
were chosen from a variety of industries in order to introduce variety and 
explore the influence of context on the process of strategy formation.
This chapter explains the processes of data collection, preparation and 
analysis that were used in this study. The conventions of qualitative 
research require the explicit reporting of data and procedures (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 439). The chapter is divided into three sections: the 
first provides an examination of the meta level, the philosophical 
assumptions guiding the research on strategy formation processes in SMEs. 
The second section gives a statement of some of the central research 
questions in the empirical work. The choice of method is discussed and 
this section points to the strengths and limitations of the chosen method.
The last section describes the challenges presented, skills required and 
problems that had to be overcome in order to carry out the research. 
Particular attention is paid to practical considerations such as selecting and 
gaining access to firms, and also to issues of confidentiality and credibility. 
The chapter is organised under the following headings (1) methodology (2) 
the research method and (3) the research experience.
(1) Methodology
The sociological positivism (objective) and German idealism (subjective) 
approaches represent two major intellectual traditions in social science 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Both are reviewed below.
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The objective approach
The first intellectual tradition is described as ‘sociological positivism’. 
Positivism reflects a belief that the social sciences can be investigated in the 
same way as the natural sciences. The social world is seen as being hard, 
real and external to individuals. This is backed up by a ‘positivist’ 
approach to epistemology (the search for universal laws which explain and 
govern the reality which is being observed), a ‘realist’ approach to 
ontology (the belief that social entities have a concrete reality), 
‘deterministic’ views of human nature (the belief that man is a product of 
the environment) and the use of ‘nomothetic’ methodologies (eg., 
quantitative methods). However, most researchers (eg. Pettigrew, 1987) 
tend to place themselves somewhere in-between the polar perspectives of 
voluntarism and determinism, and see man as a social actor who is both 
enabled and constrained by the environment. The positivist approach often 
ignores the inevitable act of interpretation by the scientist. There is a 
strong tradition in scientific writing that insists on the third person and the 
passive voice which depersonalises the arguments (Smircich and Stubbart,
1985).
The subjective/interpretative approach
The ‘German idealism’ school of thought is based upon highly subjectivist 
assumptions. The emphasis is on understanding the unique and what is 
particular to the individual rather than what is general and universal. It 
rejects the view that the social world is a reality which is independent of 
the minds of people. Instead it is constructed by individuals who, through 
use of a common language and the interactions of every day life, may 
create a social world of shared meaning. It is ‘voluntarist’ with regard to 
human nature (the belief that man is the creator of his own environment).
It is ‘anti-positivist’ in epistemology (does not search for universal laws).
It is ‘nominalist’ in its approach to social reality, (the belief that social
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entities do not have absolute meaning or reality) and it favours ideographic 
methods (eg., qualitative methods) as a foundation for social analysis.
Interpretative research should explore what strategists were thinking, why 
they acted as they did, what they wanted to accomplish. This approach 
emphasises the relativistic nature of the social world (eg., social entities 
can only be understood from the point of view of individual not the 
observer). The interpretative approach has implications for the way 
research accounts are written. The interpretative approach highlights 
personal involvement and puts the author back in the text as one who 
authorizes the account. It embraces the multiple and varied perspectives 
with the organisation rather than trying to merge them into a single, 
objective explanation (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985). Furthermore, since 
interpretations tend to be formulated after, not during events, interpretative 
research is often built upon events which have already transpired. This 
means that a critical viewpoint has had time to emerge (Isabella, 1990). 
Another feature of interpretative research is that research questions tend to 
emerge from the data instead of being predetermined from the outset 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
This study, with its use of the inductive case study method, is located more 
towards the subjective rather than the objective end of Burrell and 
Morgan’s (1979, p. 22) methodological continuum. It also seeks to avoid 
the extremes of voluntarism and determinism by taking the middle ground. 
Table 3.1 outlines the key differences between the interpretative/subjective 
approach and the objective approach.
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Table 3.1: Interpretative versus objective approach
Interpretative Objective
Words Numbers
Theory building Theory testing
Within context Independent of context
Open windows Closed window
Is not constructivist* Aggregate patterns
Judged by significance
coherence,
insight,
results.
Judged by levels of 
generalisation.
* ie. not seeking to merge all viewpoints into one, instead it embraces 
multiple realities and subjective viewpoints.
Source: Carson, D J. (1995), ‘A structured approach to generating insight 
from cases.’ U.C.D: Seminar series.
Methodological stance taken in studies in the strategy field
Within social science generally there has long been criticism of positivist 
research orientations, which has been acknowledged within the management 
literature (Bonoma, 1985; McClintock et al., 1979). Mansfield (1989, p.
6) proposes that like management practice ‘research in management is also 
more of an art than a science...’. The knowledge of the researcher is so 
limited that logic and evidence will only achieve a certain amount without 
the addition of judgement, intuition or even guess work.
Some researchers (Johnson, 1992; Pettigrew, 1973) in the strategy field 
focus on the cognitive, cultural and political impediments to change. They 
have sought to demonstrate that the socially constructed world can become 
all too real and can constrain the actions and orientations of human beings. 
Many of the key components in the strategy formation process are socially 
constructed. In any organisation, the manager collects and evaluates only a
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portion of the information on the environment. Due to ‘bounded 
rationality’ (March and Simon, 1958) decision-makers construct simplified 
mental models when dealing with complex problems; otherwise, decision 
makers would become paralysed by the need to analyze extensive data 
(Daft and Weick, 1984). Therefore, strategists have incomplete and flawed 
perceptions of the environment. The external environment is not a neatly 
packaged, objective reality to be perceived and reacted to but as an 
‘ambiguous field of experience’ that has to be interpreted by strategists 
(Smircich and Stubbart, 1985, p. 726). Managers do not react to the 
environment, they ‘enact’ (create) it (Weick, 1969). Enactment consists of 
sense-making; meaning is created through action and the process of 
attention. In other words, the environment is a social construct. For 
instance, the entrepreneur’s personal vision can become a social reality if 
he/she can gain support for his/her goals.
The last ten years in the strategy field has been characterised by a growth 
in qualitative studies. The various features of the qualitative research make 
it relevant for the study of strategy formation processes in SMEs.
Qualitative researchers are often concerned with what is known and what 
needs to be explored. Van Maanen (1983, p.2) claims that:
Qualitative researchers in contrast to their quantitative 
colleagues claim forcefully to know relatively little about what a 
given piece of observed behaviour means until they have developed 
a description of the context in which the behaviour takes place and 
attempted to see that behaviour from the position of its 
originator...
Qualitative research implies an emphasis on interpretation and context in 
tandem with a concern for process that is not measured exclusively in terms 
of quantity, intensity or frequency (Burgelman, 1985). With quantitative 
methods, a questionnaire is sent out simultaneously to all respondents. The 
researcher has only one chance to collect data. According to Miles and 
Huberman (1984, p. 36) the ‘beauty of qualitative research is that there is
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(nearly) always a second chance’ to collect data. Qualitative research is 
not as systematic or as structured as quantitative research. It tends to be a 
step-by-step cumulative learning process.
(2) The research method
The main focus of this research is the study of the strategy formation 
process in SMEs. The central research question is how does strategy form 
in SMEs and what are the key factors at work. Since the literature (as 
reviewed earlier) reveals large gaps in the understanding of the strategy 
formation process in SMEs, grounded theory and the case study approach 
is highly relevant. The following section discusses both of these 
approaches.
Grounded theory
The term ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) simply means the 
discovery of theory from data and is pertinent to studies of an exploratory 
nature. This approach has been used to good effect by Hamel (1991) in a 
study on inter-partner learning in strategic alliances. Burgelman (1985) has 
argued for the greater use of grounded theory in strategic management.
In theory, the researcher is supposed to go into the field with few 
theoretical preconceptions. In practice, few social scientists would claim to 
enter the field with empty minds waiting to be gradually filled by evidence. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that the researcher should be ‘theoretically 
sensitive’. He or she queries many different theories and is guided by 
emerging gaps in his theory. Theoretical sensitivity can be lost when the 
researcher commits himself to one specific theory. The concepts and 
questions not only come from the research, but are worked out in relation 
to the data during the course of the research. Theory based on data should 
closely mirror reality, and cannot be easily refuted since it is too intimately
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linked to data. For the purposes of this study, the researcher gained a 
working knowledge of the literature on strategy formation processes but 
remained open to the possibility of new information.
A striking feature of grounded theory is constant comparative analysis. 
Comparative analysis puts a high emphasis on theory as a process. Theory 
is an ever-developing entity, not a finished product. Comparing groups, 
irrespective of differences or similarities, is necessary to generate theory in 
the fullest possible way. In grounded research, fundamental differences 
and similarities are important qualifying conditions. Constant comparison 
across types of evidence controls the generality of the emerging theory on 
two levels - conceptual scope and population scope. For some researchers, 
comparative studies are a means of validating facts, for establishing 
generalisations and searching for universal law.
Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 43) argue for ‘the joint collection, coding and 
analysis of data’ which is generally not achieved by researchers to a great 
extent. This gives researchers the freedom to make adjustments during the 
data collection process. These adjustments can be the addition of questions 
to probe particular themes which emerge (Eisenhardt, 1989). This strategy 
proved useful for the purposes of this study. For instance, questions 
relating to the ramifications of crisis episodes were added. Thus grounded 
theory is iterative rather than linear, requiring a steady movement between 
the literature, interview data and analysis. The result of this fluid 
movement between theory and data is a re-conceptualization, often based 
on a creative leap (Mintzberg, 1979). This study was guided by the 
philosophy of Glaser and Strauss (1967), and adopted a research orientation 
that emphasised features such as induction, flexibility, constant comparison, 
attention to context and a concern for learning.
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The choice o f case-based qualitative research
This study deals with the strategy formation process in small to medium 
sized firms. It takes a look at variables such as culture, change, learning 
and the role of the entrepreneur. These concepts are not easily visualized; 
it is difficult to evolve the concepts into constructs and then develop 
measures of those constructs. The purist would claim that it is the research 
question that determines the most appropriate method. As Burrell and 
Morgan (1979, p. 399) claim:
There is a need for organisation theorists to adopt methods of study 
which are true to the nature of the phenomena which they are 
attempting to investigate.
Researchers often find that the current state of the field drive them towards 
case-based research. Over the past ten years, there has been a significant 
growth in case-based research in the strategy process field. The research 
on strategy formation (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982), 
Pettigrew’s (1985) study on the management of strategic change in ICI, the 
Burgelman (1983) study of internal corporate venturing and Hamel’s (1991) 
work on strategic alliances are among the most prominent examples. 
Mintzberg (1977) has argued for the continuing use of qualitative 
methodologies in strategic process research because many of the important 
concepts (i.e., goals, culture) are intangible.
A central feature of most case-based research is the use of interviewing 
techniques. The interview was seen by the researcher as the best way to 
obtain answers to the questions posed. Interview techniques may be 
standardized or non-standardized. With standardized interviews, each 
entrepreneur is asked an identical set of questions in a fixed order. In 
contrast, a non- standardized interview is much less structured and the 
questions asked and the phrasing of the questions vary from interview to 
interview. Interviews of this kind are most helpful in exploring new topics,
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sensitive or emotive issues and when the businesses are highly variable in 
their characteristics (Healey and Rawlingson, 1993). Face-to-face 
interviews also allows the researcher to probe vague answers and query 
discrepancies in the replies. Healey and Rawlingson (1993, p. 129) argue 
that non-standardized interviews are highly useful in certain situations:
Non-standardized interviews are associated more with 
intensive research designs in which the main questions involve how 
the observed behaviour of a business is related to its own history 
and circumstances, or how some causal processes work out in 
particular cases.
With non-standardised interviewing, interaction between the interviewer 
and interviewee is emphasised rather than minimised (Healey, 1991). It is 
important to be flexible regarding the form and order of the questions. It 
should allow for discussion and dialogue. The investigator is: ‘willing, and 
often eager, to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the 
question, the situation, is’ (Dexter, 1970, p.5).
Characteristics of case-based research
It is difficult to present a precise definition of case-based research. 
Eisenhardt (1979, p. 534) defines the case study as:
a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics 
present within single settings.
The case study method has the virtue of giving an in-depth picture of a 
particular set of circumstances. It helps develop the kinds of ‘thick 
description’ (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 221) necessary to make fine 
discriminations and interpretations. There will always be a large number 
of variables to be investigated (Yin, 1993). Mansfield (1989) proposes that 
this method is at its strongest in exploring relatively unknown areas, issues 
and processes over time. As such the case study method is highly relevant
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for the proposed study on the strategy formation process in SMEs. 
Researchers willingly acknowledge that all methodologies have limitations. 
There is the risk that theory from cases describes a very idiosyncratic 
phenomenon, or that the theorist is unable to raise the level of generality of 
the theory. According to Kitchener (1996), the tension is that of 
reconciling the particular (the case’s uniqueness) with the universal (generic 
processes at work). Multiple cases, if available, should strengthen results 
by yielding greater pattern-matching and by yielding greater confidence in 
the robustness of the theory (Yin, 1993). It was decided to use multiple 
cases since it would allow the researcher to compare and contrast concepts 
across cases and would increase confidence in the findings. In this study, 
concerns of external validity were traded off to some degree against the 
opportunity to gain an insight into a phenomenon that is incompletely 
documented.
Particular skills needed by the case researcher
The case study is a method that has been as much abused as used so it is 
important to be clear about the skills needed on the part of the researcher. 
Exponents of case research tend to converge on the notion of a craft 
process (Leavy, 1994; Mintzberg, 1979; Pettigrew, 1985). Pettigrew 
(1985, p. 223) describes his approach as a ‘craft process and not merely 
the application of a formal set of techniques and rules’. He goes on to 
point out that it has its ‘artistic and subjective side.’ Mintzberg (1979, pp. 
584-5) refers to two essential skills, the first is ‘detective work’ or the 
‘tracking down of patterns’ in the data, and the second is the ‘creative leap’ 
that generates fresh insight from these patterns. This creative leap can only 
come from being ‘close enough to the source of the data to really 
understand what is going on’ in organisational terms. Most case-based 
researchers live with a high level of uncertainty about the potential quality 
of the contribution right through to the end of the process (Hickson et al.,
1986).
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Validity and reliability
If procedures are properly followed, the case study method should be 
judged by the same criteria of reliability and validity as the traditional 
scientific method (Yin, 1993). The findings should have ‘validity’ in the 
sense that they are deemed probable, reasonable or likely to be true (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994, p. 431). If the findings are ‘reliable’, dependable, 
or trustworthy, then the researcher is measuring what he or she is supposed 
to measure. One of the traditional criticisms of case study evaluations is 
their alleged subjectivity (House, 1982). This can pose problems for 
validity. Did conclusions stem from the evidence or was it a case of 
selective interpretation on the part of the researcher? A related question 
concerns whether the case study was under-documented and over 
concluded? Did the researcher drop disconfirming evidence? One way of 
guarding against the selective interpretation of data is to make the ‘raw’ 
data as accessible as possible to the reader prior to interpretation and 
analysis. There should be a formal database of the case study data so that 
an external observer can inspect, question and re-interpret (if necessary) the 
data. This approach should increase the rigor of case study evaluation 
(Yin, 1993). This study was influenced by these considerations.
(3) The research experience
This study involved an inductive case-based study of nine firms. The 
personal interviewing technique was used to elicit information. The 
interview was not highly structured but a list of questions was devised 
beforehand as a guide. This is shown in Appendix 2. Some of the more 
practical issues encountered as a result of adopting the case study method 
are discussed as follows:
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Gaining access
The researcher may spend weeks even getting people to allow him or her to 
study them at will (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Academic enquiry is a 
reciprocal activity and people engage in research for a variety of motives.
In today’s world, gaining access to companies is increasingly difficult. 
Business people tend to have strong feelings about privacy, about 
confidentiality of information, and are often reluctant to spare their time for 
purely altruistic motives, or for an activity that is often misunderstood or 
under-appreciated.
This author found that gaining access, as to be expected, was difficult.
Some founders had been a focus of enquiry for other researchers and so 
access was denied to this researcher. A word of advice to future 
researchers is to avoid targeting well known firms in cities with a large 
student population. Another strategy is make use of one’s personal 
contacts, if any, in the business community. The author had contact with 
two firms on a previous occasion and the individuals agreed to participate 
in the study. Ethical issues were an important consideration in gaining 
access to firms. It was important to be open about the key objectives of 
the investigation and the degree of access required. All participants were 
assured that cases would be disguised in the final thesis is they so desired. 
Some feedback was promised to the respondents in order to encourage 
participation in the study. A professional approach was high amongst the 
researcher’s priorities, and this involved first contact by way of letter on 
headed notepaper, a follow-up phone call, the guarantee of confidentiality 
and good image management. Some entrepreneurs had obtained a masters 
degree, or had siblings engaged in the academic world, and so had some 
affinity with academic research. It may be wise for future researchers to 
target individuals who may understand the work of academics. In total, 
letters were sent to approximately thirty companies and two thirds were the 
subject of a telephone call due to non-response.
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Selection of cases
In Ireland, Forbairt (the Industrial Development Authority) uses 
employment as a benchmark to define the size of enterprises. SMEs are 
generally considered to be under firms with under 200 employees. The 
f i r m s , in this study, range between seven and twenty years old, with 2 to 
120 staff. Seven of the companies employ under 50 employees and the 
other two firms employ under 200 employees. The focus of enquiry is on 
firms with a relatively long history, not just start-ups. Since the research is 
concerned with a dynamic topic such as strategy formation, it is crucial to 
select firms that have some history. Since a high proportion of new firms 
worldwide disappear within a year or two (Hendry et al., 1995) to reach 
nearly ten years of existence still intact represents some kind of 
achievement from which something may be learned.
Since inductive research is normally conducted within context rather than 
independent of context, nine companies were chosen from a variety of 
industries such as the fast moving consumer good (FMCG) and software 
sectors. See Table 3.2. The literature review (see for example, Murray, 
1984; Sandberg and Hofer, 1986) suggested that contextual forces might 
have an impact on outcomes. A prime interest was to examine how 
variability in context affects patterns in the strategy formation process.
The high technology sector was regarded as a useful basis for the study for 
several reasons: many ‘hi-tech’ companies have the potential to grow 
rapidly; the ‘hi-tech’ industry is characterized by short product life cycles 
and a volatile business environment; the study provides an opportunity to 
study how founders cope with a dynamic, as opposed to a relatively stable 
environment. Having a cross section of firms introduced heterogeneity and 
diversity within the sample. As Pettigrew (1988, p .l) noted:
Given the limited number of cases which can be studied, it makes 
sense to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types in 
which the process of interest is transparently observable.
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So cases that seemed inherently dissimilar, which were likely to challenge 
or extend emergent theory, were included.
Table 3.2: Profile of industry sector
FMCG Software Various others
(1) Bray cot (1) McKeown (1) Kestrel 
(electronic 
security)
(2) Irish Breeze (2) QFS (2) BFK Design 
(graphic design)
(3) Fiacla (3) RTI (3) Caraplas 
(plastics)
A list of companies that received grant aid from Forbairt was obtained 
from the Companies Registration Office, Dublin. This list gave valuable 
information on the location of each firm and its year of establishment. The 
researcher found, through informal discussions with peers and through her 
own general knowledge of business, that the import substitution firms 
founded in the 1980s seemed to be under-explored as research sites. 
Companies with a high profile were included in this study since there 
would be abundant public information about them. Other companies were 
randomly selected from Compass, the Irish Business Directory.
The age and size of firm, geographic location, access to founder and 
variety in terms of industry, were the criteria used to assess whether the 
cases were eligible for inclusion in the study. It was crucial to be able to 
gain information on the early period of company formation, so access to 
the original founder was important. The point of studying firms in Dublin 
and nearby counties was to save time spent travelling to the firms. The 
rationale here is straightforwardly pragmatic.
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Choosing the number of cases
The information base for the descriptions of the strategy process was 
derived from nine cases and 33 interviews. The researcher who wishes to 
generate fresh insight into a topic through grounded research cannot state 
beforehand how many groups he or she will study and to what degree. The 
number of cases was largely dictated by resource and time constraints, and 
the researcher’s judgements relied heavily on the experience of earlier 
researchers. Hamel (1991), for example, used 11 cases to reveal key 
conceptual categories and two cases were used to generate insight on inter­
partner learning in strategic alliances. Mintzberg (1978) found that 
tracking the strategy formation process in four major studies fully absorbed 
his time over several years. However, Mintzberg (1978) benefited from 
using multiple fieldworkers. Bower (1970), on the other hand, spent two 
years on fieldwork in one organisation in his study of capital investment 
decisions. This study’s target of nine companies was therefore ambitious. 
This study investigated nine cases in total in order to reveal key conceptual 
categories and four cases (Fiacla, RTI, McKeown and QFS) were 
investigated in depth in order to generate richer insight into the strategy 
formation process. For instance, these cases were used to explore the role 
of the founder in more depth, and in particular, how the founder’s 
perception of risk changed over time. Given time and resource constraints 
along with the difficulties associated with gaining access, a decision was 
taken to limit the number of cases selected for more intensive analysis.
Having decided on the number of cases, it was still necessary to decide 
when the data collection process would cease. It is clear from grounded 
theory that data collection takes place in parallel with data analysis. It is 
important not to make conclusions from the initial data too early on in the 
study; it is advisable to revisit the literature in order to seek alternative 
explanations and interpretations. The data collection process was largely 
contingent on the degree of insight achieved, which may come quickly at
95
some times and at others involve long periods of gestation. Some 
guidelines exist in relation to when the data collection process should stop 
in case-based research: in Leavy’s (1994, p. 114) view it is ‘when the 
process has reached the point of diminishing returns’; ‘when additional data 
no longer adds to the refinement of the concepts (Burgelman 1983, p. 225); 
or where ‘saturation of the core categories’ is achieved (Hamel, 1991, p. 
86).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the process of building theory from data. In the early 
stages, the research was exploratory in nature, aimed at identifying 
emerging themes. The later stages of the research project were aimed at 
clarifying relationships. Four cases were analyzed in depth in order to 
probe issues, explain and elaborate on well defined themes.
Figure 3.1: Stages in Inductive Research
‘Exploratory’ ‘Explanatory’
Prior theory used 
in Data Collection 
& Analysis
* *  H: *  *
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Number of Cases
Source: Carson, D.J. (1995), ‘A structured approach to generating insight 
from cases.’ U.C.D: Seminar series.
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Interview content and interviewing style
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim so that all details 
were retained. The respondents did not have any objections. It was 
explained that written notes could be taken but that a tape-recorder would 
be more convenient to use. In one case, the respondent asked that the 
recorder be turned off for a short period so that comments could be made 
‘off-the-record’. Case-based research proved to be extremely labour 
intensive and many hours were spent gathering background information on 
the companies, interviewing respondents, transcribing data, reading and 
analysing the notes. Interviews ranged from beyond the requested one hour 
to half-an-hour depending on the respondent. All interviews began with 
some general information on the nature of the research study. The 
interviews ranged from two per company to four to six depending on the 
research stage.
Case research is generally recognised to be intellectually challenging and 
highly demanding in terms of social skills and resources. Skill in the field 
of interviewing is critical to the success of the case study endeavour. In 
this study, it was quickly discovered that addressing concerns of 
confidentiality was of paramount importance. Prospective respondents had 
to be reassured that anything they might say in the course of an interview 
would not be divulged to outsiders. A great deal of information was 
gained under these circumstances.
Advance preparation led to research dividends. The case studies covered 
the histories of the ventures from creation to the point when the last 
interview was conducted. Company documents, annual reports and press 
cuttings, were the researcher’s secondary data sources. This spawned 
topical and current information and led to pertinent questions being asked at 
the interview stage. It also helped compare rhetoric with reality. Being 
well prepared helped increase one’s credibility in the eyes of the
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interviewee. Gaining the trust of the interviewee was very important in 
order to elicit an accurate account of what actually transpired. Establishing 
rapport took time. It was found that a few individuals became more 
committed to the study after time and were more forthcoming with 
information in follow-up interviews.
Interviews consisted of open-ended conversations during which respondents 
were allowed to talk freely and tell their stories. The initial question was 
open ended: ‘Please tell me about yourself and your experiences in starting 
and developing a business’. Particular attention was paid to if and why the 
organisation made a strategic change in direction. Later, when interviews 
and observations were directed by the emerging theory, the respondent was 
asked more direct questions bearing on defined categories. For instance, it 
emerged that crisis was prevalent in all firms, save Irish Breeze. This led 
to attempts to understand the source of the crisis, its repercussions, as well 
as including matters (eg., changes in ideology) not at first envisioned. The 
second phase used a more structured interview format specifically 
addressing categories such as crisis, key phases in the strategic 
development of the firm, the role of contextual factors and the role of 
founder in the process (see Appendix 1). Thus the content of the 
interviews reflected the conceptual concerns of this study. However, a 
conscious effort was made to aspire to objectivity. An attempt was made 
to pose the questions in a neutral manner to avoid the infiltration of bias 
and to encourage the respondent to think deeply about issues. At all 
stages, questions were carefully phrased in order to avoid overly theoretical 
language and establish a rapport with the respondent.
It was important to adopt a non-judgemental stance and be sensitive to the 
mind-set of the owner/manager. Avoiding the use of pejorative words, 
such as ‘crisis’ and ‘failure’ was part of the strategy of gaining rapport 
with the interviewee. Founders often take the opportunity to glorify their 
achievements but the boasts must be considered alongside evidence which
98
suggests that disappointment, disillusionment and mistakes, are all part of 
the process of developing a business. When interviewing respondents on 
contentious or sensitive issues, such as crisis, it was useful to address the 
issue saying, "....Inm y discussions with other firms, I found that some 
had undergone a critical period, did you experience a critical period which 
may have had major implications for the business?" This strategy followed 
directly from Schein’s (1985) notion that events are critical when 
participants themselves perceive them as such. Because certain events 
make a difference in people’s thought and action, they are ‘key’ events in 
the eyes of the organisational participants. It is usual to leave sensitive 
questions until near the end of an interview because this allows more time 
for the respondent to build up trust and confidence in the interviewer 
(Healey and Rawlinson, 1993).
A number of insights were gained by talking to many people in the same 
organisation. In view of the small size of some companies, it was not 
always possible to talk to individuals in managerial positions. Interviews 
were arranged with the founder, outsiders (eg., distributors or financial 
shareholders) and employees. This provided an opportunity to investigate 
emergent themes and patterns as the interviews progressed. This fulfilled 
the need for research to be both accurate and pluralist, e.g., competing 
versions of reality seen by actors in the strategic formation process. These 
interviews provided a check on internal validity. One founder played down 
the experience of a crisis, while other employees remembered it very 
differently. A company founder has a tendency to look on the positive side 
and understate negative events, while other mangers or employees were 
more outspoken about the detrimental effects ensuing from a crisis. Many 
founders were willing to participate in another interview, and volunteered 
other respondents. This showed their interest in the study. A form of 
‘convergent interviewing’ was adopted whereby themes and ideas identified 
from early interviews were followed up in subsequent interviews. At the 
end of each interview, the respondent was asked whether he or she had
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a n y t h i n g  to add to the narrative account in order to provide a check on 
internal validity. The founders of the four companies were sent a copy of 
the written narrative in order to give them the opportunity to review the 
contents and to increase the reliability of the findings. Only a few minor 
corrections resulted from this exercise. Academic researchers have little 
tangible to offer as an incentive to interviewees for their time, but 
promising some feedback helped make the process relevant and stimulating 
to them. Also the chances of a repeat visit may well have been increased.
Figure 3.2 outlines the nature of the research process. It began with a 
literature review and its objectives were manifold: one objective was to 
examine the current state of knowledge on the strategy formation process in 
SMEs, and develop an understanding of strategy process research in 
general. The literature review was also used to develop the conceptual 
framework, the main research questions and the research design for the 
current study. The first phase of the research process involved building up 
a database of issues to be explored. An overview of the strategy formation 
process was sought through initial interviews with respondents. The second 
phase of the research process involved explaining and exploring issues in 
more depth. A deeper understanding of the inter-relationships between the 
founder, context and history was sought. Some individuals had to be re­
interviewed so as to better understand the issues involved. The research 
agenda was much more focused in this stage. The overall aim throughout 
the research process was to strive for ‘information richness’ in the study of 
how strategies form in SMEs. The research led to the generation of 
conclusions, recommendations and a model of the strategy formation 
process.
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Literature review, research method, research questions and conceptual 
framework.
I
Phase 1
First interviewing stage
Tracking the strategy formation process 
in each case company
Building up a database of issues to be 
explored.
Preliminary coding of interesting themes
I
Phase 2
Second interviewing stage
Exploring and explaining issues in depth.
Attention focused on leadership, 
contextual and historical forces.
Constant comparison
Categorization of patterns.
Figure 3.2: An outline of the research process
4
Conclusions, recommendations and areas for future research
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Analysing the data
Inductive research is perceived to represent a critical intellectual process 
for all engaged in the area. According to Eisenhardt (1989, p. 539), 
‘analysing the data is the heart of building theory from case studies, but it 
is it the most difficult and least codified part of the process’. Miles and 
Huberman (1984, p. 16) remarked that it is often difficult to follow how a 
researchers got from field notes to the final conclusions. Eisenhardt 
(1989) argues for both within-case and cross-case analysis in order to 
generate novel, accurate and reliable theory.
Within case analysis
The first key task is that of within-case analysis. One of the realities of 
case study research is the staggering volume of data produced which is 
compounded by the fact that the research question is often open-ended 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Within case analysis typically involves pure 
descriptions or detailed case study write-ups for each site. These write-ups 
are central to the generation of insight. The overall idea is to become as 
intimately familiar as possible with each case. This process allows the 
unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to 
generalise patterns across cases (Miles and Huberman, 1984). In this 
study, within case analysis isolated certain issues such as the role of the 
founder, the role of contextual and historical forces.
Cross case analysis
Cross-case analysis involves the search for themes and patterns in an 
attempt to make intuitive sense (Miles and Huberman, 1994). People are 
notoriously poor processors of information. There may be a tendency to 
reach premature and false conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989), to leap to 
conclusions based on limited data (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) to
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inadvertently drop disconfirming evidence (Nisbett and Ross, 1980) or be 
overly influenced by elite respondents (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Good 
cross case analysis counteracts these tendencies by looking at data in 
divergent ways. This study adhered to these guidelines.
This author was guided by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and employed the 
constant comparative approach. Creative insight often arises from the 
juxtaposition of contradictory or paradoxical evidence (Cameron and 
Quinn, 1988). The goal is to identify the differences that are responsible 
for contradictory outcomes in relatively similar circumstances (Pettigrew, 
Ferlie and McKee, 1992, p. 29). In other words, powerful information 
may be revealed when two cases may appear very similar, yet experience 
very different outcomes. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the constant 
juxtaposition of conflicting realities generates theory with less researcher 
bias than theory built from armchair deduction or from incremental studies. 
A myth surrounding the case method is that the process is limited by 
investigator’s preconceptions, in fact, the opposite is true (Eisenhardt,
1989).
Eisenhardt (1989) advocates the use of several tactics. One tactic is that of 
forced comparisons. She advocates that the researcher select pairs of cases 
and list similarities and differences between each pair. Another tactic is to 
select categories (eg. crisis, phases, role of founder, context) or dimensions 
and look for within group similarities coupled with differences. This forces 
the researcher to go beyond initial impressions and capture novel findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Miles and Huberman (1994) advocate the use of 
tabular displays or sequence analysis to organise data. All these tactics 
lead to a more sophisticated understanding of the data and help break 
simplistic frames of thinking. In this study both within and cross-case 
analysis proved invaluable in generating insights. The constant 
comparative approach provided extensive data on phases of strategic 
development, the role of context, the role of the founder, the role of
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history and changing ideologies.
Whilst conducting inductive case study research, the author has discovered 
features which may be of interest to other researchers using the case 
method. In order to distil themes and patterns from the data, it is vitally 
important to avoid premature categorisation of data. This researcher found 
that initial conclusions were strongly influenced by other research findings. 
The inexperienced researcher may show a lack of confidence in the data 
and look for themes that confirm the work of others in the field. An over­
familiarity with the literature can sometimes act as a barrier to 
interpretative analysis and it is therefore important to ‘unfreeze’ one’s 
thinking patterns. This can be achieved by re-focusing on the data and 
allowing a story to unfold. The constant comparison of apparently 
dissimilar cases helped generate new insight which may not have been 
possible if similar types of firms were selected.
Colleagues and fellow researchers can play a very helpful role in the 
generation of fresh angles. By asking pertinent questions, these individuals 
can challenge the researcher to think more deeply about issues. At certain 
stages, there is the danger that the researcher becomes too ‘close’ to the 
data or too rigid in one’s thinking. The use of research seminars, working 
papers, informal discussions with one’s peers, all allows the researcher to 
discuss tentative research findings and obtain feedback. All these features 
of inductive research makes it a very fluid, unstructured and uncertain 
process. In the later stages of the research process, it was important to 
analyze the empirical data in tandem with the literature review in order to 
highlight divergent and congruent views. The process of generating fresh 
insight was central to the author’s research interests. Discovering how this 
was achieved should provide a rich source of learning here. Throughout 
the study, a journal was maintained which documented initial impressions, 
ideas and potential areas of interest. This was a practical means of 
analysing data in tandem with data collection. It was important not to jump
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to conclusions too early on in the study. However, it was important to 
retain initial impressions in order to revisit these at a later stage. The data 
and the literature were revisited many times in order to seek improved 
explanations and interpretations of the strategy formation process. The 
journal proved useful in tracing the development of thought over the three 
years of the research.
Summary
This chapter described the research methodology adopted for the purposes 
of examining the strategy formation process in SMEs. The 
subjective/interpretative approach was taken since it was deemed most 
appropriate for the study of strategy formation processes in SMEs. This 
approach is congruent with the researcher’s values, ontological and 
epistemological outlook. The chapter described the research methods used, 
such as grounded theory (constant comparative method) and the inductive 
case method. An account was given of the challenges and pitfalls inherent 
in the use of the case study method. It was stressed that creativity, 
perseverance and uncertainty lay at the heart of the inductive case method.
The chapter has indicated a number of features that may be of interest to 
other researchers. Firstly, ethical issues such as confidentiality, frankness 
and respect of those under study is of cardinal importance. This is crucial 
in negotiating access and in gaining good quality information. Secondly, 
the use of multiple interviews within one company not only increased the 
dependability of the findings, but also generated a great richness of 
information. Thirdly, the use of cases from a variety of industries helped 
‘unfreeze’ thinking patterns and generate new insight, that may not have 
been possible if similar types of firms were chosen. The use of diagrams 
and tables also helped stimulate lateral thinking. Lastly, colleagues often 
adopt a mentoring role which is crucial in stimulating the researcher to 
think more deeply about the issues. The adoption of this method has
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uncovered a number of important elements in the strategy formation 
process in SMEs that have been previously missed or ignored.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STRATEGY FORMATION PROCESS IN
IRISH SMEs: CASE NARRATIVES OF THE CASES
Introduction
This chapter draws upon empirical data to describe the process of strategy 
formation in Irish companies. Table 4.1 gives a profile of the case 
companies. The case narratives of four cases are presented in this chapter 
and the case narratives of the other five cases are presented in the 
appendices.
Table 4.1: Company profiles
Firm Estb. Size Turn Over Industry Interviews
QFS 1985 80 £6.5
million
Software 6
Fiacla 1983 25 £3 million Toothpaste 4
McKeown 1976 120 £7.4
million
Software 3
Kestrel 1986 30 Confidential Security 3
Irish
Breeze
1984 2 £3.5
million
Soap 4
Caraplas 1987 Nil Nil Plastics 1
Braycot 1989 28 £1.5
Million
Biscuits 4
BFK
Design
1989 20 Confidential Graphic
Design
3
RTI 1988 13 £0.5
Million
Peripheral
Devices
5
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Case company 1: Fiacla
Introduction
Fiacla Ltd. was established in 1983 over 10 years ago. Its main product is 
‘Fiacla’, the only Irish-made toothpaste on the domestic market. It 
presently holds over 10% of the Irish toothpaste market and accounts for a 
further 4% of the market through the manufacture of ‘own label’ toothpaste 
for the major supermarket chains. Approximately 60% of business is for 
the export market. The company employs approximately 25 people in its 
facility in Dublin, including five part-time. At present, company turnover 
is around the £3m mark on the home and export markets.
Start-up
The firm was established by a former construction engineer, Richard 
Brierley. He worked abroad for some time before settling in Ireland in 
1982. He decided to set up his own company, mainly because he was 
disillusioned with working for multi-nationals. Initially, the main goal of 
Brierley was to simply start up in business - any business. He looked at 
several possibilities, such as the production of soap. After being made 
aware of the lack of indigenous Irish products, he decided to examine the 
market for toothpaste. Research showed that, with the exception of 
Stafford Miller that mainly exports Sensodyne toothpaste, there was an 
import substitution opportunity for toothpaste. There were possibilities in 
the own label market as well. However, Brierley’s intention of producing 
toothpaste was met with scepticism from state bodies. Little support was 
forthcoming from organisations like the Irish Goods Council. David Fox 
of Gillespies & Co. was approached by Brierley to act as distributor for the 
firm. Gillespie & Co. is a well established distribution company, founded 
in 1912, that handles various types of merchandise including household 
products, personal hygiene products and baby foods. Its products are
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strongly represented in the grocery trade and it has the advantage of a 
strong distribution operation. David Fox’s first impressions of the 
entrepreneur were favourable:
He seemed like a guy who knew what he was talking about.
His background struck me as a bit strange, but sometimes they 
make the best entrepreneurs. They do not see problems only 
solutions. They do not realise the implications of things.
We need a bull headed attitude; I think he went into the 
venture without realising the commercial risks involved.
He was full of praise for the entrepreneur:
It was his idea, his drive, his initiative that got it off 
the ground. We facilitated it but we did not start it up.
I would not take that from him for a moment. He put all his 
eggs in one basket. It was a speculative venture. He had 
to make it work. I suspect he made a few bob in England.
He had money to invest although he was not wealthy.
It was a case of either all or nothing.
Initially the company operated on a very modest scale. Only a few people 
were involved with the venture and the process of business start-up was 
fluid and haphazard. Richard Brierley began production by doing 
everything himself. His start-up capital was £15,000. He used the services 
of a local accountant and built up a relationship with his local bank 
manager. For the first few months, the toothpaste was sub-contracted out 
to a company in Connemara and a small grant was received from Udaras 
na Gaeltachta. This arrangement was soon terminated by the founder 
because of the difficulties associated with being too far away from the 
manufacturing process. He had no control over production or quality.
The plastic tubes were sourced in Germany and the UK. In May 1984, the 
new venture moved to Bray, Co. Wicklow, where production began in 
earnest. Formal strategies did not exist in the early days. The marketing 
manager remarked that Richard Brierley had a clear idea of what he wanted 
to achieve but doubted very much if he had well defined goals or actual
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marketing goals. Brierley simply knew how much he had to produce in 
order to make a profit. He knew that he had to obtain a certain percentage 
of the Irish market in order to be successful. According to the marketing 
manager, the primary motivating factor for Richard Brierley was money.
The IDA (Industrial Development Authority) was unwilling to assist 
Brierley initially. Once the IDA saw that he was serious and was actually 
selling toothpaste, they helped him secure a basic, second hand mixer and 
filling machine. Thus Fiacla initially started out with some ‘very basic, 
antiquated’ production equipment. Aluminium tubes were used which 
caused problems. Customer complaints arose because the Fiacla design 
wore off the tubes. The tube suppliers were unhelpful and disclaimed all 
responsibility. Brierley decided to change from aluminium tubes to plastic 
in order to resolve this problem. He changed very quickly from an import 
substitute philosophy to one where he produced a product of top quality, at 
a competitive price, that could compete with the likes of Colgate and not 
simply be marketed and sold purely on an Irish platform. By November 
1984, Fiacla was formally launched. The company concentrated on the 
home market selling through multiples. This kept the founder from despair 
and from bankruptcy in the early days. Richard Brierley remarked that his 
products today ‘are every bit as good as the multi-nationals’. This 
company ethos helped him win sales contracts.
David Fox, the managing director of Gillespie & Co. the distributor, 
believed that Richard Brierley produced a very good product. He remarked 
that Brierley’s strengths lay in manufacturing, product innovation and in his 
ability to source new business. He strove for a level of excellence in 
manufacturing. Another of Brierley’s strengths was his ability to predict 
trends and developments in the market. For instance, he was the first to 
market baking soda toothpaste in the Irish market. His great belief in the 
venture helped him through difficult periods. His degree of commitment to 
the venture was noted by David Fox:
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It required a total degree of commitment.
I do not know if I would have done it. He had family, 
commitments...
Richard Brierley described his own personal philosophy towards business:
I suppose an entrepreneur is some one who believes in 
what they do, believes in the product, is able to make it 
happen...There were many times when I lost faith, but 
not for long though, because I would have nothing to go 
on with, it is a matter of keeping it going.
The distributor saw Richard Brierley as critical to the survival of the 
company; Brierley was very much a force on the ground and indispensable 
to the operation. He realised the danger of over-dependence on one key 
individual, but remarked that since Richard Brierley was relatively young 
in terms of retirement it was not a problem at the moment. Fiacla won the 
1993 Small Business of the Year Award sponsored by The Sunday Business 
Post and ACC Bank.
According to the quality control manager, Maggie Gillespie, the company 
was very much ‘a one-man company’. It was built up from nothing by 
Richard Brierley. He had no knowledge of the toothpaste industry when he 
first started. He had spent 20 years in the construction industry, so it was 
‘a matter of bringing people together who had industry knowledge and who 
knew how to formulate toothpaste, how to fill it, everything’. Brierley 
learned about business as he went along. According to the marketing 
manager, Paul O Neill, the entrepreneur was a very important force in the 
development of Fiacla. He did a great deal of work at ground level, he 
promoted the product and obtained retailer support. He was ‘a driving 
force’ in the business and applied pressure on Paul O’ Neill, the marketing 
manager, to promote the product.
Maggie Gillespie (Quality Control Manager) attributed the survival of the
111
company to the tenacity of the managing director, his risk taking, and his 
entrepreneurial spirit. She believed that the managing director was willing 
to give ‘over 100% of himself’ to the venture. She remarked that risks 
could work for or against a company, and on the whole, the risks worked 
for them. Richard Brier ley persisted with the venture in the face of 
adversity and remarked that it was his ‘sheer bloody-mindedness’ that made 
him refuse to give up along with his sense of belief in the venture.
Richard Brierley remarked:
It’s a matter of keeping it going, not losing faith in it 
but keeping it going. You have to make it work.. .{The one 
factor blocking the growth of companies} are people sitting 
back waiting for it to happen, instead making it happen.
A lot of people sit back and say we need support, we have got 
to have support to do this, but unless they get up and go and 
do it themselves, they are not going to achieve anything...
One of the strengths of the founder was his ability to generate ideas, but 
this was a mixed blessing given that his ideas were not always practical. 
The marketing manager felt that Brierley did not always assess ideas in a 
strategic manner:
Basically it is a filling plant. He could make 
cosmetic products tomorrow for example. We have to think 
do we want to get into the market?... He has come to us with 
all these ideas...Our idea is to bring his ideas forward, look 
at which are the best financially for him and for the strategic 
development of the company.
The distributor also saw him as an enthusiastic, ideas-oriented individual:
He always wants to do something. You can never talk to 
Dick without him having some idea floating around in his head.
He would be a progenitor of most of these ideas. We would be 
the passive shareholders. He has a very active mind, chase this, 
chase that. We would be more or less responding to his suggestions 
and requests.
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Encouragement given to import substitution businesses
In the early days, Brierley planned to produce for the own label market, 
but realised very quickly that the company would not survive by depending 
on this high volume/low margin business. Within a year, Brierley realised 
that he needed to produce a branded product as well. The barriers to entry 
consisted of well established competitors who possessed economies of 
scale, a large advertising budget and brand name equity. Their products 
were heavily supported by above and below-the-line advertising. In spite 
of the fact that he would be competing against the multi-nationals in the 
FMCG (fast moving consumer goods) sector, Brierley was confident that 
the Trishness’ of his product would be a key success factor.
An early marketing objective was to promote the toothpaste on a strong 
Irish platform and much thought went into the proposed marketing of the 
product. The gaelic name ‘Fiacla’, the Irish for teeth, was devised by the 
‘Buy Irish’ campaigners. The package design was original and 
recognizably ‘Irish’ in style; for instance the letter "F" came from the book 
of Kells. Free publicity played an important part in generating awareness 
and interest in the new product. A slot on the ‘Late Late Show’ (a major 
Irish television show) helped boost sales. The entrepreneur spoke about the 
favourable conditions in the industry that facilitated company start-up:
To set up the company in the present day, in the same way, 
would have been impossible. Twelve years ago, Ireland was 
pushing for import substitution and that’s why the company was 
started and how it survived its first year.
Fiacla received considerable media coverage as one of the best home-spun 
success stories of the 1980s. The story had appeal and the company was 
portrayed by the media as a perfect example of ‘David versus Goliath’ in 
modern day business: it was a small company competing in an Irish oral 
hygiene market utterly dominated by multi-nationals.
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The nature of the industry
Richard Brierley remarked that the environment was not subject to rapid 
change but on-going change; change depended mainly on the product 
development activities of the multi-nationals. His company was generally a 
follower rather than a leader of trends as regards new product 
development. Brierley monitored newspaper reports, patent advertisements 
and competitor activity in an attempt to keep pace with the competition.
According to Maggie Gillespie (Quality Manager) the toothpaste industry 
has become much more market-led than it was ten years ago. Toothpaste 
was no longer seen as a commodity product that simply cleaned teeth. The 
marketing of toothpaste has become much more sophisticated. Attributes 
such as: effectiveness in fighting cavities; breadth freshness; gum 
protection and whitening properties have become increasingly important. 
People were prepared to pay a premium for these speciality products.
Care for teeth was brought to the forefront of general health needs.
Dentists encouraged consumers to care for their teeth, consumers became 
more educated about dental health and the wider availability of medical 
cards meant that standards of oral hygiene improved. These factors 
benefited the industry as a whole. As a result, the Irish market offered 
strong growth potential to producers of oral hygiene products. It was 
estimated that the Irish market for oral hygiene products was worth £23 
million in 1995. Toothpaste accounted for £15.5 - £20 million. The 
growth rate in the toothpaste sector was estimated at 13% per annum.
Total sales growth were spurred by increasing concerns about oral health, 
innovation, the proliferation of toothpaste products and the increase in 
promotional activity and market segmentation. The marketing manager 
noted that since toothpaste was a product used by virtually everyone, this 
helped fuel the sales of Fiacla.
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Since the 1970s, concentration in retailing began to affect the power of the 
large food and non-food manufacturers. The latter’s control over 
conditions of sale was substantially weakened by the abolition of resale 
price maintenance, concentration in the ownership of shops and the advent 
of own brands. Retailers started duplicating manufacturers’ products, in 
effect, competing with the manufacturers. Retailers worked to discard the 
‘cheap and nasty’ image of own label products and sought to provide good 
quality own label products at a competitive price to consumers. These 
trends stimulated Richard Brierley to produce own label for the multiples.
Role of distributors
Richard Brierley was introduced to Gillespie & Co. within the first year of 
operations. The distributor brought valuable marketing and management 
expertise to the company. According to David Fox:
A company like him could not have got off the ground unless they 
associated with a company like us. They could not have afforded to 
do what we do due to the logistics involved... Distribution is an 
expensive business. There were hidden benefits as well. Banks did 
not lean as heavily on him as they would on someone else because 
of our background.
The marketing manager claimed that the arrangement with the distributor 
was mutually beneficial to both parties and helped offset each others 
strengths and weaknesses.
A major decision
In 1989, Richard Brierley was confronted with a fundamental decision.
The company badly needed extra production capacity if it was to seize new 
export opportunities. New filling and mixing machines were needed to 
sustain high quality, timely delivery and low cost. It was estimated that 
investment of approximately £500,000 was needed to move the company
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from a very small concern into an enterprise geared for expansion and 
growth. The founder approached the IDA for grant aid, but they refused to 
give grants to the business unless the UK market was first developed.
Only then would they consider grant aiding the business. He claimed that 
it was a classic ‘chicken and egg situation’; the company urgently needed 
extra production capacity but had to have the markets to justify it.
Moreover, in the toothpaste industry, there were conventions as to what 
constituted a respectable size, sufficient to impress potential customers. In 
the end, plant and equipment was financed through a leasing agreement 
with Gillespie & Co. and Richard Brierley invested a good deal of his own 
money. He remarked that the capital investment decision was the most 
significant decision taken by him. The company suffered the consequences 
of that decision for the following six years, since a heavy debt burden was 
placed on the company. Richard Brierley said:
It was very risky, but without that decision, we would not be here 
today. We would not be able to produce a product as efficiently as 
we do now. We would not be able to offer to produce for people 
and do it on time, had we not taken the risk, had we not spent the 
money.
Experience of crisis
In 1989, disaster struck when the company through which the founder was 
selling into Poland collapsed, owing a substantial amount of money. The 
major problems faced by Fiacla were:
(1) Collapse of customer base
(2) Overdependence on one market
(3) Overcapacity
(4) Credit control problems
Maggie Gillespie explained that Poland was their prime export market and
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the company had reached the stage where it needed extra capacity. She 
explained the reasons for the crisis:
...we then bought a new mixing machine which had a capacity of 
1,800 kilos. Having got that, we had to go out and find markets to 
make sure we were utilising capacity to the full. We went from a 
position of under capacity to over capacity, which economically, 
was not a good idea. Having got this new equipment, then suddenly 
the bottom dropped out of the Polish market we had been serving. 
We had got a lot of packaging in Polish and were really left in a 
hole. So we went through a year of crisis.
She believed that in retrospect they were over dependent on the Polish 
market. Yet, they had to make an investment in capital equipment simply 
to carry on making toothpaste for Poland. The export opportunity came 
along and they seized it, without having the capacity to do it very well.
She said:
We could not say no to it. In fact, we had to take the risk. 
It was a chicken and egg situation. It was a way of 
increasing production.
The causes of the crisis
It was generally agreed that the company was poorly managed at the time 
of the crisis episode. The marketing manager saw Richard Brierley as a 
very impatient man who wanted ‘total control’. David Fox, the managing 
director of Gillespies remarked:
He was hell bent on keeping the order book full, but that must be 
done on a rational, commercial basis.
The crisis could have led to the demise of the company save for the 
intervention of Gillespie. Their function, according to Maggie Gillespie, 
was to counter the risk tendencies of the entrepreneur, particularly since the
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firm was almost brought to the brink of disaster. After the take-over, the 
entrepreneur’s span of control over all aspects of the business was 
curtailed. In retrospect, the entrepreneur claimed that there were many 
things he should have done differently:
For one thing, I would have researched the idea a lot better than I 
did, and I would not have tried to do everything myself. Ideally, 
having a small team of people together means that you have a little 
think tank to come up with solutions. And share the worries. My 
biggest mistake was not having enough finance and expertise in the 
early days. Having both of these would have helped us get on a lot 
further a lot quicker. The factory was built up in a very piece-meal 
way. If I had the finance to buy the right machinery from the start, 
it would have made things so much easier.
Richard Brierley was perceived to have the expertise, the know-how and 
information needed to deal with all aspects of business start-up and 
development. However, the crisis exposed his areas of vulnerability. 
Davis Fox said:
I do not think it was a bad idea to go into Poland. I think it was a 
bad idea to extend so much credit, far in excess of normal credit 
terms. It was very imprudent. Cash and credit control is critical to 
the well being of a company at that stage... Since then we have 
insisted that credit controls be taken. So if someone does not pay 
up, at least we are assured that he has assets....It was not the most 
glorious moment in the company’s history, but we did not fall out 
over it.
Recovery from crisis and the on-going development of the firm
As part of the recovery plan, costs were cut and people were laid off. 
Proper cash and credit control procedures were clearly needed. To 
survive, Brierley was forced to put his workers on a three-day week. He 
fought aggressively for contracts and invested any profits into the company. 
Conditions improved within the year ‘after a lot of hard work’. Richard 
Brierley had to rethink his strategy and his philosophy underwent a subtle
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shift. This critical phase left the owner with the intention of ‘expanding 
prudently’. The company reviewed their contracts more carefully, looked 
for letters of credit, and became more cautious on the financial front. 
Richard Brierley regretted that the company did not grow as large as he 
had hoped it would. He attributed this to:
customers going bust, customers giving us bad debt, things like 
that.. .that whole situation - ‘we have not been paid, we are not 
paying you’, these hiccups have caused difficulties. We have come 
through all of them, and worse, and survived.
There was a concerted effort to build a relationship with new distributors 
so that early warning signs of trouble would be detected. The importance 
of obtaining letters of credit and negotiating payment terms was 
underscored by the experience of crisis. The founder has also learned the 
paramount importance of cash flow to a small business as a result of the 
crisis:
You have got to have a very close control on costs....our product 
and company reputation that we have built up over the years is a 
very important part of the business, but none of that works unless 
your efficiencies are there, and that’s the most important thing, 
keeping control on the finances...Because of our borrowings, the 
number of people involved, we have to have formal procedures.
We have to keep an eye on one of our major costs - transportation - 
and get the best rates we can.
According to Davis Fox:
There were some very positive aspects to going through that period, 
from everyone’s point of view. Credit limits were placed on all 
accounts. Credit insurance was sought. Richard realised that sales 
are one thing, getting payment is another. I think he learned an 
awful lot from that. It was a tremendous learning curve. It could 
have been a very expensive one...
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David Fox remarked that Richard Brierley ‘is a far more rounded business 
man today’ than when he first started out. He gained greater knowledge of 
marketing and accounting. The company started from very humble 
beginnings. In David Fox’s view, ‘it was almost out of the bath, a bucket 
and shovel situation. ’ The company experienced major change with the 
passage of time. Its degree of sophistication improved, its in-house product 
testing along with its financial stability improved considerably. Maggie 
Gillespie said:
I think, after the initial shock, we reacted positively. We had to 
pull ourselves up again, look for new markets, maybe safer 
markets...We were certainly more cautious for a time. It’s a risk 
business. But, we do not put all our eggs in one basket any longer. 
We are spread. We are exporting to Russia a lot now. We have 
been doing a lot of work for UK companies, some of the blue chip 
companies, the safer ones.
Maggie Gillespie remarked that the company has undergone major change:
We have learned as we have gone along. We are much 
more professional now. We have credibility. Richard came into 
the business knowing nothing about toothpaste. For people like the 
Body Shop to take us on shows that we have a certain standing in 
the industry. It has been a learning process. Hopefully, we have 
learned by our mistakes and we are now taken seriously. There has 
been major changes in that respect.
As a result of the crisis of 1989, Gillespie bought 51% of the company. 
They increased their share to 55 %, leaving the founder with the remaining 
45%. In return, they invested badly needed capital. Gillespie’s 
involvement in the business was mainly on the marketing and distribution 
side and it was also represented at board level. According to the 
distributors, the day-to-day management of the business was left to the 
founder but major decisions went through the board of directors. Selling 
part of the business, according to the entrepreneur, represented the most 
difficult decision he ever faced. Ceding control was difficult since he had
120
worked hard to ensure the firm’s success and had assumed the risks of 
business start-up. According to the entrepreneur:
Selling was a matter of safe-guarding what we had achieved and 
trying to make sure that it would survive into the future, which it 
has done. Any financial decisions after that were to help the 
company grow. Additional support in the management structure 
was the main reason for selling out.
A gap in management calibre seemed to be a factor that contributed to the 
crisis. According to Maggie Gillespie:
They were a sort of controlling factor on our risk taking. They 
were a distribution company so they came to it with a rather 
different view.
This view was echoed by David Fox:
Dick probably feels that we should have allowed him to grow 
quicker, faster. We are more prudent. As we move from one stage 
to another, there is a sound financial basis behind it. Looking to the 
future, there is a more strategic based approach to it, as opposed to 
say an instinctive based approach. So there is a dichotomy there. It 
is that Dick would be much more hell bent, lets go for that, lets try 
to run a 100 yards in 10 seconds as opposed to 15 seconds which 
will take longer...
It is unlikely that the founder will sell his shareholding to Gillespie & Co. 
in the future. The possibility of a management buy-out was not ruled out 
by him. The entrepreneur built up a reputation for his company based on 
high standards of customer service together with a high quality product.
He also targeted the smaller manufacturers, which as a market niche, 
tended to be ignored by the multinationals. Maggie Gillespie suggested 
that Fiacla, like most small companies, had to be flexible and had to 
compete on service. If small quantities were needed, they supplied them, 
or if orders were needed in a hurry, they ‘would do their utmost’ to satisfy
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customer needs. The larger companies were not interested in supplying 
that market. Although Fiacla’s facilities were quite limited, they carried 
out as much R&D as possible. Customer service was a crucial element in 
the company’s strategy:
The Body Shop has a rapport with us, which is the same with a lot
of our clients Our prime competitive advantage is our flexibility
and the fact that we have a good relationship with customers. We 
have an expertise in our field. We are willing to pass it on to our 
customers, and are prepared to help them.
A reassessment of the company and its objectives took place in the 
aftermath of the crisis. A broad strategy emerged. The two major thrusts 
were:
(1) To improve competitiveness both in terms of costs and the ability to 
add value.
(2) To change the shape of the strategy in respect of both products and 
territorial spread.
A company strategy emerged over the years although planning was absent 
in the early days since the founder did not see it as being necessary. He 
maintained that with only three people it ‘was very easy to know what was 
going on.’ According to the quality control manager, they never adopted a 
deliberate strategy. The company seized opportunities and created their 
own opportunities. Its thrust was proactive, it was quite aggressive in 
pursuing markets, but it was also reactive in some areas. The company, by 
virtue of its size, was a follower of technological trends.
The entrepreneur’s aim was to develop value-added products and enter 
markets where customers were not overly price sensitive. There was a 
significant price differential between own label toothpaste, regular 
toothpaste and speciality toothpastes such as the sensitive brand.
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Consumers saw toothpaste as both a dental and a cosmetic product and 
concern with oral hygiene helped boosted the sales of Fiacla every year 
since start-up. New products included: a travel pack with tube and 
toothpaste; a toothpaste aimed at the children’s market and Fiacla Smokers. 
Brierley was the first to introduce the flip-top tube cap to the Irish market 
which replaced the old screw-on caps. The company received the sensitive 
product licence in 1992, being the second manufacturer in Britain and 
Ireland to achieve that status. The company followed trends in the US for 
a baking soda toothpaste. A ‘baking-soda’ toothpaste was launched in 1994 
which proved very popular. The company’s success was based on these 
speciality toothpastes. Any attempt at expanding the product range meant 
that new equipment had to be bought, as new products required different 
materials, different tube variants, different methods of filling and mixing.
Due to the limited size of the domestic market, the export market became 
increasingly important to the long term strategy of the company. Exports 
consisted mainly of special brand orders and other own-brands for 
manufacturers. Own label export markets included France, the Czech 
republic, Poland and Finland, Britain, and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAR). The UK market was a very difficult market to break into because 
of its competitiveness. In time, a contract was won to produce own label 
for the Body Shop, a major chain store, and the Purity Loft in the UK. 
Most of their business was obtained through contacts and word-of-mouth 
advertising. The company won the AIB export award in 1993, showing the 
extent to which they had turned the company around. There was a change 
in philosophy on the part of the Irish Export Board, who began to see the 
necessity of targeting newly accessible markets, such as Eastern Europe. 
The fall of communism and the transition to a market-based economy 
brought with it great opportunities but also high levels of uncertainty and 
environmental turbulence. The Irish Trade Board was very supportive to 
the firm in recent years.
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Fiacla signed a technology transfer arrangement with a UK company in 
1994. The UK outfit bought into the company’s expertise and gave 
Richard Brierley access to the bigger UK market for toothpaste. In 1994, 
the company obtained a product licence that classified them as a 
pharmaceutical company under the National Advisory Board.
The marketing manager remarked that the company has become more 
focused. Fiacla started to devise critical goals (i.e product development or 
expansion into Europe) and people worked towards achieving a few limited 
goals rather than several goals. He suggested that this focus was not 
present in the beginning:
At the start you need 20 things to happen to make the business 
worthwhile. Whereas when you achieve those 20 items, you then 
start to pick and chose. You say: I ’d really like to get into that 
market and you target that market...You can choose your goals once 
the business area is up and running. The company has become 
much more focused. What we do we like to do it well.
Company strategy after the crisis involved spreading risk, developing a 
range of value added products, focusing on small companies who value 
flexibility, maintaining its export ethos, building on its reputation for 
reliability and quality of service, and monitoring manufacturing and 
transportation costs. This strategy did not exist in the early years.
The entrepreneur’s view of company strengths:
(1) High level of customer service.
(2) Flexibility.
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The entrepreneur’s view of company weaknesses:
(1) Its geographic location at the edge of Europe which makes it more 
difficult to compete with other companies on price and places pressure 
on company’s profit margins. Brierley remarked that it will always be 
more expensive to distribute a toothpaste which is manufactured at 
source in Ireland.
(2) Maggie Gillespie saw lack of capital investment as the biggest obstacle 
to growth.
Company culture
Maggie Gillespie described the company culture as informal and remarked 
on the co-operative spirit that was present among all the workers. Their 
staff turnover was very low and most workers have been with the company 
for years. She said:
I think, like a lot o f small companies, we all pull together very 
closely. Communication is good between us all. This is a strength 
of the company.
According to Richard Brierley:
We certainly don’t have the rigidities that a lot of companies have, 
where it is all laid down in black and white, ‘you do this, you do 
that’. We have that to a certain degree because we have got GMP 
(good manufacturing practise). We have to work together, we 
interact, nobody has any demarcation lines - they are all part of a 
small company and have to help others to make it work. We really 
don’t have any major problems, everyone works for everyone else. 
It is not a ‘them and us’ situation. We are all here to do a job and 
keep each other in employment.
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Presence of long term plans
After the crisis, the entrepreneur carried out long term planning to a certain 
degree, but most planning tended to be short-term in nature and revolved 
around production and financial planning. Richard Brier ley maintained that 
keeping a control on costs was essential. Maggie Gillespie saw the lack 
purpose built premises as an obstacle to growth. She said:
We sort of go in lurches and then plateau off. We climb, and then 
plateau off. But before we can go ahead, we have to get capital 
investment behind us. Richard Brierley is looking at ways of doing 
that at the moment...Future objectives centres on getting new 
premises, whereby we will be able to confidently invite buyers from 
European countries to come and see us...But the constraints will be 
the actual buildings. We just do not have enough room. The lack 
of purpose built premises certainly blocks the growth of the 
company.
According to Richard Brierley, £750,000 has been invested in the business 
over the period 1990 to 1994. This included a capital investment of 
£500,000 on equipment and refurbishment. The expansion was part of the 
strategy to double turnover by mid 1992 and hold 20% of the Irish market 
within the following two years. This was largely achieved without 
government grants. Recourse was made to the cheap government 
subsidized loan scheme launched in 1994 to assist business enterprise in 
acquiring capital equipment. The company hopes to obtain the ISO 9000 
accreditation in the near future. Another aim of the company is to develop 
an international brand for the English language market in 1995, because 
Fiacla has limited international appeal. The company hopes to further 
develop the European market.
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Case company 2: RTI
Introduction
RTI was founded in 1979. It is an indigenous Irish firm which trades 
within the electronic point of sale/service (EPOS) market. The company 
pioneered the use of PC technology at the point-of-sale. This enabled 
medium sized companies to use POS systems in a cost efficient way. The 
company’s expertise lies in the area of ‘peripheral handling’ and 
‘application programme interfaces’ (API), designed particularly for PC 
(personal computer) EPOS. In simple terms, these products enable 
peripherals such as printers, bar code scanners, customer displays, etc., to 
be connected to standard PCs for use as advanced cash registers. This is 
done through a series of Local Area Networking (LAN) and Wide Area 
Networking (WAN). The end product is eventually sold for use as 
advanced cash registers in book stores, petrol stations, supermarkets, 
cinemas, department stores, restaurants, franchise outlets, and so forth in 
the point of sale/service area of the industry. The company employees 13 
people, and being such a small company, it had to fight hard to establish 
itself in a large, competitive and volatile market.
To date, because of its relatively small size, the group has relied on 
licensing as the primary route for commercially exploiting its technology. 
In 1996, the company made a significant break with the past by developing 
a new technology to be incorporated into its own range of products. It is 
presently negotiating a major financial package in order to bring the 
company to its next phase of development.
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Start-up and the role of the entrepreneur:
Jim Barry, the founder of RTI, had a varied and interesting background.
He went to sea with the Merchant Navy soon after leaving school. He 
entered the Atlantic College in Dublin for a year and a half and qualified as 
a radio officer. He worked for several years with Marconi and Phoenix 
Relays. He also worked for RTE from 1968 to 1972 but left to found his 
own company. In retrospect, he claimed that:
Leaving RTE was a major move. It was a secure job. I could have 
gone places in RTE. The attraction, at the time, o f doing things 
yourself, was really the motivation. I just wanted to get involved 
for myself. I wanted to see if I could achieve something, make 
things.
He became General Manager of Phoenix Relays, which subsequently 
became one of the largest and most successful independent TV cable 
company in Ireland. His involvement with the emerging cable TV industry 
was a profitable one. In 1977, the Commodore PET computer was 
launched on the market and the founder developed a network for these 
types of machines - the first of the ‘client/server’ type of technology. He 
took the basic Commodore PET, added a keyboard, printer and other 
peripherals and networked that into another Commodore. Today, all PCs 
are networked. At the time, the company failed to recognise the potential 
of networking and concentrated instead on the POS system. The 
Commodore PCs were quite primitive but Jim Barry claimed that at least 
they started learning about the technology and about market requirements:
We were specialists in that area. We were in it pre- the personal 
computer. We were doing programmable device drivers for POS 
before anyone else.
Most of the company employees saw the organisation, its strategy and 
culture, as a reflection of the founding manager. According to one
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employee: ‘it is very much Jim Barry’s company. It is unique in that 
sense.’
The employees believed that the founder and his technical ingenuity was 
crucial in the development of the firm. As a result, Jim Barry had 
significant input into the product development activities of the firm. He 
said:
The management style is democratic in a lot of ways, especially in 
relation to product development. Maybe it is autocratic in other 
ways. I would have a significant influence on what way we go as 
far as development is concerned.
All employees saw the founder as instrumental in the development of the 
company. According to the financial manager, he was ‘a great lateral 
thinker, a great ideas m an’. According to the international sales manager:
He was instrumental in the development of the company. Without 
him, there would be no company. In fact, without him, there would 
be no product...H e is always at least a year, if not more, ahead of 
the competition. He is an ideas man. A great lateral thinker...
He is a brilliant entrepreneur...He is a significant player within the 
computer and retail industry.
The nature of the business in which the company found itself was very 
much driven by R&D. One product evolved into another. In the sales and 
marketing manager’s view, if Jim Barry was not involved, they would have 
only one product. One of the strengths of the founding entrepreneur was 
his ability to anticipate change. Internationally, he was recognised as a 
leader in technology at point-of-sale.
Jim Barry sold his interest in the cable company in 1979, and became the 
founding director of RTI. He believed that opportunities existed in the 
computer area which impelled him to set up in business. He felt that a
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niche existed in the market for POS technology. At this stage, industry 
conditions were not favourable, particularly since the PC was not in vogue 
at that time. The company was ahead of its time and the experience they 
gained prior to the growth of PC EPOS market was invaluable. The 
company was set up to exploit the technology of EPOS, rather than to 
satisfy any predetermined market or consumer need. Their products were 
at the leading edge of technology. In 1982, there was a change over from 
Commodore PET technology to IBM PC technology which was an impetus 
to the EPOS industry. The owner manager’s role in the company was in 
the area of product development. He was closely involved with customers, 
with establishing direct end contacts, planning the future product 
development activities of the firm, and anticipating market trends and 
requirements. Jim Barry defined entrepreneurship as follows:
An enthusiasm. I can get very enthusiastic about something and 
bring people along with me, even customers. When I am in full 
flight even customers get excited about it as well. That’s part of 
being an entrepreneur. You look at things from a positive side 
rather than a negative side. I always look for an opportunity first 
and work back from that...
Jim Barry saw a great difference between a manager and an entrepreneur:
A manager has to be a very disciplined, analytical type of person, 
who can look at things and weigh them up very carefully.
Managers are more careful people. An entrepreneur is not a careful 
person. Careful people write the history, they don’t create it.
Jim Barry tried to instill into the people involved that they could be ‘world 
beaters’. He believed that Irish people had the knowledge, the educational 
level and the brain power equal to, if not superior, to their American and 
Japanese counterparts. The company was driven by the customer, to 
seeking a solution to users’ problems, rather than by the technology itself. 
The founder believed that it was this concern with customers that gave the
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firm its distinctive culture. The company had a clear strategic focus, was 
knowledgeable and confident about the niche market which they were 
addressing and pursued a consistent line of development aimed at serving 
the EPOS market. The founder claimed:
We had a focus. We knew what we wanted to do. We were 
always reasonably realistic about what we could achieve. We had a 
business plan, projections, and we were usually able to meet 
them...W e do not get overburdened with long term planning.
W hat’s a five year plan in this business? We look 18 months ahead, 
in a bit of detail. But that’s as far out as we like to look.
In the early phase of its history, the firm was forced to establish a track 
record for the organisation in the short term, to build entire POS systems 
rather than I/O devices, which meant that Jim Barry was over-stretched.
The day-to-day reality of the company was dominated by the need to 
generate revenue which placed great pressure on the founding entrepreneur. 
The company operated on low profit margins and their actions were 
dominated more by immediate issues rather than being guided by a long 
term strategy. The founder claimed there was distinct phases in the firms 
development, from where there were developing, producing and 
manufacturing products, to the licensing arrangement, to control of their 
own range of products.
The venture was a speculative, high risk one for the promoters. The vision 
of the founder was to become a major player in the I/O area. The founder 
secured capital from the banks and ‘dug deep into his own pockets’ to fund 
the growth of the business. A decision was made to sub-contract 
production due to the heavy capital investment such a project would 
necessitate. The founder had responsibility for prototype development and 
also for sales and support services. He was ‘the ideas person.’
Jim Barry did not envisage the company as being a provider of total 
solutions, just a provider of peripheral handling devices. However, in
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order to establish credibility, they had to develop applications. It was 
crucial that ‘the technology could move from the laboratory out onto the 
marketplace’. The company was credited with installing the first 
commercially successful PC point-of-sale system in the Pub trade in the UK 
and Ireland. In 1984, the company came to the attention of a Japanese 
company, TEC, which was a subsidiary of Toshiba. They started doing 
some contract work for them. In 1989, the company installed a large PC 
point of sale system in Arnotts of Henry Street. This was a major 
breakthrough for the firm. The company slowly built up a reputation and a 
track record.
Jim Barry was never completely comfortable with providing total solutions 
since it involved having a front line sales office. There was a lot of direct 
contact with the consumers. When the founder started the company, 
proprietary solutions was the norm in the marketplace. He attempted to 
convert people over to open systems architecture, where they could buy 
equipment from a variety of hardware vendors instead of being tied to a 
single vendor. Thus, a strategy that did not conform to industry norms was 
adopted. Jim Barry quickly realised that it was extremely difficult to sell 
direct in the POS area as the costs and risks involved were very high. He 
was forced to take a very ‘hands-on’ approach to everything and 
consequently was over committed to all aspects of the business.
Balance of skills
Although the company was dominated by a strong entrepreneurial figure, 
the firm was formed on partnership basis. Jim Barry readily admitted that 
he lacked a solid commercial ethos and his strength lay in developing new 
ideas; this could all too easily be dissipated by a lack of focus. He 
remarked that his partner, a financial controller, imposed discipline on the 
company. Both partners complemented each other; Jim Barry saw himself 
as an intuitive thinker while his partner was a more analytical thinker.
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According to Jim Barry:
I think I need to be harnessed at times. You need to harness what I 
am trying to do, to prioritise things and focus on particular products 
that can be successful, focus on where there is a market for them, 
rather than a shot gun approach with many targets. The technology 
business is changing so rapidly, there are so many growth sectors... 
Everyone feels they have to be in that area and doing something, 
with the result that the core competence of the business is not 
developed. I know that I can fall into that trap too, say have we 
anything that will bring us into this technology area. There are 
dangers. The great danger is feeling that you can grow the 
company into all these areas and the result is probably failure.
The sales and marketing manager echoed this by saying that:
The personalities are totally different. Roger is a totally different 
being. I think it has helped a lot. If both were the same, there 
would be blow ups every day of the week. The Financial 
Controller would like to believe he is a stabilising influence on the 
founder. He is a frustrating influence, that’s for sure. He is not 
always as free with cash as Jim would like him to be. That is good 
I suppose. You need control. He is a controlling influence 
certainly. That is his function.
Industry factors
There were major developments in the firm ’s sector which facilitated its 
development. The company possessed innovative ideas but as a small firm, 
it did not have the financial or manufacturing resources to ‘go it alone’.
The industry in which the company found itself was mainly controlled at 
the end user level by multi-nationals such as Epson, Omron, Weva 
Systems, ICL, and NCR. The Japanese players began to move towards 
alliances with smaller companies. At that time, the Japanese were moving 
away from proprietary systems and lacked knowledge of input/output 
devices. During this time, the price of hardware was falling and margins 
were being squeezed in the computer industry. The Japanese were experts
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in producing PCs (Personal Computers) but with the decline in the 
hardware industry they needed to look elsewhere for sales revenue. There 
were very few PC POS systems in sale in the 1980s. The EPOS industry 
was targeted as a growth area by the Japanese. RTI entered into a 
licensing agreement with a Japanese company in the mid 1980s. These 
various factors enabled the company to overcome the obstacle of being a 
small player in a market dominated by multi-nationals.
Early years of struggle
As a research and development companies, RTI consumed a great deal of 
capital. The time taken to develop a product was normally two or three 
years and the company had to survive in that time period without any 
customers. The insistence of the banks on personal guarantees for all 
forms of borrowings meant that the entrepreneur was personally exposed, 
and stood to lose a great deal if the business failed. The founder was 
deeply aware of the high failure rate in the business. He believed that ‘the 
danger point is when a company achieves success, it then becomes over 
ambitious’. Employees discussed the difficulties in gaining a capital 
injection:
When you are driving the development cycle, there is always 
financial crises, because everything is cost. It means cash flow 
problems. We have always been able to go the banks or an 
investment group to sort it out, at great personal risk to the founder 
and his family. He had to dig deep. If you are supporting an 
organisation like this out of your own pocket, the costs are mighty. 
Very high cost, high risk stuff...
Jim Barry’s early experiences of struggle had ramifications for his attitudes 
towards business and future goals for the company. One key element in 
the company’s strategy was the attitude of the founder towards size and 
expansion. He tended to equate freedom with the ability to do what he 
wanted to do, to develop his own ideas, which could be curtailed by
134
expansion. There was a deliberate policy to limit the size of the company. 
A common theme running through the interviews was the desire of the 
founder to maintain the advantages of being small in one form or another. 
‘The great advantage in being small’, according to Jim Barry, is that 
‘management is in control and knows everything that is going on. ’
Jim Barry claimed that they could obtain IDA backing for a manufacturing 
plant in Ireland as an alternative to outsourcing, but they did not want to 
get involved in that type of situation. In retrospect, the founder says that:
We don’t want to get into that market. We could quite easily get 
into that market and have 150 people working here tomorrow and 
be losing IR £0.5 million...the market here is not big enough. 
You’d have to provide other products and all sorts of services., 
sales.. .1 don’t know that business. I don’t want to be in that 
business. As such we want to do the things that we feel most 
comfortable with. It is a bit of a personal thing I suppose. We are 
answerable to ourselves. We want to be in this business to make 
m oney...If we were to become a significant player and bring 
turnover up to 40 or 45 million, we would end up with so little of 
the company that it would not be worth doing.
He realised that in the US, venture capital was available, but RTI was not 
based in the US and was not prepared to re-locate. Jim Barry claimed that 
securing finance from the banks was a problem because of the high risk 
nature of software investment. These companies tried to extend and build 
growth in areas in which they did not have expertise, which contributed to 
failure. Jim Barry spoke of the struggle to establish a business:
People in this business are not cheap. Unless growth does not 
continue, they cannot survive. Finance is just not available in 
Ireland for small companies....The IDA throw up the same success 
stories all the time - five or six companies. The history of these 
have broken the spirits of most of the people involved...A  shortage 
of finance always blocks growth of companies. It is not a shortage 
of expertise or of commitment from the people involved, but they 
have always been ‘hand to mouth’ situations...It is such a struggle 
for the people involved, keeping the thing ticking over. It is hard work.
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Jim Barry said that with regard to the government helping small firms in 
the start up stage, it was normally a case of ‘too little too la te .’ He learned 
from experience that Ireland was a difficult country in which to carry out 
research and development. There was a lack of support systems to nurture 
innovative activity. Jim Barry remarked that there were no venture 
capitalists or developmental capital available for innovative Irish ventures. 
He believed that anyone interested in creative thinking and bringing 
products forward should consider doing so in the US.
Licensing arrangement
In 1988, a two year exclusive licensing deal was negotiated with one of the 
market leaders in the EPOS sector - Hugin Sweda - which changed the 
focus of the company. This was a large European/American conglomerate 
who were selling proprietary POS systems and wanted to develop their 
products into programmable open systems. The company switched from 
being a small, local Irish company to one with an international outlook. 
Hugin-Sweda experienced financial difficulties and was taken over by 
Omron, a leading Japanese company. A three year exclusive licensing 
arrangement was subsequently made with Omron since the firm had a 
unique expertise at what they do. Omron insisted on an exclusive 
arrangement since they wanted a period of time where they could establish 
some stability for the product without worrying about competitors selling 
the same product. They agreed to provide equity to fund product 
development and to bear the costs of development, manufacturing, 
marketing, sales and distribution.
At the time, the company saw licensing as an escape route from the 
struggle and crises encountered up until now. The company entered into 
the business relationship when it was in a vulnerable, not a strong, 
position. A very attractive deal was offered to the founder who accepted it 
with alacrity. Jim Barry described himself at this period as being a ‘risk
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planner’ not a ‘risk taker’. The financial manager suggested that Jim Barry 
regretted that he did not continue on with the manufacture and sale of the 
systems instead of entering a licensing arrangement. The founder talked 
about the struggle to establish a high technology firm that had implications 
in terms of strategy:
Those years were a real struggle. We were making everything 
ourselves; the software, all the support, trying to fund the thing. 
Because of the struggle, we were very receptive to the licensing 
arrangement with Hugin-Sweda. It lifted a huge weight. It 
stabilised the place financially.
It allowed RTI to focus on the development of products rather than on day- 
to-day fire fighting. Jim Barry believed that in most entrepreneurial 
companies, ‘the struggle for survival cramps the opportunities to be 
innovative’. He said:
95 % of all start ups fail because people do not have the resources to 
continue. People work and work and work, they really kill 
themselves in an effort to achieve it. When some one comes 
along with an offer that clears up all the mess that has been 
accumulated, when you get the mortgage off your house, you get a 
sense of relief. Then you want to have a go at the trough again...
The exclusive licensing deal ultimately proved unsuccessful, although the 
firm learned a great deal about project management, quality issues,
Japanese methods of production, (tooling, plastics management, assembly) 
cost reduction. The company became more confident in their ability to 
deal directly with the customer. This relationship with Omron helped the 
company gain credibility with customers. They established a reputation as 
a quality supplier on a worldwide basis, largely derived from being known 
as the designers of the successful OMRON 7000 series of PC Terminals. 
However, the company lost control over its product development strategy 
and Jim Barry felt that their creativity was stifled by the licensing 
arrangement. Omron was interested in the existing product, not in further
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development. The company persisted with the exclusive licensing 
arrangement for several years until Jim Barry began to realise that the firm 
must either change, stagnate or fail. As an ‘ideas m an’ he was quick to 
recognise opportunities in the industry that challenged him to respond.
They also realised that the product had a limited life span. As time went 
on, many new players entered the POS marketplace. POS systems as 
supplied by the company were becoming more and more common and more 
price competitive. At the time of the divorce from Omron, the company 
had targeted a new area (card reader). A critical situation faced by the 
firm forced it reassess its strategy and prompted a change of thinking 
within the organisation.
Crisis
A crisis brought about the termination of the exclusive licensing 
arrangement. It rejuvenated efforts by the firm to take on board new 
shareholders and stimulated the development of a new range of products. 
The company had targeted a new area (the card reader) and hoped that 
Omron would support them financially, but were disappointed. In the 
negotiations, Omron used delaying tactics and ultimately the deal fell 
through. RTI decided to disassociate from the licensing arrangement. One 
manager remarked that at this period, opportunities had to be seized and 
changes made to prevent the company from stagnating:
The ending of the Omron exclusive arrangement and the beginning 
of this development was critical. It was very much a ‘touch and go’ 
situation. If this project had not taken off, or took longer to 
develop than expected, then the company would have ceased to 
exist.
The financial manager claimed that it was a difficult break to make since it 
involved ‘setting out into the abyss’. The directors put a great deal of their 
own resources into development which was a major risk.
138
Factors leading to the termination of the licensing deal:
The balance of power-dependency was a concern to the both parties, 
particularly the Japanese. Both parties came to the partnership with 
different perspectives. The Japanese had the hidden agenda of learning 
about, and then imitating the technology that the company possessed, in an 
attempt to de-skill the small firm. The Japanese believed it was in their 
best interests to develop this expertise in-house rather than sustain the 
relationship. One individual referred to the negative aspects of the 
licensing arrangement:
There was perhaps some sort of hidden agenda there. The Japanese 
felt that if they removed support of the company, it would go under. 
They would be able to pick up the pieces by way of personnel, by 
way of product licences, whatever else...The Japanese have 
elements like that built into their thinking. They must be self 
sufficient. They look to other markets for ideas. Once they have 
those ideas, they think they can do it better themselves.
One employee spoke about the hidden agenda that Omron possessed which 
led to the break down of the relationship:
On the marketing side, we felt that they were not going about it the 
right way in trying to sell to product. That resulted in us ending the 
arrangement with Omron. They brought out a very similar product 
to what we were producing for them. There was a court case, we 
got some payment in the end. With hindsight, the Omron deal was 
bad....W e have learned from that. It has given us second thoughts 
about being involved with licensing. We would be very careful 
with the next deal.
Management found at the end of the three years that their technology did 
not advance the way they would have liked it to advance. They were 
stagnating. In an industry characterised by short product life cycles and 
constant change, this erosion of technical vitality was a serious weakness. 
Other deficiencies also needed to be addressed. An informal review
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revealed that the company was conservative and unwilling to spread into 
other market sectors. There was also a lack of synergy in terms of culture. 
Management felt frustrated by the slow decision making process within the 
multi-national. The company learned to be cautious when arranging 
partnerships and to keep control of the direction of the company 
themselves. The basic policy of the founder was to subcontract production, 
to become a supplier of software solutions and maintain full control of the 
product development activities. This represented a change in terms of 
strategy. In the early days, the company produced the applications 
themselves and sold a ‘kit’, whereas today they see themselves as a 
problem solver.
A new phase in the company’s development:
The period following the crisis was marked by an increase in formality, 
improvements in the R&D process, a change in strategy and the possibility 
of a take-over was not ruled out. The sales and marketing manager 
claimed that the decision to enter the licensing arrangement was 
characterised by a ‘gung-ho’ attitude, which was in marked contrast to the 
position today. The company has since adopted a more planned and 
rational approach to business. They have become more formal in their 
business relationships, reflected in the adoption of ISO 900 procedures and 
importance given to confidentiality agreements. Jim Barry claimed:
It is formal now. There are projections, goals on a monthly basis, 
cost reduction programmes, a three year plan, where we want to be, 
profitability plans, investment in new product strategies. That is in 
place.
The company developed a commitment to quality shown by the 
achievement of ISO 9000 certification in June 1995. This was an important 
milestone and was crucial for the firm in tendering for international 
business. The company improved its procedures for product development
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over the years. The ‘idea generation’ stage used regarding research in the 
firm became more comprehensive. All senior staff attended industry 
specific trade shows to see what was happening in the market.
Management kept a close eye on developments in technology in the POS 
(point-of-sale) and I/O (input/output) area. They subscribed to all the 
magazines. The company attempted to integrate new technologies into their 
core technology when developing new products. Most ideas came from 
being aware of customer problems. If the initial ‘gut feeling’ for a new 
product was shared by the key stakeholders, then management drew up a 
simple prototype to show to key customers. RTI had the tools to simulate 
the final product. As the credibility of the company increased, 
management was able to persuade customers to pay for, or make a 
significant contribution towards production. Previously, they had to 
commit themselves to a heavy production expenditure in order to show the 
finished product to the customer. If commitment by clients was given to 
the product, the company moved on to the next stage of the development 
process. The emphasis both on quality and cost-effective production was a 
pre-eminent consideration from the outset.
The company showed a high degree of persistence in their strategy up until 
1993, when the directors decided to produce the PAS keyboard. The 
change in strategy was both opportunistic and reactive. At the time of the 
break up with Omron, the founder became aware o f the expanding market 
for customised keyboards (i.e. non QUERTY). The founder came across 
keys at a trade show and realised that he could develop them further. He 
knew that the technology of the PAS KEY keyboard was perfect for their 
market and would enable them to capitalise on their experience. This 
keyboard was interactive, was designed to speed up transactions at POS and 
eliminate long queues. The idea initially found acceptance in the 
hospitality area but had applications in financial services and computer 
telephony. The firm was confident that this technology would have great 
potential. WalMart in the U.S. asked the company to devise a software
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solution for them which constituted a major breakthrough for the firm. 
Since the firm was involved in business-to-business marketing, developing 
close customer relationships was very important. The project represented a 
significant break from the past, particularly since it was financed by the 
directors own funds (£3m), along with a bank overdraft. Previously all 
funds for product development came from the license partner. The 
company aims to seek further investment in order to commercialise the 
product. Additional funds are needed for marketing and sales.
The product, according to Jim Barry, was designed for the ‘technophobic’ 
users and the computer illiterate. All too often, products are designed to 
accommodate the perceived requirements of the computer professional, 
with the result that users feel intimidated by the PC. According to Jim 
Barry, the PAS KEY keyboard was the first meaningful development 
designed to cater for the needs of the user whose priorities were ease of 
use and quick results. It allowed the user to exercise a choice of menu 
options with a single key keystroke, rather than a combination of key 
strokes. Other keyboards in the hospitality industry tended to be large but 
still did not accommodate all the menu options or requirements that the 
customer has. By incorporating the latest technology, management has 
resolved these problems. The company spent two years developing the 
keyboard incorporating innovative LCD Key Switches.
This project could have been instigated by a new company. One of major 
assets of the company was its technical knowledge base, experience and 
contacts built up over the years in the complex EPOS market. This 
allowed them to commence development with a high level of confidence in 
the project. In the words of one manager:
We are more aware of where things are available, how things are 
done. The contacts are already developed which has made some of 
the development easier. Today, we contract out a bit more. We 
are more receptive to buying pieces that are already proven.
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Company culture
The company consisted of a small, highly creative, highly motivated team 
of people. The management structure within the company was flat and 
communication within the company was on a personal basis; no blind 
communication methods such as memos are used. Jim Barry believed that 
a good team spirit existed within the company. Most topics and new 
product concepts were discussed in meetings, which contributed to a very 
personal and open atmosphere within the company. The founder attributed 
the success of the company to the commitment of the people involved. He 
said:
It is a bit like a family, the people are around a long time. The 
people here all came from Cable Television. We know each other 
very well. We know the strengths and weaknesses of everyone. 
Rewards are based on our success and everyone gets rewarded if we 
succeed.
He claimed that as a company they were aware of the strength of the 
competition. They possessed a great pride in their work. They tried to 
achieve a level of excellence. Jim Barry talked about the team spirit in the 
company which contributed to its success:
It has just been hard graft... We do not have any demarcation 
between software and hardware. If there’s problem, there’s a 
problem and it doesn’t matter whether it occurs in hardware or 
software. We all get in and solve it.
One manager saw the culture of the company as being unique since:
Every one here multi-tasks. There are defined roles and everyone 
has a job specification. In the event of something happening, its a 
case of all hands to the pump.
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He mentioned a time when a problem arose with a piece of the software.
A major customer was implicated. Everyone in the organisation worked 
throughout the night to help solve the problem. He believed that such 
support would not exist in other companies:
In this company if you get your holiday entitlement, you are doing 
very well. We put the customer first. Everyone accepts that as 
being part of the way things are.
He claimed that the company was flexible and sought to respond to the 
needs of the customers:
You do not have a clear six month ahead schedule. But that is the 
nature of a small company. You have to be able to respond to the 
customer. If the customer comes along and says ‘We want that, but 
can you do this as well’, you do it. If you say no or postpone it, 
then we won’t get the business.
Management’s view of company strengths:
(1) Research and development
The most influential aspect of the company was their extensive research 
and development capabilities. The company has a particular skill for 
bringing products from ‘concept’ to ‘m arket’ within very short time frames. 
The RS7000 range of PC based EPOS systems, currently marketed world­
wide by Omron, was designed and prototyped within six months.
(2) Customer orientation
Another strength was the company’s policy of customer care. The design 
and production process was carried out with an end user in mind.
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(3) Understanding of the market
There was a good understanding of the market at grass roots level. Two 
sales people were employed, one in Germany and the other in the United 
States, who possessed excellent technical knowledge as well as a sales 
background. They contributed a great deal to the new product development 
process.
(4) Strategic relationships
The strategic relationships were built on trust and mutual support.
(5) Flexibility
The company was flexible receptive to new ideas, so product development 
moved at a fast pace.
(6) Motivation
There was a high level of motivation in the company. The directors were 
involved in the formation of the company and all had large financial 
investments. The success of the company would determine their livelihood.
(7) Aggressive pricing and low cost structures
The company was consistently profitable with average annual profits after 
tax of IR£0.5m. The combination of aggressive pricing and low cost 
structures ensured its success in the marketplace.
Through an analysis of these strengths and weaknesses, the following 
factors emerged as the core competencies of the company:
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* Quality of the product range and throughout the company
* Customer satisfaction
* Research and development capabilities
Management’s view of company weaknesses:
(1) Overdependence
The weaknesses revolved around management in that the firm was 
dependent on a few key people and the loss of their skills would be a major 
threat to the company.
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Case company 3: Quay Financial Software
Introduction
Quay financial software (QFS) was formed in 1985 as an adjunct to 
National City Brokers, (NCB) Dublin. QFS defines its business as the 
development of specialist software applications for the financial community 
worldwide (encompassing investment banks, stockbrokers, money brokers, 
life assurance companies, and corporate treasuries). Its core product is 
InVision which gives instant prices and calculations to traders in 
complicated financial areas such as foreign exchange and interest rate 
swaps. The market for this type of software is valued today at $450m, 
with London, Tokyo and new York accounting for over half of the market. 
It has over 90 clients in 24 countries worldwide. In February 1993, QFS 
was named 1993 AIB software exporter of the year in the under 100 
employee category by the Irish Exporters Association. In 1993, the 
company had a turnover of £3 million, but by 1994 this figure had soared 
to 6.5 million. In 1994, it was ranked sixth by Irish Computer out of the 
top ten indigenous software companies in Ireland. It currently employs 80 
people, of whom the majority are involved in software development. In 
1995, it was bought by CSK Micronogosis for a price reckoned to be $30 
or $40 million.
Start-up and role of founding strategists
The seeds of the company QFS were sown in 1983 when Dermot 
Desmond, the founder of National City Brokers (NCB) met Gerry Giblin 
and asked him to set up a financial software company.
Desmond was the majority shareholder with a 70% stake in the company. 
There was a substantial start up investment. In all, more than £10 million 
was invested by the shareholders in the company. In the mid 1980s,
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Desmond managed to raise three quarters of a million through the BES 
(Business Expansion Scheme) and Desmond’s own private funds were 
initially invested in the company. In the pioneering and fast expanding 
software business of the early 1980s, the rewards for investing in an 
innovative new product could be enormous. Desmond, according to the 
Gerry Giblin:
is a venture capitalist who is prepared to take a long term 
perspective. He does not look for immediate return on his 
investments and may be unsure of a return, but he is a long term 
player. He tends to make bets on people; his gift is on judging 
people, more so than analysing balance sheets; he provides the 
resources and then lets other people get on with it.
The product concept was relatively new and Desmond believed that the 
software would make stockbroking activities more efficient. Desmond was 
the majority shareholder in a number of computer companies, but his 
numerous interests acted as a severe drain on his resources. In  1986, 20% 
of Dealformatics (a holding company) had to be sold to Allied Combined 
Trust (ACT), the venture capital arm of A .I.B ., in return for equity. This 
deal gave it the right to dis-invest after a certain date. Telerate was falling 
short of the marketing of ‘Intuition’ (another software product) which as a 
result, was not generating the income expected. Desmond put a proposal 
to Telerate to merge all companies into one entity and so continue on with 
the financial software development project. It was proposed to initially sell 
20% to Telerate, giving them an option to buy out the remaining shares. It 
was hoped that this scheme would get the project off the ground. This deal 
was due in no small way to the strong negotiating skills of Desmond.
The functional background of both partners were quite different. Gerry 
Giblin was a software designer. He worked for Telerate in Ireland, 
assuming the position of Technical Project Leader and then Chief Technical 
Officer. He worked abroad for several years and developed many contacts 
within the industry which he subsequently used to generate sales.
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Desmond, a financier, started his career in banking. The company was 
formed with a balance of complementary skills: Desmond provided much 
of the finance and the founder provided the software expertise. Gerry 
Giblin had worked in the US for several years and then decided to come 
back to Ireland. Working in an indigenous Irish owned company appealed 
to him, since there he believed that there was a commitment to the 
business. He does not see himself as an entrepreneur, probably because 
the original concept was thought up and funded by the venture capitalist.
He saw himself more as a technologist who was attracted to the idea of 
working in an autonomous new business.
In contrast, employees described him as a charismatic individual and saw 
him as a typical entrepreneur. His name was well known throughout the 
industry and he became synonymous with the company. They saw him as 
a great leader of people. He was an ‘optimistic risk taker’ who relied on 
people to deliver on the promises he made to prospective clients at the 
negotiating table. Employees saw him as having the ability of a leader to 
stretch the capabilities of employees:
The essence of entrepreneurship is that you do not sit back on your 
laurels. You are always leveraging what comes in ...
The art of the entrepreneur is to take a gamble; they have to deliver 
on that gamble. Gerry’s strength was that he knew exactly how 
much we could step up to fulfil the promises he made. As the 
company gets larger, it is harder for him to put his finger on the 
pulse, to know just how much he can gamble. He does not take 
those types of decisions anymore...
The present financial manager described him as follows:
I think he is well respected. He started up something new. He was 
involved with QFS from the beginning. He was the founder of the 
company. He came to it with a strong technical background. He 
came from Telerate and was the one behind the Invision 
product...H is role was a very positive one. I think he has very 
good communication skills...
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He added that:
His strongest attributes would be in the technical and sales area...H e 
had the vision and foresight to come up with an idea and base a 
product around that idea and start up a company. He is very 
strong, a good leader.
At this stage, the personal computer had been in existence for a very short 
period and the market for financial software was beginning to grow. In the 
words of the financial manager:
Conditions were very good in the 1980s. It was the time of the big 
boom in financial services; it was just the right time.
Dermot Desmond played a crucial role in getting the venture off the 
ground. Although Desmond did not have a technical background, his 
reasons for getting involved in software development was based ‘on instinct 
and a keen sense of opportunity’. In the course of NCB’s (National City 
Brokers) development, Desmond realised that NCB could develop much 
more through the use of dealing room systems. Given the need for up to 
date information and rapid response to market conditions, the justification 
for installing computer systems and software seemed obvious. He quickly 
realised that the new product could, not only meet the specific needs of one 
customer (NCB) but also be marketed more widely. For a small company 
entering a growth market, this was a desirable position to be in. Gerry 
Giblin maintained that they understood the needs of the dealing room 
personnel. According to management, their experience with these real 
situations showed in the design and functionality provided by the InVision 
product.
According to Gerry Giblin, most indigenous Irish companies do not have 
enough money to get the product to market or even for product 
development. He believes that many software companies are underfunded 
from the start and fail to capitalize on early successes and are swallowed by
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overseas rivals. The hardest financial gap to fill is for seed or venture 
capital, this is the period of true risk exposure. Gerry Giblin realised that 
if the company was to grow it had to move from a garage-style operation at 
start up to a responsive, professionally managed, secure company. The 
whole thrust within QFS was to develop into a mature company in response 
to customer requirements.
From the outset, the founders of QFS had a clear goal, that of offering 
dealing room software to the financial services industry. One manager 
remarked that the company engaged in planning to a certain extent, since 
they put together a three year rolling business plan.
Crisis
QFS faced fundamental financial challenges. For various reasons the joint 
venture deal with Telerate failed. The company, in Desmond’s view, came 
close to producing what would have been the best deal ever in terms of the 
Irish software industry. Its failure was an enormous setback. Desmond 
was faced with a situation where he had expanded all his companies in 
anticipation of a deal that did not materialise, and the cash burn rate was 
very high in all companies. It was clear that Dealformatics was kept afloat 
by Desmond. Not only that, but Desmond was burdened with the ongoing 
operating costs of all other companies. Desmond was faced with the 
prospect of sustaining all the companies with very little funds. After the 
failure of the deal with Telerate, it seemed unlikely that QFS would remain 
a viable, on-going concern.
A software project, started by the firm ‘Dealformatics’ (to become 
company QFS), was more than a year away from completion. Gerry 
Giblin was convinced that he had the product and that he needed to market 
it. Regrettably, additional investment was required to bring a product to 
the market, at a very time there would be severe cash shortfalls. By 1987,
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Dealformatics was employing close to 60 people and was losing money. 
Desmond was at a crossroads, financially speaking. He was faced with two 
options. One option was to sever his ties with software development.
This, according to Desmond, would have been the rational solution. 
Desmond’s second option was to fund the companies out of his own 
stretched resources and put another investment deal in place. The final 
decision taken by Desmond involved a combination of both scenarios. At a 
later stage, 5% of equity was sold to the IDA in return for funding, leaving 
Desmond with a 70% stake. The remaining 20% was held by employees. 
Gerry Giblin believed that the decision to continue funding the venture was 
based on a belief in the people involved:
Desmond is not a technical person. The only thing he had to go on 
was the fact that Telerate had taken such an interest in the project, 
and had spent a long time, over a year, going over the project.
But he did not really know whether it would be successful.
He was going on instinct. As in most areas, he relied on 
his instinct for people...It was an act of faith in people and 
the belief in what they were doing would result in success.
Gerry Giblin believed that he had predicted with a great deal of accuracy 
how firstly, the financial markets were going to advance in the next four 
years, and secondly, how technology was going to evolve. Getting that 
right was, in his view, largely a matter of luck.
The formation of QFS came at a point of crisis and it was a period of 
thinking in terms of survival not growth. The initial intention to sell the 
company to Telerate did not materialise. Without the decision by Desmond 
to continue funding the business, it would not have survived. According to 
Gerry Giblin, they went back to what they were originally trying to do; 
they developed more focus - ‘get some customers, some profits’.
Conflict featured during the pre-start-up period of the company. According 
to Gerry Giblin, the year 1987 was a tense period for everyone. It was a
152
period of rationalization and consolidation which led to many internal 
disagreements and personality conflicts. Even though he was losing 
money, the venture capitalist decided to let two distinct companies work on 
the development of financial software. He hoped that this would generate 
the diversity required for success and bring the motivating effects of a 
‘technical chase’ in-house. This approach culminated in one team winning 
and the other losing. Gerry Giblin set up on his own, employing three 
people. The new company was called company QFS.
The start-up period was associated with great upheaval and change and as a 
result, the product launch was delayed. By the following year, QFS had 
sold its first product to Irish Life based on the InVision concept. QFS 
reported a loss of £151,000 in 1989 on a turnover of 371,000 but recovered 
the following year with profits of £236,000 on a turnover of 716,000. 
Within two years, the company started to make a profit. Gerry Giblin 
suggested that his experiences of the start-up stage influenced his views; he 
decided to create a firm characterised by productivity, team work and 
commercial values, rather than one characterised by individualism and 
conflict. He referred to the early start-up phase:
There was an opportunity for people to flourish, to put forward 
different points of view, stuff like that, but which was not 
necessarily a good thing. There was a lot of politics. We had 
to clear all of that out.
Development of the firm
One manager remarked that a great deal of planning was not carried out 
and that Gerry Giblin played a key part in the early development of the 
firm. His personality in terms of persuading local financial institutions to 
pay for, and take the product was a critical factor in the success of the 
company. Incorrect decisions were taken in the technology arena, yet the 
firm had the flexibility to re-adjust and adapt to new technological trends.
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Employees believed this flexibility was a major factor in the success of the 
firm.
The major problem faced by QFS was the marketing of the product outside 
of Ireland. Growth depended on the penetration of foreign markets as well 
as the credibility of the company. For large customers, the size and 
stability of the supplier was an important buying criteria. It was recognised 
that the primary strategic issue was to search for a partner who would 
provide them with marketing channels and help them overcome any lack of 
credibility in the marketplace. An attempt was made to open an office on 
New York and London in 1990. This coincided with a slump in investment 
in 1991. Problems were resolved by a deal with Micronogosis, an 
information technology company in June 1991, who wished to enter the PC 
market. Under the agreement, Micronogosis would market QFS’s products 
abroad for three years on an exclusive basis. The deal enabled QFS to 
grow from 20 people to just under 100, and from having a presence in 4 
countries to 28. Micronogosis bought the company in 1995.
According to Gerry Giblin, the deal was successful, although it carried 
some drawbacks. The problem of two companies with different cultures 
being drawn together had to be resolved. QFS had to cede some control. 
They were reliant on one company to exclusively promote the products for 
them, which in hindsight may have been a mistake. In addition, internal 
conflict arose between the product lines which was not anticipated when the 
deal was first negotiated.
Company culture
Gerry Giblin learned the importance of commercial values from an early 
stage. He felt that they had developed ‘a top class product’ but good 
management was also important to company success. According to the 
marketing manager, Bryan Maybury, QFS succeeded where others failed
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because it was run by business people not technologists. He remarked that: 
‘they are business people who happen to be in software, rather than 
software people who happen to be in business’. QFS emerged when money 
was tight in the company, so profit fitted into the basic objectives and 
philosophy of the business. The early period of formation prevented a 
technological bias over commercial concerns.
The conditions under which the firm was born had major ramifications on 
its development. For instance, Gerry Giblin ‘learned’ the value of power 
and profit:
It has made me a lot more commercial. Power is the big thing. 
Power to do what you want to do is dependent on a single issue - 
making profit - and if you are making profit then everything you do 
is right. If you are not making profit, then everything you do is 
wrong. We had that three year lesson without any product being 
turned out...A  painful lesson was learned early on. But we had the 
time and money to learn them. If you had a small company, you 
would learn the lesson but you would also be out of business.
Gerry Giblin attempted to foster a situation with the informality and 
innovation of a Silicon Valley company, but also tried to incorporate 
Japanese-style values of hard work and productivity. He believed in 
stretching the capabilities of the company employees. His motto was that 
employees ‘get out what they put in to the company.’ He believed that the 
company possessed the necessary innovation and creativity, but it was 
embedded in a team structure. He firmly believed that it was important not 
to be too dependent on the skills and abilities of one, or a few individuals 
who could easily leave the company. In the early stages of new venture 
creation, this was unavoidable but over time the company had to become 
more process driven. A structure was put in place so software was 
produced on time, on budget, with reproducibility of effort.
As a small company, its culture was characterised by the absence of formal
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personnel policies. One employee claimed that:
The individual is less catered for today than what happened in the 
past. Today the company is more careful about having personnel 
policies and rules that have to be applied, which is stifling.
Older employees now have a job title and a fixed salary range which has 
changed the atmosphere in the company. Employees have seen a change in 
thinking within the company. In the early days the company expanded on a 
cash flow basis. They could not draw on cash reserves. If  sales declined, 
and overheads rose in a particular year, then that led to a fight for survival. 
Today, the organisation is more of ‘an accounting driven organisation.’ It 
operates on some estimate of current revenue; it is financially stable due to 
the take-over and the parent organisation has placed limitations on the risk- 
taking propensity of the founder.
Continuation of niche strategy
The company pursued the product strategy as laid out in their original 
placement document way back in 1984. Gerry Giblin remarked that the 
company did not undergo fundamental change in terms of strategy. It was 
quite specialised in terms of the technology used. Most employees worked 
on the development of new products to add on to the systems originally 
sold and installed. Gerry Giblin remarked that the early product/market 
decisions were crucial and that those decisions ‘stood the test of tim e’.
One manager asserted that ‘greater efforts could have been made to 
produce other products, to diversify at that point, rather than diversifying 
later on. ’ However, software development demanded a great deal of 
finance. This manager suggested that cash shortages and the early period 
of formation made the company conservative and QFS became risk averse 
as a result.
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He spoke about the repercussions of early years of struggle and crises:
It makes a firm conservative. Very much so. I suppose if you are 
used to managing on a very tight budget, you are used to planning 
ahead, how to pay next month’s salaries, these issues were a feature 
of QFS back in the 1980s. Even though we were financed by 
Dermot Desmond, he did not have bottomless pockets, so we are 
used to justifying every piece of expenditure in great detail. It 
makes you conservative as regards pushing the boat out in the R&D 
side.
There was a gradual recognition that Invision had a limited life cycle and a 
decision was taken in 1994 to bring a new product on stream. The 
financial manager believed that a lack of research and development could 
render QFS vulnerable to newer and stronger competitors or to a rival 
technology. They faced competition from Reuters, Telerate and other 
small companies.
Changes in managerial style:
The company was set up by Gerry Giblin, an individual with a creative 
idea, immense drive and determination to succeed. His managerial style 
was informal. Gerry Giblin remarked:
There was no formal board or board meetings - meeting someone in 
the hall and having a chat -that was effectively the control of the 
company.
The founder realised that if  QFS was to become a large company then it 
had to become a professionally managed company, rather than one where 
employees react to ‘the personal charisma’ of one individual. Giblin spent 
a year looking for a general manager with strong leadership skills, but who 
would also possess the type of personality that would not alienate 
employees and cause them to leave. Gerry Giblin stressed the importance 
of finding the right person for the job; the consequences of getting the
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wrong person - ‘someone who can just crack the whip’ - would have been 
detrimental to the company.
Gerry Giblin claimed that it was difficult to make the transition from ‘a 
people-driven to a more process driven organisation’. If QFS became too 
process driven, then as a consequence, it would become too bland and 
would lose all innovation. On the other hand, QFS would fail if the 
founder could not bear to cede control. Gerry Giblin remarked:
You must be strong enough to move forward with a knowledge of
the history without being a prisoner of the history not being
afraid to make changes in management, structure, to reflect the 
progress you have m ade.. .It is vital to allow the company to 
progress, not to try and hold everything together the way it was at 
the early stages.
He was faced with the challenge of combining the innovative drive of the 
entrepreneurial stage with the conventions of the mature stage. In the 
words of the Gerry Giblin:
There has to be a balance between keeping the creative element 
where people are energised and have the freedom to innovate, and 
the opposing requirement of putting organisational structures in 
place.
According to Giblin, the ability of the company to absorb that change 
without losing the creativity that led to its success in the first place was 
crucial. Gerry Giblin remarked that this, ‘sounds pretty trite, but its a very 
subtle and a very hard thing to do and a great deal of luck goes into it as 
well. ’ The financial manager claimed that the take-over brought ‘new 
management skills that were not there in the past. ’ Employees also spoke 
of the transition to be made from a small firm with four people to a larger 
one with 100 employees. They have seen ‘all sorts o f structural and 
procedural changes’. Greater professionalism became a feature of QFS. In
158
the early days the user manuals were written in-house but today a third 
party is responsible for it. Older employees had the stimulus of working 
for a small company knowing that if they worked hard they would be 
rewarded. Gerry Giblin realised that the company had to be managed in a 
different way to allow for the increase in size. Decisions were made on 
employees’ productivity levels, time keeping, and so on, which was a 
painful process. Older employees did not need to have those procedures 
put in place but it was necessary process. The company has experienced 
major changes in terms of making a transition from a small start-up 
operation to a mature company.
A new role for the founder
Gerry Giblin’s role within the company has changed. In the early days, he 
was involved in software development and project management, then once 
the product was developed, he moved into a sales position. He remarked 
that he has become ‘more removed from day-to-day management’. He 
defined his current role as: ‘talking to important customers, taking time to 
think about what they should be doing next, what products need to be 
developed’. He has become more involved on the lower level and spends 
his time talking with programmers in order to ‘to inspire them to do 
exciting work’. He was be able to do that with the comfort of knowing 
that the day-to-day details were being taken care of by the general 
manager. Gerry Giblin sees his role as that of a facilitator - providing the 
right environment that people need in order to produce good software.
This also means having trust in employees to do a good job.
The strategic alliance deal ended in June 1995 with the take-over of the 
firm. The founder realised that there had to be an exit mechanism and a 
way of realising one’s investment but he disliked the loss of control that 
this step entailed. Gerry Giblin stated that it was difficult to change the 
ownership structure due to the psychological aspects.
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He said:
letting go and letting others take the driving seat which may not fit 
in with the way things used to be...the emotional issues will be a lot 
tougher to deal with - this is my baby and I’ve grown it up - now 
just as it is about to take off and go to the next level , I ’m being 
asked to stand aside. So that’s a big issue.
The entrepreneur’s view of the company’s strengths:
(1) Technical expertise and the quality of the software product.
(2) Low staff turnover, stability and experience of working in teams.
(3) Shared experience
(4) A solid track record and credibility.
The entrepreneur’s view of the company’s weaknesses:
(1) The lack of control over marketing
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Case company 4: McKeown Software
Introduction
McKeown is a one of the largest indigenous Irish software companies in 
Ireland. Established in 1976, the company now employs 120 staff across 
offices and has a turnover in excess of £7 million. The company has two 
main product lines, accounting and distribution. McKeown’s software 
products are aimed at large users in the upper end of the market, such as 
Bank of Ireland, Aer Rianta and the ESB. Their clients demand high levels 
of functionality combined with high transactions rates. The clients are 
principally large commercial enterprises and public sector authorities. 
McKeown’s turnover increased by 26% in 1994 to £7.4m in 1995 but its 
pre-tax profits were static at £634,250. In terms of fixed assets alone, it is 
worth an estimated £1.88m. It was named ‘Computing Services Company 
of the Year’ by ICSA (Irish Computer Services Association).
Milestones
1976 McKeown established 
1980 First package offering on the market 
1985 Opens Stevenage office in the UK 
1990 CCS takes a 55 % stake in McKeown
1990 Enters the UNIX market
1991 Opens Hong Kong office
The company sees future growth coming from export markets, particularly 
Hong Kong.
Start-up
The company was founded in 1976. Gerry McKeown qualified from 
university with a B.Sc degree, gained some experience in the software 
industry in Dublin and then worked in Canada for five years before
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returning to Ireland. His intention was to set up a software house.
Another individual joined the venture and acquired a 20% stake in the 
company. Business revolved around a few key clients. Work was carried 
out on-site in clients’ offices around the country. There was no formal, 
planned strategy in place; their attitude was simply: ‘get enough cash to 
pay this months wages...we did anything for anybody.’ They took the 
view that any job was worth doing and offered their services if a company 
wanted a particular system developed. Some of their first customers came 
from the Dairy Co-Operative industry, since Gerry McKeown had 
experience in that sector. They had a policy of developing be-spoke 
applications. This involved working closely with customers and developing 
original solutions, in effect tailoring the software to their specific needs.
The customer thus paid for the initial development. As such it was a direct 
contrast to standard, packaged software that was aimed at the general 
market. The company is more product-led today although it started its life 
as a service company. In the early days, the company received 
approximately £419,500 in IDA grants and was also supported by the 
Northern Ireland Industrial Development Board.
In 1980, the founders decided to move from being a general software 
services company into dealing with accounting software. Unlike many 
indigenous Irish software companies, McKeown did not concentrate on a 
niche market. Accounting packages are horizontal type applications.
Every industry and every company - be it a private or public sector 
organisation - needs an accounting function. In 1981 the first Digital vax 
machine was launched and McKeown worked on the now redundant Digital 
hardware. These were big, bulky machines and only clients in the top end 
of the market could afford to buy them. McKeown began to concentrate 
on developing software for the Digital VAX/VMS range of equipment.
They had a franchise for the Digital hardware machines which were sold 
almost at cost to clients. During the 1980s, Digital became reasonably 
successful in Ireland and McKeown shared in their success. McKeown also
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devised an online bureau system whereby people could dial into their 
system via modem and use their software. These clients, who could not 
afford the huge capital outlay on machines, just possessed a screen and a 
keyboard, and could still avail of computing power. This was an 
innovative concept at the time and it made computers accessible to clients. 
In 1982, office space of 5,000 sq.ft. was acquired in Dollard House, 
Dublin. It was recognised that growth would be constrained by the limited 
Irish market, so the company made the decision to expand into the UK in 
1984.
Industry environment
The computer and software industry was in its growth stage when the 
company was founded. Companies and clients were to benefit from 
revolutions in the computer environment. The first personal computer (PC) 
was launched in 1985. With the price of hardware falling and performance 
standards increasing, it was an exciting time to be in the computer software 
industry. McKeown was a little bit ahead of competitors and their bureau 
services created their market. When the bureau users eventually bought 
their own machines, they bought McKeown’s software as well. The 
company was very successful from the early 1980s through the late 1980s.
Role of the entrepreneur
The financial manager saw Gerry McKeown as a major force in the success 
of the company:
He is very dynamic. His ideas, his concepts of what clients will 
want are right. He is quite imaginative. He is marketing oriented. 
He has good technical knowledge. He is indispensable, totally.
The financial manager believed that a combination of technical, marketing
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From our point of view, it is no good knowing only one or two 
aspects. You need to know the market, the industry and have 
technical know-how. To manage a business like this, you have to 
have the ability to manage staff. And that is a talent. 
Communication is really important. He is a brilliant entrepreneur. 
He would be a very good manager. He can communicate well, he 
can communicate in R&D and in marketing.
Crisis
According to the financial manager, the company was successful up until 
the late 1980s. There were no problems; everything went well; it was a 
‘silver spoon’ situation. Hugh Cosgrove, the general manager, echoed this 
view, saying that the company experienced a period of rapid growth. The 
Irish operation was self-sufficient and it generated cash surpluses. The 
early decisions on technology did not change all that much. In the late 
1980s the industry underwent a major change and consequently McKeown 
had to change its technological base. UNIX emerged as a new operating 
system. The company decided to ‘translate’ all its products in order for 
them to run on UNIX. The transfer meant that McKeown’s software could 
run on any hardware platform that supported UNIX, such as IBM, Digital, 
ICL, Hewlett-Packard. Open systems technology benefited clients in the 
sense that were not tied to a single hardware supplier. The transfer to 
UNIX from the proprietary Digital VAX/VMS environment was inevitable 
and a case of ‘good timing’ in the light of the Digital exit from Ireland. 
However, the project demanded a huge capital outlay. From 1983/84 
onwards, the company spent at least a quarter of a million on R&D. The 
project was a costly and complicated one that took over 3 years to 
complete. The transfer had to be done correctly; the systems had to be 
properly ‘bedded down’, i.e. guaranteed to work when they were released.
Marketing costs were also quite high in gaining a foothold in export
and managerial expertise was crucial in the software business:
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markets. Any cash surpluses in Ireland were drained by the UK operation. 
The company was depending on the depressed UK market where the bulk 
of its users are based. The year 1989/90 was a very difficult trading year 
for the company. In 1989/90, the company took over an operation in 
Northern Ireland in order to sell into the Scottish market. They also 
opened an office in Hong Kong, but incurred a bad debts which had to be 
written off at that stage. The systems did not live up to customer 
expectations and the client refused to accept them. The financial manager 
claimed that the company experienced problems with bespoke contracts. 
Normally when a specification came in from a potential client, the company 
responded to it as best they could. However, it was a cost that the 
company could not control. Various factors resulted in a shortfall in sales 
revenue and a loss for the financial year.
Management unanimously agreed that the following three factors created a 
large cash flow problem for the group:
(1) High R&D investment
(2) Stagnant sales
(3) High marketing costs.
Plans had to be devised in the short term to recover from an adverse 
situation. The company was forced to reduce staff and control costs.
Hugh Cosgrove, the general manager in Dublin, saw the problem as one 
of rapid growth:
The danger with software development is that expansion can be 
rapid until one day the bubble bursts. A company can become too
big too quickly and get out of control We had a traumatic
Christmas where 25 people were made redundant. That 
concentrated our minds.
The company was very successful for three years previous to the crisis.
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They made the decision to adopt Unix technology and decided to 
concentrate on software packages. However, according to the general 
manager:
You can’t ever afford to take your eye off the ball and ignore 
management reporting and monitoring. We were cruising. We had 
two or three good years. In that particular year, we were heavily 
into marketing, and at the same time we had a fairly heavy 
investment in technology. I guess we did not review figures on a 
month to month basis. Suddenly, nine or ten months into the year 
we were faced with a real crisis situation.
The comments of the general manager suggested that the period of 
turbulence arose from a lack of planning. Cosgrove remarked that they 
should have concentrated resources on sales/marketing and formal 
reporting. Cosgrove suggested that growth should have been controlled 
better, but it was likely that the founder did not see the need to conserve 
resources. The financial manager saw the problem as a lack of reflection, 
of strategic thinking. He said that:
The company was maybe mismanaged in some ways. The company 
is much more reflective internally today.
The financial manager remarked that although it was bad period for the 
company, positive aspects emerged. The company would not have grown 
to the position it is in today, with the potential it has, without having gone 
through that period.
Recovery from crisis
The company nearly went into receivership but its problems were addressed 
by outside investment. The financial manager said they had hoped that 
sales would sustain growth and that the company would remain self 
sufficient, but things did not work out that way. This period was to have
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significant repercussions in the future. A large Spanish software company 
CCS (Centro de Calculo de Sabadell) bought a 55% stake in the company. 
According to the general manager (Hugh Cosgrove) Gerry McKeown was 
comfortable with relinquishing control of day-to-day management. On a 
personal level, the transition to a formal board of management happened at 
the right time for him. A man in his fifties, he worked hard and had the 
opportunity to enjoy the rewards of business success. He became more 
directly involved in the R&D side and played a lesser role in the direction 
of the company. The comments of a few managers suggested that long 
term strategies were put in place:
McKeown started off with a few employees, with his ideas, with 
what he wanted to sell, after that there was continual growth all the 
time to the mid 1980s. Then it was realised that it was a big 
company that had to be responsible for it’s employment, .a definite 
mark.. At that stage, business strategies would really have been 
kicked into place, in the long, long term. Up until then, it would 
have been in the growth stage, which is quite common in a lot of 
companies, you know who you are selling to, what you are selling, 
you take your product and sell around the hardware. Long term 
plans are not present in the initial stages.
According to the financial manager, the company became far more cost- 
oriented and budget conscious as a result of the crisis. R&D expenditure 
was planned a year in advance. They estimated the amount they would 
have to spend and areas that would generate cash. There was a two year 
development plan. The company aimed to anticipate future trends. The 
financial manager remarked that changes in strategy ‘were planned 
reasonably well in advance’. The negative aspects of that period were 
redundancies and the effects it had on the customer base. The clients had 
large maintenance contracts with McKeown and concerns about company 
survival caused some to look at other options. They learned that the Irish 
marketplace was not a place in which to be pro-active. The Irish market 
was too small and they learned of the paramount importance of opening up 
new markets with a new product. Due to the cyclical nature of the product
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life cycle, planning for new product development was crucial. Whereas 
older clients would only look for enhancements, new customers would 
demand new products. The financial manager remarked that they can cope 
with the product life cycle much better today because they have a secure 
financial base. An aggressive development cycle, the lack of planning, the 
lack of proper budgeting and control procedures, all contributed to the 
crisis. Crisis seemed to caused by poor management.
In the aftermath of the crisis, it was critical to monitor expenditure and 
make the firm as cost effective as possible. The decision to shift from 
bespoke development to a product led strategy emerged in the late 1980s. 
There was a strong degree of consensus among manager regarding 
company strategy; most saw the crisis has having ramifications for the 
company’s strategy. The financial manager claimed that as a result of the 
problems the company went through in the 1980s, they decided to move 
away from bespoke contracts. Hugh Cosgrove (General Manager) also 
believed that packaged software made more financial sense. For instance, 
the company produced a customized package for the health sector and that 
became part of the standard product. Rather than having different versions 
of the software, they had one product which had perimeter settings to suit 
the particular market requirements. The company concentrated on 
developing one system instead of maintaining many different versions of 
the same product. This led to significant savings.
According to management, the thinking of the company changed in the 
wake of the crisis situation. Programming staff had to change their work 
practices. In the past, there was a tendency to leave certain features out of 
a package unless the client specifically requested it. Today, programming 
staff have to think in terms of ‘putting everything into the package’. The 
company is committed to developing standard software packages. The 
company therefore has become more of a R&D and sales unit. The 
company did not have the same requirement for programming staff as a
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result. As they deliberately reduced their involvement in large bespoke 
contracts, the consequent resources were retrained and diverted into the 
R&D and Product Development division. According to Hugh Cosgrove, 
the company emerged from this period in 1980s with:
(1) a commitment to product stability and
(2) an objective to restrict growth in terms of employee numbers.
Before the crisis, if a contract was obtained people were employed in the 
hope that more work would become available by time the contract was 
finished. That ethos has changed. The company became much more 
product-oriented. They concentrated their energies on developing the core 
product instead of devising new products. They did not intend to grow 
any bigger in terms of numbers employed. In the past the company grew 
without worrying too much about profitability. The financial manager 
remarked that:
they have stepped back from that. If we have an overflow, we use 
third party contractors and some of the larger consultancies who 
assist us in implementation; this helps pick up the peaks and 
troughs.
Mr Hartley, the sales manager, claimed that the company has become much 
more focused because of the change in their core strategy. He remarked 
that in the past they:
...we tried to cover too much ground, we bid for nearly everything 
that moved, we would grab it. Now we are saying no. We have a 
core regime.
They made a decision to bid for contracts that fitted their customer profile 
not for contracts that required a great deal of bespoke enhancements. The 
marketing manager noted that the company as a whole learned valuable 
lessons along the way.
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He suggested that the company has become more focused:
We are going to stop buying market share. We adopt this ‘live and 
let live’ posture. You can take the bad business. We will chase the 
good business. We are more completely focused now on profit not 
on revenue.
Development of the company
The company targeted three main market segments:
(1) Commercial (38.4%)*
(2) Healthcare (30.9%)
(3) State (30.7)
* 1994 figures
The company quickly identified the commercial advantages of developing 
the public sector market. Malachy Hartley remarked that the company was 
strong in local or quasi-local government in Ireland, with clients such as 
SFADCO and Aer Rianta. Revenue was biased more towards the public 
sector than their traditional commercial sector. The recession in the 1980s 
stimulated McKeown to target the public sector. The company developed 
its product portfolio over the years and added a new system in 1994 aimed 
at the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK. Although the company 
penetrated the health service and used it as a reference site to build future 
sales, they did not ignore other industry sectors.
A technological orientation
The financial manager stressed that an R&D orientation emerged from the 
1980s period. He remarked:
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The concept of being much more R&D oriented came into existence 
in the company in the late 1980s. Technology changed so fast that 
the company had to be R&D proactive.
According to him:
You couldn’t just keep on with ‘bespoke, bespoke, bespoke’. It 
started to fall over eventually. The client became more aware of 
what was out there. The client became more aware of their own 
business as well. The more information technology they got, the 
more they wanted. So the systems would have continued to grow, 
like a bonsai tree...it came to the stage where it was too big in the 
garden. We wanted to get everything into the nut. It was not going 
to grow anymore. The package should have everything that the 
client wanted. All they needed should be within it.
Changes in the technological environment resulted in dramatic changes in 
the products, both in terms of functionality and the hardware systems they 
work on. According to the financial manager, McKeown was proactive 
and prone to taking calculated risks, however the company had a more 
secure financial base. McKeown and its parent group CCS agreed to 
exchange technology and to collaborate on future product development. A 
pan-European Co-operative Development Initiative was set up by the group. 
This was a product development alliance with firms in Spain, France, the 
Netherlands and Portugal. This project could not have been undertaken by 
the company on their own due to the huge investment required.
Management thinking changed after the crisis; the focus was on continuous 
development of their product and technology. The survival and expansion 
of the firm, according to the general manager, would depend on its ability 
to refine their product and absorb new technological trends. Company 
strategy centred around a fairly standard product aimed at the public sector 
and private sector organisations. This contrasted with their previous policy 
of adapting the basic product or technology for particular needs or 
customers. This strategy (i.e. a shift from bespoke development to
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products) resulted in changes in staffing, in work practices, in customer 
profiles and a new R&D orientation.
A customer orientation
The importance of customer service was evident throughout the company. 
Since the buyer-seller relationship was long term in nature the ability to 
communicate with and reassure the customer was crucial. Long term 
contracts, the high cost and nature of the purchase, meant that client 
contact was extremely important. The relationship between customers and 
a software company like McKeown was a paradigm of mutual trust. For 
instance, one manager remarked that the company provided extensive 
customer support:
Our support services and structures are second to none. Having 
said that, it is being improved all the time. It is very good.
Their commitment to standards of customer service was indicated by the 
adoption of ISO 9000 practises in all their locations. This award was 
critical to the company’s ability to tender for international business.
Mr. Hartley (Sales and Marketing Manager) saw the customer as a driving 
force behind the core strategy. The company had to draw a fine line 
between adjusting the product without changing its core structure. If they 
impinged on the stability of the product, it would preclude their existing 
customer base from moving with them. According to Mr. Hartley, their 
approach was one of caution, it was a ‘softly, softly’ approach. They 
worked on the basis that it would take time for the market to mature, to 
accept new technology. Selling software was a two way process, one of 
customer education. He stressed that consumers needed to be reassured 
that they would have a path to future technology.
The financial manager claimed that a customer awareness was present from
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the outset but the company realised that being proactive in R&D was also 
very important. The board of management developed a User Group and 
Special Interest Groups (SIGs) who were active in reviewing and 
recommending new areas of product development and enhancement.
Technological and competitive challenges
Keeping up to date with technology was a major challenge to be faced by 
the company. Hugh Cosgrove claimed that the company has seen major 
trends on the technical side. The company had to evaluate closely those 
trends that were likely to impact their market. The company did not 
position itself in the forefront of technology, but was a follower of 
technological trends. The company’s objective was to incorporate new 
developments into the core product. Evolution not revolution was the 
attitude adopted by the company. According to the general manager:
We have never sat down and said that we have a new piece of 
technology. Instead, we say, we have a set of core packages which 
we have spent a lot of time and energy on. In terms of providing 
stability, let’s try and bring these packages forward, not scrub the 
investment and start from scratch...The company cannot afford to 
discard its customers. It has to bring them with the company when 
adopting new technologies.
The financial manager claimed that the company adopted ‘a bold and 
aggressive posture’ when an opportunity to make sales existed. That 
opportunistic posture drove the company since the late 1980s. Through 
their knowledge and their experience, they were in tune with customer 
needs. Their perception of risk was relatively low since the opportunities 
were very real to them. The financial manager remarked that: ‘they can 
drive R&D as hard they want’ but that is not inherently risky. R&D is the 
‘bread and butter’ of the company. Devoting as much resources as 
possible to R&D was in line with the long term strategy of eliminating 
bespoke work. The only risk lay in the cash flow situation, but since the
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company was taken over it has become better managed.
According to one manager, the marketplace has become more sophisticated 
and more demanding in terms of new technology. The market has become 
much more educated in terms of what to expect and demand a high level of 
customer support. In the past five years, customers have started using 
consultants to advise them on their computer requirements. Customer 
specifications have become more detailed and more formal. In one sense 
this change has actually benefited McKeown since according to one 
manager: ‘they have a clearer idea of what the customer wants right from 
the start’.
McKeown took the threat of competition very seriously. They gathered 
information on competitor activities, In an intensely competitive business, 
it was extremely difficult to compete against international competitors. The 
large players had worldwide exposure, guaranteed financial stability, 
hundreds of reference sites in many market sectors which was always an 
advantage. They were able to compete on ‘junkets’ (i.e. a day out playing 
golf) whereas McKeown had to rely on the products to sell rather than on 
ancillary things. McKeown was a medium sized company and that caused 
clients some concern. Yet, they compensated for these disadvantages by 
providing local support. Their main competitive advantage was the fact 
that they were the author of the software; they controlled the whole 
development, implementation, training and marketing processes. The 
company was a one-stop shop which was what clients wanted.
Future plans
The general manager spoke of their future plans:
We’ll see what technologies are emerging, keep monitoring the sales 
situation, keep reasonably tight as regards size, grow turnover by 
adopting a product oriented strategy.
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The company may use agents to distribute their product. The financial 
manager sees future goals as continued growth in Ireland and the UK, and 
‘hopefully, a big operation in the Far East’.
Management’s view of company’s strengths
(1) A very good work force
(2) Centralized control
(3) Reference sites
(4) Full control over product development, training, implementation and
local support services
(5) R&D expertise
Management’s view of company’s weaknesses
(1) Being tied to existing customers
(2) Lacking the international dimension, being a medium sized company
competing against multi-nationals
(3) Difficulty in getting established in the UK
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CHAPTER FIVE: MAJOR THEMES AND OUTCOMES FROM THE
CASE STUDY FINDINGS
Introduction
This chapter draws on the empirical data to describe the strategy formation 
process as observed in nine small ventures in Ireland. Figure 5.1 presents, in 
overview, a model of the strategy formation process guiding this study, as 
developed earlier in chapter two. In this chapter, each of the three major 
influences on the process are analysed in turn. For instance, Figure 5.2 
synthesises the main findings relating to the entrepreneur. The chapter then 
concludes with an examination of the patterns of process produced 
by the interaction of these influences over time. The chapter is organised 
under the following headings: (1) The Entrepreneur, (2) Context, (3) History 
and (4) Patterns in strategy formation.
Figure 5.1: A Model of the strategy formation process in SMEs
Main elements Process Outcomes
Context—»
Entrepreneur—»
History—»
—» Realised
Strategy
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Outcomes
process in SMEs
Realised 
-» Strategy
The psychology of the 
entrepreneur.
Types of entrepreneurs. 
The role of the 
entrepreneur as creator of 
organisational culture, 
the darker side of 
entrepreneurship, the 
dynamic role of the 
entrepreneur and the 
mediating influence of 
partners on the 
entrepreneur.
Main elements Process
Figure 5.2: Entrepreneurship and the strategy formation
Context-»
History-»
The entrepreneur
Introduction
A key debate that emerged from the literature was whether or not the 
personal attributes of the entrepreneur had a significant impact on outcomes 
(see, for example, Cromie, 1994). Other studies suggested that the trait 
stream of literature adopted an overly voluntarist perspective on the role of 
the entrepreneur (Sandberg and Hofer, 1987). The case study data 
informed this debate by looking at a variety of entrepreneurs in context and 
over time. The case study findings are summarised in Figure 5.2. Firstly, 
the study examined whether the concept of the ‘entrepreneurial hero’ was 
based on reality or myth, and secondly, it assessed the role of the 
entrepreneur in the strategy formation process.
A key research question related to the role of the entrepreneur in the 
strategy formation process. This study found that the individual was, in 
most but not all cases, a crucial actor in the process of strategy formation. 
All founders had the ability to perceive and act on new market 
opportunities. Many exhibited qualities such as commitment, willpower, 
tenacity, persuasiveness, along with people skills. The vast majority (7 out 
of 9) of the companies were based on the exploitation of a previously 
untried and untested idea in the Irish marketplace. One firm (BFK Design) 
was a ‘me too’ company and had some difficulty in differentiating itself 
from competitors. Some entrepreneurs such as Richard Brierley (Fiacla), 
Jim Barry (RTI), Gerry Giblin (QFS) and Gerry McKeown (McKeown 
Software) did command a standing in their firms of almost homeric 
proportions, supporting the classical, romantic stereotype of the 
entrepreneur. What emerged from discussions with employees in these 
firms was the unique and valued contribution of the founder to the firm. 
The entrepreneurs left their mark on the firms by fostering a distinctive 
culture. The ‘hero status’ of the founder was very much in evidence. The
(1) The entrepreneur
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accounts of stakeholders praised the entrepreneur, they had a strong 
predilection for the meteoric rise, the success story, the small firm holding 
its own with large companies. A question that arose in the case of RTI and 
Fiacla was whether the company could survive beyond the tenure of the 
founding entrepreneur, indicating the importance of the entrepreneur to the 
firm.
In contrast, the entrepreneurs in Caraplas, BFK Design, Kestrel and 
Braycot, did not seem to enjoy the same ‘hero status’, questioning the 
universality of the traditional romantic stereotype. There seemed to be 
variations in the personas and role played by the founders in the 
development of their firms. In addition, the role of the entrepreneur was 
not always a constructive one in the strategy formation process. The 
influential role played by the entrepreneur in the company’s early 
development was often moderated in later stages. Learning and change 
was a feature of both the firm’s and the entrepreneur’s development over 
time, an insight that is often lost in the more traditional, static studies of 
the entrepreneurial personality.
The psychology of the entrepreneur: personal traits, motives and aims
A key research question centred on whether the personal attributes of the 
entrepreneur had an impact on the strategy formation process. By 
comparing and contrasting entrepreneurs in terms of their personal 
attributes two main archetypes of founders were revealed. These are 
shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Typology of entrepreneurs
Type 1 Type 2
The charismatic entrepreneurs The pragmatic 
entrepreneurs
Richard Brierley (Fiacla)
Jim Barry (RTI)
Gerry Giblin (QFS)
Gerry McKeown (McKeown Software)
Peggy Connolly 
(Irish Breeze).
Kevin Barry & Partners 
(BFK Design).
Gerard Crowley (Braycot). 
Pearse O’ Kane (Caraplas). 
Joe McArdle (Kestrel).
These two types exhibited different attitudes towards risk, different 
attributes and had a different standing in the eyes of employees. Their 
approach to the formation of strategy was different: the charismatic 
entrepreneurs took risks in order to aggressively grow the company, 
whereas the pragmatic entrepreneurs sought to minimise risk in the strategy 
formation process. The charismatic entrepreneurs were able to infuse 
employees and customers with their vision for the company; their approach 
to the formation of strategy was emotion-rich and underpinned by 
humanistic as well as commercial values. The charismatic entrepreneurs 
possessed certain attributes that seemed to fit the stereotypical, 
romanticised ‘larger-than-life’ image of the entrepreneur. The pragmatic 
entrepreneurs were perceived in less charismatic terms and adopted a more 
down-to-earth, instrumental and calculated approach to strategy formation 
and business development. Although they did not seem to fit the 
stereotypical image of the entrepreneur, they were just as effective in most 
cases. The main attributes of each type are shown in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Dominant attributes of the charismatic and the pragmatic
entrepreneurs
Type 1: Type 2
The charismatic entrepreneur The pragmatic entrepreneur
Dominant attributes Dominant attributes
Approach to strategy formation: 
visionary, idealistic, romantic, 
intuitive.
A ‘bullish’ attitude to the 
management of risk.
Abiding commitment; obsessive, 
success against the odds; 
achievement of goals an ‘end in 
itself’.
Approach to strategy formation: 
‘common-sense’, down-to-earth, 
planned, rational.
A ‘bearish’ attitude to the 
management of risk.
‘Calculated’ commitment; 
success obtainable: dream within 
reach; instrumental aims: 
achievement of goals a ‘means to 
an end’.
Type 1: The charismatic entrepreneur
The charismatic entrepreneurs shared common characteristics: all were 
visionaries; they had an unshakeable, obsessive belief in their venture ideas 
and abiding loyalty to their companies; their vision was often based on 
intuition and experience rather than hard data, proven facts, forecasts or 
plans. They were prepared to assume risks in order to aggressively grow 
the company even when their ambitions exceeded company resources. 
Although they were small players competing in industries dominated by 
large, well established multi-nationals, their ambitions were not modest. 
Their sense of confidence in the venture, ability to inspire employees and 
persuade stakeholders to continue to support the venture in times of 
difficulty, were all important characteristics of the charismatic 
entrepreneurs. Their tenacity and persistence in the face of difficulties 
eventually led to success, often success against the odds. They were 
guided by idealistic as well as commercial goals: success and financial
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reward was important to them but they also had other aims such as: making 
computer power at the point-of-sale more accessible to the users; building a 
world-class reputation for Irish software, and proving that Irish produce is 
as good, if not better, than the import substitutes. They constituted a 
driving force in the development of their companies, but on the negative 
side, their role in developing the business and emotional attachment to it 
made them virtually indispensable to the firm. They were reluctant to cede 
control of the venture and take-over was eventually forced on the 
companies in two cases.
Approach to strategy formation: visionary, idealistic, romantic, intuitive.
The charismatic entrepreneurs were visionaries for their companies, they 
were oriented towards the future, towards exploiting new opportunities and 
new innovations. The start-up and early development of their companies 
was driven more by their instinct or ‘gut feel’ for the business rather than 
by a rational plan. They were driven by deep-rooted values rather than 
purely economic values which helped them tap into a niche market and 
respond to the needs of customers.
The founder of RTI, Jim Barry, set up a company to exploit the technology 
of EPOS (electronic point of sale). He went into the market pre- the P.C. 
(personal computer) era. Industry conditions were not favourable to the 
start-up of a new technologically based venture, and the Commodore PET 
computer which was launched in 1977 was ‘quite primitive’. Jim Barry 
remarked that: ‘the market wasn’t right for it then, that’s for sure’ but 
claimed that the knowledge they gained about the technology and market 
needs was invaluable. He decided to leave his job which was a ‘major 
move’. He was pulled into entrepreneurship by his strong desire to 
achieve, to ‘build things’ and by his belief that a market existed for POS 
(point-of-sale) technology. This belief seemed to be based more on his 
intuition and ‘gut feel’ for the project rather than on any in-depth market
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analysis. He remarked that he: ‘just became interested in the technology 
around 1974’ and that it was: ‘all seat-of-the-pants stuff at the time.’ He 
described himself as follows:
...I’m a gut feeling type of person as well. You get a gut feel for 
something. If you look around - where are the problems, the 
bottlenecks? Wherever there is a bottleneck there is an 
opportunity...
If Jim Barry’s instinct for a new project was shared by the other directors, 
they then proceeded with the project. The comments of one employee 
suggested that forming a strategy in this way was risky since the founder’s 
instinct for market needs may not always be correct:
The current project is risky in the sense that the 
market research that justifies the need for the product 
is Jim Barry mainly, his hunches, his experiences of 
talking to people, his experience of using existing 
products himself which he reckons are hard to use.
Hopefully there will be enough people out there 
in the same boat as him
Jim Barry believes that the entrepreneur is an individual who only sees 
opportunities not problems, and it is likely that this attribute caused him to 
persist with his vision for the company:
You look at things from a positive side rather than 
a negative side. I always look for an opportunity first 
and work back from that...
As a visionary for the firm, he had a love of ideas, and had a significant 
impact on the new product development activities of the company. Jim 
Barry spoke about their latest project which challenged certain assumptions 
inherent in the industry:
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Recent studies in the US show a phobia about computers. The big 
players have all convinced everyone that all this stuff is very 
simple...It always ends up that the people who are operating the 
computers to input data, access data at the POS (point of sale and 
point of service) are the lowest paid people in the business, on 
minimum wages, a lot of them can’t speak English...The big 
players don’t see that as their market but we see that as our market, 
so we hope to get our share of that by addressing the low-end, the 
low level users.
His vision for the company was predicated on addressing the needs of the 
computer user who was marginalised by the industry:
There is a huge uneducated market out there who will never have 
experience of the PC in their home. They seem to have been 
excluded from all the calculations people are doing. They are 
marginalised in the computer area, I suppose. We feel the 
technology we are involved in will make it easier for uneducated 
people to use the power of PC - so we are targeting our extension 
of the existing product - allowing menu options to be entered in a 
simple way through key-strokes...
His idealistic approach to strategy formation was also shown in his desire 
to produce high quality software products and achieve ‘a level of 
excellence.’ He had a great pride in the company and the skills of its 
employees, saying that the company was ‘full of people with bright ideas’ 
and that the Irish ‘were the smartest people in the world’. However he 
lamented the lack of resources available to exploit these ideas. The 
charismatic status of this entrepreneur was reflected by the comments of 
employees who saw him as the creative force behind the venture:
He was instrumental in the development of the company.
Without him, there would be no company. In fact,
without him, there would be no product He is
always at least a year, if not more, ahead of the 
competition. He is an ideas man. A great lateral 
thinker. He is always thinking ahead...
He is a brilliant entrepreneur...
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Similarly, Gerry McKeown was perceived by employees as being a major 
force behind the success of his company, McKeown Software. Gerry 
McKeown founded the company in 1979 with the intention of offering be­
spoke applications for large businesses. The company was driven by the 
vision of the founder and long term plans were absent in the early years. 
Part of McKeown’s vision was to make computing power accessible to 
clients, since computers were prohibitively expensive for small to medium 
sized companies. The computer systems were large and primitive by 
today’s standards. McKeown came up with the idea of an on-line bureau 
system, where people could dial into their system and use their software. 
When the first PC was launched in 1985, many users bought their own 
hardware and availed of McKeown’s software. Gerry McKeown changed 
from a proprietary to an open systems architecture in the late 1980s. This 
decision involved a high degree of uncertainty but was fortuitous in the 
light of Digital’s market problems in the early 1990s. This entrepreneur 
demonstrated both managerial and technical expertise which was vital to the 
success of the technologically based venture. Like Jim Barry, he was 
creative, future-oriented, and a good communicator. In the words of the 
financial manager:
He is very dynamic. His ideas, his concepts of what
clients will want are right. He is quite imaginative...To manage
a business like this, you have to have the ability to
manage staff. And that is a talent. Communication is really
important. He is a brilliant entrepreneur. He would be a
very good manager. He can communicate well, he can
communicate in R&D and in marketing.
Similarly, Richard Brierley of Fiacla possessed vision. He founded a 
company to produce the only Irish-made toothpaste on the marketplace; his 
vision was rooted in the desire to produce a product that was as good if not 
better than that produced by the multi-nationals. His distributor remarked 
that he was ‘driven by this search for excellence’ and ‘always wanted the
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best’. Brierley decided to target the East European market which was an 
emerging market at this time. This was an imaginative response to the 
barriers to entry he faced in the FMCG (fast-moving-consumer-good) 
market at home. The Trade Board did not encourage Irish firms to enter 
this market since the fall of communism and the transition to a market- 
based economy brought high levels of uncertainty and turbulence. The 
export strategy adopted by Brierley was an unconventional one at the time 
and became the foundation stone in the success of the company. Richard 
Brierley was quick to adopt new trends and his company became the first 
to launch a baking soda toothpaste in the Irish marketplace. The distributor 
saw him as an individual with a great love of ideas:
He always wants to do something. You can never talk to Dick 
without him having some idea floating around in his head. He 
would be a progenitor of most of these ideas. We would be the 
passive shareholders. He has a very active mind, chase this, 
chase that. We would be more or less responding to his suggestions 
and requests.
Gerry Giblin of Quay Financial Software (QFS) was perceived to have 
vision and foresight by employees. The company was headed by two 
individuals, two founding strategists. One was a venture capitalist (Dermot 
Desmond) with a flamboyant profile in the Irish business world. The 
other, Giblin, was a software programmer. Gerry Giblin claimed that he 
‘basically built the thing up.’ Although this individual did not fund the 
venture, he did take a share of the profits and managed the firm with a 
considerable degree of autonomy. He had predicted with a great deal of 
accuracy how the technology and financial markets would evolve in the 
future. He provided the vision, the technical creativity and contacts that 
led to the firm’s success. Growth in QFS was driven more by the vision of 
the founder that by a plan. One manager remarked that ‘Gerry’s vision 
would have been a key part’ in the growth and success of QFS. Gerry 
Giblin was an opportunist who used his contacts in the software industry to
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put together the deal with Telerate.
This entrepreneur, like the others, was driven by deep values that 
underpinned the purely commercial values such as growth, success, 
financial reward, and so on. His aim was to be a ‘world class software 
developer’, to produce ‘world class products’, not just products for the 
domestic market. The company was named the AIB software exporter of 
the year in 1993. He was seen by employees as having a charismatic 
personality and having status in the software community:
Gerry met Dermot Desmond in the States who asked 
him to come back and head up the company. You had the 
deep pockets of Desmond and the charismatic type of individual 
in Gerry who was able to do all the front work...A lot 
of new companies have that type of personality, 
particularly now since we are moving into risk management, 
the entrepreneur is normally a person you would identify with 
the company, not just the company name
As the company grew larger, Gerry Giblin, realised that there was need to 
bring in a professional manager instead of having a situation where 
employees reacted to ‘the personal charisma, influence or style of any 
individual.’ The role of Gerry Giblin was praised by the new managing 
director:
I think he is well respected. He started up something new.
He was involved with QFS from the beginning. He was the 
founder of the company. He came to it with a strong technical 
background. He came from Telerate and was the one behind 
the Invision product...He had the vision and foresight to come up 
with an idea and base a product around that idea and start up a 
company. He is very strong, a good leader.
It would be difficult to make sense of the culture of QFS without knowing 
the fraught circumstances of its birth. The founding strategists had 
ambitions well beyond the reach of current means, which was seen by the
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proposed deal to merge all companies into one entity and secure funding 
from Telerate even though some were in a weak and embryonic state. The 
aim was to become a major player in the industry. Large expectations 
were created. Part of the culture entailed taking risks in order to pursue an 
aggressive growth strategy. Since QFS was owned substantially by 
financier Dermot Desmond, Gerry Giblin said that they had the appropriate 
investment at start-up ‘to think big as opposed to small’. However, this 
vision failed to materialise. Thus, the charismatic entrepreneur seemed 
capable of assuming risk in the pursuit of a vision which had implications 
for the strategy formation process.
A ‘bullish ’ attitude to the management o f risk
Another distinguishing characteristic of the charismatic entrepreneurs was 
their attitudes towards risk. Most were obsessive in orientation, they were 
driven by the strength of their convictions, and this confidence in the 
business enabled them to take risks in the pursuit of their vision. Although 
most entrepreneurs have to take risk or deal with uncertainty, the risks 
taken by the charismatic entrepreneurs were often perceived to be very high 
by external stakeholders. In the early days, Jim Barry of RTI developed, 
produced and manufactured products. He took a ‘hands-on’ approach to all 
aspects of business-start up. Although he was never completely 
comfortable with that level of risk, it was necessary in order to prove that 
the technology worked, and that it could ‘come from the laboratory out into 
the real world’. After a few years, the company made a decision to use 
licensing as a route for commercialising its technology. The company 
made a significant break with the past in 1996 by launching a new range of 
innovative products. Management are presently seeking a quotation on the 
small firms security market in the United States. They will become one of 
a very small group of Irish companies to go public. One employee spoke 
about the high degree of risk borne by Jim Barry:
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When you are driving the development cycle, there are 
always financial crises, because everything is cost.
It means cash flow problems. We have always been able to 
go to banks or an investment group to sort it out, at 
great personal risk to the founder and his family. He had 
to dig deep. If your are supporting an organisation like this 
out of your own pocket, the costs are mighty.
Very high cost, high risk stuff...
In spite of the pressures and strains involved, this entrepreneur persisted 
with the venture. Jim Barry was totally committed to the new venture. He 
was ‘pulled’ into entrepreneurship by his high need for achievement. He 
needed an outlet for his creativity and was motivated primarily by the 
desire to ‘build things’ rather than the desire to build an organisation. The 
desire for achievement was a strong motivating factor:
Leaving RTE was a major move. It was a secure job. I could have 
gone places in RTE. The attraction at the time of doing 
things yourself was really the motivation. I just wanted to get 
involved for myself. I wanted to see if I could achieve 
something, make things...
Jim Barry was prepared to leave what is colloquially referred to as the 
‘good job’ and assume the social, psychological and financial risks entailed 
in new venture initiation. The founder of RTI believed that the 
entrepreneur has an unique outlook on life that differentiates him from the 
manager. The entrepreneur lacks the analytical skills of the manager but 
possess a risk-taking posture that is a primary requisite for enterprising 
behaviour. The manager’s way of thinking is oriented towards control, 
risk avoidance and rational analysis while the entrepreneur’s way of 
thinking is completely different.
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Jim Barry remarked:
A manager had to be a very disciplined, analytical type 
of person, who can look at things and weigh them up 
very carefully. Managers are more careful people.
An entrepreneur is not a careful person. Careful people 
write the history, they do not create it. A manager is 
interested in control, in keeping things ticking over on a 
day-to-day basis. That is an area I am not particularly 
good at myself and do not get involved in
Similarly, Richard Brierley of Fiacla also showed an ability to assume risk 
and uncertainty. Unlike Peggy Connolly of Irish Breeze, he decided to 
manufacture his product rather then sub-contract production. He invested 
£500,000 in capital equipment for the business which represented the most 
fundamental decision he ever had to take. Richard Brierley described his 
own personal philosophy towards business, which centred on being 
proactive and able to assume risk without depending on external support:
The one thing blocking the growth of companies is people 
sitting back and waiting for it to happen, instead of making 
it happen. A lot of people sit back and say we need support, 
we have got to have support to do this, but unless they get 
up and go and do it themselves, they are not going to achieve 
anything...
Even though he did not have the sales contracts in place, and was unable to 
obtain grant-aid, he knew that capital investment was needed to bring the 
firm to its next phase of development. The firm endured a financial crisis 
soon after, when its distributor collapsed and its entire market nearly 
disappeared. The quality control manager referred to the founder’s 
tendency to take risks even though the firm was not equipped for them:
This export opportunity came along and we seized it, without having 
the capacity to do it very well. We could not say no to it. In fact 
we had to take the risk. It was a chicken and egg situation. It was 
a way of increasing production.
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The marketing manager perceived Brierley as an ambitious, impatient and 
driven individual who wanted total control. He suggested that Brierley’s 
frame of thinking bordered on the unrealistic; in his view, Brierley’s 
expectations of what he could achieve were too high. Brierley seemed to 
be an individual who would push the frontier of his capabilities and did not 
impose self-limiting barriers:
I think when he went into the business, he knew exactly what he 
wanted. Whether the goals were attainable in his time frame, or 
ever, is debatable! I do believe he knew exactly what he wanted. 
The motivating factor was money at the end of the day. If he gets a 
slice of the Irish market it would make him a lot of money...
As a charismatic entrepreneur, Brierley was not interested in minimising 
risk or adopting a strategy of slow growth/slow build. The company 
survived the crisis of 1989 and went on to win the 1993 Small Business of 
the Year Award sponsored by the Sunday Business Post and ACC Bank. 
Brierley’s perception of the risks of business start-up seemed to be low due 
to his distinct personality as well his lack of business experience. The 
Managing Director remarked:
He seemed like a guy who knew what he was talking about.
His background struck me as a bit strange, but sometimes they 
make the best entrepreneurs. They do not see problems only 
solutions. They do not realise the implications of things. We need 
a bull headed attitude, I think he went into the venture without 
realising the commercial risks involved. He had an idea and 
reckoned he could make it work...
Likewise, Gerry Giblin of QFS was also a risk-taker. One employee 
described him as an ‘optimistic risk taker’ and a ‘typical entrepreneur’ who 
relied on people to deliver on promises he made to clients during 
negotiations. In the early days, the company expanded on a cash flow 
basis and could not rely on reserves. If sales declined and overheads rose
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in a particular year, then that led to a fight for survival. This aspect of 
small business development called for an ability to assume risk, to promote 
the venture continuously and inspire employees to perform above and 
beyond their capabilities. One employee remarked:
The art of the entrepreneur is to take a gamble; 
they have to deliver on that gamble...The essence of 
entrepreneurship is that you do not sit back on your laurels.
You are always leveraging what comes in
The comments of this employee demonstrate that the charismatic 
entrepreneur was not overly concerned with circumscribing risk or with 
limiting his degree of risk exposure.
Abiding commitment; obsessive, ‘success against the odds achievement of 
goals 'an end in itself’.
The deep-seated passions that drove the charismatic entrepreneurs helped 
them inspire employees and secure the assistance of key stakeholders. The 
entrepreneur’s unshakeable belief in the product, which was sustained even 
in times of difficulty, and the ultimate success of the business, helped 
secure credibility for the entrepreneur. Their role in starting and 
developing a business, often against the odds, guaranteed them status. In 
the pantheon of Irish entrepreneurs, they were renowned for their 
achievements. The companies received recognition from the business 
community as a whole through awards. For instance, McKeown had a 
strong customer orientation and was named ‘Computing Services Company 
of the Year’ by the ICSA (Irish Computer Services Association) in 1994.
The distributor of Fiacla believed that Richard Brierley was virtually 
indispensable to the company and remarked that he was a ‘driving force’ in 
development of the firm. He said:
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It was his idea, his drive, his initiative that got it off 
the ground. We facilitated it but we did not start it up... 
I would not take that from him in an instant...
Richard Brierley was driven by the strength of his convictions. He 
overcame great odds and challenged conventional wisdom in order to 
establish the venture. He faced scepticism from the Irish Goods Council 
when he first approached them but was undeterred. He remarked:
I can’t remember the number of times they threw me out, 
saying I was crazy
However, his commitment and unrelenting desire to make the business a 
success allowed him to make his dream a reality. Once the IDA saw that 
he was serious and had actually sold some toothpaste, they lent him a 
second hand mixing machine. Many organisations such as the ‘Young 
Ireland Movement’ helped Brierley through free publicity. The marketing 
manager of Gillespie remarked that Brierley drove the business forward:
We would have 100 products that we would sell. We would 
concentrate on the most important products. As well 
as that we would concentrate on where we would get the 
most pressure. Like every business, where you get the 
most pressure you react to it. It was Richard who had to 
drive the business from our point of view. He would keep 
on our backs
The managing director of a distribution firm saw Brierley as a highly 
committed individual who was determined to make a success of the 
business:
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He put all his eggs in one basket. It was a speculative venture.
He had to make it work. I suspect he
made a few bob in England, He had money to invest
although he was not wealthy. It was a case of either all
or nothing. It required a total degree of commitment.
I do not know if I would have done it. He had 
family commitments...! think most founders are driven...
Richard Brierley of Fiacla was a civil engineer by profession who knew 
very little about the toothpaste industry. He did not have any solid 
business experience and seemed less equipped for venture start-up than the 
other founders. In spite of this obstacle, he built up an indigenous Irish 
toothpaste firm from scratch. He fitted the typical stereotype of the 
entrepreneur, being ambitious, a risk-taker, hard working and dedicated. 
According to the quality control manager:
The company was very much a one-man company.
He built it up from nothing
The founder of Fiacla suggested that entrepreneurship entails tenacity and a 
great self-belief; this helps sustain the entrepreneur through lean periods:
I suppose an entrepreneur is someone who believes
in what they do, believes in the product,
is able to make it happen. There are many times when
I lost faith, but not for long though, because I would
have nothing to go on with; it’s a matter of keeping it going,
not losing faith in it but keeping it going. You have to
make it work...It’s sheer bloody-mindedness!
The early success of the firm and considerable media coverage it received 
as a ‘David versus Goliath’ firm may have added to the founder’s standing 
in the business community. The willingness of Brierley to persist with the 
venture after the crisis episode of 1989 also helped build credibility for the 
entrepreneur. It enhanced the reputation, charisma or ‘myth of the
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entrepreneurial hero’ especially since the venture turned out to be 
successful. For instance, Maggie Gillespie (the quality control manager) 
remarked that he gave ‘over 100% of himself’ to the venture and she 
attributed the success of the venture to the founder’s ‘tenacity, his risk- 
taking, his entrepreneurial spirit.’
The other cases provided evidence of the founders’ high degree of 
commitment to the venture along with their persistent nature which helped 
build credibility for them in the eyes of stakeholders. Jim Barry of RTI, 
Gerry Giblin of QFS and Gerry McKeown of McKeown Software were all 
considered to be vital to the success to their firms. A manager in RTI 
claimed that the business would not exist today were it not for the founding 
entrepreneur. One manager claimed that Gerry McKeown was 
‘indispensable, totally.’ He possessed both the technical and marketing 
knowledge needed to build a successful software firm.
The passion of the charismatic entrepreneur is illustrated clearly by the 
comments of Jim Barry of RTI. He seemed to have a capacity to infuse 
customers with his enthusiasm purely as a result of his emotional 
attachment to the business. He remarked:
Entrepreneurship is an enthusiasm. I can get very 
enthusiastic about something and bring people along with me, 
even customers. When I am in full flight even 
customers get excited about it as well. That’s part of 
being an entrepreneur...
This ability can have its drawbacks, the main one being that the 
entrepreneur found it difficult to become dispassionate about the business 
and cede control. For instance, Richard Brierley’s level of commitment to 
the venture meant that the take-over of the company represented the most 
difficult decision he ever faced. He indicated that he would take steps to 
regain his majority shareholding in the future, which suggests that his
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emotional ties with the venture had not weakened with the passage of time. 
In spite of the fact that he achieved what he set out to achieve, he wanted 
to regain full control of the venture. Being in business was an ‘end in 
itself’. Similarly, Gerry Giblin found that ceding control was difficult 
because of his emotional attachment to the venture:
.. .letting go and letting others take the driving seat which may not 
fit in with the way things used to be...the emotional issues will be a 
lot tougher to deal with - this is my baby and I have grown it up - 
now just as it is about to take off and go to the next level, I ’m being 
asked to stand aside. So that’s a big issue.
Belief in the venture and the ability to persuade others to accept or ‘buy 
into’ the entrepreneur’s vision for the future was a key factor in the 
strategy formation process. A key orientation of the charismatic 
entrepreneur, one that set them stand apart from others, was their ‘people 
skills’. The founder seemed to be a highly persuasive individual who was 
good at managing relationships with clients, customers, suppliers, 
distributors, financial backers and employees. Like the other 
entrepreneurs, Jim Barry emphasised his sales ability:
Most certainly on the sales and product side, I would 
play a key role, at identifying the m arket’s needs, 
listening to what people say, trying to address solutions 
to what they want
He managed to build a strong reputation for himself and his company. One 
manager described his standing in the business world:
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He is a significant player within the computer 
and retail industry...Internationally, he is recognised 
as being a leader in technology at point-of-sale.
He knows what the market requires. He has always 
been able to fill a niche. He is so well known in 
the industry. We talk to all the major players: Omron,
Riva Systems, NCR, Epson, all of them at some stage have 
been reliant on us for this technology. He is synonymous 
with computers at point-of-sale
He was described by an employee in the following way:
One of his main attributes is that he is a people person.
He gets on well with people...
Jim Barry of RTI was fully committed to the business. He claimed that 
success was due to ‘just hard graft’ and that tenacity along with sacrifices, 
hard work and commitment was necessary in order to achieve success:
People work and work and work, they really 
kill themselves in an effort to achieve success.
Jim Barry was deeply aware of the high failure rate in the software sector 
and suggested that most software firms succeed against the odds:
People in this business are not cheap. Unless growth 
continues, they cannot survive. Finance is just not available in 
Ireland for small companies....The IDA throw up the same success 
stories all the time - five or six companies. The history of these 
have broken the spirits of most of the people involved...A shortage 
of finance always blocks growth of companies. It is not a shortage 
of expertise or of commitment from the people involved, but they 
have always been ‘hand to mouth’ situations...It is such a struggle 
for the people involved, keeping the thing ticking over.
It is hard work.
Likewise, Gerry Giblin played a key role in the start-up and development 
of his company and had to overcome obstacles in order to succeed. One
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manager talked about his sales ability:
His role was a very positive one. I think 
he has very good communication skills...
His strongest attributes would be in the technical 
and sales area...
Gerry Giblin had the ability to stretch the capabilities of employees beyond 
their perceived limits. One employee remarked that they sometimes feared 
that they would not be able to deliver on the promises made by the founder 
at the negotiating table. Gerry Giblin was able to put together a wide base 
of support and gain acceptance from resource allocators. He had a history 
in the financial services community, he was well known throughout the 
software industry and as a result had good contacts. One employee 
referred to his commitment to the venture that helped him secure sales 
contracts:
He has put a lot of enthusiasm into the company. He is keen 
on pushing it forward, he has developed it over the years.
He has many contacts with the industry in Ireland and abroad.
He has used those to generate sales
Gerry Giblin of QFS negotiated a deal with Telerate in the early days. It 
was expected that they would become involved in the marketing of the 
proposed software product but this deal fell through. This was a huge set 
back to all concerned. One employee remarked:
The Telerate experience was a disappointing one.
It set people back on their heels. What future was there?
It was a big disappointment for Gerry Giblin
Giblin was convinced that he had the product but regrettably, additional 
investment was required to bring it to the market, at the very time when 
there was severe cash shortfalls. The venture capitalist, Dermot Desmond,
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was faced with a fundamental decision of whether he should continue to 
fund the software project or disengage from the venture. The rational 
decision would have been the latter, but he decided to fund the company 
out of his own stretched resources and also sold shares to the directors. 
Without that decision, the company would not have survived. His decision 
was influenced by Gerry Giblin. As a venture capitalist, he tended to make 
an assessment of the people involved and was convinced by Gerry Giblin to 
continue funding the venture. Gerry Giblin remarked:
This was an act of faith in the people and the belief
in what they were doing would result in success
The fact that Telerate took such interest in the software project also helped 
persuade Dermot Desmond to continue to fund the venture.
In summary, the strategy formation process was characterised by the 
idealism and romanticism of the charismatic entrepreneurs, which allowed 
them to respond to the needs of customers. Their high involvement with 
their companies allowed them to achieve the seemingly impossible. The 
strategy formation process was driven by the deep commitment of the 
charismatic entrepreneur, along with his intuition, risk-taking behaviour 
and personal vision. The charismatic entrepreneur enjoyed high regard 
from both within the organisation and outside of it. Part o f this charisma 
was derived from the undoubted talents of the entrepreneur, but also from 
the fact that the risks they assumed resulted in success, often success 
against the odds. These individuals seemed to be adept at cultivating a 
certain image. The charismatic entrepreneurs were willing to grasp 
opportunities even if current resources did not exist; they were proactive 
and attempted to control events rather than let events control them. The 
charismatic entrepreneurs were readily prepared to sacrifice their job 
security and invest significant amounts of time, effort or money into the 
venture. The charismatic entrepreneurs were prepared to be totally
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committed to the venture. Certain attitudes and values distinguished the 
entrepreneur from others: these included vision, a sense of hope, of 
optimism, of all things being possible, the creation of high expectations, an 
obsessive commitment to the venture, together with an ability to take risks 
and secure the support of employees and stakeholders.
Type 2: the pragmatic entrepreneur
Approach to strategy formation: ‘common-sense’, down-to-earth, rational.
In contrast to the charismatic entrepreneurs, the approach of the pragmatic 
entrepreneurs to strategy formation was underpinned by a ‘common-sense’, 
more down-to-earth and rational approach. The founders of these 
companies were not driven by a grand ambition or compelling vision, or by 
an intuitive ‘gut feel’ for the market, nor were they driven by the desire to 
achieve the seemingly impossible. Instead, strategy formation was 
characterised by more conservative thinking, by mainly economic concerns 
and strategies were formed primarily on the basis o f planning, skill and 
knowledge.
Peggy Connolly of Irish Breeze (like Richard Brierley of Fiacla) founded 
an import substitution business in the late 1980s. However, she adopted a 
very different approach to the strategy formation process, one that was 
more planned, more rational and risk-averse. W ith the help of the IDA, 
she undertook a feasibility study in order to assess the viability of her 
business idea. This took a year and a half to complete and showed quite 
clearly that a gap in the market existed for an Irish made soap product.
She carried out market research by targeting supermarket buyers and 
assessing their receptiveness to an Irish-made product. She also 
approached a distributor and asked them for assistance with the product 
concept and with selling it into supermarkets in the first year of operation. 
They offered advice in terms of packaging, colour, fragrance and brand
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name. This contrasts with the more intuitive, ‘seats-of-the-pants’ approach 
of Richard Brierley.
Similarly, Pearse O ’ Kane of Caraplas undertook a two year feasibility 
study and obtained grant aid from the IDA who took an equity stake in the 
company. In the cae of Joe McArdle and Kestrel the company was 
founded with the aid of a business plan that helped them obtain a grant 
from the IDA as an EDP (Enterprise Development Program) company in 
1987. In the business plan, there was a need to identify a market need or 
niche in the market for the product. The company was guided by a broad 
plan although they did not ‘stick rigidly’ to the plan. Likewise, the start-up 
of BFK Design was characterised by a ‘common-sense’, down-to-earth and 
rational approach. The firm was set up by two individuals (Kevin Barry 
and Howard Kent) who had considerable experience in the design and print 
industry. Business start-up allowed them to use their skills in design.
They had many contacts in the industry which they felt they could use to 
good effect. Likewise, they prepared a business plan which took ‘months 
to prepare’. They asked another business colleague to act as consultant for 
the venture. He took on the role of the ‘grey haired individual’, since he 
had considerable experience in design and with start-ups.
A ‘bearish ’ attitude to the management o f risk
The pragmatic entrepreneurs adopted a cautious approach to the strategy 
formation process and they sought to contain, rather than court, risk.
Peggy Connolly sought to minimise her exposure to financial risk and took 
steps to reduce the potential for business failure. As a result of the 
feasibility study, she found that it was not feasible to set up a soap 
production facility in Ireland due to the large capital outlay entailed in the 
project. In any case, she had absolutely no experience of manufacturing. 
Therefore, she used sub-contracting as a way of breaching the entry
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barriers into the soap industry. Brierley, on the other hand, was a risk- 
taker. For him, the venture was ‘a speculative one’; he was an individual 
who ‘did not realise the implications of things’ and adopted a ‘bull-headed 
attitude’.
Similarly, the founders of Caraplas were cautious in their approach to 
strategy formation. Pearse O ’ Kane was not readily prepared to leave his 
job and assume the risks of business start-up. He attempted to ‘sell’ his 
ideas internally to a large multi-national, but they refused to back the idea. 
Feeling that he had no choice, the individual left the firm. The founders of 
BFK Design also sought to minimise risk. The company was set up by a 
team of individuals and a consultant was brought on board to advice them 
on strategy. In another attempt to minimise risk, they modelled the 
company on two main competitors: Dimension and Marketing Image. The 
former no longer retains its original core directors and the latter has been 
shut down. The managers of BFK Design had a long held ambition of 
becoming one the most respected design companies in Ireland, but they 
were well aware of the risks and constraints on their ability to expand 
further. Companies like Marketing Image, among others, made the 
mistake of attempting to diversify into other areas too quickly, a mistake 
that the founders of BFK Design were keen to avoid. According to the 
founders, the main obstacles to growth were industry factors such as any 
decline in demand for graphic design services, as well as potential 
disagreements among the directors over future policy. These founders 
were interested in growth, but would not expand unless they believed that 
they would break even, even in the worst case scenario. The founders did 
not fit the classical stereotype of the ‘bold risk-taker’ entrepreneur. 
Minimizing risk and safeguarding what they had already achieved, was 
more important than rapid expansion.
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According to Kevin Barry:
We were very, very cautious and still are. We are not a 
company to make rash decisions. Everything is calculated. 
We go through decisions, like employing a single person, 
very, very carefully.
The chairman said that:
...staying small in terms of people, not committing 
yourself...The policy has been to stick to our knitting 
until we have achieved a much firmer foundation
Jim McArdle of Kestrel also seemed to fit into the category of the risk 
minimising, pragmatic entrepreneur. The company was taken over after 
the experience of a financial crisis. A management buy-out took place 
some time after and as a result the firm was undercapitalised. Many 
factors such the company’s history, personality of promoters, under­
capitalization and experience of crisis led to conservatism in decision 
making. People within the company were aware of the need to become 
more proactive:
I still believe that we are a bit too cautious, still 
a little too slow. Someone else may say that we need 
to be cautious because we have to recuperate a costly 
R&D program. I would advocate that we be a little bit 
quicker in making decisions, that we be a bit bolder
This manager believed that the company today is at a crossroads, it has to 
make changes and seek a strategic partner in order to lead the firm to the 
next stage of its development. Joe McArdle, an accountant by profession, 
believed that the company was reactive rather than proactive.
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‘Calculated’ commitment; success obtainable: ‘dream within reach’; 
instrumental aims: achievement o f  goals ‘a means to an end’.
The pragmatic entrepreneurs had a tendency to offset risk which meant that 
they were not prepared to readily sacrifice resources to the venture. A 
calculated commitment was made to the business; resources were only 
committed if  the prospect of a reasonable return existed. The pragmatic 
entrepreneurs were committed to making the business a success but were 
not prepared to invest themselves on a deep personal level. This 
manifested itself in a concern with narrowly economic rather than idealistic 
values, a reluctance to sacrifice job security and an unwillingness to invest 
significant amounts of time, energy or money into the venture. Some 
clearly viewed business success in instrumental terms: the development of 
the business increased its value and it could be sold at a profit. Since they 
set up the companies as a ‘means to an end’ rather than as a vehicle to 
realise a cherished dream, they were not as wedded to the business as the 
charismatic entrepreneurs. Their vision for the firm was based on 
straightforward commercial values rather than the more emotion-rich, 
idealistic values espoused by the charismatic entrepreneurs. As a result, 
ceding control of the venture was not overly difficult for them.
The distinguishing characteristics of the pragmatic entrepreneur was best 
illustrated by looking more closely at Peggy Connolly of Irish Breeze and 
Richard Brierley of Fiacla who both founded companies in the FMCG 
(fast-moving-consumer-good) area. What distinguishes Connolly from the 
founder of Fiacla was her more pragmatic approach to business. She was 
not prepared to risk substantial amounts of her own funds in the venture. 
She invested £10,000 from the proceeds of the sale of her Montessori 
School at start-up and obtained grant aid from the IDA. She re-invested 
company profits in order to grow. The company was managed from her 
home. Brierley, on the other hand, was fully committed to the business 
since he invested £500,000 in capital equipment over the years. Connolly’s
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distributor felt her business was a marginal one:
Her approach was very different to Fiacla. One person 
got involved in manufacturing, the other sub-contracted.
I do not think that soap is particularly difficult to 
manufacture. My own view is that the capital equipment 
needed to manufacture soap cannot be that different from 
that needed to make toothpaste. There was no real financial 
involvement in the company. One person was committed to 
a production run, bought equipment, invested substantially 
in the business. I think Dick saw it as his livelihood, 
whereas Peggy did not. Her husband had a very good job. She 
was doing this as an outside interest
Peggy Connolly realised that if Irish Breeze was to succeed, it would 
depend on her ability to generate funding, exploit publicity and persuade 
intermediaries to stock the product. She appreciated what sales and 
marketing could do for the venture. She approached Gillespies and asked 
them for assistance with the concept and with selling it into supermarkets in 
the first year of operation. Connolly knew that her strengths lay in public 
relations and used it to great effect in establishing a name for the business. 
Peggy Connolly became synonymous with the soap firm she founded and 
later won a prestigious ‘Women in Enterprise’ award in 1988. She, along 
with her distributors, observed the success of Fiacla which capitalised on 
its appeal as a guaranteed Irish import-substitute product. She seemed to 
realise that with hard work her dream was within reach:
She was a lady with a lot of drive. She was not afraid 
of knocking on as many doors as possible. She did a lot 
of the promotion herself on the ground level. She spent 
hours and hours on promotion and the company was built 
up over the years to give her the turnover she was 
happy with. She was a very ambitious lady...W e find with 
an Irish product, there is an awful lot of pressure on 
the person who produced it to promote it because there 
is never enough money left to promote it. They invest 
so much in manufacturing it and getting it onto the 
market, that they do not have any money left to advertise it. 
They need to do a lot of ground work at store level
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A major injection of capital was needed if Irish Breeze was to capture a 
higher percentage of the home market and to gain access to the export 
market. Peggy Connolly was confident of her ability to mobilise financial 
resources to overcome obstacles. However, her company became a take­
over target by her distributor. She felt that the take-over price offered by 
her distributors was too low and refused it. Shortly afterwards, a more 
attractive take-over price was offered to her by another interested party and 
she accepted it. The take-over company was interested in using the brand 
name to sell cotton wool. In spite of her interest in growing the company, 
various issues influenced her decision to sell: the difficulties of entering the 
US market, conflict between her family and work roles, the heavy financial 
investment needed to expand and disagreements with her distributors over 
policy. Unlike Richard Brierley or Gerry Giblin, ceding control of the 
venture was not a difficult personal decision for her. She was aware of the 
constraints upon her ambitions to expand and viewed business success in 
instrumental terms.
Gerard Crowley, the owner of Braycot, also made a calculated commitment 
to the venture. He was aware that the firm was a niche business and had 
limited growth potential. His ambition was to run it as a family business 
rather than build a large organisation. He described his aims as follows:
This is my first foray into a manufacturing firm.
I see it as a great personal challenge. To take something 
that was not making money and turning it into something 
that deserves to make money. I see that as a great 
personal challenge. As to the long term, I am really not 
sure. I want to make it a success. My sons can continue it.
It will be something to pass on ... My own feeling is that 
if it is very successful a predator might make an offer that 
is very difficult to refuse. Having said that, that’s not 
what I am looking for
Maintaining a good lifestyle was a central concern for this type of founder. 
This individual was not prepared to risk his own financial resources to any
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great degree in the business. He bought the firm because it was offered to 
him at an attractive price. He had other sources of income (a consultancy 
firm in Cork) and was not solely dependent on Bray cot for income. He 
managed the firm on a part-time basis. His role was to turn a loss-making 
company into a successful one. He sought to achieve this objective by 
cutting losses, rationalising the product range and introducing world class 
manufacturing principles. His intention was to seek grant aid and avail of 
state services. He was aware that the firm was a niche firm competing in 
the healthy end of the market, which was minute in comparison to the 
overall industry. Gerard Crowley spoke about his ambitions:
I would never wish to become huge. We will always remain 
relatively small in a niche market if  we are to succeed, 
and keep on succeeding, in other words making a quality 
biscuit product for the niche market
The pragmatic entrepreneurs made a calculated decision to enter business. 
They realised that there was a demand for the product and that with a good 
product, hard work, access to state support and luck, the company could be 
successful. The success of BFK Design depended on their knowledge of 
the industry and the network of contacts they had built up through work. 
The sales and marketing manager of BFK Design claimed that personal 
contacts played a significant role in the early success of the business:
Without luck and a good network of people prepared 
to refer the name of the company to others, there 
would have been major problems in getting the 
business established
The directors of BFK Design believed that if they were prepared to go 
‘knocking on doors’ for sales, go directly to clients and offer suggestions 
on how to improve their design strategy, they had a good chance of 
succeeding. This strategy did not seem to be common practice in the
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design industry.
Bray cot was founded under favourable conditions. The founders identified 
a gap in the market for a wholefood biscuit product. The early era of 
Bray cot was a very proactive one, with the Hunters prepared to go out and 
actively sell the company. They were very successful in terms o f securing 
sales. The founder of Caraplas (unlike Richard Brierley) went ahead with 
business start-up only after he succeeded in gaining support for his ideas; 
he managed to raise £2 million in equity for the development of a 
revolutionary new product. Most had success with state agencies and 
availed of grant aid, unlike the charismatic entrepreneurs like Richard 
Brierley and Gerry McKeown.
The pragmatic entrepreneur did not have the all-consuming passion and 
commitment of the charismatic entrepreneur. The pragmatist was only 
willing to grasp opportunities if current resources existed. Connolly of 
Irish Breeze and Crowley of Braycot were not readily prepared to sacrifice 
their job security or invest significant amounts of money into the venture. 
As pragmatic individuals, they worked from home and on a part-time basis, 
they had other sources of income which minimised the risks involved.
The role of the entrepreneur as a creator of organisational culture
One of the themes that emerged from the data is how the founding 
entrepreneurs helped create culture. It was evident from the interviews 
how much the founder was an agent for cultural transmission within the 
SME. The founder played a key role in establishing founding values be 
that responsiveness to customer needs, quality of service, high standards in 
production, the fostering of a team spirit and the development o f a sense of 
pride in employees. The values and personal preferences of the founders 
helped shape the firm and became an integral part of its early development. 
For instance, Jim Barry of RTI fostered a culture based on a team spirit.
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Jim Barry had a love of ideas and was not interested in building a large 
organisation. As a small R&D unit with a team approach, it allowed Jim 
Barry to exercise control over the product development strategy. On the 
other hand, Gerry Giblin of QFS had different ambitions. He realised that 
the company would have to grow and become a professionally managed 
organisation in order to ensure its continuation. A strong culture was 
created by the charismatic entrepreneurs and it played a key role in the 
success of RTI, QFS, McKeown and Fiacla. The cultural values of the 
founders became their legacy to the firms. In this way, the founding 
entrepreneurs had an indirect influence on the strategy formation process 
well into the future. Four distinct typologies of cultures were discerned 
from the case study data and these are illustrated in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Dominant cultural values espoused by entrepreneurs
Dominant cultural 
values
Company
Quality driven Fiacla, Braycot, Irish 
Breeze, Kestrel.
Team based RTI.
Nationalistic QFS.
Customer-oriented McKeown, BFK 
Design.
The quality-driven culture
In the case of Fiacla, the defining theme was that of excellence in 
production. The distributor pointed out the founder’s values:
He always wants the best o f everything. If  there is 
a piece of equipment there worth £100,000 and worth 
£50,000, he will want the £100,000. He is driven by 
this search for excellence.
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The founder changed very quickly from an ‘import substitute philosophy’ 
where the product was simply sold and marketed on an Irish platform to 
one where a top quality, competitively priced product was produced. The 
founder was at pains to point out that the product was as good as the 
Colgate product. The company adopted G .M .P. (good manufacturing 
principles). There was some indication that this importance given to 
quality was not always present, due to a combination of financial 
constraints and a lack of expertise in the early days. The company started 
out with some very basic, second-hand equipment. Aluminium tubes rather 
than plastic were used which caused the design to wear off the tubes and 
the firm experienced customer complaints. The distributor referred to 
firm ’s humble beginnings:
It was almost out of the bath, a bucket and shovel 
operation. It has undergone major change. Its degree 
of sophistication has gone up and its in-house product 
testing has improved.
The focus on quality helped the company gain contracts and enhanced its 
credibility in the eyes of clients. The quality control manager said:
For people like the Body Shop to take us on shows that we have a 
certain standing in the industry.
Braycot aimed to produce a top quality product using only the finest 
ingredients. Management believed that their expertise in biscuit making 
helped them win contracts.
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A team-based culture
RTI stressed the unique strengths of the small firm, where employees and 
managers all worked together, often beyond working hours. Financial 
rewards were based on company success and this aspect of the small firm 
culture secured the commitment of organisational members. In RTI, the 
team spirit was very much in evidence. The company consisted of a small, 
highly creative, highly motivated team of people. According to the 
founder:
It is a bit like a family, the people are around for a
long time. The people here all came from Cable Television.
We know each other very well. We know the strengths and 
weaknesses of everyone. Rewards are based on our success 
and everyone gets rewarded if we succeed.
The sales manager claimed that ‘everyone here multi-tasks. There are 
defined roles and everyone has a job specification, but in the event of 
something happening, its a case of all hands to the pum p.’ He gave an 
example of where a problem arose with a piece of software and everyone 
worked through the night to help solve the problem. He believed that such 
support would not exist in other companies.
The nationalistic spirit or ‘economic patriot* motive
In QFS, a nationalistic spirit, or pride in things Irish, was the cornerstone 
of Gerry Giblin’s business philosophy. He saw his role as helping people 
see that they could be ‘world class’ beaters and he had the idea that a 
‘distinctly Irish’ culture should be promoted:
The local Irish situation appealed to me the m ost...
First of all, I wanted to have an Irish software company.
I want to have a culture here which is distinctly Irish 
and put that ethos up against a more external one.
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The founder described the distinctly Irish culture as follows:
The Irish culture does not really support a ‘prima donna’ type 
approach - where there is a great reliance on individuals 
who tend to take ownership of an idea, who do not provide 
a good team environment. I think we have the innovation and 
creativity in a team structure rather than in a purely 
people related situation. So if one guy goes, we still 
have all the software skills so other people can do it
Gerry Giblin went on to say that many people who have worked for them 
have worked abroad and were keen to work for a company that was Irish 
owned and controlled. In the take-over negotiations, Gerry Giblin worked 
to ensure that operations would be retained in Dublin. For Gerry Giblin 
the ability to produce world-class, Irish-made software was important. He 
remarked:
Our objectives were to be a world class software 
developer, to produce world class products...
From the beginning, the barrier that we were trying 
to get over was to be a world class software developer. 
We would probably define ourselves, at core, in a 
technical sense. Are we writing better 
products, as good as our competitors, as good as 
anyone else worldwide in our sector?
The company obtained IS09000 certification which illustrates that they 
have a good track record in producing software on time and on budget. 
Customers look for this certification as evidence of strong project 
management skills and reproducibility of effort.
A customer-oriented culture:
The values of Gerry McKeown were important in shaping a particular 
culture that tended to endure. McKeown Software was formed as a 
general software services company. They started by developing be-spoke
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applications, whereby the software package is tailored to meet the specific 
needs of the customer. The customer has an input into the product 
development process and they ‘drive the R&D w ork.’ They worked on site 
and the customer paid for the initial development costs. The company was 
involved in business-to-business marketing which was characterised by 
close, long term customer relationships. The mantra of McKeown was a 
customer orientation, which was a feature of the firm ’s culture from the 
outset and helped it succeed. It was named ‘Computer Services Company 
of The Year’ by a computer body. According to one manager:
We are an independent solutions provider...
Some organisations say, ‘you are here now, you must move 
to that’. That is not what we do. We look at what the 
clients need and want, as opposed to what we think they 
need and want
Gerry McKeown worked in Canada before he started up a software house 
in Ireland. According to one manager, he developed his software and 
marketing concepts there and knew what would be required in the Irish 
market. Once the company changed its strategy in the late 1980s and 
became more product led, other values such as a research and development 
orientation came into being which complemented the original founding 
values.
The other cases also provided evidence of the infusion of cultural values by 
the founders into their companies, although the cultures were not as strong 
as those formed by the charismatic entrepreneurs. In Kestrel, reputation 
and quality of product were important goals. In Braycot, it was suggested 
that the founding values of the company were based on a quality 
consciousness that lingered long after the Hunters bowed out from the 
company. The founders aimed to produce a natural wholefood product 
aimed at a niche market. In BFK Design, a strong customer awareness
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was cultivated by the founders:
Our attitude is - we are in the service business. If a 
client wants something, then we have to go and do it, 
no matter what it takes to do it. That has always been 
and still is our priority. It is one of the reasons why 
we are still here. I do not think that you can be 
arrogant or aggressive
It was evident from the cases that one of the major roles played by the 
founder in strategy formation was the creation of strong cultural values that 
continued to influence the process well beyond the founding period.
The darker side of the entrepreneur: excesses of power and control
The entrepreneur’s role in the strategy formation process was not always a 
constructive one. The data indicates that, paradoxically, the founder’s 
driving conviction to succeed which was influential in stimulating the start­
up and early development of the venture, can become a problem in later 
stages. The tenacious side of the founder led him or her to form a strong 
allegiance to a particular goal, vision or strategy. However, the strengths 
of the entrepreneur sometimes became weaknesses. The data indicates that 
three entrepreneurs seemed to fit the traditional stereotype of the ‘power 
hungry’ leader.
Richard Brierley of Fiacla established a venture in spite of strong obstacles 
and he became accustomed to scepticism, to the lack of support for his 
views, to working on his own. The isolation of his position as a lone 
entrepreneur came across from the interviews. There was evidence that 
Brierley’s wide ambit of control over all aspects of the business was not in 
the long term interests of the firm. His style of leadership was predicated 
upon individualism rather than team work. It seemed that Richard Brierley 
was perceived to have the vision, commitment, expertise, information and
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so on, to deal with all aspects of business start-up and development. 
However, these characteristics eventually contributed to the company crisis 
of 1989. The problem was due primarily to a lack of commercial 
awareness. The picture that emerged was of a driven, ambitious individual 
who took control of all aspects of the business despite his inexperience.
One manager referred to the controlling aspect of the founder’s personality 
that influenced the strategy adopted:
It was the way he wanted to go.
He wanted total control...
The firm had just increased its capacity in order to fulfil an order when the 
distributor collapsed. It was the characteristics of the founder that led the 
firm into crisis. According to the distributor:
He was hell bent on keeping the order book full,
but that must be done on a rational, commercial basis
The marketing manager suggested that the founder was inclined to make 
decisions on the basis of instinct and hunch instead of on the basis of 
factual information and a rational analysis of the environment. He believed 
that the founder could ‘bring the firm to the brink’ but this was prevented 
by the relationship that the firm had with its distributors. The distributors 
now own 55 % of the firm and handle the strategic development of the 
firm. The sale by the founder of more than half his stock was a last resort 
to ensure survival of the firm. Brier ley was highly motivated to succeed. 
He was fairly hostile to the concept of take-over or sale of company shares. 
Issues of autonomy and control had to be resolved by him. The decision to 
disengage from the firm or change ownership structure represented a very 
difficult personal decision for Brierley although he recognised that this 
barrier had to be breached. He outlined the reasons for the take-over:
215
Selling was a matter of safeguarding what we had 
achieved and trying to make sure that it would survive 
into the future, which it has done. Any financial 
decisions after that were to help the company grow.
Additional support in the management structure was 
the main reason for selling out.
In the case of McKeown, the founding entrepreneur had sole control of the 
company for 13 years. McKeown software entered a period of rapid 
growth due mainly to the vision of its founder. Initially very successful, 
the company made major changes in its strategy in the 1980s. In 1983, 
the company had to adapt to new technological trends which demanded 
high outlays over the following four year period (£250,000 a year). The 
company opened up an office in Belfast and in Hong Kong and this 
represented a major investment in marketing. The company also incurred a 
major bad debt when a software system did not live up to customer 
expectations. The customer refused to accept the system. Three factors: 
high R&D investment, stagnant sales and high marketing costs created cash 
flow problems for the organisation. The company nearly went into 
receivership and was taken over. The financial controller said:
We had hoped that sales would sustain growth and 
that the company would remain self-sufficient, 
but things did not work out this way
Gerry McKeown was proactive and willing to take risks, but the data 
indicates that the founder’s desire for full control led the firm into crisis. 
This desire for control led him to eschew badly needed equity investment at 
this point in time. What emerged from this case study was that strong 
leadership with too much control inhibited company development.
Peggy Connolly of Irish Breeze was very committed to making the business 
successful. The tenacious side to the founder led her to form a strong 
allegiance to a particular strategy, that of selling Irish Breeze into the US
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market. In the words of the marketing manager:
She had a small bit of success in the States where she
sold some products. I believe she really wanted to sell her products
into the States rather than anywhere else. She was a bit
more involved in the States because she got the
idea while she was over there. The idea of Peggy selling her
product in the US was a lot more attractive than Peggy
selling it to Hungary.
It seems that because these entrepreneurs were accustomed to building 
support for their views, to overriding resistance or scepticism, to 
overcoming obstacles, they were unlikely to be open to suggestion or to 
yield easily to different ideas or inputs. Peggy Connolly persisted in the 
belief that she was right even in the face of ambivalent evidence. 
Disagreements over marketing policy arose between her and her 
distributors which led to the founder ending her relationship with her 
distributors. They described the background to this disagreement:
We have not broken into the US market. We have not 
tried. We have stuck closer to hom e...
Whereas we look at it the opposite way, America is
just too big. We will go into Hungary, Poland,
the Czech Republic where markets are growing. We look to
the basics. In ten years time, we will have a nice business
in those countries. It will be established.
Another comment was:
She believed that an 80% share of the Irish market could 
be obtained overnight. That does not happen. The FMCG 
sector is a very difficult, very tough market. The 
distribution was there but the product was not as 
competitively priced as Fiacla’s
Thus the picture that emerged was of a strong willed individual who 
wanted to dominate all aspects of marketing strategy in her organisation.
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The potential of the company was never fully realised and the founder’s 
vision of eventually manufacturing the soap herself and targeting the US 
market never came to fruition. She signed a new agreement with another 
distributor and eventually sold the company to them. The distributors of 
the soap firm ’s products claimed that ‘things got a bit acrimonious in the 
end.’
Not all entrepreneurs were unwilling to compromise or listen to other 
people. Jim Barry said that his management style was:
.. .democratic in a lot of ways especially in relation to product 
development, maybe autocratic in other ways. I would have a 
significant influence what way we go as far as development is 
concerned.
He realised that unrestrained control by the entrepreneur over the firm 
could lead to difficulties. The role of his partner was crucial in mitigating 
his weaknesses. The risk profile of the entrepreneur and his enthusiasm for 
new ideas could cause the core competence of the firm to become diluted.
In the words of Jim Barry:
I think I need to be harnassed at times. You need to 
harness what I am trying to do, to prioritise things 
and focus on particular products that can be successful, 
focus on where there is a market for them, rather than a 
shot gun approach with many targets. The technology business 
is changing so rapidly, there are so many growth areas...
The great danger is feeling that you can grow the company 
into all these areas and the result is probably failure.
Employees felt free to express their views:
It is down to the people around him be honest with him.
If they feel that what he is doing is not in the 
interests of the company, they can talk to him.
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This study found that leaders driven by the strength of their convictions 
were not open to different views and sometimes failed to recognise the 
need for change. They seemed to possess an inflexible outlook which 
manifested itself in an unwillingness to compromise, to cede control of the 
firm, to change ownership structure or rethink their visions for the firms.
Dangers o f overdependence
Charismatic individuals such as Richard Brierley, Gerry Giblin, Jim Barry 
and Gerry McKeown were perceived to be virtually indispensable to their 
firms by organisational members. They founded and helped sustain their 
companies. Stakeholders in these companies seemed to value the lone 
entrepreneur, the star performer whose genius created good ideas almost 
out of the blue. The unique talents of the founder constituted a firm- 
specific competitive advantage. However, the data shows that the ability of 
the firm to retain and develop its capacity for enterprise beyond the tenure 
of the founding entrepreneur could become a problem in the future. For 
instance, the distributor of Fiacla remarked that Richard Brierley had great 
commitment, unique skills in developing new export markets and new 
product ideas, and he had also developed his manufacturing expertise over 
time. As a result, his retirement or loss would be a severe blow to the 
company. The main strength that the distributor brought to the company 
after its take-over was a financial management strength which was not rare 
or exceptional in any way. The distributor remarked:
The business would survive without us, since another
company with the same skills could do the same for Fiacla.
Richard is very much a force of the ground and
indispensable to the operation
The main weaknesses of RTI revolved around management in that the firm 
was dependent on one key person - Jim Barry - and his loss would be a 
major threat to the company. The financial manager believed that Jim
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Barry was a great lateral thinker and that there was ‘always that potential 
for over reliance on the inventor. ’ He added, however, that the technology 
was customer driven and customers could suggest ideas. Gerry McKeown 
was seen as the driving force behind the company. According to the 
general manager:
He is marketing oriented. He has good technical knowledge.
He is indispensable, totally. From our point of view, it is 
no good knowing only one or two aspects. You need to know the 
market, the industry and have technical know-how.
Although these entrepreneurs constituted a driving force in the development 
of their enterprises, their companies were heavily dependent on their skills 
and abilities.
The dynamic nature of the entrepreneurship: learning and change
A research question that emerged from the literature review was what 
happens to entrepreneurs over time? How much do they change and why? 
Most of the entrepreneurs in this study were conscious that the process of 
strategy formation was a learning process which developed their 
personalities and enhanced their skills. In retrospect, Richard Brierley 
(Fiacla) claimed that there were a lot of things he should have done 
differently. His individualistic style of management was not always in the 
long term interests of the firm:
For one thing, I would have researched the idea a 
lot better than I did, and I would not have tried to 
do everything myself. Ideally, having a small team of people 
together means that you have a little think tank to come up with 
solutions, and share the worries. My biggest mistake was 
not having enough finance and expertise in the early days.
Having both of these would have helped us get on a lot 
further a lot quicker.
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The experience of a crisis played an important role in the development of 
the individual. The crisis had both positive and negative aspects and forced 
attention to information that was previously ignored. For instance, the 
distributor of Fiacla’s products spoke about the learning effects of crisis on 
the entrepreneur:
He has far more of a commercial awareness that he had in the 
early years. He can read a Balance Sheet now, which I 
suspect he could not do 10 years ago. He understands the 
commercial realities, cause and effect. If  I buy a piece 
of equipment, what do I have to do to pay it back?
The founder of Fiacla learned the paramount importance of cash and credit 
control to a small business as a result of the company crisis. It was 
probable that the risk-taking propensity of the entrepreneur together with 
his sense of optimism led him to neglect this crucial aspect of business 
management. Richard Brierley claimed:
You have got to keep a very close control on costs. Our 
product and company reputation that we have built up over 
the years is a very important part of the business but none 
of that works unless your efficiencies are there, and that 
is the most important thing, keeping control on the finances.
The distributor believes he has gained valuable skills in the area of 
marketing and finance:
From a financial point of view, he is far more aware. He knows 
that you have to generate a million before you spend it.
From a marketing point of view, we handle that, he knows the 
benefits of promotional activity. He is a far more rounded 
businessman today than he was before. He is an engineer by 
profession not a businessman. He is a businessman now.
The quality control manager suggested that the company progressed up the
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learning curve:
We have learned as we have gone along. We are much more 
professional now. We have credibility. Richard came into 
the business knowing nothing about toothpaste. For people 
like the Body Shop to take us on shows that we have a certain 
standing in the industry. It has been a learning process.
Hopefully, we have learned by our mistakes and we are now 
taken seriously. There has been major changes in that respect
Similarly, Gerry Giblin of QFS claimed that valuable lessons were learned 
as a result of the ‘cash crunch’ situation. He recognised that control over 
project development, both in a creative and financial sense, was important. 
He believed that the company would not have survived but for the 
intervention of the venture capitalist. He learned about the detrimental 
effect of politics:
We had that three year lesson without any product 
being turned out. There was an opportunity for people 
to flourish, to put forward different points of view, 
stuff like that, but which was not necessarily a good thing.
There was a lot of politics. We had to clear all of that 
out. A painful lesson was learned early on. But we had 
the time and money to learn them. I f  you had a small 
company, you would learn the lesson but you would also 
be out of business
Likewise, Jim Barry of RTI learned valuable lessons. The firm ’s entry into 
a licensing arrangement was a valuable learning experience. Protecting the 
intellectual nature of the product and gaining ownership over the 
technology was an issue that concerned management. One employee said:
They won’t give the technology away as freely as they did in the 
past...We have confidentiality agreements. Both parties 
have to sign them.
As was the case in Fiacla, Gerry McKeown of McKeown Software learned
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about the importance of financial planning. The general manager claimed:
You can’t ever afford to take your eye off the ball and 
ignore management reporting and monitoring. We were cruising. 
We had two or three good years. In that particular year, 
we were heavily into marketing, and at the same time we 
had a fairly heavy investment in technology. I guess 
we did not review figures on a month to month basis.
Suddenly, nine or ten months into the year we were 
faced with a real crisis situation
Gerry McKeown withdrew from day-to-day management which then 
became the responsibility of a board of managers. The transition was not 
an overly difficult one for him due to his stage of life; as a man nearing 
retirement it allowed him to enjoy the rewards of success.
Other cases suggested that financial planning was neglected in the early 
phases of company development. The general manager in Bray cot learned 
from his experience of crisis that arose during the early era:
Management must know the market, anticipate market trends and 
know where the company is headed. A company has to 
start off small and stabilise the market before they 
try to expand...The marketing plan has to be very good.
A company could be very busy but be in a position where 
they are losing money
The general manager believed that financial control, marketing and 
production were three key management issues:
The most important functions in the company are cash flow 
or credit control, marketing and production.
A partner in BFK Design, talked about how his personal outlook on life 
had changed. He has become more self-confident and more opportunistic 
as a result of developing his own business:
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My own attitude, personality and outlook has changed dramatically.
People have a respect for you. It makes you a better
person, a responsible person. I have a totally different
outlook in life. You look at things and say, is there
an opportunity for me there, anything we can do better,
can we gain something out of it. That might be selfish...
The partner in BFK Design saw the process of business start-up and
development as a learning process:
You learn a lot. You learn to adapt. You learn to 
deal with different attitudes, to make decisions.
People come looking to you for guidance. Suddenly you 
realise that you are no longer an employee, but an employer 
and a director. You learn to be responsible...The ability 
to set a company on your own and grow and grow it is a 
part of a great learning curve.
The manager in BFK Design claimed that crisis made them more vigilant. 
He remarked that it, ‘took any complacency we might have had before out 
of us. We are constantly aware. We try to second guess what is 
happening.’ Crisis, in most cases, was the result of poor management. 
The crisis signalled renewed attempts to bring about organisational change 
and renewal.
The role and influence of the founder on the performance of the firm 
varied across cases. In six out of nine cases, the original founder was still 
associated with the firm. As regards the other three, one founder sold the 
firm, another firm underwent a financial crisis and was taken over, and the 
last went into liquidation. The latter failed due to mismanagement and lack 
of finance. Considering the high failure rate of new firms, the long 
survival period and continued association of the original founder with the 
other firms was a testament to the quality of management within the firms. 
Most realised that they had to assess their management skills and adapt in 
the light of crises.
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Change in management style
The data suggests that the entrepreneurs had to change their management 
style over time. This is illustrated clearly by the experience of the founder 
of QFS, Gerry Giblin.
QFS started off as an informal, garage-type operation, with few 
bureaucratic constraints, where a small team of fanatics got together with 
seed capital, during the early stages of the innovation process. They 
managed to develop an innovative software product. Gerry Giblin 
suggested that company failure was linked to the founder’s inability to cede 
control. He realised that his management style and approach had to change 
over time:
You must be strong enough to move forward with 
a knowledge of the history without being a prisoner 
of the history...not being afraid to make changes 
in management, structure, to reflect the progress 
you have made...It is vital to allow the company to 
progress, not to try and hold everything together 
the way it was at the early stages
Gerry Giblin of QFS conceded that it was difficult to change the ownership 
structure and managerial style due to various psychological aspects of 
‘letting go and letting others take the driving seat’, but realised that the 
ability to change management style was a primary requisite for the growing 
firm. He was aware from the outset of the need to bring in a professional 
manager who would take responsibility for the day-to-day running of the 
company. Establishing a more formal structure of ownership was 
important as it would lend credibility and stability to the firm. He 
remarked that the presence of a board of directors sent a signal to the 
shareholders that the company would survive in the long term. Gerry 
Giblin contended that many companies fail to make the transition from a
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‘people-driven’ to a more ‘process-driven’ organisation. The challenge 
facing this firm entails combining the innovative drive of the 
entrepreneurial stage with the conventions of the mature stage:
There has to be a balance between keeping the creative 
element where people are energised and have the freedom 
to innovate, and the opposing requirement of putting 
organisational structures in place...It sounds pretty 
trite, but it’s a very subtle and a very hard thing 
to do and a great deal of luck goes into it as well
One of the founders of BFK, also talked about the changes in management 
style that occurred over the years:
A few years ago, we tended to hand-hold everything, 
every piece of communication was looked after. We 
tended to worry about everything. Now we have to stand 
back a little. We have 16 wonderful people, all of whom 
work on their own initiative. Once a job goes through, 
it goes through on its own
Changes in management style need not always be for the better. The 
managers in this company realised that they were becoming somewhat 
isolated from, and inaccessible to, employees due to their position at the 
apex of the organisation. They realised this and took steps to remedy it. 
An ‘open door’ policy was recently adopted by management. The general 
manager of Braycot also talked about the need to delegate:
I have always been in the driving seat. I have tried 
to manage everything. I have tried to hold onto all 
the ‘tentacles’ as it were but one day I had to let go. 
If I give someone a job, I do not interfere
Most of the entrepreneurs stressed the need to delegate and change their 
management style as the company grew in size.
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Change in personal life cycles
The case studies suggested that the founder moved from one stage of life to 
another which had an impact on their goals for the business. For example, 
the older entrepreneur with family obligations was more likely to cede 
control or sell the firm than the younger entrepreneur with few family 
obligations.
McKeown Software made a transition to a professionally managed 
organisation. This firm experienced a crisis on account of three factors: 
high R&D investment, high marketing costs and stagnant sales. The 
founder hoped that sales would sustain growth and that the firm would 
remain self-sufficient but this did not happen. One manager believed that 
the founding entrepreneur was comfortable with relinquishing control of 
day-to-day management issues:
I would say that on a personal level, the transition to 
a formal board of management happened at the right time 
for him. He is in his fifties and now he is able to sit 
back and enjoy the rewards.
Another entrepreneur explicitly stated that stage of life had an impact on 
business goals. He believed that anyone interested in creative thinking and 
bringing products to the market should consider doing so in the US. He 
realised that greater opportunities existed in the United States for software 
development but was not interested in re-locating. Future plans centred on 
becoming a small R&D unit in Ireland under the umbrella of a large 
corporation.
Most certainly, in the US, venture capital is available, 
but we are not based in the US. I have got too old for that.
My family are all here in Ireland... .We feel if you go to
the banks, the banks do not like software companies..it’s bad in this
country because a lot of them have failed.....
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An interesting issue that emerged from the data was the significance of 
personal life cycles, as illustrated most strongly in the case of RTI and 
McKeown. While recognising the dangers of generalising, there is an 
indication that the founder’s stage of life affected their goals for the 
business.
The creation, maintenance and abatement o f credibility over time
The individualistic style of leadership, although vital in the early stages of 
business development, created problems in a few firms, resulting in crisis. 
However, Gerry Giblin of QFS was keenly aware of the problem of 
overdependence on one person’s key skills and sought to create a team 
structure as the company moved beyond the start-up stage. The role of the 
entrepreneur was not always a constructive one in the development of the 
enterprise. Entrepreneurs lost some credibility during periods of crisis; 
however employees never lost their admiration or respect for the founder 
and always acknowledged his role in building the enterprise. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the issue, that of the entrepreneur’s diminished stature, 
employees and managers were circumspect in their responses. When a 
crisis occurred and if the entrepreneur was perceived as being a 
contributory factor to it, then the founder’s heroic status was diminished.
A crisis clearly signalled that something was amiss. In a business world 
that valued success and outer appearances, a confidence crisis was one that 
most business owners wished to avoid.
The individualistic style of Richard Brierley was clearly evident in Fiacla. 
The founder was very committed to making the business successful. The 
data suggested that the firm had to struggle to become established in the 
early years with the risk of the founder being over-extended. Brierley said 
in retrospect: ‘...I would not have tried to do everything myself’. The 
overwhelming need for sales means that Brierley lost sight of rational 
business objectives in the Polish debacle. Brierley’s lack of commercial
228
awareness and management training was exposed by the experience of a 
financial crisis. The managing director believed that sales contracts were 
not negotiated on a rational, commercial basis. He said:
I think it was a bad idea to extend so much credit, far in 
excess of normal credit terms. It was very imprudent.
Cash and credit control is critical to the well being of a 
company at that stage...Since then we have insisted that credit 
controls be taken. So if someone does not pay up, at least we are 
assured that he has assets...It was not the most glorious moment 
the company’s history, but we did not fall out over it.
In order to survive, the founder was forced to put his workers on a three- 
day week. He fought aggressively for contracts and ploughed any profits 
into the company. The company reviewed their contracts more carefully, 
looked for letters of credit and became more cautious on the financial front. 
The company did not grow as sufficiently as the founder hoped. He 
attributed this to bad debts and customers going bankrupt.
In Quay Financial Software (QFS), the founding strategists had great 
ambitions for growth. It was hoped to merge all software interests into one 
entity and involve Telerate in the marketing side. The aim was to become 
a major player in the industry. Part of the company culture was based on 
taking risks in order to pursue an aggressive growth strategy. The deal 
with Telerate subsequently fell through which was a major setback to all 
concerned. If negotiations with Telerate had proved successful, it would 
have represented the most important software deal ever carried out in 
Ireland. A ‘cash crunch’ occurred. Gerry Giblin faced serious questions 
regarding the future of his embryonic software firm. This led to a 
questioning of the entry strategy and a reconstruction of events seemed to 
take place. In retrospect, Gerry Giblin claimed:
There is no point in trying to be IBM when you are 
in the garage-style mode of operation
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McKeown nearly went into liquidation as a result of cash flow problems. 
The fact that the financial manager or other employees failed to anticipate 
the crisis suggests that an uncritical, non-judgemental acceptance may have 
developed among individuals of the founding entrepreneur. This period in 
the firm’s history exposed the founding entrepreneur’s weaknesses. 
Although the charismatic stature of the founder was very much in evidence, 
employees became aware of his weaknesses. The informality and lack of 
planning and control that was characteristic of the early stage led the 
company into crisis in the growth phase. The general manager, Hugh 
Cosgrove, traced the problem back to mismanagement. Rapid growth 
exposed problem areas:
The danger with software development is that expansion 
can be rapid until one day the bubble bursts. A 
company can become too big too quickly and get out 
of control...We had a traumatic Christmas where 25 people were 
made redundant. That concentrated our minds...
The company was very successful for three years 
previous to that, we had made the decision to adopt Unix 
technology and had decided to slim down by concentrating on 
packages...
The company’s early history was described as a ‘silver spoon’ situation. 
Since the company was young and successful, it tended to ignore planning 
as it did not feel the need to conserve resources. An element of 
complacency crept into management thinking. The financial manager 
suggested that problems arose due to a lack of planning and reflection. He 
claimed that:
The company was maybe mismanaged in some ways. The 
company is much more reflective internally today
The early era of Bray cot was very successful. The company grew rapidly, 
achieving a growth rate of 45% per annum from 1983 to 1986. In 1987 
domestic sales peaked at £750,000. The year 1989 was a year of major
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upheaval for Braycot Foods which resulted in the take-over of the firm. 
However, the Hunters received praise for their handling of many aspects of 
the business. The Hunters played a vital role in the company’s success; 
they capitalised on the trend towards healthy eating; built up a name for the 
company as a quality biscuit producer; they were active in the new product 
development area; developed markets at home and abroad and marketed the 
product very well. However, they did not possess all the skills needed to 
protect that success. The comments of the general manager suggested a 
subtle shift in their status after the crisis experience. Problems in Braycot 
can be traced back to a combination of mismanagement and the faltering of 
a long term perspective:
Unfortunately, they did not sit back and think about things.
If they had organised it differently, they would have
achieved more.. .A company can be in a situation of being
very busy but losing a lot of money.
The general manager suggested that rapid growth and the Hunters’ inability 
to protect that growth contributed to the firm’s problems. The new owner 
was unable to comment on the original owners but made efforts to address 
the firm’s weaknesses. These included the targeting of the own label 
market, improvement of the firm’s cost base, the introduction of world 
class manufacturing principles, the elimination of loss making products and 
the introduction of a new sports line bar aimed at the sports conscious.
The mediating influence of partners on entrepreneurs
Five companies (RTI, QFS, BFK Design, Kestrel and Caraplas) were set 
up on a team basis and the owners stressed the benefits of teaming up. In 
RTI, the role of the financial partner and other employees in counteracting 
the founder’s maverick tendencies was well recognised throughout the 
organisation. It seemed that restraint was anathema to Jim Barry’s sense of 
inventiveness. The company was formed with a balance of complementary
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skills, the creative skills of the Jim Barry and the analytical and financial 
skills of Roger Bannon. The personalities were also different, the 
flamboyant, risk-taking style of Jim Barry contrasted with the more 
understated style of his partner. According to the sales and marketing 
manager:
The personalities are totally different. Roger is a totally 
different being. I think it has helped a lot. If both were 
the same, there would be blow ups every day of the week...
The financial controller is a frustrating influence, 
that’s for sure. He is not always as free with cash 
as Jim would like him to be. That is good I suppose. You 
need control. He is a controlling influence certainly. That 
is his function
Jim Barry suggested that business success in the long term depended on a 
combination of intuitive and analytical thinking. He saw himself as an 
intuitive thinker and his partner as a more rational and analytical thinker. 
He commented on the complementary strengths of his partner:
I have a partner who is very focused on the figures side, 
the commerciality of what we are doing. There is a balance 
there. He is an accountant. Although he is very much aware 
of innovation, your feet would be on the ground. There has 
to be a commercial result. You have to see what segment of 
the market you are going to get into, what percentage of 
the market will be captured with the product...
A central paradox is that of earlier strength turning to weakness. Jim 
Barry felt that risk-taking, his enthusiasm, his zeal for new ideas, could 
cause difficulties in later stages. Jim Barry was aware that his desire to 
diversify would not be in the long term interests of the company. He said:
...I know that I can fall into that trap too, say have 
we anything that will bring us into this technology area.
There are dangers. The great danger is feeling that you can 
grow the company into all these areas and the result is 
probably failure
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One employee also referred to the creative side of the entrepreneur that was 
not always be grounded in commercial realities:
He is very enthusiastic... He is also an ideas person...
If you have got one idea that is being developed, you must 
commit to that. If you are thinking of the next and the next 
idea, not giving enough resources to the one you are currently 
working on, it might not succeed.
When Jim Barry first floated the idea of a new product to the directors, 
they were reluctant to go down that route. There were uncertainties 
regarding the technical feasibility and commercial potential of the project. 
The idea was rejected but Jim Barry ‘went off quietly and developed it with 
the help of a hardware manufacturer and showed them what he had done. ’ 
He had to gain some credibility for his ideas before they were acted upon. 
His partner had a mediating influence on him.
In the case of QFS, the founding strategists were Dermot Desmond (a 
venture capitalist) and Gerry Giblin. Dermot Desmond financed the start­
up of QFS and enabled it to survive the early crisis situation. He did not 
play an active role in the management of the firm. Gerry Giblin, the 
charismatic entrepreneur, was able to put together a wider base of support 
for the development of the venture. He had a background in the software 
industry and provided the technical and entrepreneurial skills. He 
remarked that the high costs involved in software development meant that 
the project would never have got off the ground without access to venture 
capital. He was aware that most software firms have difficulty in obtaining 
seed capital, despite the higher than average growth rates. This is mainly 
due to the fact that a software company’s assets are mainly intangibles, 
comprising of the skills of its people and its products.
Three other companies were formed on a team basis. There was the 
suggestion that a team structure brought more cautiousness into the decision
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making process. In BFK Design, the company was well structured to 
cover all functional areas which was unusual for a design company. A 
mentor was available to advise the founders on the start-up and 
development of the business. He advised the founders to consolidate 
existing business before diversifying. The sharing of psychological and 
financial risks was seen as a benefit by the founder of Kestrel who was 
involved in a partnership. He referred to the potential for conflict in the 
relationship, where one partner may push for growth and greater risk 
taking, whereas the other may prefer to retain the status quo. Caraplas was 
formed on a team basis when two work colleagues came together to share 
the risk of company formation.
To summarise, the data showed that the entrepreneur played a pivotal role 
in the strategy formation process. The above section described two main 
types of entrepreneurs, the charismatic and pragmatic entrepreneurs, who 
were differentiated primarily by their attitudes to risk. The entrepreneurs 
played an important role in the strategy formation process by creating 
strong cultural values that tended to endure. This section also highlighted 
the darker side of entrepreneurship by outlining the excessive influence and 
control of the founding entrepreneur. By tracking the development of the 
companies over time and the corresponding change in the entrepreneur’s 
role, this study highlighted the dynamic nature of entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurs experienced considerable learning over time, they acquired 
new skills, adapted their management styles, and changed their goals in the 
light of their changing stage-of-life. By looking at leadership as a process 
rather than a property, the study showed how the entrepreneurs’ credibility 
was built up, maintained and ultimately diminished in the wake of crises.
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(2) Context
The conceptual framework developed in chapter two saw strategy formation 
in SMEs as the product of the interaction of three variables, entrepreneurs, 
context and history. In the early part of this chapter, the first variable - the 
entrepreneur - was examined in some detail. In this section, the second 
variable - context - is given attention. A key research question centred 
around the impact of contextual forces on the scope for entrepreneurial 
action and the impact of external factors on the strategy formation process. 
The case findings showed that the strategy formation process was affected 
by the following elements in the firms’ context: Irish industrial policy, 
industry conditions at start-up, the financial environment, technology and 
the nature of the market, contextual variations over time, and the effects of 
inter-organisational politics. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Although 
these contextual features had a bearing on the potency of leadership, 
leadership choices were still crucial.
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Figure 5.3: Contextual factors and the strategy formation process
Main elements Process Outcomes
History—»
Context
Entrepreneur-»
-»  Realised 
Strategy
Irish industrial policy 
Industry conditions at 
start-up.
The financial 
environment. 
Technology and the 
nature of the market. 
Contextual variations 
over time.
The effects of inter- 
organisational politics.
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One salient aspect of context that had impact on the strategy formation 
process in the SMEs was Irish industrial policy. It was found to have a 
particularly strong influence on strategy formation in the case of companies 
founded in the FMCG sector, in contrast to the other companies where its 
influence seemed muted.
The legacy was a promising one, in many respects, for the founders of 
import substitution businesses initiated in the 1980s. The start-up process 
in Irish Breeze and Fiacla was loosely linked to the industrial policy of the 
Irish government. Various reports highlighted the weak nature of 
indigenous industry and the need to promote opportunities in the import 
substitution area. The IDA paid Peggy Connolly 50% of the cost of a 
feasibility study into the cost of manufacturing soap in Ireland. The Irish 
Goods Council helped Richard Brierley secure second hand equipment once 
they saw that he was serious about marketing an Irish-made toothpaste.
The 1980s was characterised by recession and as Peggy Connolly remarked 
a ‘fount of goodwill’ existed towards Irish-made products. Many parents 
saw a link between buying Irish products and the maintenance of 
employment for their children in the future. Organisations such as ‘Young 
Ireland’ helped promote Irish made products and both Irish Breeze and 
Fiacla benefited from free publicity. As the marketing manager of Fiacla 
remarked:
When Fiacla started out, the ‘Irishness’ of the product 
was extremely important. The only unique part of Fiacla 
was that it was Irish... 10 or 15 years ago they were screaming 
out for Irish products. It was slightly easier to get in on 
the publicity side. You needed a lot of luck as well, being 
at the right place at the right time, a lot of hard graft, 
knocking on doors...
Bray cot did not promote the ‘Irishness’ of their product at start-up, instead
Irish Industrial Policy
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they targeted a small, health-conscious niche market and promoted the 
product as a natural, wholefood one. However, the company benefited 
from the export expertise of An Bord Bia (The Irish Trade Board). Unlike 
the firms in the FMCG sector, the other firms did not seem to enjoy the 
effects of policy intervention in industrial development. For instance, the 
service companies were ineligible for full state support. The founders of 
BFK Design lamented the lack of support available for service firms. They 
pointed out that there was a general reluctance in Irish industry to use Irish 
designers, and even state-owned companies preferred to go outside of 
Ireland for design expertise. Although some of the high-tech companies 
availed of grant-aid and BES (Business Expansion Scheme) funding, this 
did not alleviate their problems. Joe McArdle of Kestrel lamented the lack 
of developmental capital available in Ireland for expansion. Likewise, a 
manager in QFS pointed out the lack of venture capital in Ireland, but 
recognised that growth and the financing of growth was a complex issue. 
Gerry Giblin noted that most indigenous Irish software companies were 
underfunded. Jim Barry set up RTI without recourse to state grant-aid and 
stressed that it was a huge struggle to get the business established. He 
remarked that with regard to the government helping small firms, it was a 
case of ‘too little too late’. He suggested that there was a lack of support 
systems available in Ireland to nurture innovative activity. In his view, 
there was no venture or developmental capital available in Ireland for 
innovative ventures, unlike the situation in the US.
Certain developments in the policy arena facilitated the start-up process and 
enabled the founders of companies in the FMCG area to overcome 
obstacles. While the demand for ‘Irish’ products undoubtedly facilitated 
entrepreneurial behaviour in the case of Fiacla and Irish Breeze, both 
entrepreneurs responded to the opportunity presented by their contexts in 
different ways. This will be outlined in the next section.
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Industry conditions at start-up
There was evidence that industry conditions at start-up had a major bearing 
on the strategy formation process for firms in the high-technology sector, 
much more so than for firms in the FMCG area. The following section 
therefore compares and contrasts the experiences of founders in the FMCG 
area with those in the high technology sector.
The salient features of the industry environment include the financial 
environment, and technology and the nature of the market, both of which 
constrained the high-technology entrepreneurs scope for action.
They had to contend with more variables. The market was complex, it 
required technical knowledge by users, the market and technology was in a 
constant stage of change, markets were global, product life cycles were 
short, a high priority was placed on R&D and competition was robust 
(Garavan, O’ Cinneide and Flemming, 1997). This complex environment 
served to frustrate the intentions of the founders at certain stages. The 
founders of these firms faced similar strategic challenges and responded to 
the challenges in similar ways. These challenges include the issues of 
finance and technology, which are discussed below.
In contrast to these high technology firms, the firms in the FMCG did not 
face the same degree of constraint. The founders of Fiacla and Irish 
Breeze, for instance, experienced greater scope for entrepreneurial action. 
Their firms were similar in several ways. They were located in the FMCG 
(fast-moving, consumer good) area, which was generally seen to be a 
highly competitive arena. Both produced personal hygiene products, basic 
commodity-type products, and founded their import-substitute firms in the 
late 1980s. The barriers to entry were high; the founders faced 
competition from multi-national companies who benefited from economies 
of scale, large advertising budgets and brand name equity. The multi­
nationals were industry leaders and had significant resources at their
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disposal for new product development initiatives. Little or no 
encouragement was received from state agencies when the founders initially 
approached them for assistance, since they were perceived to be vulnerable 
to the activities of the multi-nationals. However, the entrepreneurs 
managed to overcome the scepticism of state agencies and obtained support.
Conventional wisdom suggests that a highly specialised strategy would have 
been appropriate for these firms, yet neither adopted a niche strategy. The 
products were aimed at the national market. After a period of research, 
Peggy Connolly decided that sub-contracting was the only feasible entry 
strategy. Brierley decided to manufacture the product himself, despite the 
large capital investment required. He targeted the emerging East European 
market, while Connolly concentrated on building up the domestic market. 
She eventually hoped to capture a large ethnic market segment in the US. 
He produced both a branded and own label product while Connolly adopted 
a policy of branded products only. Both founders expanded the product 
range as new opportunities arose. The case findings showed that 
considerable scope for action existed in spite of the constraints faced by the 
founders. The strategy formation process was a direct result of the 
personal preferences, imaginative leadership and entrepreneurial spirit of 
the founders.
The financial environment
There were variations in the strategic challenges faced by the firms. The 
founders of the high technology firms faced fundamental financial 
challenges, that were not a strong feature in the case of the FMCG 
companies. A manager in QFS saw finance as a barrier to growth:
There is no shortage of good people or good ideas,
but financial backing is really key.
240
Irish high technology firms have difficulty in obtaining long term finance, 
despite experiencing higher than average growth rates and relatively low 
failure rates. This is mainly due to the fact that a high technology 
company’s assets are mainly intangibles, and comprise of its products and 
the skills of its people. High-tech companies require finance at the start-up 
stage in order to fund research and development. This is the time of 
greatest risk exposure. Gerry Giblin spoke about the unique financial 
challenges faced by software firms:
The capital issue was, and I think, still remains the 
biggest issue. Local indigenous Irish companies are 
underfunded and they do not usually have enough money 
to wait long enough to get the product developed and 
out to the market. So they compromise by doing consultancy 
or once-off jobs of which there’s plenty but that tends to 
take the focus away, and even if they get enough money to 
get the product developed, they still have to go out and do 
all the sales and marketing of it.
Jim Barry of RTI also talked about the problem of funding and argued that 
finance was not available in Ireland for small companies.
The nature of the market affected the strategy formation process in several 
ways. Firstly, both RTI and QFS adopted a niche strategy. Although both 
founders were charismatic types, and the strategy formation process was 
driven primarily by their vision, intuition and ‘gut feel’ for the market, 
they realised that their freedom of manoeuvre was limited and both had a 
clear product/market focus from the outset. Gerry Giblin suggested that a 
vertical strategy was the only viable option for a software firm:
If you look at what product/market strategy means to a software 
company, you have two choices: you can go vertical or work at the 
horizontal level. The vertical market tends to be tied to a particular 
business area, where there’s a great requirement for business 
knowledge as well as for technical knowledge, which in our context, 
was the financial sector. This was the appropriate one...
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He suggested that the financial constraints limited the strategic options 
available to entrepreneurs in the software arena:
I don’t think it makes sense for a start-up company to go into the 
horizontal market. There has never been an Irish company which 
was successful doing that, primarily because the issue there is 
access to the market - where the requirement is to have a big sales 
department, a big marketing capability and unfortunately in Ireland 
we don’t have a track record of marketing and selling information 
technology products in the horizontal sector. So we shouldn’t try to 
compete with Microsoft or Lotus or any of those people who sell 
word processing, things that are available to everyone. A couple of 
people have tried but no-one has ever broken through, and again I 
think that’s a funding issue. It’s funding because you really need a 
big marketing budget.
Connolly and Brierley, in contrast, were not constrained by the barriers to 
entry in the FMCG (fast-moving, consumer good) area.
Crisis and the limited funds available for R&D led to a similar response in 
both RTI and QFS. It led to a conservative ethos in QFS and RTI (at least 
for a certain period of time) and may have eroded the technical vitality of 
the companies. Both companies had a great need for cash during the 
product development phase, particularly since no revenue would be earned 
during the R&D period. As a result, QFS depended on a single product 
(Invision) and only began to diversify towards the end of its product life 
cycle. One manager believed that this decision should have taken earlier.
The entire strategy of Kestrel was circumscribed by the need to generate 
cash. Kestrel had to target the installations area in order to generate cash 
which took the focus away from the core competence of the firm. Capital 
was thus a critical factor for the company founders and hampered the 
growth of the company. Management in Kestrel saw lack of finance as the 
single, biggest barrier to growth. One manager remarked:
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Growth has been quite slow really...
We are now looking at niche markets, taking away small, 
profitable business from large companies. We are steering away 
from anything large. We just could not afford it or be able to 
finance it...We have not been able to maintain a presence on the 
ground that would certainly have benefited us.
McKeown started out as a software services house, so it did not face the 
same challenge in attracting the huge resources needed to develop a 
software package from scratch.
Technology and the nature of the market
The nature of the strategy formation process seemed to vary according to 
technology and the nature of the market. The founders of RTI and QFS 
seemed to adopt a more focused approach than the other firms. These high 
technology entrepreneurs had a tendency to adhere to their early decisions 
regarding products, markets and technology.
Jim Barry, of RTI, suggested that this focus on the market was forced on 
him. Although he was interested in new ideas and new technological 
developments, he realised the dangers of diversification. Jim Barry 
claimed that: ‘we had a focus, we knew what we wanted to do. We were 
reasonably realistic about what we could achieve.’ He went on to say that 
a continued focus was vital and suggested that he was restrained by the 
nature of the market:
The technology business is changing so rapidly, there are so many 
growth sectors... Everyone feels they have to be in that area and 
doing something, with the result that the core competence of the 
business is not developed. I know that I can fall into that trap too, 
say have we anything that will bring us into this technology area. 
There are dangers. The great danger is feeling that you can grow 
the company into all these areas and the result is probably failure.
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In contrast, Brierley of Fiacla did not have a focused product/market 
strategy from the outset. His main aim was to start up a business - any 
business - in the import substitution area. He changed from producing 
own-label to a branded product, from sub-contracting to manufacturing, all 
within the first year of operation.
Gerry Giblin suggested that a software product firm that developed a 
product without due regard to the market was probably doomed to failure. 
Unlike firms in the non-technical sector, the less focused ‘learn as you go 
along’ approach was just not feasible. The more focused nature of the 
strategy formation process may have been due to critical elements in the 
market. The high cost of research and development allowed little room for 
mistakes. Giblin said:
We started out with a pretty focused mission and I think if you look 
at the original placement document...way back in 1984 - what we 
laid out there as our product strategy - we continued to pursue...
He went on to say that the relationship with their first customer (NCB), 
was crucial. The programmers ‘benefited from a close association’ with 
NCB and it:
...enabled them to get close to the customers very early on, so that 
their product, in a very real sense, was driven by what those 
people said they could use in a dealing room desk.
The high technology founders realised that due to the nature of the 
technological environment, strategic alliances would be a feature of the 
strategy formation process. Gerry Giblin realised that the marketing and 
distribution issues were too great for a company such as QFS to have a 
realistic chance in ‘going it alone’. As a result, Gerry Giblin saw strategic 
alliances as the only viable option if the firm was to grow. He suggested 
that this was due to the pace of technological change, as well as the global
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nature of the industry:
By 1990, we had offices in London and New York, very small, 
very modest. But even at accelerated investment and growth 
rates, where we were opening an office every six months, it was 
going to take us ten years to get to all the financial sectors, and in 
ten years time our products wouldn’t have any relevance. So, more 
than anything else, time to market means that it was appropriate 
(and I suspect for a lot of software companies) to find a partner who 
actually had sales channels in place but did not have the particular 
product.
Likewise, Jim Barry realised that alliances and co-operation rather than 
competition, featured in the development of a small indigenous Irish 
software firm. Jim Barry of RTI faced constraints arising from the 
technical nature of the product. He had to build total systems in the early 
days in order to prove that the technology worked. He was responsible for 
product development, sales, end-user support and so on. He remarked that 
he was never completely comfortable with that and after a few years the 
company decided to use licensing as a route for commercialising its 
technology. The EPOS (electronic point of sale) industry was controlled at 
the end user level by multi-national companies based in Japan and the US. 
These companies were able to provide total solutions (hardware and 
software) at the lowest cost possible. RTI entered into licensing 
agreements at an early stage in order to overcome the problems of being a 
small player in a market dominated by multi-nationals. Although Jim 
Barry claimed that it might have been possible to build a manufacturing 
plant in Ireland with the help of the IDA, this strategy would not have 
worked:
We could quite easily get into that market and have 150 people 
working here tomorrow and be losing half a million...the market 
here is not big enough. You would have to provide other products 
and all sorts of services, sales, I don’t know that business. I don’t 
want to be in that business...
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Plans were made in 1996 for a capital injection and possible changes in 
ownership structure. The capacity to resolve issues of autonomy and 
control seemed particularly important for firms in the software sector. The 
sales manager in RTI remarked:
It looks like this company will become part of a much bigger 
group. By definition, the bigger company will build in all 
the protection needed to keep it going....I think Jim Barry 
would be quite happy with that....
In a similar way, Gerry McKeown of McKeown Software entered into a 
product development alliance with a pan-European group. They gradually 
shifted from a service to a more product-oriented strategy. This 
necessitated a greater focus on R&D. The project could not have been 
undertaken by the company on their own due to the high level of 
investment required. For these hi-tech firms, collaboration with 
competitors seemed to be a common pattern in the strategy formation 
process. Likewise, the founder of Kestrel remarked that obtaining a 
strategic partner featured strongly in the company’s future plans.
As small players in the software industry, McKeown, RTI and QFS were 
forced to anticipate and respond to technological developments that were 
outside of their control. The financial manager of McKeown described the 
company environment as being subject to moderate to rapid change. The 
general manager claimed that keeping up to date with technological change 
was ‘the biggest single problem’ faced by the company. Company 
personnel had to undergo training in order to cope with new trends. 
Individuals in RTI also spoke about the nature of the product life cycle that 
made new product development a priority for them. QFS experienced 
changes in the technological environment (such as DOS, Windows, Work 
Stations and object-oriented programming). Not surprisingly, Gerry Giblin 
miscalculated at times in his attempts to keep pace with technological 
change but the company was flexible enough to absorb changes.
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On the other hand, industry conditions were not always constraining.
There was scope for imaginative leadership. When QFS and McKeown 
were founded in the late 1980s, the industry was in the growth stage; little 
competition existed, consumer demand for software and an awareness of its 
possibilities existed. This benign environment gave rise to new 
opportunities for enterprising individuals prepared to take risks in the Irish 
software climate. The two software firms showed the highest turnover 
rates of all firms (£6.5m and £7.4m respectively) in the study. QFS was 
founded under favourable conditions. According to one manager:
Industry conditions were very good. The ‘80s were the 
time of the big boom in financial services. It was just 
the right time.
However, the vision of the founder in predicting how market and 
technological trends would evolve contributed in no small way to the 
success of the venture. According to Gerry Giblin:
The ideas and the product were absolutely right. It was 
predicted with a great deal of accuracy how, firstly, the 
financial markets were going to advance in the next 4 to 
5 years and, secondly, how technology was going to evolve.
Getting that right is largely a matter of luck.
There was also the suggestion that the unsophisticated nature of customer 
demand assisted the start-up process. The old attitude of customers, 
according to Gerry Giblin was: ‘we must have it no matter what it costs, 
because everyone is doing it’. The entrepreneurs seemed capable of 
capitalising on favourable industry trends. Gerry Giblin had a product 
concept and a well defined market from the outset that made the new 
venture easy to justify financially.
RTI was founded by Jim Barry in 1979 because he believed that
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opportunities existed in the EPOS area. The company was set up to exploit 
the technology of EPOS rather than to satisfy any predetermined market or 
consumer need. It was a speculative venture. As such, industry conditions 
were not favourable. As well, Jim Barry decided to convert buyers over to 
open systems architecture (where equipment is bought from a variety of 
hardware vendors rather than being tied to just one vendor) at time when 
proprietary solutions were the norm. The company adopted an 
unconventional strategy that did not conform to industry norms. Yet, the 
founder gained valuable knowledge of an emerging market which stood to 
him over time. He was always a year if not more ahead of the 
competition. According to Jim Barry:
We were specialists in that area. We were in it pre the PC.
We were doing programmable device drivers for POS
before anyone else.
The cases seemed to indicate that market selection and industry conditions 
played an important role in the strategy formation process but management 
expertise was required to protect and build on early success. The initial 
product/market choices were driven by the vision and ingenuity of the 
founding entrepreneur.
In summary, finance, technology and the nature of the market had a potent 
effect on the strategy formation process in the software firms. While the 
import substitute firms seemed to experience more scope for 
entrepreneurial action, the hi-tech firms faced a more constraining 
environment.
Contextual variations over time
A number of different contextual features were noted in the case histories 
and it is shown in the following section how these propelled, constrained or 
even frustrated the aspirations of the founder.
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McKeown Software concentrated on developing software for the Digital 
VAX/VMS range of equipment and did very well on the back of Digital. 
Gerry McKeown was always a bit ahead of competitors and created an on­
line bureau system whereby users could dial into their systems. The first 
PC (personal computer) was launched in 1985 which signalled the fall in 
hardware prices and the increase in performance standards. When users 
eventually bought their own hardware, they bought McKeown software as 
well. McKeown obtained an important sales contract with a health 
authority in the UK which gave them an important reference site. In this 
way, the ingenuity and vision of McKeown allowed him to capitalise on 
favourable trends. According to one manager:
Gerry McKeown is very dynamic. His ideas, his concepts
of what clients will want are right. He is quite imaginative.
He is marketing oriented. He has good technical knowledge.
On the one hand, adverse conditions affected the strategy formation 
process. On the other hand, fortuitous events also had an impact on the 
strategy formation process. A manager in Kestrel claimed that they 
‘stumbled onto the access control area’, which offered them the potential 
for high margins. RTI discovered a new opportunity through a random 
visit to a trade show. Jim Barry saw a product that could be adapted 
through the use of his company’s technology.
The firms in the fast moving consumer good (FMCG) area had to contend 
with the challenges of a changing environment, which affected the strategy 
formation process. Adverse conditions such as changes in consumer 
behaviour, downturn in demand, bad debts, currency pressures, the 
intensity of competition and recessionary pressures posed threats for most 
firms and contributed to crises.
The history of Braycot reflected the vicissitudes of the biscuit industry as a 
whole. Industry conditions at start-up facilitated entry for Braycot. Its
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initial success can be partly attributed to the high growth rate in the 
wholefood sector of the biscuit industry. Consumer concerns for improved 
diet and health opened up new opportunities in the biscuit industry. 
However, management was unable to protect its early success. The natural 
wholefood sector was one of the fastest growing segments in the industry 
and the company achieved a market share of 1 % in the overall biscuit 
market by 1987. The positioning of Braycot as a niche, wholefood 
product meant that exporting would be vital to the success of the company. 
However, France was its only strong export market and the company’s 
international distribution arrangements were haphazard. In 1989, sales 
suddenly started to drop due to changes in the industry. The stratification 
of the market into the premium, top end of the market and the economy 
end meant that Braycot’s sales were squeezed. Braycot found it extremely 
difficult to gain distribution in the UK since retailers wanted the product 
for ‘next to nothing.’ It was difficult to cut costs since the price of raw 
materials was high for a premium, high quality product like Braycot. 
According to the general manager:
Sales levelled off in 1987, not because of lack of expansion 
or the failure to bring new products on stream, but 
because conditions in the industry had changed...the company 
was very proactive in terms of new product development 
but new products simply took up the loss on products that 
went down.
Changes in consumer behaviour, a more competitive environment and 
errors of management led to Braycot’s demise. It was clear that changes 
would have to be made to arrest Braycot’s decline. Under new ownership, 
changes in strategy were made. New ownership targeted the own label 
market and produced a chocolate-coated product to extend the product into 
more mainstream markets and utilise capacity. It also pursued new export 
opportunities, aimed to stress the ‘Irishness’ of the product as a reason for 
purchase. It also got rid of loss making products and adopted world class 
manufacturing principles in order to tackle the firm’s cost inefficiencies.
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The comments of the new owner suggest that past errors of management 
had to be tackled:
We have deliberately changed methods of operations and 
attitudes and that had a major impact on how we are 
now performing...We have done very deliberate things.
Braycot Foods Ltd. succeeded in obtaining a contract from a company 
called Diana’s California Cookies. This company contacted An Bord Bia 
(The Irish Trade Board) for sales leads. The manager in Braycot spoke 
about the element of luck needed in business. One manager suggested that 
Braycot could have experienced similar problems under new ownership but 
for the fact that enquiries were followed up and contracts gained.
Fiacla also operated in the FMCG area but performed better. This may be 
accounted for by more favourable industry conditions, but mainly due to 
the vision and enterprise of the founder. Both Fiacla and Irish Breeze were 
successful in exploiting networks of contacts. They were introduced to 
Gillespie, a well established Irish distribution company, which helped them 
gain access to the Irish market. Brierley built up a strong foundation in the 
East European markets when they were considered unstable markets. He 
maintained a reasonable share of the Irish market. The company won the 
AIB export award in 1993 and won a small business of the year award in 
1993 also. Brierley capitalised on the Trishness’ of the product at start-up, 
targeted the own label market and ensured that the product was 
competitively priced. He targeted the national market rather than a niche 
market which also helped boost sales. His distributor spoke about his role 
in the success of the firm:
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...he has done extremely well...
Equally he has an undoubted ability to source new 
business...W e have taken the burden of distribution off 
him which has left him free to go off and develop 
his export business where he has been very successful.
In the Irish market, he has been extremely successful 
between own label and the branded product.
Changes in the industry meant that speciality toothpastes, like sensitive 
toothpastes, commanded higher margins. According to the quality control 
manager, the toothpaste industry has become much more market led than it 
was when Fiacla was founded. Toothpaste was no longer seen as a 
commodity product that simply cleans teeth but was sold for its various 
attributes, such as gum protection, breadth freshness, whitening properties, 
and so on. Fiacla, according to the quality control manager ‘aggressively 
pursued opportunities.’ The company broadened its product/market base as 
new opportunities and threats arose.
Irish Breeze was successful in the home market, capturing 10% of the Irish 
soap market in 1991. At start-up, all other soaps were imported and 
encouragement was given to Irish producers to enter this market where 
there was a high level of import penetration. The product was not as 
competitively priced as Fiacla, probably due to the fact that manufacturing 
was sub-contracted. In addition, the large multi-nationals had a cost 
advantage and could ‘dump’ soap on the Irish market. Yet the company 
never fully developed its potential. Connolly’s intention of eventually 
targeting the ethnic market in the US was never realised due to a change in 
her personal goals.
Some firms in the FMCG area performed better than others due to the 
ability of the entrepreneur to make decisions which ensured continued 
survival and growth. In summary, there were major developments within 
the firm s’ sector which affected the strategy formation process. All firms 
were faced with both opportunities and threats.
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The effects o f inter-organisational politics on the process:
Political forces are generally perceived to be less relevant to the smaller as 
opposed to the larger organisation, however, organisational politics were 
found to be important in at least two of the cases in this study, particularly 
when inter-organisational relationships were present.
RTI entered into a licensing arrangement with a Japanese multi-national. 
Both parties came to the partnership with different perspectives. The sales 
manager spoke about the political dimension:
You just do not licence your technology to any one 
company because that company can kill you. They can 
starve you of seed capital, prevent you from making any 
products, keep you so busy working for them on 
nonsensical projects that you just do not make any advance.
I think a conscious decision had been taken by the board 
that they won’t go into exclusive arrangements with anyone.
The Japanese had the hidden agenda of learning about, and then imitating 
the technology that the company possessed. One employee claimed:
They brought out a very similar product to what we were 
producing for them. There was a court case, we got some 
payment in the end. With hindsight, the Omron deal was bad...
We have learned from that. It has given us second thoughts 
about being involved with licensing. We would be very 
careful with the next deal.
One individual remarked that their alliance partner had a ‘hidden agenda’ 
and probably felt that if financial support was removed from the company, 
it would fail. Their partners would then be able to ‘pick up the pieces by 
way of personnel, by way of product licences, whatever else.’
Management found at the end of the three years that they were stagnating. 
In an industry characterised by short product life cycles and constant 
change, this erosion of technical vitality was a serious weakness. The
253
company has learned to be cautious when arranging partnerships and to 
keep control of the direction of the company themselves. The marketing 
and sales manager asserted that the divorce from Omron was probably a 
good thing, mainly because it focused everybody’s mind on looking at 
some alternative product. In the light of his experiences, the basic policy 
of the founder was to maintain full control of product development 
activities and restrict company size, which contrasts with his earlier policy 
of producing entire systems through the use of sub-contracting.
In the case of Irish Breeze, disagreements arose between the entrepreneur 
and her distributors over marketing strategy. She had ambitions to take 
Irish Breeze to the United States but needed an injection of capital. They 
believed that the Eastern European markets were a safer option. These 
plans were in the pipe line when her distributors made a take-over bid for 
the firm. The entrepreneur was faced with an unsatisfactory take-over bid 
from her prospective purchaser. The case showed the danger of politics 
particularly where there were potential conflicts of interest. The 
manufacturer-distributor relationship tends to be a delicate one, and in the 
case of Irish Breeze it may have been in the interests of the distributors to 
restrict company growth since they intended making a bid for the company 
Connolly eventually sold the company to another bidder.
(3) History
The third element in the conceptual framework was the variable of history. 
A key research question centred on the influence of history on the strategy 
formation process, and the impact of history on the scope for 
entrepreneurial action over time. Figure 5.4 illustrates the main themes to 
emerge from the data under the ‘history’ variable.
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Figure 5.4: History and the strategy formation process in SMEs
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Founding History
The literature highlighted the potential constraints to change that arise from 
the early period of company formation. One research question centred on 
the impact of founding history on the strategy formation process and the 
scope for future action.
As mentioned earlier, the founder played a key role in creating cultural 
norms that tended to endure. By creating cultural parameters, be that a 
quality-driven, team-based, or customer-oriented culture, the founder 
restricted the number of strategic choices open to the company in the 
future. Perhaps the most significant role played by the entrepreneur was in 
providing the initial idea or product/market vision for the company. The 
founder helped build consensus for a certain strategic option that restricted 
the company’s freedom of manoeuvre in the future. For instance, the 
vision of Gerry Giblin of QFS was predicated on providing high quality 
dealing room software to a well defined niche market, the financial services 
community. He remarked that it did not make sense to diversify out of this 
market. The build up of a customer base over time also constrained 
entrepreneurial scope for action. For instance, managers in McKeown 
Software remarked that their product was sold to knowledgable buyers who 
entered into a long term relationship with the company. The customer 
therefore became ‘locked into’ a relationship with the seller. On the one 
hand this benefited McKeown since it gave the company a certain degree of 
financial security. On the other hand, the company was precluded from 
radically changing the core product since it would take time for its existing 
customers to mature and to accept new technology.
The history of the company was intricately linked with the founder, his or 
her personal values, preferences and vision for the company. The 
founders, in interaction with context over time, left a historical legacy 
behind them.
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Defining episodes
One of the most striking themes to emerge from the case study data was 
the presence of crisis or ‘defining episodes’ in the early histories of the 
companies under study. These crises had important ramifications for the 
strategy formation and change processes. Crisis was prevalent and 
occurred across a variety of contexts. The term ‘defining episode’ is used 
here to describe a period of transition. In most cases it was characterised 
by financial crisis and in some cases it was characterised by a change in 
ownership, but in all cases it signified a significant break from the past. 
During this stage, it was incumbent on the firm to react to the crisis and 
make changes in the organisation. A great deal was learned and lessons 
were drawn for the future. Wide ranging alterations in strategy, ownership 
structure, people, systems and ideologies took place during the 
development of the firm. The defining episode was of vital long term 
significance for the organisation.
Source of crises:
(a) Crisis that is internally generated (arising primarily from the actions of 
the founder in his drive for growth)
(b) Crisis that is externally generated (arising primarily from 
environmental shocks)
(a) Internal crisis
Crises which mainly arose from forces inside the firm showed themselves 
most vividly and dramatically in growing firms, such as QFS, McKeown 
and Fiacla. These firms were led by charismatic entrepreneurs. In an 
attempt to expand, to target new markets, to bring new products or 
technology on stream, the founder tended to neglect financial planning and 
did not allow for contingencies. The pressures towards growth and 
expansion seemed very strong in some cases. It was the entrepreneur’s
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actions and initiative that precipitated the crisis. Although the firms 
seemed caught up by inexorable forces, it was the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur that led the firm into crisis. They freely choose the growth 
option and the attendant risks this strategy entailed. Unfortunately, 
unanticipated jolts from the environment exposed the weaknesses in the 
entrepreneur’s plans. The repercussions of crisis were particularly acute 
for the small firm. Although the nature of the crisis and its causes varied 
with particular historical circumstances, the overall effect of these defining 
episodes on the strategy formation process was quite similar as the 
following analysis will show.
The crisis in QFS arose mainly from the risk-taking that underpinned an 
ambitious growth strategy pursued by the founding strategists. It occurred 
during the start-up stage. The venture capitalist of QFS adopted a strategy 
that was proactive, innovative and risk prone. The venture capitalist was 
a majority shareholder in a number of computer companies but these 
interests acted as a severe drain on his resources. Gerry Giblin put a 
proposal to a well known corporation, Telerate (a data vendor) to merge all 
the companies into one entity. It was initially proposed to sell 20% to 
Telerate giving them an option to buy out the remaining shares. The 
proposed deal was highly unusual given that a software project was in the 
process of development in QFS but a product did not exist. For various 
reasons, the deal with Telerate fell through. This was a major setback to 
all concerned. Gerry Giblin and Dermot Desmond had come close to 
closing a deal that would have been highly acclaimed in the Irish software 
industry. The venture capitalist faced a difficult decision of whether to 
continue funding the software project. Gerry Giblin remarked:
Desmond is not a technical person. The only thing he had 
to go on was the fact that Telerate had taken such an interest 
in the project and had spent a long time, over a year, going 
over the project. But he did not really know whether it would 
be successful. He was going on instinct. As in most areas, 
he relied on his instinct for people.
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The venture capitalist was faced with two options: sever his connection 
with software development or continue to fund it. The former would have 
seemed like the most rational choice but the financial backer sold shares of 
20% to employees, 5% to the IDA, and continued to fund development. 
The start-up of QFS was fraught with tension, with cost cutting and 
pressure to bring a product to the market. This critical period had a 
marked effect on future decisions and the culture of the firm.
Likewise, McKeown grew rapidly during the 1980s largely due to the 
vision of its founding entrepreneur, Gerry McKeown. The crisis in 
McKeown arose several years after start-up when it was well established.
It stemmed mainly from internal forces such as the lack of planning for 
growth. By the mid 1980s the company realised that it would have to 
compete in an open systems environment and would also have to shift from 
a service to a product focus. The entrepreneur found the change in 
strategy generated overheads, particularly in R&D and marketing, which 
was difficult to cover in the subsequent downturn in demand. A major bad 
debt placed a strain on the organisation. A crisis arose due to the fact that 
far reaching changes were made in the organisation without a solid 
financial base. Gerry McKeown was proactive, he introduced strategic 
changes in anticipation of industry change and tried to influence the 
environment. The founder played a vital role in early company success, 
but did not have the skills to protect that success. The problems in 
McKeown stemmed from mismanagement and internal inefficiencies.
Likewise, the crisis in Fiacla arose from the pursuit of a high-risk growth 
strategy. It too arose several years after start-up, when the company was 
intent on expanding into export markets. Richard Brierley of Fiacla 
realised that the limited size of the Irish marketplace made exporting and 
the opening up of new markets a key priority. However, Fiacla was ill 
equipped in terms of production facilities and decided to invest heavily in 
new equipment in order to grasp an opportunity to supply the Polish
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market. In the toothpaste business, there were conventions as to what was 
a respectable size necessary to woo customers; capital investment was 
necessary to gain contracts. The founder was aware of the risks he took 
when investing in capital equipment. He seemed to describe his posture as 
one of obedience to the categorical imperatives of survival. The comments 
of employees suggested that the founder was a mere creature or even 
prisoner of such pressures: ‘We had to put in this investment simply to 
carry on’, or ‘Without that decision, we would not be here today’ and ‘We 
could not say no to it (orders from the Polish market). In this respect, the 
risk was perceived to unavoidable. The sense of crisis was heightened by 
the feeling that the survival of the firm was at stake. Brierley introduced 
capital equipment in order to grow. However, the lack o f proper cash and 
credit control procedures led the firm into crisis. The distributor collapsed 
and the problem of recovering cash arose. The company went from a 
position of under capacity to over capacity and Brierley almost saw his 
entire business disappear. The founding entrepreneur played a vital role in 
company success, but he did not have the skills to protect that success and 
see the company grow. Part of the problem stemmed from the personal 
attributes of the entrepreneur: his risk-taking and optimism.
In RTI, the crisis arose primarily as a result of internal organisational 
politics. It too arose several years after the company was established. 
Management had ideas for a new product and negotiated a financial deal 
with Omron who later backed out of the deal. A crisis brought about the 
termination of the exclusive licensing arrangement. The licensee believed 
it was in their best interests to develop the expertise offered by RTI in- 
house and attempted to undermine the firm. Due to various difficulties in 
the relationship, RTI decided to disassociate itself from the licensing 
arrangement. Jim Barry recognised that the product had a limited life cycle 
and the company had to constantly innovate in order to survive. One 
manager remarked that at this stage opportunities had to be seized and 
changes made to prevent the company from stagnating:
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The ending of the Omron exclusive arrangement and the 
beginning of this development was critical. It was very 
much a ‘touch and go’ situation. If this project had not 
taken off, or took longer to develop than expected, then 
the company would have ceased to exist
The financial manager claimed that it was a difficult break to make since it 
involved ‘setting out into the abyss’. The directors put a great deal of their 
own resources into project development which was a risky undertaking.
The basic policy of the founder was to maintain full control of product 
development activities. Jim Barry remarked that the great advantage of 
being small was the fact that management was in control and knew 
everything that was going on.
To summarise, several companies experienced crisis primarily as a result of 
forces internal to the firm. The founders neglected the importance of 
planning for growth, experienced the detrimental effects of politics, ignored 
proper cash and credit control procedures, took risky decisions and crisis 
focused attention on areas of weakness within the firm.
(b) External Crisis
The second type of crisis was caused primarily by factors that were 
external to the firm, such as difficult trading conditions, changes in interest 
rates, currency crises, recessionary pressures, customer rejection of product 
and slowdown in the industry growth rate. The entrepreneurs tended to 
react to external events and crisis usually forced a change in strategy or 
ownership structure. The entrepreneurs in these cases were also guilty of 
mismanagement, poor control, and lack of contingency planning.
The crisis in Kestrel was precipitated by the currency crisis of 1992 and 
occurred a few years after start-up. Kestrel was set up to design electronic 
security products. It was very difficult to survive the first five years since
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the company was undercapitalized. Management underestimated the 
amount of time it would take to bring the product to the market.
According to one manager:
You cannot afford to make mistakes and developing products 
is all about making mistakes
Since the development process took longer than anticipated, the founders 
were forced to focus on installations in order to improve the cash flow of 
the business. This strategy diverted attention away from the core business 
and more importantly, the company was competing with potential future 
customers in this area. By 1988, the company was faced with severe 
problems. It was undercapitalised, it had neglected its core business, its 
product range was restricted and it possessed large overheads. These 
problems led to its take over and an injection of capital in 1989. This take 
over was unsuccessful for various reasons. A management buy-out 
occurred in 1991. About a year afterwards, the company endured another 
major crisis. Kestrel was still over-geared and the unexpected currency 
crisis of 1992 was disastrous to a firm that relied heavily on the UK 
market. This crisis had a marked effect on management, on a personal 
level, and it also restricted the strategic options open to them:
It has been a hard slog. We have "been down in the dirt" 
to coin a phrase. We have struggled and have got over it.
We are very sharpened now as to the effort needed.
We are not taking anything for granted anymore. We are 
constantly aware, we try to second guess what is happening.
All in all it has taken any complacency we might have 
had out of us.
The crisis resulted in cautiousness in decision making because the company 
was highly geared and management had to recuperate a costly R&D 
program. The firm ’s main advantages were its product design capability 
and its flexibility. The company was adept at adding on features to a
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product that was specifically designed to suit the needs of the customer. Its 
weaknesses included the lack of resources available for R&D, its 
weaknesses in manufacturing, cost inefficiencies and tendency to bring a 
product to the market too early. Management became aware of the need to 
look for a strategic alliance partner, the need to take more risk and to 
obtain financial strength. A strategic partner who could contribute to the 
marketing side would give them the start that they need.
The crisis in Braycot was caused primarily by changes in industry 
conditions. It entered a period of rapid growth for four years with virtually 
no advertising support. The natural wholefood sector was one of the 
fastest growing sectors of the biscuit market. Management was very 
proactive in the early days in terms of securing new products and new 
markets. Yet, it failed to plan. Crisis occurred when the company was 
well established. According to the new owner:
Finance is always a major problem. The whole issue of growth, 
how it is planned and controlled can bury a company. A 
company has to be very careful in its expansion plans.
Managing cash flow, how much money is spent, how much is 
got back in, seeing that credit terms are adhered to, are 
all crucial.
Sales suddenly started to drop in 1989 due to changes in the industry. The 
history of the company reflected the vicissitudes of the food industry of the 
1980s - a period of intense price competition at the lower end of the market 
and product innovation at the luxury end. Problems in Braycot came to a 
head when their sole distributor in the UK suddenly collapsed without 
warning. The company found itself in a crisis situation with few orders for 
its products. The loss of export sales in the UK, compounded with 
problems in the home market, a more competitive environment and 
pressure on its cost base, resulted in it falling under the control of a major 
food group. The crisis resulted from the founders being immersed in the 
day-to-day management of the business, not managing the growth period
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properly, failing to think strategically and anticipate problems. According 
to the general manager:
Unfortunately, they did not sit back and think about 
things. If they had organised it differently, they would 
have achieved more.
The crisis in BFK design stemmed mainly from recessionary pressures, 
from forces that were external to the firm. It arose in the second year of 
company formation. The company was launched in a growth period but 
the recession adversely affected the firm two years later in 1990. One of 
the founders alluded to the financial weaknesses of the firm a start-up:
We were a bit shakey on the financial side. It was a little bit 
fingers crossed as well.
The company had difficulty in controlling its expenses when sales 
deteriorated sharply due to the recession. The firm also suffered a major 
bad debt. The company over-extended itself, employed too many people, 
failed to pull in customers during the recession and found itself in crisis. 
Competition also became more intense. The industry consisted of 
numerous small designers - where the aim of the designer was simply to 
make a living - along with a few medium sized firms. The smaller 
designers were able to undercut their competitors and were willing to do 
speculative work. This type of climate made it increasingly difficult for the 
medium sized firms to earn money. A greater price consciousness on the 
part of consumers emerged as a consequence of the recession. These 
external forces over which the firm had no control constituted obstacles to 
growth. This firm had to adapt to an external environment, it was reactive 
rather than proactive. Similar to other companies such as Braycot, 
McKeown and Fiacla, the crisis alerted management of the urgent need for 
more stringent accounting controls.
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The loss of several key customers precipitated the crisis in Caraplas.
Crisis arose shortly after its start-up. The company made a major 
technological breakthrough in the plastics industry when it became the first 
company in the world to produce thick, durable sheets of transparent plastic 
(PET). There was an ingrained conservatism in the industry that prevented 
customers from adopting a superior product with a significant price 
advantage. Management miscalculated by not fully researching the 
technical limitations of the product. Instead management learned through a 
process of trial-and-error. The product was used in some applications and 
failed. Had they been more cautious and chosen the initial applications 
more carefully, subsequent problems would not have arisen. In addition, 
their raw material supplier was using cheap sub-standard raw materials 
without their knowledge which caused the plastic product to become 
contaminated. The company’s customers rejected the product. In an 
industry where ‘bad news travels fast’, the company never recovered from 
this period. The assets of the company were bought out in 1995 by a giant 
chemical corporation.
To summarise, crisis was found to be a common pattern in small-medium 
sized firms. It was associated with a variety of events, and was caused by 
both internal and external factors. These included:
* Organisational politics
* Under-capitalization
* Loss of internal control (people, finance, technological systems)
* Inadequate planning (being late to the market with a product, 
unanticipated extra costs in product development)
* Overdependence on a single product, customer or market.
* Decline in customer demand, customer rejection of product.
* Intensity of competition
* Collapse of distributor
* Bad debts
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* Recessionary pressures
Although crisis took place in most companies, the exception was the case 
of Irish Breeze. It is tentatively proposed that since Peggy Connolly 
subcontracted production this minimised financial risk and the potential for 
crisis. However further research is needed to clarify why crisis occurs in 
one company and not in another.
The data revealed that the defining episodes were characterised by learning 
and change, ideological shifts and strategic persistence. These factors will 
be discussed as follows:
Learning and change
The case study observations suggested that the ‘defining episode’ had a 
deep influence on the strategy formation process. The defining episode 
was a period where considerable learning and change took place. It led to 
the emergence of a more planned approach, a clearer sense of the 
company’s direction and the emergence of more realistic expectations. In 
two cases, it led the founders to restrict the size of the company. The 
crisis exposed areas of weakness within the company and stimulated 
management to rectify past mistakes. Although learning and change was a 
feature of most companies’ development, the following analysis centres on 
the experiences of four companies: McKeown, Fiacla, QFS and RTI. Due 
to time and resource constraints, these companies were selected for more 
intensive analysis in the research process.
The financial manager in McKeown remarked that the company 
experienced changes in its strategy and its way of thinking as a result of the 
crisis. McKeown started out as a software services firm. The early 
decisions taken regarding products, markets and technology remained stable 
and did not change that much. In the 1980s, the industry underwent a
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major change in terms of technology. As a result, the company had to 
change its technological base and adopt a new operating system. A 
combination of factors led the firm into crisis and this crisis give the 
impetus to changes in strategy. The seeds of a new culture and a new 
strategy were bom  out of the early turbulent period of the company’s 
history. In the aftermath of the crisis, a greater commitment was given to 
a product-led strategy. The company became more of an R&D and sales 
unit. A product focus and technological orientation came into being in the 
1980s but was not there from the outset. The company deliberately 
reduced their involvement in large bespoke contracts (a service where 
software was tailored to suit customer needs) and resources were diverted 
into the R&D and Product Development division. According to the 
financial manager:
a customer awareness was present from the outset but the 
company now realises that being R&D proactive is very 
important also. The clients have an input into the product 
development process and it is they who drive the R&D work.
If the client makes a worthwhile suggestion, then the 
release of the new package will have that extra 
functionality, but the client does not have to pay for 
the bespoke element. It will be available to everyone.
The company is much more technologically and R&D oriented 
for the purpose of being customer oriented
After the crisis, a deliberate decision was taken to remain a certain size:
.. .but now we have become much more product oriented 
and want to concentrate our energies on developing our 
core product rather than devising new ones, without 
growing any bigger in terms of numbers employed...
A more planned approach to strategy was adopted:
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Even though it was a bad period for the company, positive 
aspects emerged...the company has become far more contemplative, 
it has become prudent about how money is spent. R&D expenditure 
is now planned a year in advance...W e learned that because of 
the cyclical nature of the product life cycle, we have to open 
up new markets all the time. In new markets, we need to 
enter with new products at the start of the product life cycle.
Now we can ride it out much better because a secure financial base 
is there.
Fiacla’s strategy in the aftermath of the crisis involved spreading risk, 
developing new, safer export markets, improving credit control procedures, 
and monitoring costs as well as developing a range of value-added 
products. Like McKeown, Fiacla adopted a more cautious and rational 
approach to strategy formation:
There were some very positive aspects to going through that 
period, from everyone’s point of view. Credit limits were placed 
on all accounts. Credit insurance was sought. Richard realised 
that sales are one thing, getting payment is another. I 
think he learned an awful lot from that. It was a tremendous 
learning curve. It could have been a very expensive one.
The collapse of the Polish market in the case of Fiacla sparked a search for 
new and safer contracts. According to one manager:
I think after the initial shock we reacted positively.
We had to pull ourselves up again, look for new markets, 
maybe safer m arkets...W e were certainly more cautious for a time. 
Its a risk business. But we do not put all our eggs in one 
basket anymore. We are spread. We are exporting to Russia a lot 
now. We have been doing a lot of work for UK companies, some 
of the blue chip ones, the safer ones...W e reviewed our contracts 
more carefully, looked for letters of credit and so on.
Weaknesses in planning and control were exposed in McKeown and Fiacla 
and this led to more rigorous systems being put in place. Crisis 
contributed to both ‘unlearning’ and to new organisational learning. It
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brought benefits, by exposing the founder’s area of weakness and led to the 
construction of new systems and new competencies.
QFS developed a clearer focus and more realistic expectations after the 
crisis. Gerry Giblin and the venture capitalist had an ambitious growth 
strategy; they proposed to merge the hardware and software companies into 
one entity and involve Telerate in the marketing side. After the crisis, 
Gerry Giblin claimed that: ‘there was no point in trying to be IBM when 
you are in the garage-style mode of operation. ’ The crisis heightened the 
sense that the survival o f the company was at stake; they resolved to ‘get 
some customers, some profits.’ Similar to the founders in Fiacla and 
McKeown, Gerry Giblin developed a greater commercial awareness. He 
knew that in the early stages, people ‘had the opportunity to flourish, to put 
forward different points of view’ but that it was not in the long term 
interests of the firm. He learned that business was all about making profit.
Both McKeown and RTI took a deliberate decision to restrict the size of the 
company after the experiences of crises. Jim Barry of RTI was keenly 
aware of the disadvantages pertaining to large size. These included loss of 
control, a decline in job satisfaction and possible decline in profits. His 
propensity to restrict growth was due in part to his early experiences of 
being responsible for all aspects of the business. Jim Barry said:
As such we want to do the things that we feel most comfortable 
with. It is a bit of a personal thing I suppose. We are answerable 
to ourselves. We want to be in this business to make m oney.. .If we 
were to become a significant player and bring turnover up to £40m 
or £45m, we would end up with so little of the company that it 
would not be worth doing.
He realised that growth in terms of size would not always be equated with 
increased financial reward and spoke of the disadvantages of growth:
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We don’t want to get into that market. We could quite 
easily get into that market and have 150 people working 
here tomorrow and be losing IR £0.5m ...the market here is 
not big enough. You’d have to provide other products and 
all sorts of services...sales...I don’t know that business.
I don’t want to be in that business...
This founder tended to equate freedom with the ability to do the type of 
work he liked. There was a deliberate policy to limit the size of the 
company in order to retain full control of R&D and product development, 
an activity at which the founder excelled. The founder experienced the 
detrimental effects of politics when the company was involved in the 
strategic alliance with a Japanese company. Their alliance partner had a 
hidden agenda of appropriating RTI’s technology and taking the company 
over. RTI learned to be cautious when arranging partnerships and to keep 
control of the direction o f the company themselves:
I think a conscious decision has been taken by the board that they 
won’t go into exclusive arrangements with anyone.
This company, like many others, realised that a more planned approach to 
new product development had to be taken in order to prevent crises in the 
future. Jim Barry remarked that one of the lessons they learned along the 
way was to ‘allow more scope for errors and changes.’
A common pattern in financial recovery for the firms in the study was take­
over or a change in management structure. The imposition of professional 
management brought both advantages and disadvantages. It led to 
increased formality, greater planning, an improved infrastructure, and 
shared decision-making, but the disadvantages included the erosion of the 
small firm culture and slower decision-making processes.
In the case of Fiacla and McKeown, investment of shares by an outside
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group was the impetus for introducing new m odem  systems of accounting 
and control and the introduction of professional managers versed in their 
use. The distributors of Fiacla’s products believed that new ownership 
countered the risk tendencies of the entrepreneur. The role of outsiders 
was important in this case in moderating the potentially negative influence 
of the entrepreneur. The implementation of a group-wide R&D program in 
McKeown was an unmitigated good. In the case of QFS, the growth of the 
firm and its take-over by CSK Micronogosis led to more formal personnel 
policies and a more ‘accounting driven organisation. ’ The other cases 
showed that absorption into a larger group resulted in over-control, loss of 
identity, and a loss of entrepreneurial energy and freedom. Braycot was 
stifled when it was acquired by an international food group. When Kestrel 
fell under the control of a parent group, it was forced to lose a number of 
staff and meet various profit and performance targets. It lost its team spirit 
and fell prey to a culture of management-by-objectives. Employee morale 
was poor and the take-over sent conflicting messages to employees. In 
these firms, there was considerable volatility in ownership forms. Both 
firms regained their independence in the 1990s.
To summarise, the case findings indicated that a great deal was learned 
over time and the founder matured along with the organisation. Most of 
the entrepreneurs remarked that business development was a ‘learning 
process’, the phrase: Teaming curve’ was often used and many claimed 
that they had ‘learned from their mistakes’. This learning manifested itself 
in greater planning and control, a more commercial awareness, controlled 
growth, a new awareness of company weaknesses and need for new skills 
and competencies.
Ideological shifts
The case findings suggested that the ‘defining episode’ had a deep influence 
on the strategy formation process and it gave rise to ideological shifts.
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There seemed to be a change in the mind-set of the entrepreneur over time. 
By looking at what happens to the founders and their firms over time, it 
was found that the founder’s perception of risk changed. A characteristic 
of the strategy formation process over time was the emergence of a more 
realistic and more objective assessment of risk. There was a change in the 
ideology of the firm due to the mediating influence of partners, early years 
of straggle and crisis, personal learning and experience of the founder, 
increase in company size and new ownership. The following analysis is 
based primarily on the experience of the charismatic entrepreneurs.
The start-up stage was characterised by an ideology of risk taking (why 
not?); it was characterised by a founder with a business idea, great 
ambitions, optimism and belief in the venture (Imagination); however, 
formal planning was absent (unproven ideas); the company was managed 
opportunistically and intuitively (what is desirable?); the stage was 
characterised by learning-by-doing (experimentation); learning by mistakes 
was a feature of this stage since getting the business off the ground 
involved many uncertainties and unknown variables.
In the later stages, a new risk-averse, more conservative ideology tended to 
take root (Why?); greater planning was evident (proven ideas); decisions 
had to be justified (What is feasible?) and were based on rationality not just 
intuition (Rationality); the company had several years of experience and 
learning to draw upon and a clearer focus in terms of strategy was 
discernible (Experience).
The case histories suggested that a marked shift in ideology occurred over 
time in Fiacla, McKeown, QFS and RTI. Braycot and Kestrel also 
exhibited a greater degree of cautiousness in the light of their experience 
with crises and near demise of the companies.
In Fiacla, there was a shift from a risk-prone to a more conservative
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ideology which manifested itself in greater planning for growth, a strategy 
of controlled growth, the targeting of new safer markets, and the adoption 
of stringent cash and credit control procedures. Crisis and new ownership 
played an important part in this ideological shift. Fiacla was founded by 
Richard Brierley and it was a speculative venture for the founder. He 
saved capital when he worked as an engineer in England and re-located to 
Ireland. He decided to look at the possibility of producing toothpaste. One 
manager said that he: ‘had an idea and reckoned he could make it work’.
In the words of one manager, he ‘had to make it w ork’ since he ‘put all his 
eggs in one basket. ’ In retrospect, Brierley suggested that he should:
‘have researched the idea a lot better than I d id .’ Reacting quickly to 
opportunities, responding flexibly to the demand of customers, taking risks 
in order to seize new business opportunities, constituted the original 
strength of the firm. The founding ideology in Fiacla was an ideology 
based on opportunism and risk-taking. One manager remarked that 
Brierley ‘went into the venture without realising the commercial risks 
involved.’ The founder of Fiacla desired rapid growth. For instance, one 
manager remarked that: ‘whether his goals were obtainable in his time 
frame, or ever, is debatable!’. His aim was to capture a large share of the 
home market within a certain time frame. For this reason, the firm 
prospered at start-up. According to the quality control manager:
The survival of the company is due to Richard Brierley, his 
risk taking, his entrepreneurial spirit. Risks can work for or 
against the company. On the whole, they worked for us.
When the fateful business opportunity arose in Poland, the entrepreneur 
pursued it with the confidence that the necessary resources would follow. 
The decision was taken regardless of current resources. The entrepreneur 
was proactive, he took the initiative, and attempted to control events rather 
than be controlled by the vicissitudes of the marketplace:
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The export opportunity came along and we seized it, 
without having the capacity to do it very well.
We could not say no to it.
However, the founding ideology created serious internal organisational 
problems. It led to a neglect of proper credit control procedures and an 
informal, ad-hoc approach to business management existed. The collapse 
of the distributor in Poland and the subsequent experience of crisis 
compelled the founder to confront his lack of management skills. The 
company was taken over by the distributors. According to the quality 
control manager:
They were a sort of controlling factor on our risk taking.
They were a distribution company so they came to it 
with a rather different view.
The distributor suggested that a certain level of restraint had to placed on 
the founder due to his propensity to take risks:
Dick sees the dynamic picture up front whereas I would put 
a certain amount of restraint on him. That is not to say 
that he has done extremely well. I have tried to bring my 
commercial skills to bear on the company. Equally, he has 
an undoubted ability to source new business. We have 
achieved a fine balance between his skills and mine, two 
and two makes five. It allowed people with different skills and 
competencies to integrate into the firm.
New ownership added accounting and management skills to the undeniable 
strengths of the founder. According to the new managing director:
We have financed the company for him. Finance is not his 
forte. We have four to five accountants 
here, we are employing professionals. Dick is quite happy 
to let us deal with certain issues. We have taken the 
burden of distribution off him which has left him free to 
go off and develop his export business...
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Crisis, early years of struggle or new ownership challenged the founder’s 
ideology. In the aftermath of a crisis, the founder had to reassess his goals 
for growth and he sought to minimise risk through the adoption of credit 
and cost control procedures. This critical phase in the company’s history 
left him with the intention of ‘expanding prudently.’ The founder 
remarked that: ‘keeping control on the finances’ was crucial. One manger 
remarked that he developed ‘more of a commercial awareness than he had 
in the early years.’ The marketing manager suggested that the company 
became more careful in its decision-making. He remarked: ‘when we 
decide to launch a product, it has to work! ’
Difficult decisions and choices had to be made. Changes in the 
management structure were made in order to safeguard the organisation.
The comments of the marketing manager suggested that a cultural change 
had taken place within the organisation due to new ownership. Brierley’s 
vision for the future was now shared rather than internalised, and new 
owners brought competing views to bear on the organisation:
Dick probably feels that we should have allowed him to grow 
quicker, faster. We are more prudent. As we move from one stage 
to another, there is a sound financial basis behind it. Looking to the 
future, there is a more strategic based approach to it, as opposed to 
say an instinctive based approach. So there is a dichotomy there. It 
is that Dick would be much more hell bent, lets go for that, lets try 
to run a 100 yards in 10 seconds as opposed to 15 seconds which 
will take longer...
In McKeown Software, the new ideology centred around a new more 
conservative orientation, as well as the development of a long-term 
orientation, the desire to restrict company size and protect the key 
resources of the organisation. Part of the founder’s initial vision was to set 
up a ‘big software house’. As time went on, Gerry McKeown began to 
realise that he was responsible for the security of employees’ jobs. The 
altruistic side of the entrepreneur seemed to emerge in McKeown. The
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financial crisis was a traumatic period since employees were made 
redundant:
...then it was realised that it was 
a big company that had to be responsible for its 
employment, a definite mark. At that stage business strategies 
would really have been kicked into place, in the long long term.
Gerry McKeown began to see the organisation in terms of an entity that 
had to survive into the future rather than simply as a vehicle to implement 
his ideas. This may have had an impact of the entrepreneur’s perception of 
risk; he became more aware of how his actions would impinge on the 
business. In  the early days, the company took people on with the 
expectation that more work would become available by the time the 
contract was finished. In the past the company grew ‘without worrying too 
much about profitability.’ After the crisis, they deliberately reduced their 
involvement in large be-spoke contacts which meant that they did not have 
the same need for programming staff. The company does not intend to 
grow large in terms of employee numbers. One manager remarked that: 
‘we have become far more contemplative about we ran the business.’ In 
the aftermath of the crisis, they had to be ‘more prudent’ as regards 
expenditure.
The ideological shift that took place in QFS was predicated on the 
development of a conservative, risk-averse orientation along with a new 
awareness of the detrimental effects of politics. In the aftermath of the 
failed deal with Telerate, the company was faced with the prospect of 
severe cash shortages. Its future was in jeopardy. Gerry Giblin of QFS 
learned the paramount importance of profit:
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It has made me a lot more commercial. Power is the 
big thing. Power to do what you what to do is dependent 
on a single issue - making profit - and if you are 
making profit, then everything you do is right. If you 
are not making profit, then everything you do is wrong.
QFS emerged with a keen awareness of commercial issues and a more 
realistic view of what was feasible. Prior to the crisis, technology was the 
driving force, ambitious growth was a major goal, as seen by the proposed 
deal with Telerate; after the crisis, commercial issues defined and 
orientated the firm. In QFS, the period of foundation had a marked effect 
on future decisions and the culture of the embryonic firm. The firm clung 
to its initial product/market strategy as laid down in its original business 
plan. Giblin was described as an ‘optimistic risk-taker’. Yet, one manager 
remarked that crisis ‘makes a firm conservative as regards pushing the boat 
out in the R&D side.’ The company was very slow in developing its 
product range which was perceived by the new financial manager to be a 
weakness. The start-up stage was based on an ambitious, growth- and risk- 
oriented ideology that was undermined after the crisis.
Likewise, RTI experienced an ideological shift that was characterised by 
conservatism in decision-making and the desire to restrict company size. 
RTI was set up to exploit the general technology of EPOS rather than fulfil 
any pre-determined market need. In spite of the fact that industry 
conditions were not favourable, Jim Barry left a secure job in RTE which 
was a major move. One manager remarked that the product development 
cycle was ‘very high cost, high-risk stuff!’. The company went through a 
cycle of change, initially characterised by optimism and a strong belief in 
the viability of the organisation, to a more risk-averse period where 
licensing was used to exploit the firm ’s technology and back again to a 
more risk taking posture. Jim Barry stressed the struggle and hard work 
entailed in getting a business established. In RTI, the desire for stability 
supplanted the desire for growth due to the early experiences of struggle
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and crises. The firm seized the opportunity to enter into a licensing 
arrangement with a major multi-national. The founder’s perception of risk 
changed with the passage of time. Jim Barry described himself at this 
point in the company’s history as a ‘risk planner’ rather than a risk taker, 
although this was to change at a later stage. The early years of struggle 
meant that the entrepreneur’s hope, optimism and ability to assume risk 
were undermined over the years. Jim Barry remarked:
People say it is crisis that makes things 
happen - having to get resources, having to make things 
work. When there is a goal and a tight deadline, the buzz 
is up, the adrenalin is working. Everyone works way beyond 
their normal capacities. But after a while, that struggle to 
keep the bank manager happy grinds you down a b it...
The experience of Jim Barry illustrates clearly how ideological shifts and 
change in the founder’s perception of risk are linked to crisis and context. 
Most software firms, according to Jim Barry, have experienced traumatic 
periods. Although crisis can stimulate above average performance among 
people, learning through crisis is likely to be achieved at considerable cost 
to the individual and to the organisation. Jim Barry, in particular, learned 
that the market was a harsh taskmaster, and that failure rather than success 
was the norm in the software industry in spite of the hard work, 
commitment and talent of entrepreneurial people. The comments of Jim 
Barry suggested that disillusionment and disappointment was all part of the 
process:
The IDA throw up the same success stories all the time, 
five or six companies. The history of these have broken 
the spirits of most of the people involved...It is not a 
shortage of expertise or of commitment from the people 
involved, but they have always been ‘hand to mouth’ 
situations...It is such a struggle for the people 
involved, keeping the thing ticking over. It is hard work.
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Likewise, the founder of Kestrel also talked about the sense of 
disillusionment that he experienced that has made him more cautious in his 
approach to business. This case provided evidence of the lessons of 
experience from working in a volatile sector. Joe McArdle remarked:
Finance is a real barrier.
If you want to go down a certain direction and take risk, 
then the risk becomes a lot greater. On the one hand 
you have someone who wants to play it safe and stick to 
the status quo, another person measures risk by growth...
I am a total optimist but that has been battered 
out of m e...
A more conservative ideology took root in Braycot in the aftermath of the 
crisis. It made management more cautious in their decision making. This 
contrasted with the early period of the firm ’s development which was 
characterised by a more proactive ethos. The general manager suggested 
that his mind-set had changed as a result of crisis. The company adopted a 
more planned approach to strategy seen by the importance given to market 
surveys:
We are prepared to take a risk if the opportunity comes 
up. It is a conservative risk. The negative aspects of going 
through a critical period is that you hesitate to bring in new 
products unless you are 100% sure. You need market surveys 
which is expensive.
To summarise, ideological shifts took place over time in McKeown, Fiacla, 
RTI, QFS, Kestrel and Braycot. It resulted in conservatism in decision­
making, at least for a certain period of time, and it also led to a more 
planned approach being adopted by management. The key objective was to 
protect and stabilise the success of the organisation. Although the 
emergence of a new ideology was constructive in many ways, it also 
carried with it the potential drawback of leading to over-cautiousness in 
decision-making.
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Strategie persistence
An interesting characteristic of the defining episode period was that it led to 
‘strategic persistence’, albeit this phenomenon was evident in only two 
cases. The term used to describe how organisational behaviour was 
constrained over time was ‘strategic persistence.’ There was the danger 
that the entrepreneurs would persist with a strategy beyond the point where 
it served the interests of the firm. In QFS, one manager talked about the 
negative effects of crisis on strategy:
It makes a firm conservative, very much so. I suppose if 
you are used to managing on a very tight budget, you are 
used to planning ahead, how to pay next month’s salaries, these 
issues were a feature of QFS back in the 1980s. Even though 
we were financed by Dermot Desmond, he did not have 
bottomless pockets, so we were used to justifying every 
piece of expenditure in great detail. It makes you 
conservative as regards pushing the boat out in the R&D side
QFS emerged at a time when money was in short supply, so profit fitted 
into the basic objectives and philosophy of the company. There was a 
suggestion that the early period of formation made the company 
conservative. Maintaining the economic health of the firm was a priority 
for Giblin. In retrospect, the new manager believed that greater attempts 
should have been to diversify on account of the nature of the product life 
cycle for software:
I would say, looking back - Invision was a great product - 
but more effort should have been made to produce other 
products, to diversify at that point, rather than diversify 
at a later point, rather than depending on one product. 
That happened subsequently - maybe it would have been 
better if  the company had started that earlier.
Jim Barry of RTI remarked that the early years of struggle made them 
receptive to a licensing arrangement with a Japanese company which may
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not have been in the best interests of the firm. At the time, Jim Barry saw 
licensing as an escape route from the years of struggle encountered up until 
then. The company entered into the business relationship when it was in a 
vulnerable, not a strong, position. A very attractive deal was offered to the 
founder who accepted it with alacrity. Jim Barry remarked:
Those years were a real struggle. We were making 
everything ourselves; the software, all the support, trying 
to fund the thing. Because of the struggle, we were very 
receptive to the licensing arrangement with Hugin-Sweda.
It lifted a huge weight. It stabilised the place financially.
It really allowed you to focus on the development of products 
rather than on day-to-day fire fighting.
The financial manager suggested that the founder regretted this decision 
and probably should have remained independent. The arrangement was a 
very ‘cushy situation’ and at the end of the three years, management found 
that their technology did not advance the way they would have liked it to 
advance. They were stagnating. In an industry characterised by short 
product life cycles and constant change, this erosion of technical vitality 
was a serious weakness:
We were developing nothing of our own at that tim e...W e had 
to try and catch up on what was happening generally.
We felt this was a great weakness. The company has learned to 
be cautious when arranging partnerships and to keep control of the 
direction of the company themselves.
One employee claimed:
With hindsight, the Omron deal was bad....W e have learned 
from that. It has given us second thoughts about being 
involved with licensing. We would be very careful 
with the next deal.
McKeown and Fiacla did not show the same unwillingness to diversify
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possibly because new ownership provided finance which stabilised the 
venture and minimised the prospect of a recurrent crisis. The case findings 
showed that forces for continuity and inertia were found to exist in the 
small firm. Crisis brought about changes, both positive and negative, in 
the founder’s beliefs, values and objectives. However, crisis experienced 
by some companies was often a disincentive to growth. Many founders 
were personally exposed and stood to lose a great deal if  the business 
failed. The ramifications of crisis episodes cannot be overestimated and in 
the aftermath of a crisis the morale of the company may have been 
weakened. In the long term the new risk-averse ideology seemed to 
become a constraint and had to be broken or ‘unlearned’. RTI and QFS 
have since taken steps to remedy this problem. QFS has launched a new 
risk management project and RTI has changed its strategy from licensing 
and has assumed full control of product development. Crisis encountered 
in the high technology firms seemed to have more detrimental effects than 
for firms in the low technology sector. Jim Barry remarked:
In most entrepreneurial companies, the struggle for survival 
cramps the opportunities to be innovative. You need comfort 
and resources.
Due to the pace of technological change, a high-tech firm cannot afford to 
stand still and persist with its founding strategy. It constantly needs 
replacement products to give it a competitive edge in the marketplace.
Early crisis experienced by companies may be a disincentive to growth 
since stringent controls on cash are put in place. This induces 
conservatism into a firm which should be innovative and the inclination 
therefore may be to avoid major change.
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(4) Strategy formation in SMEs - a phase pattern
So far in this chapter we have considered in turn how each of the three 
variables of the entrepreneur, context and history have influenced the 
strategy formation process in SMEs. The final section looks at the effects 
of the interaction of these variables over time. When looked at in this 
way, the data revealed an interesting phase pattern that was characteristic 
of nearly all of the cases featured in this study. This phase pattern has 
already been anticipated in the previous discussion o f defining episodes and 
is more fully developed in this final section of the empirical analysis. This 
is illustrated in Figure 5.5. The companies evolved from an early fluid 
stage and disorganised state (the quasi-strategic phase) to a stage where the 
enterprise became led by a more explicit and well defined strategy (the 
strategic phase). Table 5.4 describes the key events each company 
encountered during the phase change. The following section discusses the 
phase change in four cases: QFS, McKeown, RTI and Fiacla. Due to time 
and resource constraints, a decision was taken to analyse a limited number 
of cases in-depth.
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Figure 5.5. A phase pattern of strategy formation in SMEs
Little planning formality 
Multiplicity of goals:
'all things to all people’ 
Founder’s views dominate 
Individualistic style
Planning formality 
Stable, core goals:
'what business are we in’ 
Outsiders/other views 
Delegation, 'letting go’.
► Time
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Table 5.4: The phase pattern of strategy formation in SMEs
Quasi-strategic stage Defining episode_________Strategic stage
QFS
1985: founded
Ambitious
growth
strategy.
1987: crisis
Crisis due to failure of 
proposed deal with 
Telerate. Shortage of 
venture capital arose.
Major decision: to 
persist with venture in 
a loss-making 
situation.
Prudent as opposed to 
ambitious expansion.
Cash and profit oriented. 
Technical to commercial 
values.
Board of management. 
Change in managerial style. 
1990: office opened up in 
New York, London. 
1991: Strategic alliance 
1995: Take-over
McKeown
Software
1976: Formed
Service-
oriented.
1980: first
software.
package.
1985: UK 
Office.
1989: crisis.
Crisis due to lack of 
planning and financial 
control, high R&D and 
high marketing costs, 
bad debts.
Change from bespoke 
development to a more 
product-led strategy.
Evolution not revolution. 
Stability in product line. 
Restriction of employee 
numbers.
Formal board of management. 
R&D values.
1990: Take-over.
1990: enters UNIX market 
1991: Office in Hong Kong 
1994: NHS contract
Fiacla
1983: formed, 
based on 
own-label. 
1984: Fiacla 
launched. 
1989:
major capital 
investment. 
1989: crisis
Crisis due to demise of 
distributor in Poland 
and lack of credit 
control.
Result: over-capacity. 
Major decision was to 
sell a majority 
shareholding.
1989: Take-over 
Deliberate strategy based on 
spreading risk.
Focus on high margin, 
speciality toothpastes.
1992: Sensitive toothpaste. 
1994: Baking soda 
toothpaste.
Focus on cost competitiveness 
and efficiency.
Prudent as opposed to 
ambitious expansion.
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\continued
Table 5.4: The phase pattern of strategy formation in SMEs.
Quasi-strategic stage Defining episode Strategic stage
R TI
1979: Founded. Early years of 1996: PAS
Strategy of struggle endured. Keyboard.
producing Led to risk-averse
full EPOS systems. licensing deal in Move from being a
1982: IBM PC available. 1988. provider of total
1984: Project for solutions to that of
Japanese OEM. 1993: failure of software solutions.
1989: Contract with licensing Key objective to
Amotts, Dublin. arrangement due to restrict company
1988: Exclusive politics; erosion of size.
licensing deal technical vitality.
negotiated.
1993: crisis situation.
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The ‘quasi-strategic’ phase
The first phase in the development of the companies could be best 
described as a ‘quasi-strategic’ phase. This phase was generally 
characterised by the lack of a clearly defined strategy and the founders’ 
intentions were often negotiated and aborted at a later stage. It was also 
characterised by little planning formality, a multiplicity of goals, the 
founder’s views dominated and an individualistic style of management was 
evident.
Little planning formality
The findings of this study suggested that strategic planning did not exist in 
small firms, at least in the early stages of the firm’s development. The 
companies were not led by a formal strategic plan but were managed 
opportunistically and intuitively. The strategy formation process did not 
conform to the rational, planning, textbook model of strategy. Instead 
vision, leaming-by-doing and leaming-from-experience seemed to be a 
substitute for formal planning.
The quasi-strategic stage in McKeown and Fiacla was characterised by the 
lack of a strong product/market focus or a dominant strategy.
McKeown is a perfect illustration of this process and one manager said:
The company was formed by Gerry McKeown and two or 
three other people. There was no strategy. They simply 
wanted to get enough cash to pay this months wages.
The company started out as a software services house. The initial 
customers came from the dairy industry since Gerry McKeown had an 
employment background in this sector. The comments of the financial
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con tro ller suggest that form al planning w as absent in  the early  stages:
The company started off with a few employees, with 
his ideas, with what he wanted to sell, after that 
there was continual growth all the time to the 
mid-1980s...Long term plans are not present in the 
initial stages
The company was guided by Gerry McKeown’s vision and opportunism 
rather than a formal plan. The first Digital Vax machine was launched in 
1981 which represented an opportunity for McKeown. The company began 
to concentrate on developing software for the Digital VAX/VMS range of 
equipment. It gained a franchise with Digital and used this connection to 
increase sales. The firm entered the public sector market when they 
obtained a contract to supply the health sector in the UK - the opportunity 
simply arose rather than being anticipated and planned for in advance. The 
firm underwent a fundamental re-direction in 1980/81. Four years after
start-up, the firm decided to become more product led. It made more sense
to develop a basic accountancy package instead of constantly ‘reinventing 
the wheel’. This was the first significant decision to be faced by Gerry 
McKeown.
Similarly, the process of strategy formation seemed informal and even 
more fluid in the case of Fiacla. Richard Brierley’s approach seemed to be 
an intuitive rather than planned approach. The start-up stage was a 
learning process. It was only by putting plans into action and learning 
from the outcomes that Brierley arrived at a workable strategy. This 
inexperienced entrepreneur had to grapple with being in business in the 
early days, with what that meant for him on a personal level, with all that 
was entailed in establishing a business. Richard Brierley planned to 
produce for the own label market initially but quickly realised that own 
label would not be profitable. Within a year, Brierley decided to produce a 
branded product as well. Operational and production planning seemed to
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overshadow strategic planning in the firm in the early stages.
Manufacturing was sub-contracted out to a company in Connemara but this 
arrangement was soon terminated because of the lack of control over 
quality and difficulties associated with being too far away from the 
manufacturing process. Brierley also experienced problems with suppliers 
when the design wore off the toothpaste tubes supplied by them. Early 
plans and intentions were aborted through a trial and error process. 
Likewise, as new opportunities arose (such as the growth in speciality 
toothpastes, emergence of Eastern European markets, new innovations) 
Brierley seized them.
Richard Brierley seemed to take a very informal approach to strategy 
making. The comments of the marketing manager suggested that Brierley 
had very general goals and Fiacla was not led by a formal or detailed
strategy:
I don’t know if he had specific goals. He wanted 
listings in Quinnsworth; an acceptable level, 50% of 
stores would have been a realistic level and a 40% share.
I doubt very much is it was as detailed as that. He knew 
how many tubes of toothpaste he had to produce in year one, 
two and three, in order to finally make a profit. That is 
what his view would have been, on cost, the price at which 
he would have to buy materials, he had all these goals.
But as for actual marketing goals, I don’t think they were 
as well defined as they are now.
A much clearer product/market focus was evident in QFS and RTI from the 
outset, although the entrepreneurs seemed sceptical of the benefits of 
formal, long term planning. RTI was set up to exploit a new technology 
aimed at serving the emerging EPOS (electronic point of sale) market.
The founder remarked:
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We had a focus. We knew what we wanted to do. We 
were always reasonably realistic about what we could 
achieve. We had a business plan, projections and we 
were usually able to meet them...We do not get overburdened 
with long term planning. What’s a five year plan in this 
business? We look 18 months ahead, in a bit of detail.
But that’s as far out as we like to look
RTI experienced significant changes along the way, entering into a 
licensing arrangement for several years, then going in a new direction by 
launching its own range of products. This change in direction was sudden 
and opportunistic. A visit to a trade show was the source of Jim Barry’s 
inspiration for the new line of product development. This change in 
direction was led more by the instinctive, ‘gut feeling’ of the entrepreneur 
rather than by in-depth market analysis. Therefore, elements of vision, 
opportunism, luck and spontaneity clearly played a part in the strategy 
formation process in RTI.
QFS also had a clear product/market focus. Strategy in this company was 
more deliberate than emergent. According to Gerry Giblin:
We started out with a pretty focused mission and I 
think, if you look at the original placement document for the 
company we took advantage of the initial BES schemes way back in 
1984 and what we laid out there as our product strategy we 
continued to pursue.
However, there was no sense of the company adhering to formal textbook 
planning. Gerry Giblin remarked that they did not plan ‘in the formal 
sense’ and went on to say that it ‘would be over a few pints’ and did not 
concern the long term ‘it wouldn’t be a case of where are we going to be in 
five years time.’ One manager suggested that the company was led more 
by the vision of Gerry Giblin than by a formal plan:
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It was 70% vision of Gerry Giblin and 30% planning. A company 
can’t succeed without planning, not in the long term. The company 
would have to have some plan. Gerry’s vision would have been a 
key part...
Although the company adopted a very specialised product/market strategy, 
Gerry Giblin claimed that the thrust of the company was still opportunistic:
If someone suggested something, we’d be capable of actually 
saying: ‘stop this’ or ‘lets hire people and have a go at 
doing this.’ We’d be pretty flexible about it.
The strategy formation process in QFS and RTI was clearly affected by 
context. The enterprises of QFS and RTI were characterised by skill­
intensive, technology-based goods with a high export potential, whereas 
Fiacla was characterised by a fairly simple product of low skill intensity 
(toothpaste). McKeown was a knowledge based firm also, but it offered 
services to clients and the functionality of its accounting software did not 
change all that much. The most important characteristic differentiating 
QFS and RTI from the other major cases was the focus on innovation. The 
high costs of research and development demanded a clear and well defined 
strategic direction as well as sufficient funds to get the product to the 
market. The more deliberate nature of the strategy formation process may 
be due to the nature of the industry. Original decisions regarding products, 
markets and technology were crucial since the founders could not afford to 
make mistakes.
Some founders faced obstacles to planning; new product development in the 
high-tech firms was a highly uncertain process. The software companies 
were based on a high number of assumptions and inevitably experienced 
deviations from the original forecasts. In case of Kestrel, the product 
development cycle took longer than anticipated and the firm ran out of 
funds for product development and was forced to target a new area (alarm
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installations) in order to improve its cash flow situation. Gerry Giblin of 
QFS remarked that they had to allow for contingencies:
We spent two years doing things wrong, making mistakes.
When you say you need funding up front, you need funding 
up front to allow you to make those mistakes, to actually 
develop the product. You just don’t do everything right 
straight away. So when you see a business plan, do x, y
and z, you just have to build in some room for 
contingencies, because you are learning.
The lack of formal planning meant that the company was characterised by 
flexibility. The small size and simple internal structure of the small firm 
made it fundamentally adaptive. According to the employees in QFS, they 
were able to change very quickly if mistakes in the area of technology were 
detected. Gerry Giblin saw the firm’s flexibility as a key strength and said:
Getting the appropriate structures and the appropriate 
people in place for the next 12 months and then being 
able to change all that is very important
It was revealed through interviews with entrepreneurs in BFK Design, Irish
Breeze and Kestrel that all had used a business plan. This did not prevent
contingencies and crises from arising. The founders of BFK Design spent 
months devising a business plan but like the founder of RTI questioned the 
value of committing detailed plans to paper. The business plan seemed to 
be used more as a marketing tool to gain finance rather than as a planning 
or management tool.
Braycot, initially a biscuit producer, expanded its product range as new 
opportunities and threats arose, and produced cereal bars, organic products, 
own label and chocolate products. It attempted to penetrate markets such 
as Canada and the US but had to withdraw due to difficulties over 
sustaining the shelf life of the product. The thrust of the company was
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opportunistic  ra ther than  planned.
Multiplicity o f goals: ‘all things to all people ’
The quasi-strategic stage seemed characterised by a multiplicity of goals. 
Since the margin between success and failure can be thin the entrepreneur 
has to grapple with diverse tasks and different goals. Entrepreneurs 
sometimes need to focus on several goals in order to ensure the viability of 
the enterprise. The sales manager in McKeown remarked that in the past, 
‘we tried to cover too much ground, we bid for nearly everything that 
moved, we would grab it.’ Today, they do not bid for contracts with a 
large bespoke element due to the change in their core strategy. They are 
‘more completely focused on profitability not on revenue’.
The marketing manager of Fiacla suggested that the early start-up period 
was fraught with instability and many goals had to be achieved; it took time 
for the business to establish a certain level of comfort and stability:
At the start, you need 20 things to happen, to make
the business worthwhile doing. Whereas when you achieve
those 20 things, you then start to pick and choose...
You can choose your goals once the business is up and running.
The company has becomes more focused. What we like to do 
we do it well. We have time to investigate things.
Similarly, RTI also focused on several goals in the start-up period. Jim 
Barry was involved in the exploitation of a new technology. The company 
installed EPOS systems in a few outlets in Ireland and the UK and 
therefore had to maintain a sales office in the early days. The company 
had to prove that the technology would work and that was the rationale for 
installing entire systems. Jim Barry was ‘never completely comfortable 
with that’ but needed to master diverse skills in order to get the business 
off the ground. He found those years a ‘real struggle’ and the focus 
seemed to be more on ‘day-to-day fire fighting’ rather than on the
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development of products. After several years in a licensing arrangement, 
the company decided to launch its own products and again took control of 
its destiny. The sales manager remarked:
At the moment he is ‘hands-on’ everything. It would be better if he 
hugs the ideas, got the drawings on board and then leaves it to 
someone else to let it work. He is very much over committed as he 
is now.
Likewise, Gerry Giblin of QFS was preoccupied with many different tasks 
in the start up stage. He had to develop and test the software product, 
liaise with NCB so that the software solution would conform to users’ 
expectations, negotiate a deal with Telerate and ensure that continued 
funding would be available.
Similarly, the founder of BFK Design had to deal with an unstructured, 
pressure-ridden environment. Kevin Barry (entrepreneur) found that he had 
to deal with many pressing issues: such as getting business, producing the 
work, getting paid for it, thinking about the future and keeping abreast of 
technological change. He found such there was ‘a lot more involved in 
running a business than I thought. ’
Founder’s views/vision dominates
The quasi-strategic stage seems to be strongly influenced by the vision, 
goals and attributes of the entrepreneur. RTI, McKeown, Fiacla and QFS 
were set up by charismatic individuals with a creative idea, immense drive 
and determination to succeed.
Richard Brierley had a broad ‘vision’ for the enterprise, that of producing a 
top quality Irish-made toothpaste for the home and export markets. He was 
described as someone who: ‘knew what he was talking about’ and ‘knew 
exactly what he wanted’ when he went into business. Richard Brierley
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remarked that an entrepreneur is someone who ‘believes in what they do, 
believes in the product, is able to make it happen. ’ This faith in the 
product and in the venture itself helped him overcome obstacles. One 
manager in Gillespies remarked that it was ‘Richard who had to drive the 
business’ from a marketing point of view. This highlighted how closely 
the firm’s development was linked to the personality of the entrepreneur.
Similarly, Jim Barry of RTI dominated the company from the outset. One 
employee remarked that ‘it was very much the founder’s company.’ Jim 
Barry remarked that: ‘I suppose, from a product and vision viewpoint, I 
drive it. I’ll say that.’ Likewise, Gerry Giblin was perceived to be 
synonymous with QFS and was well known throughout the software 
industry. His ability to persuade local financial institutions to pay for, and 
take the product, was seen as a critical factor in the success of the 
company. One employee remarked that:
He has put a lot of enthusiasm into the company, he’s keen on 
pushing it forward, it has developed over the years, he had many 
contacts with the industry - in Ireland and abroad - he has used 
those to generate sales
The strategy of QFS and RTI was clearly affected by the personal 
preferences of the founders. Jim Barry was not interested in building a 
large organisation whereas Gerry Giblin saw the need for a professionally 
run mature organisation. Gerry McKeown was perceived to be a major 
force in the development of the company. He had a combination of 
technical and marketing knowledge that was crucial for company success. 
As mentioned previously, the founders had a significant impact on the 
culture of the firm. They instilled certain values into the companies such 
as quality, team-work and a customer orientation. For instance, Jim Barry 
suggested that what made RTI distinctive was the fact that they: ‘look at 
things from a user’s point of view, rather than things being driven by 
technology. ’ These values lingered on even when the company was taken
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over.
An individualistic style of management was characteristic of the quasi- 
strategic stage. Richard Brierley had total control over the development of 
the company since he was the only shareholder. In hindsight he claimed 
that there were things he should have done differently: ‘I would not have 
tried to do everything myself’. He regretted the fact that he did not have 
the support of a small team of people who would constitute a ‘think tank to 
come up with solutions - and share the worries.’ A ‘hands-on’ approach 
was taken by the Richard Brierley in the early days. He was responsible 
for all aspects of business start-up and development and performed a wide 
range of functions. Likewise, Jim Barry played a pivotal role in the 
development of his company and was perceived to be virtually 
indispensable to the firm. He described his management style as autocratic 
in some ways, since he had a significant influence on product development.
In QFS the comments of the founder suggested that his managerial style 
was both informal and charismatic in the early days:
There was no formal board or board meetings, meeting 
someone in the hall and having a chat - that was 
effectively the control of the company.
This was to change as the company grew larger. Giblin remarked that the 
company had to make a transition from a small company to a more mature, 
professionally run company where employees no longer reacted to the 
‘personal charisma’ of one individual. It had to change from a ‘people- 
driven to a more process-driven organisation.’ He remarked:
Individualistic style o f  management
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...letting go and letting others take the driving seat which may not 
fit in with the way things used to be...the emotional issues will be a 
lot tougher to deal with - this is my baby and I ’ve grown it up - 
now just as it is about to take off and go to the next level, I ’m 
being asked to stand aside. So that’s a big issue.
As a leader, he had the ability to stretch the capabilities of employees, 
beyond what they themselves believed possible:
The art of the entrepreneur is to take a gamble; they have to deliver 
on that gamble. Gerry’s strength was that he knew exactly how 
much we could step up to fulfil the promises he made.
As the company gets larger, it is harder for him to put his finger on 
the pulse, to know just how much he can gamble. He does not take 
those types of decisions anymore.
His style of management was individualistic, in the sense that he had 
significant control over the company’s future. Gerry Giblin remarked that 
he ‘basically built the thing up’ even though the company was substantially 
owned by a venture capitalist, One manager remarked that he: ‘provided 
the initial vision and had the foresight to come up with an idea and base a 
product around that idea and start up a company. ’ Giblin negotiated the 
deals with both Telerate and Micronogosis. He was aware of the problem 
of over-dependence on one person’s key skills; he believed that the 
company possessed the necessary innovation and creativity but more 
importantly, it was embedded in a team structure.
The ‘strategic’ phase:
The strategic phase was characterised in general by a clear and controlled 
sense of direction and the presence of well defined strategies. The salient 
features of this phase were as follows: planning formality, stable, core 
goals, the emergence of outsiders’ views, and delegation on the part of the 
founder. The phase change was instigated as a result of the defining 
episode which was a significant shaper of strategy in the firms under study.
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Planning form ality
The strategic stage was characterised by a certain degree of formal 
planning in the SME. Growth in the quasi-strategic stage was largely 
achieved by the guiding vision of the entrepreneur with minimal planning 
taking place; in the strategic stage, greater attention was paid to planning.
In McKeown, long term plans were put into place in the mid 1980s due to 
the experience of crisis and change in ownership structure. One manager 
remarked that major change took place after the crisis since in the early 
stages, McKeown did not have an explicit long-term strategy:
...At that stage, business strategies would really have 
been kicked into place, in the long, long term. Up until 
then, it would have been in the growth stage, which is 
quite common in a lot of companies, you know who you are 
selling to, what you are selling, you take your product 
and sell around the hardware.
There was a shift from offering a service (bespoke contracts) to a much 
more product-led strategy. This meant that most of the programming staff 
were re-trained and diverted into the product development and R&D unit. 
The key policies which the founder and the board of management 
developed were explicit and shared throughout the organisation.
The key objective, at this stage, was to protect and stabilise the early 
success of the organisation. It became necessary for the founder to adopt 
more formal patterns of behaviour. Management started to plan its 
resource requirements, whereas previously the entrepreneur seemed to learn 
about what was required through action. One manager remarked:
It was a silver spoon situation, everything had gone well. Since 
the crisis, we have become far more contemplative about how we 
ran the business. We cut costs. We had to be prudent on what 
we were spending our money on. We became more budget 
oriented. R&D expenditure would be decided a year in advance.
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A clearer focus was evident throughout the organisation. For instance one 
manager remarked that since 1989, they ‘really concentrated on a declared 
product-oriented strategy. ’ The comments of the general manager 
suggested that formal planning took place within the organisation:
....we have formal meetings to look at past performance. We also 
try to forecast over a three year period as to where we might 
we going, what investment we might require to keep up to 
date with technology. We have a dynamic three year business plan.
Similarly, RTI experienced an increase in formal planning from its early
The firm has much more formal plans now. That has to happen. 
We also have IS09000 in-house which has helped a lot. Planning 
and having procedures, rather than the ‘lets go and do it’ approach. 
Everything is formal now. Before when we were selling anything, 
our view was what is the best price you can get, now we have 
definitive price lists for everything we sell. The actual product, 
the parts, down to support charges, tariff charges, components. 
That has only recently emerged.
Likewise, the general manager of Braycot remarked that planning became a 
feature of the firm’s development and they learned valuable lessons from 
the crisis episode:
There is a lot more research into prospective customers.
We plan a lot more.
Fiacla adopted a more rational and more planned approach to strategy 
formation shown by the close attention given to cost and credit control. 
Brierley referred to the increase in formality that took place after the crisis:
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...that’s the most important thing, keeping control on 
the finances. We know from one month to the next what 
we have achieved. As a matter of principle, we review 
things every month...Because of our borrowings, the 
number of people involved, we have to have formal procedures.
We have to keep an eye on one of our major costs, 
transportation and get the best rates we can.
The strategic stage seemed characterised by a greater awareness of the 
company’s strengths and weaknesses. RTI has developed a good 
understanding of its strengths, which include the quality of the product, 
customer satisfaction and its R&D capabilities. Its main weaknesses 
revolve around management in the sense that they are dependent on a few 
key people. Similarly, Richard Brierley had a clear view of the company’s 
strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths depended on the quality of the 
product, customer service and flexibility in terms of response to shifts in 
demand. The major weakness of the company was its geographic location 
at the edge of Europe.
Stable, core goals: ‘what business are we in?’
Stable, core goals emerged in the strategic phase which contrasted with the 
multiplicity of goals present in quasi-strategic phase.
Richard Brierley of Fiacla developed a clearer focus and a more well 
defined strategy emerged that centred on marketing high-margin speciality 
toothpaste products and expanding into Europe. The seeds of its strategy 
were sown during early turbulent periods. As a new organisation, it 
endured periods of instability which resulted in a greater focus. The 
transformation of the company involved the incremental extension of some 
policies (increasing exports; reducing reliance on own label) as well as 
features that were more radical (new plant and equipment, change in 
philosophy, professionalism, new product range, wider markets, reducing 
dependence on a single market). The large investment program was the
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m ain  d river o f  change.
Similarly, RTI developed a clear sense of its future direction. It defined 
itself as a supplier of software solutions, whereas in the early days it was 
forced to develop entire POS systems and it offered total solutions. RTI 
has established a track record and has achieved a certain level of credibility 
with customers which has made the process of product development much 
easier. The company was able to persuade the customer to pay for 
production. They no longer had to strive for credibility and prove 
themselves in the marketplace. The new project, the PAS keyboard, 
represented a significant break from its previous strategy of licensing its 
technology. It recently negotiated a financial package in order to obtain a 
placement on the small firm stock market.
McKeown emerged from the critical period in the 1980s with two 
objectives: a commitment to product stability and the intention of restricting 
growth in terms of employee numbers.
Outsiders/other views
The experience of crises provided a rationale for bringing in outsiders 
and/or putting a professional management structure in place. McKeown, 
Fiacla and three other companies, Braycot, Caraplas and Kestrel were 
taken over after the experience of a crisis.
After the takeover, QFS diversified into a new area, risk management.
The new owners realised that the core product was moving into the final 
stages of the product life cycle and a new product was needed to prevent 
stagnation. This view did not seem to be shared by the founding 
entrepreneur. Before the take-over, Gerry Giblin did not see any lack of 
demand for their product and did not envisage moving outside of the 
financial markets. He remarked:
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If QFS continues to be Irish-owned, it would be a question of 
sticking to our knitting. If we go down the route where we 
try to sell to someone else, we would be lucky to have a situation 
where our software skills are recognised and if that company 
had opportunities in other sectors then of course we’d want to 
pursue those. But if we’re staying as a stand-alone Irish company 
(which may well be the case) then I would not see us moving out of 
financial markets.
When QFS was taken over by CSK, they devoted resources to R&D. QFS 
was then able to carry out R&D ‘knowing that salaries will be paid next 
month’. Gerry Giblin’s role changed under new ownership. He remarked:
My role is changing. It’s a number of things. It’s 
talking to customers, strategic customers, having time 
to think about what we will be doing next. It’s also going 
back down into the lower levels and saying "lets sit down 
and talk about what product is going to be developed 
next. Let’s work on this in some detail."... I also get the 
opportunity to go back down into the organisation and 
continue to inspire groups of people to do exciting stuff
After take-over, Richard Brierley focused more on production management 
and the development of new export markets. Gillespie & Co. assumed 
responsibility for strategic management and accountancy. Richard Brierley 
had regular board meetings with his distributors to discuss issues. Roles 
were clearly defined. According to the distributor:
I think we marked out the course. We both know the field 
we are playing in. He is on the left side, I have got the 
right. We do not get into that much conflict. He is left 
a free hand in the day to day business.
Jim Barry has also experienced changes in his role over time. He became 
more focused on idea generation and customer contact which contrasted 
with his earlier role of organising the production, development and 
manufacture of products. As the business matured, the entrepreneurs 
seemed to have more freedom to pursue the role at which they excelled.
302
The strategic stage was about comfort, long term survival and the existence 
of a strategy in a well established organisation. The take-over brought 
financial stability to both QFS and McKeown which they did not have 
before.
Delegation, ‘letting go ’
The strategic phase saw a change in management style on the part of the 
entrepreneurs. The individualistic style of management in the quasi- 
strategic phase gave way to more delegation, to ‘letting go’ and greater 
reliance on general managers and employees.
QFS, like McKeown, has undergone a major transition from a small start­
up company to a mature, professionally managed organisation. QFS has 
moved from a ‘garage style operation’ where employees responded to the 
personal charisma, energy and style of the founder to an organisation with 
formal personnel policies, regular board meetings and the presence of a 
general manager who is responsible for day-to-day operations. In QFS, the 
style of leadership in the start up phase (visionary, charismatic, collegiate) 
was wholly different from that in the later stages, (formal, dispersion of 
control, delegation). According to Gerry Giblin:
We are moving from a situation where trust and peer pressure were 
the only two management techniques that actually motivated people 
to a situation where we are making decisions on people’s 
productivity, time-keeping and so on. It is quite a painful 
transition.
Gerry McKeown made a transition to a formal board of management and 
seemed willing to relinquish control. One manager remarked that:
As to actual man management, he would probably shy away from 
that. He would look for people who would be good at that.
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Not all founders found it easy to breach this barrier and make this 
transition. Progression from a quasi-strategic to a strategic stage was not 
inevitable in the case of Kestrel; growth seemed to be arrested largely due 
to management’s delay in finding a strategic alliance partner. In addition 
the severity of the crisis meant that the company’s lack of financial 
resources became a constraint to action. Braycot and BFK Design 
experienced changes in managerial style due to the increase in company 
size, and greater attention was devoted to areas of weakness in the 
aftermath of the crisis. Caraplas was taken over and since the original 
founders were no longer with the firm, insufficient data was available to 
assess whether a phase change occurred.
To summarise, the strategic stage was characterised by some degree of 
formality and by whether or not the company had:
(1) greater planning and control systems
(2) clearly defined roles
(3) explicit or implicit strategic plans
(4) changes in ownership structure
(5) a focus, a clear sense of firm’s future direction and its strengths and 
weaknesses
(6) stability and financial security
In the ‘strategic phase’, a strategic consciousness, a focus, a dominant 
strategy and dominant ideology seemed to emerge. It seemed that the small 
firm became more focused and persistent in its strategic patterns. Strategy, 
before the crisis experience, seemed a fluid and emergent process, but 
afterwards, it exhibited more deliberate components.
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Summary
This chapter has analysed the strategy formation process in SMEs in terms 
of the perspectives of the entrepreneur, context and history. Figure 5.6 
synthesises the findings relating to the three key variables. The role of the 
entrepreneur in the strategy formation process was described and two main 
types of entrepreneurs were outlined. The entrepreneur played a key role 
in establishing enduring cultural values that affected strategy formation 
well into the future. This chapter also drew upon the data to describe the 
dynamic nature of entrepreneurship, suggesting that the effectiveness of the 
entrepreneur changed over time. The entrepreneur experienced changes in 
cognition in terms of change in goals, managerial style and attitudes 
towards risk. Based on the data, a phase pattern of the process was 
generated suggesting that the companies adopted a more planned orientation 
as time passed. These two main phases were termed the ‘quasi-strategic’ 
and ‘strategic phase’. The data suggested that the entrepreneur played a 
key role in the strategy formation process, although this role was mediated 
by contextual and historical forces. The next chapter will discuss the 
significance of the findings and examine their implications for future 
research and practice.
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Figure 5.6: A model of the strategy formation process
in SMEs
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Entrepreneur
The psychology of the 
founder.
Types of founders.
The role of the 
entrepreneur as 
creator of
organisational culture; 
the darker side of 
entrepreneurship; the 
dynamic role of the 
entrepreneur, and the 
mediating influence of 
partners on the 
entrepreneur.
Context
Irish industrial policy 
Industry conditions at start­
up.
The financial environment. 
Technology and the nature of 
the market.
Contextual variations over 
time.
The effects of inter- 
organisational politics.
History
Founding history 
Defining episode.
O utcom es.
Realised
Strategy
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
The overall objective of this research was to identify and analyse the main 
factors underlying the strategy formation process in Irish SMEs. The aim 
of the author was to make sense of the company’s realised strategy, by 
looking at the company’s origins, its unfolding history and the intentions 
and actions of the founder. This approach allowed the researcher in this 
study to see strategy as the interplay between the founder, context and 
history. Despite the growing interest in strategy process research, it 
emerged that limited academic attention had been given to the SME. 
Contemporary evidence was gained through a study of nine indigenous Irish 
companies. In this concluding chapter, the primary concern is to examine 
the contribution that this study has made to existing knowledge of strategy 
formation in SMEs and to discuss its implications for further research and 
for practice. The chapter is organised under the following headings:
(1) Typologies, traits, roles and the dynamics of entrepreneurship
(2) The phase model
(3) The utility of the strategy process model
(4) The elaboration of the model: how the strategy formation process in 
SMEs is different from that of large companies.
(5) Strategy formation in SMEs: the rational planning model and intuitive 
learning model
(6) Areas for future research
(1) Typologies, traits, roles and the dynamics of entrepreneurship
The next section relates the findings of this study to the entrepreneurship 
literature in more detail. Figure 6.1 outlines the major themes relating to 
entrepreneurship that emerged from the data.
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Figure 6.1: Outcomes: typologies, traits, roles and the dynamics of 
entrepreneurship
Typologies, traits and roles.
Entrepreneur <
Dynamics of entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurial typologies and traits
There were variations in the personas of the entrepreneurs and their role in 
the strategy formation process. By comparing and contrasting types, this 
study distinguished between the charismatic and pragmatic entrepreneurs; 
the key distinguishing characteristics among the types were underlying 
world views and attitudes to risk. Table 6.1 illustrates the dominant 
attributes of the two main types.
Table 6.1: Dominant attributes of the charismatic and the pragmatic 
entrepreneurs
Type 1: Type 2
The charismatic entrepreneur The pragmatic entrepreneur
Dominant attributes Dominant attributes
Approach to strategy formation: 
visionary, idealistic, romantic, 
intuitive.
A ‘bullish’ approach to the 
management of risk
Abiding commitment; obsessive; 
success against the odds; 
achievement of goals an ‘end in 
itself’.
Approach to strategy formation: 
‘common-sense’, down-to-earth, 
planned, rational.
A ‘bearish’ approach to the 
management of risk.
‘Calculated’ commitment; success 
obtainable: dream within reach; 
instrumental aims: achievement of 
goals a ‘means to an end’.
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The strategy of the firm can follow very different patterns, reflecting the 
variability in attributes and objectives of individuals. The charismatic 
entrepreneurs shared common characteristics: all were visionaries; they had 
an unshakeable, obsessive belief in their venture ideas and abiding loyalty 
to their companies; their vision was often based on intuition and experience 
rather than hard data, proven facts, forecasts or plans. They were prepared 
to assume risks in order to aggressively grow the company even when their 
ambitions exceeded company resources. Although they were small players 
competing in industries dominated by multi-nationals, their ambitions were 
not modest. They had the ability to persuade stakeholders to continue to 
support the venture in times of difficulty. Their tenacity and persistence in 
the face of difficulties eventually led to success, often success against the 
odds. They were guided by idealistic as well as commercial goals: success 
and financial reward was important to them but they also had other aims 
such as: making computer power at the point-of-sale more accessible to the 
users; building a world-class reputation for Irish software, and proving that 
Irish produce is as good, if not better, than the import substitutes. They 
constituted a driving force in the development of their companies, but on 
the negative side, their role in developing the business and emotional 
attachment to it made them virtually indispensable to the firm. They were 
reluctant to cede control of the venture and take- over was forced on the 
companies in two cases.
The pragmatic entrepreneurs, in contrast, were more aware of the 
constraints on their actions, they sought to avoid risk and adopted a more 
planned approach to strategy formation. They were only willing to grasp 
opportunities if current resources existed. These individuals viewed the 
business in instrumental terms and were willing to sell if the take-over 
price was right. For instance, Peggy Connolly (a pragmatic entrepreneur) 
and Richard Brierley (a charismatic entrepreneur) set up similar ventures 
but adopted entirely different approaches which was a function of their 
personalities. The former sought to minimise risk through the setting up of
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a home-based business, the undertaking of a feasibility study, the use of 
sub-contracting, the targeting of the ‘safe’ domestic market, and later 
succumbed to an attractive take-over offer. In contrast, the latter made a 
commitment to a production run, invested £500,000 over the years into the 
business, targeted the high-risk ‘Eastern European’ markets, and the 
approach to business start-up was intuitive rather than planned. The take­
over of the company represented a difficult episode for Brierley.
The literature rarely accommodates the pragmatic type of entrepreneur, 
mainly because the notion of entrepreneurship is a popular and potent one. 
The discourse of entrepreneurship has succumbed easily to rhetoric, 
platitudes and catchphrases which have served as a simple way for 
describing entrepreneurs in today’s world. It has encouraged the use of 
over-simple stereotypes such as the ‘bold risk-taking hero’ (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1982) of organisational life. Hobbs (1991, p. 107) remarked that 
up until recently, entrepreneurship was perceived to be the ‘province of 
exceptional, often obsessive individuals...doomed romantics...’ who 
‘obtained great wealth in a style that was rather dashing and rather 
eccentric.’ It is all too easily forgotten that most entrepreneurs may not 
correspond to the exceptional, obsessive and charismatic type. The 
pragmatic entrepreneurs do not seem to fit the stereotypical view of the 
entrepreneur, however, the fact that they were prevalent in the sample of 
nine entrepreneurs questions the universality of the traditional model.
While the pragmatic entrepreneurs did not share the all-consuming passion 
and commitment of the charismatic entrepreneurs, their companies such as 
BFK Design, Irish Breeze, and Bray cot enjoyed success. This suggests 
that organisational success need not always depend on the presence of a 
strong charismatic entrepreneur. However, it must be recognised that the 
research design of this study did not incorporate robust measures of 
company performance, nor did the study seek to explain success.
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However, in the literature value-rich leadership is seen to be a potential 
source of superior performance (Leavy, 1996). There has been, and still 
is, great interest in the notion of visionary leadership (Bennus and Nanus, 
1985) or charismatic leadership (Bryman, 1993). According to Bryman, 
charismatic leaders are regarded as exceptional, they have a vision that 
elicits followership and enjoy great personal loyalty and high levels of 
commitment from their followers. In their study, Collins and Porras 
(1995) found that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the success of some of 
the world’s most well known companies was neither due to great ideas nor 
great and charismatic entrepreneurs. This study on SMEs also questions 
the implicit assumption in the literature that there is a necessary link 
between ‘heroic’ entrepreneurship and the founding of successful and 
enduring companies.
Entrepreneurs are not similar in nature; some, like the charismatic 
entrepreneur still manage to retain their propensity to assume risk, while 
others, like the pragmatic entrepreneur, approach risk situations with 
caution. Being in a position to take risk is not the same as taking risk. 
Risk-taking will always be a function of the individual’s personality; some 
individuals will have a greater propensity for risk-taking than others, 
although genetic influences interact with circumstance to determine the 
treatment of risk. This study illustrates that not all entrepreneurs conform 
to the traditional stereotype of the ‘bold risk taker’. This finding shows the 
danger of drawing upon literature that is American in origin. It means that 
research may be culturally bound and policy makers should be careful in 
applying stereotypes to the Irish situation.
The distinction between the charismatic and pragmatic entrepreneurs 
revealed in this study also contributes to the minor, but growing literature 
that takes issue with the predominant view that there is only one distinct 
type of entrepreneur. A great deal of thought has been devoted to the 
small-business entrepreneur with the result being a number of interesting
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typologies (Birch, 1987; O’ Farrell, 1986; Sexton, 1989; Smith, 1967; 
Storey, 1989). Smith’s (1967) study, like many other typologies, links the 
type of man to the type of firm and more specifically whether it is growth- 
oriented or not. Birch’s (1987) categories of ‘income substitutors’ and 
‘builders’ also illustrate the importance given to growth. These two 
categories reflect the difference between two types; on the hand one, there 
is the small business owner who does not exhibit innovative behaviour and 
is not interested in building a large organisation; and on the other hand, 
there is the entrepreneur who is characterised by innovative behaviour and 
is interested in growth. The former, who is not interested in growth, tends 
to be described as a sort of ‘half-hearted’ or reluctant entrepreneur. These 
typologies suffer from the drawback of attempting to embrace all types of 
entrepreneurs under one dimension. The pragmatic entrepreneur does not 
seem to fit into the fore mentioned categories.
Existing typologies capture some, but not all, of the traits displayed by the 
charismatic and pragmatic types profiled in this study. The charismatic 
entrepreneur shares some of the characteristics of the visionary (Bennis and 
Naunus, 1994) or charismatic leader (Bryman, 1993) in the strategic 
management field. Chell and Haworth (1992) describe the prototypical 
entrepreneur as being proactive, highly innovative, intuitive, adventurous 
and capable of promoting a high profile image for the company. This type 
came close to the ‘charismatic’ entrepreneur proposed in this study. Chell 
and Haworth (1995) proposed another type, the ‘quasi-entrepreneur’ who 
was not as opportunistic as other types and showed more restraint in 
pursuing an idea. Growth was constrained since they carefully considered 
an idea before pursuing it. Hornaday’s ‘promoter’ type is also relevant 
since this type shows more loyalty to career rather than to the company. 
‘Promoters’ are interested in personal gain and drain cash out of their firms 
without regret; they found, grow and sell the businesses as a normal way of 
doing business. In this sense, they share some of the characteristics of the 
pragmatic entrepreneur (see Table 6.1).
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While existing typologies come close to capturing some of the differences 
between the charismatic and pragmatic types described here, terms such as 
‘income substituted, ‘promoter’ or ‘quasi entrepreneur’ do not quite 
capture the essential contrast that the pragmatic entrepreneurs presented 
from the more ‘heroic’ type in this study. Here, the difference is not just 
in growth-orientation but it seems to be in more fundamental personal 
world views. The charismatic type is a romantic who seems to be driven 
by transcendent aims - the pragmatic type is a rationalist who seems to 
have a more calculating and instrumental outlook in terms of business and 
personal goals. This study proposes a more in-depth profile of 
entrepreneurial types based on their fundamental values, motivations, 
attitudes and approaches to strategy formation.
The charismatic entrepreneur is driven more by emotion-rich values such as 
the desire to become a ‘world class software developer’; the desire to make 
computer power at the point-of-sale accessible to the ‘huge uneducated 
market out there’; and desire to ‘build a large software house.’ Their 
valued reward is turning a dream into a reality; they are intuitive, far- 
seeing, action-oriented, able to take risks in the pursuit of their visions.
The qualities of these individuals, their commitment, charisma and vision, 
were often decisive factors in securing credibility and getting the business 
off the ground. These qualities helped push the firm towards growth in the 
early days.
The pragmatic type relies more on analytical reasoning and hard facts 
rather than on the non-rational, visionary, intuitive approach of the 
charismatic entrepreneur. The pragmatic entrepreneurs make an assessment 
of both themselves and the market; the aim is to set up a business that has 
a good chance of succeeding. One founder remarked that he would never 
‘wish to become huge’ and that the company would have to ‘remain 
relatively small in a niche market if we are to succeed’. The founders of 
another firm remarked that: ‘we go through decisions, like employing
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another person, very very carefully.’ They decided to set up a 
professionally-run, well organised organisation that was not always 
characteristic of start-up firms in the design industry. Previous 
employment skills, knowledge, pragmatism and desire to contain risk, were 
key factors in getting the business off the ground. The pragmatist is driven 
by tangible goals such as the desire to make a living, earn financial reward 
or sell the business at a profit. Unlike the charismatic entrepreneurs who 
tend to be more emotionally attached to the venture, the pragmatic 
entrepreneurs are not as umbilically tied to their organisations. On account 
of their more down-to-earth approach to strategy formation, they find that 
ceding control of the venture is not overly difficult.
The distinction drawn here between the charismatic and pragmatic type 
reflects a similar distinction between ‘romanticism’ and ‘rationalism’ in 
western philosophy (Ebers, 1985). Ebers (1985) noted that the belief in the 
supremacy of reason was inherent to rationalists. The rationalist approach 
dominated organisational studies until recently with its tendency to view 
organisations as goal-oriented, efficiency-seeking entities. Ebers (1985, p. 
53) noted that the symbolist perspective ‘originated in dissatisfaction with 
the exclusively analytical-quantitative approaches dominating organisational 
analyses until recently’. Romanticists, on the other hand, recognise that 
not all areas of human experience can be known through reason and hard 
facts, and that some areas are accessible only to non-rational faculties and 
may lie with intangibles such as imagination. Culture and symbolism 
consider intangibles and highlight the limitations of prevailing ‘objective’ 
research efforts. This study differs from others in that it acknowledges the 
positive aspects of the charismatic and pragmatic types of entrepreneurs.
The role o f the entrepreneur: as creator o f organisational culture
One of the contributions of this study was to affirm the pivotal role played 
by the entrepreneur in the strategy formation process through the creation
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of enduring cultural norms. The term used to describe entrepreneurs was: 
‘agents of cultural transmission.’ The founder played a key role in 
establishing founding values whether that was a culture emphasising 
product quality, team spirit, or responsiveness to customer needs.
In most cases culture was the result of the personal preferences of the 
founder and may have accounted for different patterns in the strategy 
formation process. Culture had an impact on how entrepreneurs saw the 
world. For instance, Jim Barry of RTI valued ideas, research and 
development and working as part of a small highly motivated team of 
individuals. He did not want to build a large organisation which would 
encroach on this type of culture. On the other hand, Gerry Giblin wanted 
to become a developer of world-class software and perceived a large, 
professionally run, mature organisation as the pinnacle of success. The 
original founders of Braycot were biased in favour of a top quality branded 
product. Unlike other companies, they did not stress the Trishness’ of the 
product, being either unwilling or unable to do so.
Likewise, Schein (1983) found that the initial thrust of the company or its 
culture was very much a function of the personality of the founder.
Culture, in itself, determined performance. Murray (1984) also examined 
the role of the founder in creating organisational culture. Murray (1984) 
found that the entrepreneur plays a key role in forging a vision for the firm 
and in imprinting a ‘corporate personality’ that was unlikely to be easily 
discarded even after the entrepreneur had bowed out of the firm. These 
studies suggests that entrepreneurs had an important role to play in the 
organisations they created.
The basic premise of Ray’s (1993) paper was that entrepreneurial 
personality had a decisive impact in shaping a new venture, and usually left 
an imprint on the company for a long period of time. It shaped the 
company’s culture, the values and the social behaviour of the firm. This
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study on SMEs, along with others (Kets de Vries, 1990; Schein, 1983; 
Murray, 1984) has progressed from the simple trait theory with its static 
terms of reference to more complex models that see a link between 
individual characteristics and the organisation. These studies seek to 
explain rather than merely document the entrepreneurial phenomenon.
The dynamics o f entrepreneurship
This study has also extended the literature on entrepreneurship by firstly 
adding fresh insight to trait theory (in relation to risk) and secondly by 
forging a deeper understanding of the dynamics of entrepreneurship. It 
differed from many previous studies on entrepreneurship by taking a 
dynamic perspective and by following the development of enterprises 
beyond the formative early period. The insights gained by this longer than 
usual time perspective are illustrated in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Change in entrepreneurship capacity over time: a dynamic 
process perspective
Changes in risk perception over time. 
Change in management style and 
personal life cycles.
The changing influence of the 
entrepreneur in the process.
The creation, maintenance and 
abatement of credibility.
The perspective on traits and risk in particular
This study extends the personality trait literature by showing that risk is not 
just a function of personality but it also reflects organisational context, and 
organisational history. Furthermore, risk is a capacity that changes over 
time with learning and change in cognition. Figure 6.3 illustrates the main 
variables that impinge on the entrepreneur’s changing perception of risk.
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Figure 6.3: Changes in risk perception over time
Extrinsic factors:
Time
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In overview, this framework conceptualises risk as composing of two main 
variables - context and the entrepreneur. The capacity or propensity of the 
entrepreneur to assume risk is influenced by context - factors that are 
extrinsic to the entrepreneur such as crisis, partners, new ownership and 
the nature of the market. In addition the capacity to assume risk is 
determined by factors that are intrinsic to the entrepreneur - such as 
personal learning and experience, personal crisis, and the innate personal 
attributes that are reflected in the different types of entrepreneurs 
(charismatic and pragmatic) identified in this study.
The role o f crisis
Crisis constrained the entrepreneur’s risk-taking propensity since it 
deprived the company of funds needed to implement risk decisions. For 
instance, in the aftermath of the crisis episode, Kestrel was severely 
constrained. The company lacked the resources needed to develop new 
products, enter new markets and adopt a proactive stance in general.
Furthermore, crisis led to a heightened awareness of risk since a very real 
threat to the company’s survival was posed. Problems and crises, which 
were generally not foreseeable at start-up, arose which increased the 
entrepreneur’s perception of risk. For instance, the founders of both QFS 
and RTI encountered problems, and as a result, were markedly influenced 
by a strong desire to maintain the companies’ financial health. The 
survival of the firm took precedence over riskier initiatives, such as R&D 
and new product development. New product development requires 
substantial financial investment, which would, in all likelihood, be lost if 
the project failed.
Since the entrepreneur is likely to have devoted himself to the venture at a 
personal level, business crisis becomes the crisis of the individual. For 
instance, crisis was a traumatic experience for the founder of Kestrel who
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remarked that he had ‘gone to the edge’ and found that ‘it was easy to see 
who your friends are, to see loyalty and to see those who sit on the fence.
It is down to yourself. ’ Crisis resulted in a greater awareness of the 
consequences of one’s actions. Richard Brierley of Fiacla had just bought 
new capital equipment when their main market collapsed. He became more 
aware ‘of cause and effect’ and that he ‘had to generate a million before he 
could spend it.’ Management in Kestrel realised that if ‘you cannot survive 
in the short term there is no point in thinking in the long term. ’ These 
accounts suggest that the ramifications of crisis should not be 
underestimated.
Partners and new ownership
The data suggested that the founder’s plans for the company were 
sometimes revised to satisfy the requirements of partners or new owners. 
Partners with an accountancy background often counteracted the risk 
tendencies of the entrepreneur, by pointing out the risk of certain courses 
of action. Jim Barry of RTI suggested that the presence of an analytical 
thinker like his partner served the interests of the enterprise. He realised 
that what he was trying to do had to be ‘harnessed’. His partner was a 
‘controlling influence’ and was not as ‘as free with cash’ as the founder 
would like. However, Jim Barry who was an intuitive thinker, was still 
vital to company development.
The incorporation of new owners into the company seemed to bring 
competing views to bear on the company, demanding that the vision of the 
founder be shared rather than internalised. For instance, the marketing 
manager in Fiacla claimed that his role was to assess Richard Brierley’s 
ideas in a strategic manner and develop those ideas that had merit.
Richard Brierley faced constraints from his distributors. They were ‘more 
prudent’, placed constraints on his plans for growth, and adopted a ‘more 
strategic based approach’ instead of the instinctive approach favoured by
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the entrepreneur. This suggests that the founder still has the propensity to 
assume risk but that it is curtailed involuntarily.
Link with context
The nature of the industry had an impact on how risk was assessed and 
managed by entrepreneurs. The high technology industry environment is 
generally perceived to be a dynamic, complex and high risk one, and it was 
interesting to explore how entrepreneurs coped with the nature of the 
industry. The scope for risk-taking was often constrained by the 
environment; the entrepreneur’s experience of the high technology 
environment raised their awareness of risk. The hi-tech founders endured 
early years of struggle which made them receptive to the idea of licensing, 
of collaboration with competitors, partnership arrangements, all of which 
were an alternative to the high-risk ‘go-it-alone’ strategy. One company 
was forced to abandon an ambitious growth strategy, realising that: ‘there 
was no point in trying to be IBM in the garage style mode of operation. ’ 
The comments of one founder suggested that disillusionment was part of 
the process of developing a software company: it had ‘broken the spirits’ of 
many. Many founders did not have the resources to develop new products 
and were obliged to seek a strategic partner or venture capital which 
reduced financial risk.
Personal learning and experience
In addition, the entrepreneur, in interaction with organisational history and 
context, begins to perceive risk in somewhat different terms. Crisis 
provided valuable lessons of experience for the founders. Recall the 
comments of one manager, Jim Barry, who remarked that he had changed 
from being a ‘risk-taker’ to a ‘risk planner’. The comments of Jim Barry 
suggest that some notion of acceptable risk had been developed over time. 
The founder of Kestrel described himself as an ‘optimistic risk-taker’ but
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noted that this had been ‘battered out of him’. This reflects personal 
learning and the full range of experiences the entrepreneur had in starting 
and developing a venture. Richard Brierley became aware that his 
risk-taking, enthusiasm for new ideas, and lack of proper credit control 
procedures underpinning growth, contributed to the crisis.
The literature on entrepreneurial risk-taking: the static trait view versus 
the dynamic learning and contextualist perspective.
The topic of risk has been, and still remains, a source of controversy in the 
literature. The trait view of risk which defines risk purely in terms of 
personal attributes (Knight, 1921; Begley and Boyd, 1986) can be 
contrasted with more recent thinking on the subject (Ray, 1993, Deakins, 
1996) which sees risk more as a strategic and contextual variable. In 
addition, within the trait school of thought, various debates have arisen 
over the exact nature of risk: whether entrepreneurs are high, low or 
moderate risk-takers (as indicated by Brockhaus, 1987); whether the 
entrepreneur is distinguished by his perception of risk or propensity to take 
risk (Perry, 1990).
Trait theorists (Knight, 1921; Begley and Boyd, 1986) generally use static 
terms of reference in relation to traits since attributes are ‘measured’ at a 
particular point in time. The argument put forth here is that a limited 
perspective on entrepreneurship and risk exists in the literature. This study 
allows for the possibility of new attitudes towards risk emerging as the 
history of the company unfolds, that are not observable by simply 
measuring traits at a particular point in time. The literature on risk-taking 
has been criticized by Ray (1993, p. 348), who suggested that risk is not 
just a matter of personality, but largely ‘a function of situations, 
information, strategy and decisions.’ Likewise, Drucker (1985) is 
prominent among those who dispute the relationship between risk-taking 
propensity and entrepreneurs. He argues that entrepreneurs are individuals
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who define the risks to be taken and they then seek to minimise them as 
much as possible. Drucker (1985) suggests that the search for a distinct 
entrepreneurial personality is futile. Others like Sandberg and Hofer 
(1987) and Brockhaus (1987) have expressed similar views.
Perry (1990) made the insightful distinction between the perception of level 
of risk and propensity to take the perceived level of risk. Both Perry (1990) 
and Palmer (1971) have argued that the perception of risk is what 
distinguishes the entrepreneur from the general population; it is not a 
personality trait, an approach or reaction to the world but a perception of 
the world. The findings of this study lend support to this concept of risk; 
risk perception is open to change, and as a variable it is not independent of 
the strategy formation process. It was by no means suggested that 
entrepreneurs changed their personalities, rather that traits, attitudes and 
goals were not always stable and constant.
This study showed that personal learning played an important part in 
altering the founder’s perception of risk. From the softer behavioural 
sciences, learning approaches provide helpful information on risk 
perception. Learning theorists state that learning is context-dependent and 
socially-constructed (Perkins, 1994; Krueger and Hamilton, 1995). 
Personality trait theory tended to take a regressive perspective by looking at 
the entrepreneur’s past and their background. The ability of the leader to 
learn from experience and modify their behaviour accordingly seems 
underplayed by trait theory. Deakins (1996) pointed out that characteristics 
were not stable, in fact they changed over time; he suggested that the 
personality trait approach has diverted attention away from the ability of 
the entrepreneur to learn and gain from their business experience (Deakins, 
1996, p. 22). Low and MacMillan (1988, p. 148) outlined a problem with 
personality trait theory:
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...the possibility that observed entrepreneurial traits are 
the product of entrepreneurial experience, make it difficult 
to interpret results.
The implicit assumption in static trait theory is that one is either born a 
risk-taker or not at all. However, psychologists are not ‘hard’ 
determinists, they are ‘soft’ determinists (Low and Macmillan, 1988).
Social psychologists recognise the influence of environmental factors in 
shaping personality and that traits have a limited influence on specific 
people in specific situations (Gartner, 1989). A social development 
perspective encourages one to believe that behaviours can be acquired over 
time which in turn modify the personality (Rotter and Hochreich, 1975).
In this way, one need not take the personality profile as given, instead, 
when the individual’s behaviour is placed in context, detailed explanations 
of the individual’s behaviour are possible.
This study highlighted that new attitudes towards risk emerged as the 
history of the company unfolded, and some support for this is to be found 
in the literature. The debate on ‘nature versus nurture’, voluntarism versus 
determinism, has engaged the attention of numerous scholars, spanning 
diverse disciplines. In the field of entrepreneurship, the pendulum tended 
to swing firmly towards inherited traits and away from environmental 
influences. Interest in notions of personal learning and change (Deakins, 
1996) serial entrepreneurship (Lamont, 1972) and personal life cycles 
(Gersick, 1991; Liles, 1981) has given rise to an approach that is neither 
overly voluntaristic or overly deterministic in outlook. Although 
researchers conceive the entrepreneur as both influencing, and influenced 
by the environment, few studies have sought to demonstrate how exactly 
the entrepreneur interacts with his or her context. This study concludes 
that risk is not just a personality variable but reflects organisational history 
and context. At certain times, the founder is clearly a risk-taker and at 
other times, the founder’s tendency to assume risk is tempered. As regards
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the ‘nature versus nurture’ debate, this study seems to indicate that the 
pendulum should rest mid-way between the twin columns of genes versus 
the environment.
This study, with its more embracing view of risk sheds further light on a 
complex issue. For instance, one aspect of context - that of crisis - was 
shown to help shape the entrepreneur’s perception of risk. Numerous 
scholars have contended that managers serve a cognitive function in 
organisations by interpreting events and ultimately using those 
interpretations to frame meaning for other organisational participants (Daft 
and Weick, 1984; Isabella, 1990). Since leaders have the formal authority 
to prescribe interpretations, their viewpoints and how they shift during 
change can be highly instrumental and significant (Isabella, 1990). Isabella
(1990) found that it is external events that appear to trigger a shift in 
thinking and move individuals from one interpretative stage to another. 
Isabella (1990, p .33) pointed out that cognition and emotion were 
intertwined and that:
...personalization of trigger events appears to bring an
affective dimension into play.
In the literature, it is recognised that crisis is linked with learning and 
reactive change. Since crisis is a highly charged, emotive event, then it 
might be expected that crisis would lead to a change in the entrepreneur’s 
views. In this study, early crises and years of struggle helped break certain 
ways of thinking and acting. Van de Ven (1980) suggested that personal 
crisis initiates change in cognition. Hedberg (1981) argued that it may take 
trauma or the experience of crisis to help management alter culture and so 
unlearn deeply held beliefs. Notions of cognition, personality development, 
learning and reactive change, illustrate the complexity of the relationship 
between personality and the strategy formation process. This study 
suggested that the traditional image of the risk-taking entrepreneur (as
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identified by trait theorists), needs to be expanded, if not changed radically 
to incorporate the new evidence. The main implications for personality 
theorists is that entrepreneurship is multi-dimensional rather than one­
dimensional in nature, a dynamic as opposed to a static phenomenon.
Finally, it is argued that the ability to assume risk is a feature of the 
strategy formation process but that risk needs to be managed by the 
entrepreneur as the business grows.
In a number of cases, the desire to seize new opportunities, expand and 
grow led the company into crisis and jeopardised the continued survival of 
the business. Therefore, the risk-taking propensity of the entrepreneur that 
propels business start-up may not always be appropriate at different stages 
of business development. The explicit assumption in trait theory is that the 
same characteristics which lead to the decision to launch a new venture are 
also synonymous with success - an assumption which is open to challenge 
(Ray, 1993).
Change in management style & personal life cycles.
A further contribution of this study was to affirm the entrepreneur’s 
capacity for change - manifested in a change in management style and a 
change in personal goals in line with shifts in personal life cycles - which 
offers further support for the dynamic nature of entrepreneurship. For 
instance, most founders learned that their style of management had to 
change with the increase in company size. The influence of personal life 
cycles was noted albeit in only two cases. One manager suggested that 
Gerry McKeown’s desire to be in the driving seat was lessened as he 
approached retirement age. Jim Barry remarked, ‘I have got too old for 
that’, meaning that he was not prepared to re-locate to the U.S even though 
its environment was more conducive to innovation than Ireland. Chell and 
Haworth (1992) also pointed out that personal circumstances affected the
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motivation for further growth. For instance, business owners near 
retirement were reluctant to pursue growth. Other writers (Gersick, 1991; 
Liles, 1981; O ’Farrell, 1986) also suggest that personal circumstances or 
stage-of-life have an impact on the decision to start and grow a new 
venture.
The changing influence of the entrepreneur in the strategy formation 
process
This study found that entrepreneurial capacity changes over time, which 
highlights the dynamic rather than static nature of entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurial capacity was influenced, not just by the possession of 
innate personal traits as trait theorists would imply, but by other factors 
such as circumstance, the context in which entrepreneurs found themselves, 
and through historical experiences such as crisis. For instance, the hi-tech 
entrepreneurs seemed to face greater strategic challenges than the 
entrepreneurs in the FMCG area which constrained their scope for action.
A key research question centred on the role of the founder in the strategy 
formation process. It was revealed that the role of the entrepreneur in the 
strategy formation process was not always constructive. Although the 
literature gives primacy to the entrepreneur and the pivotal role played by 
them in securing support for the venture and gaining the commitment and 
loyalty of a followership, this study highlighted what is often ignored in the 
literature - the abatement of credibility.
The creation, maintenance and abatement o f credibility
The theme of credibility emerged as an interesting theme from the data. 
There was little doubt that the personal attributes, values and commitment 
of the founders had a decisive influence on the companies’ early expansion, 
growth and ultimate success.
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As one employee recalled, Jim Barry of RTI was a ‘driving force’ in the 
business. If it had not been for Jim Barry, the company would not exist 
today. To another employee, he was ‘a brilliant entrepreneur.’ Jim Barry 
supported an organisation ‘at great personal risk’ to himself and his family. 
His capacity to understand customer needs and ability to ‘bring customers 
along with him ’ was crucial to company strategy. In another case it was 
remarked that Gerry Giblin of QFS was an ‘opportunistic risk taker’ who 
drove the firm forward. Gerry Giblin persisted with the venture after the 
proposed deal with Telerate fell through. This was ‘a big disappointment’ 
but Gerry Giblin managed to maintain the trust and backing of the venture 
capitalist which was crucial to the continued existence of the firm. The 
quality control manager of Fiacla attributed the success of the company to 
Richard Brierley and his ‘tenacity, risk-taking and entrepreneurial spirit’. 
Brierley managed to gain the support of a distribution company, Gillespie 
& Co. which played a role in the firm’s success. The fact that Richard 
Brierley, among others, succeeded against the odds also increased the 
entrepreneur’s credibility. These accounts suggested that the founder was 
able to secure the support and commitment of a followership. The study 
identified factors that helped secure credibility for the entrepreneur: the 
degree of persistence exhibited by the entrepreneur in achieving his or her 
goals; early years of struggle endured; the great belief of the entrepreneur 
in the venture as well as innate personality strengths, all these factors 
perpetuated the idea of the strong entrepreneurial figurehead.
The abatement o f credibility
In Fiacla, the pressures towards growth and expansion were very strong. 
Brierley freely choose the growth situation. Although the firm seemed 
caught up by inexorable forces, it was the characteristics of the founder 
that led the firm into crisis. For instance, the distributor of Fiacla’s 
products remarked that the cash and credit flow procedures were practically 
non-existent before the crisis episode. The distributor remarked that this
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was ‘very imprudent’ and that the crisis was ‘not the most glorious moment 
in the company’s history’. A manager in McKeown remarked that, ‘the 
company was maybe mismanaged in some ways’. There was evidence of 
the founder’s reluctance to seek equity in the face of early success and 
rapid growth. The early crisis in QFS revealed that, ‘there was no point in 
trying be IBM when in the garage style type of operation’. In QFS, a 
manager remarked that efforts to diversify should have been made early on. 
In these cases, crisis exposed the entrepreneur’s area of weakness.
The fact that the status of the founders was eroded at certain stages due to 
crisis suggests that the ‘heroic’ view of leadership is incomplete and overly 
voluntarist. Crisis was found to be a common occurrence in the SME and 
resulted primarily from mismanagement. The founder’s conviction and 
belief in the venture was necessary to gain the support of employees and 
outsiders, yet the risk remained that an uncritical, non-judgemental 
acceptance developed among stakeholders. The founder was seen to have 
the knowledge, expertise, commitment, vision and so on, to deal with most 
aspects of the business. The founder was generally in a position to make 
all the decisions and was perceived to be in control. However, the fact that 
crisis resulted from internal inefficiencies, loose accounting controls, and 
lack of strategic thinking, suggested otherwise. In some cases, company 
take-over was forced on the firm through crisis episodes.
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The literature relating to the theme of credibility.
The behavioural science/cognitive sciences provide helpful information on 
the role of the founder in new venture development process. The concept 
of ‘charismatic power’ has been generally associated with the German 
sociologist Max Weber and show how individuals gain support for their 
ideas. Other researchers have paid attention to the issue o f charisma or 
vision; in general it is a way of ensuring that ideas are enacted into social 
reality (Daft and Weick, 1984; 1987; Hanlon and Scott, 1995; Schumpeter, 
1921; Joerges and Wolff, 1991). For instance, Hanlon and Scott (1995) 
argued that founders were able to persuade others to ‘buy into’ their dream 
or vision; organisational stakeholders participated in shaping the vision, and 
hence, in the development of the venture. The concept of charisma and the 
credibility that it confers appear to fit well with the fascination with 
business heroes, leaders’ visions and capacity to have a pronounced 
motivational effect on others (Bryman, 1993, p. 289). It involves power 
over others and power to accomplish great feats. Charisma is a designation 
made by others and therefore it is not just a personal trait but a social 
relationship between leader and follower. Bryman (1993) pointed out that 
certain aspects of charismatic leadership have been marginalised by 
researchers - such as the loss of charisma - even though issues like these 
were central to Weber.
The variation in effectiveness over leadership tenure was originally 
highlighted by Eitzen and Yetman (1972). However, it remained a 
neglected issue until revived in recent years by Hambrick and Fuktotomi
(1991) and Miller (1991) in strategic management. Eitzen and Yetman 
noted the curvilinear relationship between leadership performance and 
tenure. In a study of college basketball coaches, they found that the longer 
the coaching tenure, the greater the team success but after a certain period, 
approximately ten years, team performance declined steadily.
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Many reasons have been put forward to explain loss of effectiveness. Loss 
of charisma in organisations is often, but not always, associated with a 
deterioration in performance (Bryman, 1993). Research on tenure 
(Hambrick and Fuktotomi, 1991; Miller, 1991) corresponded to some 
extent with the creation and loss of credibility theme. This stream of 
research suggests that the insularity and power of CEOs increases over 
time, along with their commitment to a paradigm; however environmental 
change will ultimately expose their areas of weaknesses.
The work of Hambrick and Fuktotomi (1991) suggested that there are 
discernable phases, or seasons, within a CEO’s tenure in a position, and 
these seasons give rise to distinct patterns of behaviour, attention and 
ultimately, organisational performance. The CEO is given a mandate, 
responds to it, experiments, selects and converges on an enduring theme, 
which ultimately leads to dysfunction. In particular, the more dynamic the 
environment, the earlier and steeper the performance downturn of the long- 
tenured CEO. Over time, CEOs become more and more wedded to their 
‘paradigms’, i.e. their beliefs, perceptions and skills. In addition, the 
power of the CEO increases with time. By becoming more close-minded 
or committed to a particular strategy, structure or policies, the CEO 
becomes resistant to change even when change is necessary. Miller (1991, 
p. 35) found that successful leaders became victims of their own success. 
Success ‘increases the credibility and independence of leaders and makes 
them overconfident and complacent.’ As their power and reputations grow, 
their views are less likely to be challenges from within or without. They 
and their organisations become less responsive and the likelihood of a 
serious mismatch developing between the organisation and the environment 
increases.
However, there is a lack of empirical evidence on how the entrepreneur’s 
credibility with key stakeholders is eroded over time in the SME context.
In this study, it was crisis that brought about a questioning of the
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entrepreneur’s abilities. It may be that the capacity of the founder to 
assume risks where others would have been rendered incapacitated led to 
the creation of credibility. Comments such as T don’t think I would have 
done that... ’ illustrate this point. However, evidence of success in the face 
of risk-taking strengthens the founder’s charisma, credibility and 
independence. Followers develop a strong belief in the entrepreneur’s 
sense of judgement. Due to sole ownership and control, founders continue 
to assume risk, even when risk-taking behaviour may not be appropriate. 
Thus a combination of factors may contribute to the gradual erosion of the 
entrepreneurs’ credibility: crisis, environmental shocks, company’s lack of 
success, risk-taking, the dark side of the founder in terms of need for 
control, inability to listen to others and compromise.
The darker side o f entrepreneurship - excesses o f power and control
There were indications that the role of the founder in the strategy formation 
process was not always a constructive one. Paradoxically, the 
entrepreneurial impulses that were responsible for start-up and early 
development (tenaciousness, driving conviction to succeed) were later seen 
to translate sometimes into resistance to change, unwillingness to listen to 
other views and result in excesses of power. This is illustrated in Figure 
6.4.
Figure 6.4: The dark side of entrepreneurship
The dark side of < Excesses of power and control
entrepreneurship
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The individualistic style of management clearly contributed to crisis in the 
case of Fiacla. Richard Brier ley ‘wanted total control’ and he remarked 
that he: ‘...tried to do everything m yself. The entrepreneur was perceived 
to have the vision and commitment needed to expand the company, 
however these characteristics eventually led the company into crisis. The 
founder’s desire to rapidly grow the company led him to ignore proper 
credit and control procedures. As an individual driven by the strength of 
his convictions, he failed to realise the need for restraint. In another 
company, McKeown Software, the reluctance of the founder to seek equity 
investment to sustain growth contributed to crisis. In a third company,
Irish Breeze, the founder’s unwillingness to re-think her vision for the 
company led to a disagreement with a key stakeholder and the eventual sale 
of the company. She formed a strong allegiance to a particular strategy - 
that of targeting the US market - and was not open to different views and 
failed to recognise the need for change (such as the need to target the East 
European market).
Although small firm researchers take an idealised view of employment 
relations in small firms (Schumacher, 1973) and suggest that the potential 
for political behaviour is constrained due to the small size of the 
organisation, shared goals and ability of owner-manager to exercise 
control, this study found indications that the small firm is not immune from 
political behaviour. The study found that the propensity of the founder to 
centralise power, the unwillingness to change and listen to other views, can 
be a problem in the smaller firm. In the small firm setting where the 
founder exerts undue influence, this is power.
Other studies also suggest that strong leadership can give rise to problems. 
Kets de Vries et al (1984) addressed the ‘dark side’ of the entrepreneur and 
the negative influence of the founder’s dominant personality. Kets de Vries 
(1990) examined the negative repercussions of need for control, sense of 
distrust, desire for applause, which resulted in irrational and self-
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destructive behaviour. This type of individual would have a problem with 
delegation (Kets de Vries, 1990). A study by Hendry et al., (1995) has 
also highlighted the negative effects of the founder’s dominant personality 
and how it contributed to crisis. Many firms contribute to crisis by virtue 
of their own actions and the failure of entrepreneurs to cede control. Many 
commentators today (Stanworth and Curran, 1973; Lindell, 1991; Hendry 
et al., 1995) propose that entrepreneurs must delegate authority for decision 
making and hire professional managers.
Some of the entrepreneurs in this study conformed to the traditional ‘hero 
leader’ or charismatic model of leadership. However, the implicit 
assumption in trait theory is that the traits responsible for start-up are 
associated with continued success. This study highlighted that this is not 
always the case. The same attributes of tenacity, self-belief and 
commitment responsible for gaining credibility and driving the start-up 
process sometimes translated into darker qualities such as an unwillingness 
to listen to other views. This study builds on previous studies by outlining 
the darker side of entrepreneurship. It answers the call of Ray (1993, p. 
355) who argued that much more ‘needs to be understood about 
entrepreneurial behaviour and the relationship between the entrepreneur’s 
personality and the new venture creation process.’ He (1993, p. 350) 
criticised the ‘simple-mindedness’ of early trait approaches that did ‘a grave 
injustice’ to the complexity of the relationship between personality and the 
new venture development process.
Issue o f overdependence
An issue closely related to excesses of power and control is that of over 
dependence on the founding entrepreneur. The classical stereotype of the 
entrepreneur has been that of the ‘power seeking’ individual.
For instance, Pitt (1989) found that CEOs in small firms tended to be 
pivotal, involved and charismatic figures, whose disappearance would
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create major problems. Hendry et al., (1995) also referred to the problem 
of over-dependence on a strong entrepreneurial figure. His study found 
that a dominant personality tended to stifle creativity among workers; it 
created overdependence on the founder, with problems of founder 
succession.
A contribution of this study centres on the mediating role of partners and 
the role they play in circumscribing the influence of the entrepreneur. The 
case of RTI, for instance, showed how the financial partner and employees 
were able to challenge the views of the founder and counteract his risk 
tendencies. Researchers, as noted by Hendry et al. (1995), have tended to 
see the entrepreneur as a solitary and heroic figure, instead representing a 
team of employees joined in pursuit of a common goal. Other studies 
(Cooper, 1980) have found that team ventures, as opposed to individual 
ventures, were linked to the success of the organisation. Teams provided a 
balance of skills and allowed for greater access to finance. This study 
suggests that a third factor - a combination of analytical and intuitive 
thinkers - could well be in the long term interests of the enterprise. 
However, further research is needed to validate this proposition.
Contextual variation - high technology firms versus FMCM firms.
This study showed that entrepreneurial capacity was influenced, not only by 
the possession of innate personal traits as trait theorists would imply, but 
by other factors such as the context in which entrepreneurs found 
themselves. This study proposed a multi-dimensional rather than one 
dimensional view of the strategy formation process. Contextual factors 
such as: Irish industrial policy; industry conditions at start-up; contextual 
variations over time; the financial environment; technology and the nature 
of the market; the effects of inter-organisational politics; all played a role 
in inhibiting or facilitating entrepreneurial behaviour.
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The nature of the market had a strong influence on patterns in the strategy 
formation process. The founders of firms in the high technology sector 
faced a more constraining environment than firms in the FMCG sector, 
which influenced the strategy formation process. The computer industry is 
one of the most dynamic in the world, with large, powerful US companies 
such as Microsoft dominating the product market. Irish companies had to 
anticipate and respond to technological developments that were largely 
outside of their control. The software firms faced fundamental financial 
and technical challenges. As a result, RTI and QFS seemed to adopt a 
more focused approach than other firms at the outset. The high costs of 
R&D allowed little leeway for a fundamental change in strategy. These 
firms also saw strategic alliances as the only option if the firms were to 
grow.
There has been a growing disillusionment with personality trait theory, with 
all its emotional overtones of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ entrepreneurs. Attributing 
organisational outcomes to the particular traits of individuals is seen as 
reductionist in nature. The work of Sandberg and Hofer (1987, p. 26) 
challenged the long held belief that the entrepreneur’s traits had an 
influence on new venture performance:
...there is little justification for researchers’ continued use of 
standardized psychological questionnaires that measure need for 
achievement, need for power, or risk preferences. Even though 
they may be easy to use, they have produced few useful results to 
date.
Instead, Sandberg and Hofer (1987) found that success depended on 
industry structure and the strategy of the venture involved. Sarason’s 
(1972) study suggested that while the role of early leaders may be critical 
during organisational birth, as the organisation matures, it develops norms, 
acquires a history and identity and the importance of the person at the top 
diminishes in explaining organisational outcomes. Previous research can be
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taken to task for being too narrowly focused on personality variables to the 
exclusion of context. Other scholars have directed the attention of 
researchers to the importance of context in determining outcomes. Murray 
(1984), for instance found that the experimental ‘learn as you go’ approach 
was not feasible in a context where the costs and risks of start-up were 
high. Various studies1 have highlighted the lack of venture capital in 
Ireland and the need for software firms to enter into alliances at an early 
stage.
In reaching a balanced judgement on the potency of entrepreneurship, the 
researcher had to inevitably pronounce a verdict on the total context, and 
had to assess the achievement of the leader in the context of the 
possibilities and limitations of the environment in which the founder found 
himself. The case study findings showed that contextual factors 
circumscribed the influence of the founder and his or her actions.
However, the role of the founder was still vitally important in making 
choices, indicating that some of the critics of the trait or typology 
approaches may be going too far in their dismissal of such approaches.
(2) The Phase Model
A central theme of this study has been that strategy formation in small 
organisations is a process influenced by the interplay of three elements: the 
entrepreneur, context and history. Adopting a multi-dimensional and 
processual approach to the examination of strategy formation helped to 
reveal the ‘phase’ pattern that characterised the development of most of the 
SMEs under study over time.
The companies evolved from an early fluid and disorganised state - the 
quasi-strategic phase - into a stage where the enterprise became led by an
1 A Strategic Review (1992) Irish Software Directorate, IDA.
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explicit and more well defined strategy - the strategic phase. The 
companies underwent a phase change primarily due the experience of a 
defining episode (eg. crisis). Formal planning became evident to a certain 
degree in the firms but it was the product of years of struggle, crises, the 
growth of the venture, changing perception of risk, constraints imposed by 
context and new owners. As time went on, the founder’s ability to manage 
the firm opportunistically and intuitively was constrained by new ownership 
structures. The characteristics of the phases are shown again in Table 6.2.
However, the phase model is not a rigid model. For instance, 
entrepreneurs like Jim Barry of RTI and Gerry Giblin of QFS tended to 
adopt a more planned and deliberate approach to strategy formation from 
the beginning. This was accounted for by the nature of the market.
Table 6.2: Characteristics of the quasi-strategic, defining episode and
strategic phase
Quasi-strategic phase Defining episode Strategic phase
Little planning formality 
Multiplicity of goals:
‘all things to all people’ 
Founder’s views/vision 
predominate. 
Individualistic style
Crisis/ 
period of 
transition 
resulting in 
strategic 
change.
Planning formality 
Stable, core goals:
‘What business are we in’ 
Outsiders/other views
Delegation, ‘letting go .’
The fact that strategy was evolutionary rather than predetermined had its 
own logic. The comments of Jim Barry illustrate the need for risk-taking 
and instinct in the start-up and development of a business; this is not 
accommodated by the more rational, planning model of strategy. He 
remarked that:
A manager has to be a very disciplined, analytical type of person, 
who can look at things and weigh them up very carefully.
Managers are more careful people. An entrepreneur is not a careful 
person. Careful people write the history they don’t create it.
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In addition, all problems and new opportunities that the entrepreneur would 
face could not be predicted. For instance, Gerry Giblin remarked that they 
spent two years ‘making mistakes’ and they needed funding to ‘allow them 
to make those mistakes’. The case findings showed that some 
entrepreneurs questioned the value of long term planning; one founder 
remarked: ‘what’s a five year plan in this business?’. However, various 
factors stimulated greater planning.
The literature on phase changes
Life cycle models (Kimberly and Miles, 1980) chart the growth of the 
organisation from a small unit to large corporation. A biological metaphor 
is used to classify organisations into analogous equivalents of the stages of 
life: birth, growth, maturity and decline. The power of the life cycle 
concept is that it directs descriptive and prescriptive theory onto the 
contingencies presented by these different stages. These models fail to 
capture the important early stages such as the origins, founding history and 
early growth. As a model of process, the life cycle metaphor is over- 
deterministic and this is perhaps its most serious limitation. The phase 
model proposed here, does not assume that there is an inevitable, well- 
ordered linear sequence of stages in organisational development. In 
addition, the life cycle model does not offer much help for those interested 
in understanding why a phase change occurs. The phase model here 
attempts to explain the process of change of the SME by discussing the 
significance of defining episodes or crises.
Greiner’s (1972) model is a growth model which discusses five phases - 
growth through creativity, through direction, through delegation, through 
co-ordination, through collaboration. At the end of each phase, a crisis 
occurs - crisis of leadership, of autonomy, of control and of red tape - that 
leads to change. Unlike the life cycles models, Greiner does not assume 
that decline is an inevitable feature of organisation life. Greiner’s (1972)
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model was one of the few that recognised the role played by history 
(previous actions that subsequently constrain) along with crisis on 
organisational development. Therefore, the model proposed by this 
research is similar in some respects to Greiner’s (1972) model. Greiner 
(1972) argues that as firms moves from one stage to another, the factors 
responsible for this transition can sow the seeds of failure in the next. For 
instance, a crisis of control in one stage can result in greater control 
systems being put in place. However in the next phase, these same control 
systems can restrict the freedom of employees and their ability to innovate, 
thus stimulating another crisis (Greiner, 1972). However, Greiner assumes 
that all organisations follow the same pattern irrespective of differences in 
leadership and organisational context. Greiner (1972) was not overly 
concerned with the contextual variables that influenced the way in which 
firms develop over time which is a limitation; this study found that since 
organisations do not exist in a vacuum, contextual factors can help explain 
the nature of the phases and change over time.
Like other models, the phase model proposed here is descriptive. Founders 
tend to adopt a more planned orientation over time as a result of ‘defining 
episode’ or crisis. The model posits tendencies, not a deterministic 
relationship (as is the case with Greiner’s model). One drawback of 
Greiner’s (1972) model is its historical determinism - all firms are seen to 
go through the same sequence of phases as they grow. The model here is 
not as deterministic and as such exceptions and variations occur.
This study ultimately describes the first major crisis experienced by the 
organisations under study. This research found that companies could 
experience crisis at any time - pre-start-up (QFS), start-up (BFK Design) or 
several years after the company was established (Fiacla). The study by 
Greiner, in contrast, seems to suggest that crises occur in a well ordered 
and predictable sequence. This study found that the nature of the crisis 
differed in the companies under study and crisis was caused by many
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different factors, such as mismanagement, excessive power and control, 
loss of a key customer, recessionary pressures, risk-taking, etc. Greiner 
(1972) suggested that the most potent factor causing a crisis was the 
inability of the founder to delegate. In the first phase of Greiner’s model, 
the organisation is a simple one, the owner is the business and does 
everything. At some stage, the demands of the business on the founder and 
reluctance to delegate gives rise to a crisis of leadership. The implication 
that the organisation’s first crisis is always due to a crisis of leadership is 
not supported by this study.
Many researchers have extolled the benefits and virtues that strategic 
planning brings to the small firm (Anderson, 1970; Chaganti and Chaganti, 
1983). There is, by no means universal agreement that planning is 
desirable or necessary. Other studies (Bhide, 1994; Gibb and Scott, 1996; 
Patterson, 1986) have found that entrepreneurial firms focus on ‘doing’ 
rather than on formal planning, and that formal planning may even stifle 
the flexibility to respond to new opportunities. Entrepreneurs are reluctant 
planners, because they are too busy with handling the challenges and 
inherent uncertainties of business start-up, growth and survival (Foster, 
1993). Pleitner (1989) suggested that the necessity for working towards 
strategic behaviour in the SME depends on two criteria, the size of firm 
and type of entrepreneur. Some founders viewed the firm as a vehicle for 
an independent lifestyle which might be threatened by the growth option, 
while others sought to realise the firm ’s full potential. This study 
suggested that a third factor, defining episodes (crisis) gave rise to greater 
planning within the SME. The study suggests in the early stages, the 
vision, opportunism and commitment of the entrepreneur was a substitute 
for planning; the entrepreneur needed the freedom to pursue new 
opportunities, to assume risk, to learn-by-doing and learn from mistakes; in 
the later stages, the requirement for planning arose and became more 
potent.
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Defining episodes
The term ‘defining episode’ was used in this study to describe a period of 
transition; it was seen as the bridge between the quasi-strategic and 
strategic phases of small firm development. It helped move the 
organisation from the fluidity of the first phase to the more stable, but 
possibly constraining assumptions of the second phase.
The ‘defining episode’ included the incident of crisis. Crisis was common 
in Irish SMEs and had ramifications for the long-term development of the 
company. Crisis very often forced a change in cognition, in ownership 
structure and strategy and as such represented a ‘defining moment’ for the 
organisation and the entrepreneur. Crisis was caused by both internal and 
external factors, such as mismanagement, poor accounting control 
procedures, and loss of key customers.
Learning and change as a result o f  crisis
Crisis resulted in substantial learning for the entrepreneurs and it 
often forced attention to areas of weakness and created a perceived need for 
change within the organisation. Valuable experience was gained by the 
founders in the area of product development, marketing and financial 
planning and control.
For instance, Richard Brierley of Fiacla managed to overcome a serious 
crisis through hard work and dedication. He learned that ‘nothing works 
unless your efficiencies are there’, in other words, keeping control of the 
financial side of the business. Likewise, the founders in McKeown, QFS 
and RTI learned of the importance of planning and control. Gerry 
McKeown of McKeown Software became far more contemplative as 
regards how the business was run. The learning and experience of the 
entrepreneurs was reflected in a business with improved planning practices,
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a clearer focus and a longer term orientation. Crisis resulted in the 
adoption of new roles by the founder, personal growth shown by the 
acquisition of new knowledge and new skills and cautiousness in decision 
making (for a certain period of time).
The literature on crisis
In the literature, crisis has been explored extensively. Paradoxically, it is 
seen to play a constructive and destructive role in the development of the 
organisation. A crisis stage has been defined by Weitzel and Jonsson 
(1989, p. 24) as follows:
It is here that the organisation reaches the critical point in its 
history, during which it must undergo major reorientation and 
revitalization or suffer certain failure.
Hermann (1969) defines crisis as (1) turning point, implying abrupt and 
largely irreversible change of trend or status and (2) a situation or episode 
characterized by surprise, high threat to organisational goals and a short 
time frame for decision making. The study of crisis in small firms by 
Chowdbury et al., (1993) found that it was always management problems 
that led to business failures and corrective action was needed in this area. 
Hendry et al. (1995), in an in-depth study of 20 firms, found that crisis 
was a common, recurrent phenomenon among small-medium firms. ‘Crises 
of control’ referred to the loss of internal efficiency and control of key 
resources, whether of people, finance, plant or operating systems. If the 
growth stage was mismanaged, it could quickly lead to the demise of the 
organisation, The dominant personality of the founder was often a root 
cause of the crisis, because of a reluctance to relinquish control or failure 
to prepare others for a bigger role in management.
Recent theoretical developments, such as the organisational learning
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perspective, have provided some highly useful concepts which can be used 
explain strategy formation in the entrepreneurial small firm. Findings by 
Nystrom and Starbuck (1984), Pitt (1989) and Hendry (1995) contribute 
support to this study by proposing that crisis led to unlearning (a change in 
manager’s thinking patterns), new learning and the creation of new skills 
and competencies. The most common perspective on crisis has been to see 
it breaking old strategic recipes, challenging belief systems and overturning 
existing power structures (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tushman et al., 1986). 
One study found that crisis led to substantial renewal, significant learning 
and a general enhancement of the organisation’s capability to cope with 
future opportunities and threats (Hendry et al., 1995). Hedberg (1981) 
argued that it may take trauma or the experience of crisis to help 
management alter culture and so unlearn deeply held knowledge and 
beliefs. Pitt (1989) saw crisis as a turning point for better or worse; it was 
a stressful situation that demanded decisive actions. These actions often 
altered a firm ’s domain, resources, standard operating procedures and 
cultural patterns and values.
Ideological shifts
The case findings showed that ideological shifts took place as a 
consequence of the defining episode. This is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
The change in ideology is not just a product of the individual alone, but 
also of the wider organisational and historical context. Ideological change 
was seen to be an important force underpinning a phase change from the 
quasi-strategic to strategic phase.
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Figure 6.5: Ideological shifts over time
Organisational History
Quasi-strategic phase Strategic phase
Founding ideology 
risk-prone
Why not?
Unproven ideas 
Imagination 
What is desirable? 
Experimentation
Strategic
Persistence
The Entrepreneur
* Personal learning
* Experience
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Figure 6.5 shows the change from a risk-taking ideology to a more 
conservative, risk-averse ideology as a result of historical and 
entrepreneurial forces. The quasi-strategic stage was characterised by a 
founding ideology of risk taking (why not?). For instance, Fiacla was a 
speculative venture and the founder faced scepticism from state bodies.
QFS had an ambitious growth strategy in mind. This stage was 
characterised by a founder with a business idea, however, formal planning 
was absent (unproven ideas, imagination); the company was managed 
opportunistically and intuitively (what is desirable?); the stage was 
characterised by learning-by-doing (experimentation) since getting the 
business off the ground was of paramount importance.
During the defining episode stage, a new risk-averse, more conservative 
ideology took root (Why?); For instance, RTI changed from a ‘gung-ho’ 
orientation in the early stages to a more planned and pragmatic orientation 
at later stages. More formal planning was evident (proven ideas), decisions 
had to be justified and were based on rationality not just intuition. For 
instance, Brierley had to justify new product development initiatives to a 
board of management. Rationality rather than imagination (What is 
feasible?) was a feature of the new ideology. For instance, QFS 
emphasised rational objectives like profit, productivity and meeting 
deadlines. The stage was characterised more by experience rather than 
experimentation. For instance, QFS had several years of experience and 
learning to draw upon. RTI had considerable experience in new product 
development.
The literature on ideological change
This research supports the small, but growing, literature that is sensitive to 
organisational ideology in the small firm. The study adds to the existing 
research by highlighting how such ideologies change over time. It is well 
recognised that founding entrepreneurs are able to imbue their organisations
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with a strong vision, culture or ideology (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982; 
Murray, 1984; Schein, 1985). Bouwen and Steyaert (1990) described 
ideological shifts in their study of a small organisation, the Newcome case. 
They described the dominant logic of the firm as being ‘opportunistic’, 
where reacting quickly to the demands of clients constituted the original 
strength of the firm. In Newcome, the original competence was service 
oriented. During the process of growth, a new and complementary ‘logic’ 
emerged, the ‘bounding’ logic. This logic expressed the need for managing 
the boundaries of the organisation, of selecting from possibilities, of setting 
limits and acting professionally as a manager. This demanded a co­
ordinating role. The challenge for the firm was for the new logic to 
complement, not supplant, the original.
Strategic persistence
Crisis and early years of struggle had repercussions for a few companies 
and forces of continuity and inertia were apparent. Crisis encountered in 
the high technology sector seemed to have more detrimental effects than for 
firms in the FMCG sector. It induced a conservative ethos into a firm that 
should be innovative and the firm was inclined to avoid major change.
This was a major drawback since a software firm could quickly lose its 
competitive edge in the marketplace.
For instance, a manager in QFS remarked that efforts should have been 
have been to diversify early on but were not due to the experience of crisis. 
He noted that crisis ‘makes a firm conservative as regards pushing the boat 
out in the R&D side’. Kestrel also became more risk-averse as a result of 
the crises experienced. RTI entered into a licensing arrangement on 
account of the early years of struggle endured but their creativity suffered 
as a result. They were ‘just working on projects that they {the partner} felt 
was important’. Jim Barry of RTI remarked that at this stage (after a 
series of setbacks) he was a ‘risk planner’, whereas in another period he
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described himself as a ‘risk taker’. Jim Barry suggested that any erosion of 
technical vitality can be detrimental to a firm in an industry where the pace 
of technological change is relentless. He remarked that ‘we live and die by 
the products we produce.’ However, in RTI and QFS, there was some 
evidence of the ideology being dismantled yet again at a time when the 
field work was nearing completion.
Product development has been characterized as a highly uncertain process, 
entailing large resources and carrying no guarantee of success or failure. 
Firms that are slow or cautious in the race risk losing market share to their 
quicker rivals (Heeley and Hill, 1996, p. 572). This study concludes that 
crisis and early years of struggle could well have serious ramifications for 
firms in the high-tech field.
Support for this notion of ‘strategic persistence’ is to be found in the 
literature. The term ‘strategic persistence’ (Lant, Milliken and Batra,
1992) is often used to describe inertia in large organisations due to potent 
psychological, political and cultural forces. However, the study of inertia 
in small firms is a neglected arena. Hendry et al., (1995) made the point 
that crisis represented a major event in the organisation and affected 
psychology. According to Hendry et al. (1996, p.77) crisis: ‘tends to 
reach throughout an organisation’ and in time ‘becomes myth and taboo’.
It provided a lasting warning about the things that should be avoided. It 
created the risk that past crises over-conditioned subsequent behaviour. 
Equally, success itself could have a similar impact by creating over 
confidence. However, the study by Hendry et al. (1995), for the purposes 
here, was limited in that it did not discuss the concept of ‘dominant logics’ 
which explains why forces for continuity exist.
Previous research has demonstrated that biases and mental models based on 
the status quo may inhibit adequate strategy formation. Research in the 
strategic management area has shown that cultural factors are a barrier to
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change in the large, well established organisation. Deeply ingrained 
assumptions or generalisations can influence how managers understand the 
world, and plans fail to get put into practice because they conflict with 
powerful mental models. An ‘organisational paradigm’ (Johnson, 1992), 
‘dominant logic’ (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) or ‘dominant ideology’ is 
slowly built up over time. Mintzberg and Waters (1986) suggest that it is 
almost impossible to destroy existing paradigms, practises and beliefs, 
unless instability is created. Strategic persistence in the face of 
environmental change can often result in ‘strategic drift.’ The concept of 
‘strategic drift’ (Johnson, 1992) refers to strong cultural forces that lead to 
little or no change in strategy, even when far reaching change is called for.
Concepts of inertia and strategic persistence, however, have been largely 
untested against the experience of smaller firms. The literature was replete 
with examples of how cultures were an important component of strategy in 
the large firm. Examples cited in recent accounts of dominant ideology, 
such as Philip Morris, IBM and General Motors, Shell Oil, and university 
institutions, (Johnson, 1994; Drucker, 1994; De Geus, 1988; Bettis and 
Prahalad, 1995) added to the emphasis on large firm imagery, and 
deflected interest away from the smaller firm.
However, ideology in the small firm was found to be more of a personal 
analogy rather than an organisational analogy - it was intimately linked to 
the founder and to his changing perception of risk. As such it may be 
more amenable to change. The small organisations profiled in this study 
were able to prevent ‘strategic drift’ (Johnson, 1992) from becoming a real 
problem. Although, the common perspective on dominant ideologies tends 
to emphasise their role as constraints to organisational change (Prahalad 
and Bettis, 1986; Johnson, 1993), this study examined how ideologies in 
small firms can act as energies: releasing, focusing as well as inhibiting 
behaviour. Ideologies were seen to lead to proactive behaviour as well as 
reactive behaviour. For instance, the founding ideology (based on risk-
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taking, opportunism, tenacity, persistence) helped push the new 
organisation towards growth.
(3) The utility of the strategy process model
One of the main contributions of this study was the extension of a large 
firm model of strategy formation processes to the small firm sector.
By focusing enquiry on the interaction between the entrepreneur, context 
and history, a more thorough examination of forces that shaped strategy in 
SMEs was offered, than has typified the literature to date. Figure 6.6 
presents this framework of influences on strategy formation again in this 
chapter.
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Figure 6.6: A model of the strategy formation process in
SMEs
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The literature review showed that explanations for organisational outcomes 
tended to be very person-centred in entrepreneurship and SME fields. 
Personality trait theorists associated the start-up and success of a venture 
with the attributes and abilities of entrepreneurial people. Since strategy 
formation represents one example of entrepreneurial behaviour, the implicit 
assumption in personality trait theory is that strategy formation in SMEs is 
intentional and under the control of the entrepreneur. Personality trait 
theory, however, offers only a partial explanation of the strategy formation 
process. Theories of leadership, on the other hand, have progressed over 
the years from simple ‘trait’ theories to approaches that considered a 
variety of forces at work, such as vision (Bennus and Nanus, 1986;
Bryman, 1993), behaviour (Kotter, 1990) and leadership styles (Bass,
1981; Kakabadse, 1991). Recent research has sought further insight 
through the analysis of the interactions over time of leadership, context and 
history in the process of strategy formation (Leavy and Wilson, 1994; 
Pettigrew, 1985; 1987). For example, Leavy and Wilson (1994) argued 
that some leaders would be remembered as builders or revitalizers, not only 
because of their personal capacities for such roles, but also because of the 
opportunities presented to them by history and context to perform in them 
(see also Leavy, 1996). This study followed a similar approach in its 
examination of strategy formation in Irish SMEs.
The predominance of the planning perspective in the entrepreneurship 
and SME fields
The dominant perspective in the entrepreneurship field has been the 
rational, planning model (Hanlon and Scott, 1995) which sees strategy 
formation as an intentional and planned process. Inherent also in much of 
the normative planning literature is the assumption that entrepreneurs have 
control over their firms’ destinies. The literature review showed that there 
has been a preoccupation with strategy content (Hanlon and Scott, 1995) 
rather than strategy process. Studies aimed at identifying the most
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appropriate strategy for the small firm (such as a niche strategy) were 
included in the rational planning school of thought. However, this study 
shows the difficulty of applying generic terms to strategy. Attempting to 
label the realised strategies as niche, differentiation, prospector and so on, 
would be at best, reductionist and at worst, misleading. The preoccupation 
with planning in the literature tended to deflect attention away from the 
process by which strategy was actually formed within organisations. The 
aim of this research was to take a fresh and open minded look at strategy 
formation processes in SMEs. This study sought to widen the perspective 
beyond the planning and personality trait perspectives with the tendency to 
see the individual as the key actor in strategy formation. No prior 
assumptions were made regarding the nature of strategy formation. This 
study concludes that there are other explanations apart from the rational 
planning model as to how strategy forms in organisations that are closer to 
the process theories of Mintzberg (1978; 1990; 1994), Quinn (1980) 
and Pettigrew (1987).
A large part of the literature on SMEs subscribes to the planning 
perspective, that planning is necessary, that it reflects the will of 
entrepreneurs and that it leads to improved performance (Timmons, 1978; 
Van de Ven, 1980). While others (Patterson, 1986; Bhide, 1994) take a 
far more critical view of the role of planning in the smaller firm, the 
literature fails to offer alternative explanations of how strategy is formed in 
SMEs. The entrepreneurship field lags behind strategic management with 
its persistent preoccupation with the rational planning perspective. This 
study suggests that future research might well begin to focus less on ‘do 
firms plan or don’t they?’, ‘should they plan or shouldn’t they?’ and more 
on describing how a strategy is formed, and when and why a 
planned/emergent mode of strategy formation is adopted.
The dichotomy between the planning and process view of strategy in the 
strategic management literature, has been, and still remains, a source of
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controversy in the literature (see the exchange of articles between Ansoff 
(1991) and Mintzberg (1991)). This study found that defining episodes 
resulted in a more planned approach; this finding may help to reconcile 
somewhat the planning-oriented perspective with the intuitive learning 
perspective. A key dimension missing from the Ansoff-Mintzberg planning 
versus learning debate is the one of time. As this study has shown, at 
certain times in a firm’s history, the opportunistic, learning and emergent 
mode of strategy formation seems beneficial, at other times, undertaking a 
more planned approach seems the safer route to follow for the SME. It 
may well be that as firms develop, they oscillate between these different 
modes of strategy formation. Some indications of this can be taken from 
the large firm literature on strategic change, where firms are generally seen 
to cycle between long periods of evolutionary change punctuated by shorter 
bursts of more revolutionary transformation (Miller and Friesen, 1980; 
Pettigrew, 1985; Tushman et al., 1986; Mintzberg, 1987; Johnson, 1990; 
Mintzberg and Wesley, 1992). The evolution period is typically 
characterised as one in which firms build on existing strategies and pursue 
it in a relatively planned and predictable way. The revolutionary period is 
often characterised by accelerated learning in the face of major 
uncertainties and volatility. The notion that SMEs might cycle between 
learning and planing modes of strategy formation clearly needs further 
research.
A summary of the main contributions of this study
The use of the conceptual model with its three key elements - the 
entrepreneur, context and history - offered a number of advantages. 
Conceptually, viewing strategy in this way facilitated the development of 
the main contributions of this study. Firstly, fresh insight was gained into 
entrepreneurship - in particular the concept of risk and the dynamic nature 
of entrepreneurship. A striking feature of this study was that entrepreneurs 
change over time, in particular, their perception of risk alters. Personality
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trait theory can be taken to task for adopting a one dimensional approach to 
the study of risk-taking, for using static terms of reference and ignoring the 
individual’s potential to learn from experience.
At the heart of this study is the notion that the influence of entrepreneurs 
can be best understood by looking at what happens to them over time; the 
focus is on their intentions, what actually happens, organisational 
outcomes, rather than just traits. This avoids the over-voluntarism inherent 
in many studies in entrepreneurship, where entrepreneurs are simply seen 
as good or bad, and successful entrepreneurs are those with the traits and 
skills needed to start and develop companies. There is a strong 
predisposition towards voluntarism in entrepreneurship. Attempts to 
explain outcomes is very person-centred in orientation. Inherent in the 
literature on personal traits is the assumption that founders are the driving 
force in the formation of strategy. However, some studies (eg. Hofer and 
Sandberg, 1987) propose that outcomes do not depend on the personal 
attributes of the founders but on strategy and industry variables. This 
study, which highlighted crisis, the creation, maintenance and abatement of 
credibility, change in leadership capacity or scope for action over time, 
supports the small, but growing literature that is sensitive to context and 
not overly voluntaristic. The focus on history and context accommodates 
variation in the entrepreneur’s locus of control on strategy formation over 
time. The strategy of the small firm, may at some times be largely 
determined by the voluntarist actions of the founder, at other times, largely 
determined by the pressures of the marketplace. In the process of forming 
a strategy, new people may be incorporated into the firm, the company 
may increase its size, crises and change in ideologies may occur, contextual 
variations and strategic challenges arise, all of which inhibit or facilitate the 
actions of the founding entrepreneur.
Secondly, adopting a multi-dimensional and processual approach to the 
examination of strategy formation helped generate a ‘phase’ model. Most
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of the cases showed evidence of two main phases: the first was the quasi- 
strategic phase and the second was the strategic stage. The companies 
underwent distinct periods of change due the experience of a defining 
episode (eg. crisis) and changes in the founder’s cognition. Formal 
planning was evident, to a certain degree, in the firms but it was the 
product of years of struggle, crises, the growth of the venture and advent 
of new ownership. Although most businesses were led by a business plan 
at start-up, strategy formation was substantially an visionary, learning and 
emergent process in the early years. This view of patterns in strategy 
making is consistent with Mintzberg’s (1978) study of realised strategy in 
Steinberg’s grocery chain. He detected distinct patterns in decision making 
that enabled him to differentiate between cycles of continuity and change in 
the development of the company.
Although the stage-of-growth or life cycle models are useful as they direct 
attention to changes that take place over time, they are limited in various 
respects. The life cycle model largely ignores contextual factors, many are 
deterministic and assume that all organisations ultimately pass from a 
growth phase towards maturity and decline in a linear sequence. The phase 
model here seems to be closer in accord with empirical reality than the life 
cycle model. It recognises the role played by both organisational history 
and context in the organisation’s pattern of development.
(4) The elaboration of the model: how strategy process in small firms is 
different from that in large companies.
This study showed that the entrepreneur, context and history were all 
linked together in a non linear way. Outcomes, such as realised strategy, 
could not be fully understood without knowing how the entrepreneur, 
context, and history were interrelated and interacted. However, there is 
the possibility that research frameworks from the large business sector may 
not generalise to the SME sector, or at least, differ due the unique
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characteristics of the SME. The main similarities and differences in the 
strategy formation process in large versus smaller organisations are 
discussed as follows:
This study affirmed the importance of the entrepreneur in shaping the 
strategy in the organisations under study. The role of the entrepreneur was 
highly visible and influential: it seemed to over-shadow the role of 
contextual forces in shaping the strategy of the firm. It was tentatively 
suggested that the high technology industry context seemed to play a more 
restraining role in the process than for the FMCG firms. The strategic 
challenges faced by the hi-tech entrepreneurs served to frustrate the 
intentions of some founders. On the other hand, firms in the FMCG sector 
seemed more able to transcend the influence of context and had greater 
scope for action. One notable finding of the study is that strategy 
formation may vary across contexts. However, further studies are needed 
to test this proposition.
Pettigrew (1987) was to the fore in highlighting the influence of 
of context, including culture and politics, in influencing the pace, direction 
and outcome of strategic change. As regards inner context, there was an 
indication in this study that politics was a feature of the process: it arose 
internally from the dominance of the founder and externally from key 
stake-holders, rather than internally. However, the political dimension is 
stressed a great deal more in large organisations, probably because politics 
is dependent on a large social mass; large organisations have a complex 
structure which is conducive to the formation of groups, of coalitions and 
of intra-organisational conflicts of interest. The small organisation has a 
simple structure, and the founder controls the decision-making process due 
to the privileges of ownership, and to the great personal power that 
charimatic leadership and credibility confers.
In large organisations, ideology is often seen as a constraint to action. It
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develops over time and becomes so deeply embedded in the fabric of 
organisational life that it can lead to ‘strategic drift’ (Johnson, 1992).
Signals for change can go unheeded or be resisted by powerful interest 
groups. The concept of ideology may have a different meaning in the 
small firm: it is intimately linked with the founder, his values, personal 
preferences and experiences. Writers such Bouen and Steyaert (1990), 
have highlighted the potential role for ideology in the entrepreneurial firm, 
but the literature on the role of ideology in the strategy formation process 
in SMEs remains underdeveloped.
The term ‘strategic persistence’ was used to describe the founder’s 
unwillingness to change. This term is often used to describe inertia in 
large firms (Lant, Milliken and Batra, 1992). Kaufman (1971; 1976) 
argues that organisations often persist in courses of action that were 
previously beneficial even when new conditions necessitate new patterns of 
behaviour. The norm is inflexibility of behaviour. Strategic persistence or 
inertia reflects the level of commitment to current strategy, individual 
support for a given way of operating, monetary investments, social 
expectations and institutional mechanisms used to implement strategy (Huff, 
Huff and Thomas, 1992). This study suggests that since ideology is so 
closely tied with the original founder, it may be more amenable to change. 
The cathartic effect that crisis was seen to have on the personal cogniion 
and attributes of the individual entrepreneurs would seem to bear this out. 
The case findings showed that although forces for inertia existed in the 
smaller firm - termed ‘strategic persistence’, efforts were made to discard 
outmoded beliefs.
History is sometimes seen to be of less immediate significance to the small 
firm than the large, mature organisation, simply because most small firms 
do not have a long history. This study highlighted the importance of 
history as a major force in shaping the formation of strategy in small 
organisations. The Leavy and Wilson (1994) and Pettigrew (1985)
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frameworks would have been inadequate models with which to explain the 
influence of history on strategy formation to be found in this research. 
History, by these scholars, was taken to mean the history of the firm to 
date, reflected in the strategies pursued by different generations of leaders.
History, taken here, consists of ‘founding history’ and ‘defining episodes’. 
The former is more of a personal variable rather than an organisational 
variable. It reflects the business experiences of a single founding 
entrepreneur. The founder is in a position to ‘create the history’, unlike 
incoming leaders to established organisations who are not normally free to 
develop a strategy without reference to the past; they inherit the decisions 
of their predecessors. This study assigned importance in its own right to 
‘defining episodes’ or crisis. The case data suggested that defining 
episodes were a significant shaper of strategy, had ramifications on the 
strategy formation process, in the sense that it was a cathartic event that 
resulted in a more well defined strategy for the organisation. Explanations 
of a more planned approach to strategy formation requires acknowledging 
the effects of defining episodes. In general, the role of historical influences 
on strategy formation in the small firm is underexplored. Researchers in 
organisation theory (Boeker,1988; Kimberly, 1979) have provided an 
important role for history for the organisation. They have argued that 
forces at birth along with the early history of the company shape 
organisations and set them on particular courses. It is hypothesised that 
organisations do not significantly alter the strategy they establish at start-up 
(Boeker, 1989). However, these studies do not make fine discriminations 
between early and late founding history. As the data have shown here, the 
defining episodes have most implications for future strategy and can happen 
years after foundation. This study therefore presents a more fine-grained 
picture of the impact of founding conditions upon the strategy formation 
process than typically found in the literature to date.
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The strategy process, as depicted in this study, was very unlike traditional 
notions of strategy formation. The rational planning model was not a 
descriptively accurate one for the firms featured in this study of strategy 
formation in SMEs, particularly in the earlier phase of their development. 
The main differences between the two models of strategy formation are 
shown in Table 6.3. Entrepreneurs helped create culture, they encountered 
setbacks, learned from that, changed and re-defined their ideologies. The 
study suggested that the development of the SME was not necessarily a 
rational, mechanistic process. On the contrary, in many instances, the 
strategy formation process seemed to be driven by ‘irrational’ issues. The 
lack of ‘rationality’ manifested itself in the importance given to vision, to 
intuition or ‘gut feeling’; the great faith of the entrepreneur in the 
company’s products/services; the intimate link between the entrepreneur 
and the organisation; shifting ideologies; the presence of charismatic 
power, the entrepreneur’s diffidence in addressing issues of autonomy and 
control and the emergence of inertia due to the experience of crises and 
early years of struggle. The lack of deliberate, planned processes of 
strategy formation in the early stages of business development was reversed 
somewhat in the later stages as the firm developed a history, experienced 
crisis, increased its size, changed ownership structure and acquired new 
norms and ideologies.
(5) Strategy formation in SMEs: the rational planning model and the
intuitive learning model.
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Table 6.3: A comparison of the rational planning model and intuitive
learning model of strategy
The rational planning model The intuitive learning model
Organisation should be guided by 
a formal plan.
Linear model of decision making: 
the firm devises a mission, goals, 
alternatives, selects an optimum 
strategy and implements it.
Rational.
Adaptive
Voluntaristic perspective - the 
founder is the planner.
The organisation need not always 
be guided by a formal plan.
Non linear - due to politics, 
culture, opportunistic learning and 
practical difficulties in ‘seeing’ the 
environment.
Not always ‘rational’ - due to role 
played by vision, intuition and 
power.
Inventive - due to vision and 
creation of credibility.
Intermediate view - due to role of 
context in circumscribing 
entrepreneurial scope for action.
This study suggested that the strategy formation process did not occur in a 
linear, sequential manner. Several perspectives were sympathetic towards 
the model of strategy formation as revealed by this study. Mintzberg 
(1978), for instance, reminded people that strategy could form gradually 
and sometimes unintentionally over time. Murray (1984) also found that 
entry strategy could be deliberate or emergent depending on the particular 
set of circumstances facing the new venture. In this study, the effects of 
history and the passage of time were explored which showed promise in 
explaining the process of strategy formation in SMEs.
Writers such as Daft and Weick (1984), Johnson (1987), Huff (1982), 
Isabella (1990), Schein (1983) and Senge (1990) have greatly contributed to 
current understandings of strategy processes by taking into account
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concepts such as learning, culture, dominant logics and cognition. Their 
work suggests that strategy formation in the small firm is a highly 
individualistic process. All these approaches have represented a movement 
away from the normative, rational, planning model of strategy process by 
describing what actually happens instead of seeking to prescribe how 
entrepreneurs should go about formulating their strategies.
(6) Areas for future research
This study has raised a number of issues and opportunities for further study 
which centre around the major contributions of the research.
Traits, typologies and the dynamic nature of entrepreneurship
(1) The typology of entrepreneurs presented in this study was not definitive 
or wholly exhaustive and will need further scrutiny. The complexities of 
human behaviour were far too intricate for this type of analysis to be 
absolute. It was derived from a consideration of the characteristics and 
motives of the entrepreneurs and was a conscious simplification of reality.
It was based mainly on qualitative data and subjective findings such as 
attitudes to risk, attributes and motivations of the founder. It was 
suggested that the pragmatic entrepreneurs were more likely to follow the 
rational planning model of strategy and the charismatic more likely to 
follow the intuitive-leaming model. In addition, it was proposed that 
pragmatic entrepreneurs were as effective as charismatic entrepreneurs, but 
the limitations of the research design did not allow for robust measures of 
company performance. Further study is needed to test these propositions.
(2) One striking issue that emerged from this research was that the 
entrepreneurs’ perception of risk changed over time, reflecting their 
experience of crises, early years of struggle and learning. It was proposed 
that partners and changes in ownership structure, played a role in
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circumscribing the influence of the founding entrepreneur and his or her 
capacity to assume risk. It was shown that there has been a growing 
disillusionment with the study of traits, such as the propensity to take risks, 
in the field of entrepreneurship. Some researchers (Ray, 1993) have 
argued that the propensity to assume risk is a contextual and strategy 
variable, not just a personality variable. Future researchers need to adopt a 
holistic approach to the study of risk since it may be a function of many 
variables not just personality variables. Each of these three variables - 
crisis, partners and new ownership - need to be analysed in far greater 
depth. Future researchers should continue this shift towards a more 
contextual and processual perspective to risk in entrepreneurship.
(3) This study highlighted the importance understanding how credibility is 
created and abated over time in entrepreneurial firms. The methodology 
used in this study had its limitations, the main one being that people may 
form post-hoc interpretations of events which may have distorted their 
representations of reality. Longitudinal studies, which follow a firm over 
time could give a ‘before-and-after’ view of a firm’s experience with crisis 
and illustrate more clearly the creation and loss of credibility. For 
instance, this study proposed that entrepreneurs who were driven by the 
strength of their convictions, their vision and instinct for the market, 
managed to secure the support of key stakeholders; however there was an 
indication that stakeholders placed undue trust in the intangible qualities 
and abilities of the founding entrepreneur. The fact that crisis occurred 
suggests that an uncritical, non-judgemental acceptance may have developed 
among stakeholders. This proposition needs to be tested. In addition, it 
was suggested that the reverse side of the credibility phenomenon was the 
reluctance to change and the unwillingness to accommodate other views. It 
might be interesting to explore in more depth the downside of conviction 
leadership in entrepreneurial firms.
(4) The study provided some insight into the impact that political factors
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had on the strategy formation process, albeit in only two cases. It was 
found that power arose internally from the undue influence of the founder 
and externally from relationships with key stakeholders such as distributors 
and strategic alliance partners. This study found that the tendency of the 
founder to centralise power and control had the potential to create 
problems. However, this study outlined the potential role of 
partners/mentors in circumscribing the influence of the entrepreneur. It 
was tentatively proposed that having a balance of intuitive and analytical 
thinkers in the founding team would serve the long term interests of the 
company. The insufficiency of the evidence makes this point a matter of 
judgement. Further work is needed in this area to test this proposition.
The nature of power and politics in the small firm and mediating factors 
were not fully explored by this study and further studies are needed in this 
area.
(5) One interesting issue that emerged from the study was the importance 
of personal life cycles in the strategy formation process. There was some 
evidence to indicate that the founder’s stage-of-life affected their goals for 
the business and attitudes towards take-over. This is a relationship that 
merits further study in its own right and clearly has implications for future 
research into the wider question of how and why the personal impact of 
entrepreneurs on the development of their firms varies over their tenures at 
the helm.
The phase model
(1) A phase model of the strategy formation process was proposed but the 
model was a simplified representation of reality; in no way was it 
suggested that this model represented the strategy formation process for all 
SMEs. Further study is necessary to validate or modify this model. It was 
suggested that some organisations may find it difficult to breach the barrier 
between the quasi-strategic and strategic phase for various reasons;
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however, insufficient data meant that any points made here were a matter 
of subjective judgement.
(2) This research found that defining episodes or crisis were a feature of 
the strategy formation process. This study found that crisis had 
ramifications for the firm: it gave rise to a more planned approach to 
strategy making; it resulted in the creation of new learning and new 
ideologies.
It seems promising to explore the extent to which crisis is functional or 
dysfunctional. It was a source of learning for the small firm in the strategy 
formation process. Clearly valuable learning took place that might not 
have occurred otherwise. However, the price paid by the individual and 
the organisation was very high. Crisis had dysfunctional consequences and 
there were indications that it led to over-cautiousness in decision making.
It was also proposed that crisis in the high technology sector seemed to 
result in a greater conservatism in organisational decision-making and 
reluctance to innovate. These findings point to the need for more studies 
on the impact of crisis on innovation processes. Although new ventures are 
characterised by flexibility, quick response times and rapidity of learning 
(Murray, 1984), the small firm may be less malleable than traditionally 
assumed.
A question raised by the study is whether the level of planning and control 
must be raised in the SME if the experience of crisis is to be averted.
Since crisis stimulated greater planning does this mean that if planning was 
present from the outset that crisis would have been averted? This is a 
question for future researchers. However, this study indicated that the 
vision, risk-taking and intuition of the entrepreneur often acted as a 
substitute for planning in the early phases. Attempting to force certain 
types of firms into the straight-jacket of traditional planning methodologies 
might be counter productive and stifle the very impulses that were
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responsible for the start-up and early development of the entrepreneurial 
firm.
The adoption of a cognitive perspective is desirable in future studies since 
it is becoming clear that ‘soft’ issues like cognition, ideology, learning, 
change and inertia play an important role in the strategic development of 
the firm. Future researchers with a background in psychology could 
explore in more depth the changes in cognition that were found to take 
place as strategy was formed and crisis encountered.
The utility of the conceptual framework
(1) Describing the process of strategy formation in SMEs has been a 
central concern of this study. To help understand this process, this study 
has used a conceptual framework incorporating three key elements: 
leadership, context and history. Future research should continue this trend 
towards more contextual and process-oriented research. The framework 
provides an understanding of the strategy formation process within the 
small firm but it may also prove a useful one within which to analyse the 
growth of the small enterprise.
(2) This study looked at the process of strategy formation in small firms. 
However, the study adopted a retrospective approach, where people were 
asked about the past. Longitudinal studies, which follow a firm over time, 
and the use of ethnographical techniques, such as observation, would give a 
greater insight into how strategy actually forms in small firms. Such 
studies are inevitably more time consuming and expensive than other 
studies, but the potential benefits could be considerable. In this study, it 
was left to the researcher to subjectively interpret interview data, vague 
comments and overt meanings in order to piece together a picture of how 
strategy formed in SMEs. This carries the obvious risk that interpretations 
may not fully reflect reality, however this is a problem that confronts all
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researchers.
The impact o f context
(1) This study found that firms in the high technology context faced a more 
constraining environment that firms in the low technology sector. Case 
companies in the hi-tech sector were contrasted with two cases in the low- 
tech sector and it was suggested that variability in context had an influence 
on the strategy formation process. However, this form of comparison 
carried the danger of over-simplification of a highly complex process. 
Research is required to gain further insights into how context impinges on 
the strategy formation process.
Finally, the findings presented in this thesis were derived from only nine 
case studies and generalisations developed from such a small sample size 
need to be verified by more extensive research. Careful attention had to be 
given to the issue of ‘inferring logically’ from the results of the study 
beyond the scope of the organisations studied (Bryman, 1989). However, 
numerous participants in a variety of settings were interviewed which 
should enhance the transferability of the findings.
Practical implications of the study
(1) This study showed the limitations of the normative rational planning 
model of strategy which has implications for policy makers, small business 
development agencies and entrepreneurs alike. In many cases, the 
entrepreneurs under study had to contend with a multiplicity of goals; they 
had to grapple with the challenges and inherent uncertainties of new 
product development. The entrepreneurs needed time to experiment, to 
make mistakes and learn from their mistakes. In some cases, non-rational 
elements such as the vision, imagination and instinct of the entrepreneur 
was a feature of the strategy formation process rather than purely ‘rational’
365
elements such as plans and hard facts. This has practical implications for 
policy advisors and others encouraging entrepreneurs to devise and adhere 
to detailed business plans during start-up. Being aware that business start­
up is a learning process should allow for a greater tolerance for 
experimentation. Certainly, as time went on a more planned approach 
emerged and greater emphasis was placed on financial planning and 
control. Entrepreneurs need to be aware of the requirements and demand 
for planning when ownership structure changes, when the business becomes 
established and when a growth strategy is pursued.
(2) There were indications that the role of the entrepreneur in the strategy 
formation process was not always a constructive one. Paradoxically, the 
same qualities that drove start-up - the tenaciousness and driving conviction 
to succeed - were later seen to translate sometimes into resistance to 
change, unwillingness to listen to others and excesses of power. The 
creation, maintenance and abatement of credibility issue showed that 
entrepreneurs were adept at mobilising and maintaining support for their 
ideas, but they could also lose the support of their followership. The study 
suggested that entrepreneurial risk-taking which resulted in success 
increased the entrepreneur’s credibility in the eyes of key stakeholders. 
However, entrepreneurs need to be alert to the dangers of a non- 
judgemental acceptance developing among key stakeholders. This points to 
the need for a balanced management team and the willingness to listen to 
partners for divergent, fresh insights. The entrepreneur’s own program of 
education such as networking, going to conferences, and so on, may 
influence his or her open-mindedness. A willingness to accommodate other 
views in the formation of strategy may help avoid the loss of credibility.
(3) Crisis was found to be common in the organisations under study. It 
was tentatively proposed that crisis in the high-tech sector gave rise to 
‘strategic persistence’ or a reluctance to innovate. An implication of this 
finding for entrepreneurs is that they may find it worthwhile to orientate
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themselves towards the future, towards constant questioning, towards 
change. The use of a mentor may be particularly beneficial. This may 
help them surmount the very human tendency to cling to the status quo and 
avoid taking risks that gave rise to crises in the past. Given the importance 
of the high technology sector to the economy, policy makers may need to 
be more willing to deliver help to SMEs in times of difficulty. The fact 
that crisis resulted in take-over for some companies in the high technology 
sector is also an issue to be addressed by policy makers. Whether it is in 
the national interest to accept the loss of innovative firms to large multi­
nationals, who more often that not are competitors, is an issue that needs to 
be debated. Although crisis resulted in considerable learning for the 
entrepreneur, it was achieved at considerable cost to the individual and the 
organisation. This may point to the need for more proactive involvement 
on the part of the government.
(4) It is important that entrepreneurs are made aware of the prevalence of 
crisis and the possible psychological ramifications of crisis for the 
individual. The management of stress, the need for support mechanisms 
and benefits of networking with business owners who have undergone 
similar experiences, are all dimensions that need to be given consideration 
by entrepreneurs.
(5) The study highlighted the strategic challenges faced by the software 
firms. It is possible that potential fast-growth enterprises (eg. RTI,
Kestrel) have been lost to the Irish economy due to the inability of financial 
providers to keep their nerve and fund enterprises through the early 
difficult years of R&D activity. The need for adequate financing of 
technology based companies should continue to be emphasised.
(6) The study outlined two main types of entrepreneurs, the charismatic 
and pragmatic entrepreneurs. Until quite recently, it was perceived that 
entrepreneurship was the province of the rare, the exceptional and the
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‘heroic’ type of entrepreneur. This led to scepticism on the part of many 
as to the ability of policy makers to influence the supply of entrepreneurs. 
However, this study proposed another type - the pragmatist - whose 
distinguishing attributes may be more widely distributed throughout the 
general population. This type might more responsive to state incentives 
and state training schemes.
(7) The study highlighted the dynamic nature of entrepreneurship and the 
fact that entrepreneurs often change their management styles, attitudes to 
risk and personal goals as time passes. These changes may not always be 
for the better. Companies need to be alert to the possibility of 
entrepreneurs being reluctant to launch into a new direction due to the new 
conservatism of the entrepreneur, increasing awareness of risk and change 
in personal life cycle.
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APPENDIX 1: Flexible interview structure
Stage One: flexible interview structure
Introduction: broad objectives of the study.
Preliminaries: Is it acceptable to record interview - confidentiality.
Focus on interviewee: What is your name, position, knowledge of the 
company’s history - its start up, development and any major turning points.
Stage two: more structured interview
Introduction: reasons for follow-up interview.
Preliminaries: is it acceptable to record interview - confidentiality. 
Interview content:
Founder-centred:
You mentioned a critical episode in the last interview. Has the 
company changed in any way because of that experience.
Has there been a change in your outlook or management style?
Based on your experience in business, what are the major lessons you 
have learned along the way?
What is your personal theory of management?
What do you think will be your legacy to the firm if you did decide to 
bowed out from it in the future?
What drove you? What were your ambitions for the firm?
Has your vision for the firm changed?
In retrospect, are there things you would liked to have done differently. 
What is the ownership structure of the company.
What influenced your decision to sell shares/sell the company.
How did that come about?
What changes did new ownership/outside shareholders bring to the 
company.
Context
What were the industry conditions like (favourable or unfavourable) when 
company was set up?
How important were early marketing decisions (product/market/technology) 
What were the major problems experienced in growing the business?
How would you characterize the market within which your firm operates.
Phases
Did the company have a deliberate strategy from the outset.
In your opinion, has the company undergone major change.
What caused this change.
Were changes in strategy planned well in advance or more opportunistic in 
nature.
Crisis
Can you think of any critical episode along the way, or fundamental 
decision to be made that had repercussions for the firm.
Could it have been avoided?
How did the company respond to it?
What were the positive and negative aspects arising from this period, if 
any.
Future plans
What do you see as the major obstacles to the growth o f the business in the 
future?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the business?
Where do you see the firm in the future?
APPENDIX 2: CASES
Case company: Irish Breeze 
Introduction
The story of Irish Breeze is a classic example of the vision and 
opportunism of one individual that led to the marketing of the only Irish 
made soap on the market. The firm now holds 8-9% of the soap market in 
Ireland. It succeeded in establishing a platform in the Irish market, and 
also targeted the US and Canadian markets. Yet, it never fully developed 
its potential and was left vulnerable to take over. The founder of the firm, 
Peggy Connolly, was made an attractive take-over offer by her distributors, 
Boyne Valley Foods in 1995 which was accepted.
The new venture idea
Peggy Connolly was a native of Cape Clear Island, Cork, married with two 
children. She was a qualified montessori teacher and worked with mentally 
handicapped children for several years. From 1979 to 1984, she 
successfully ran her own Montessori school and worked with mentally 
handicapped children for several years. She subsequently gave up the 
school when the family moved to California.
The origins of the company began in the Summer of 1984, when Peggy 
Connolly was living in California. She bought a bar of Irish Spring soap 
which she later found out to her disappointment, had nothing whatsoever to 
do with the country of Ireland. The product, aimed at the large ethnic 
market in the States, was selling rather well. Immediately, she saw a 
possible niche in the market. She felt that a better quality and more 
authentic product could be produced in Ireland, for both the home and 
export markets. The founder knew that there were no Irish-made soaps 
and speculated that the IDA (Irish Industrial Authority) would sponsor an 
Irish made-soap as an import substitution business. In retrospect, the 
founder said that had she remained in Ireland, she would never have got 
the idea off the ground. The spirit of optimism in America and the 
competitive spirit there was energising. ‘America changed m e’, she said.
‘It instilled in me a desire to get up and do something instead of just sitting 
back. It charged me with an entrepreneurial spirit. ’
In 1985, Peggy Connolly returned home with the seeds of her idea - that of 
an Irish made soap product in mind. She approached the IDA to persuade 
them to sponsor part of the cost o f a feasibility study. Brimming with 
enthusiasm, the founder thought that ‘the IDA would welcome my idea 
with open arms’, but found that they were sceptical at first. They agreed 
to fund 50% of the cost of the market research, and she raised £10,000 
from the proceeds of the sale of the Montessori school. The founder was 
well aware of the heavy financial considerations that went along with 
starting up in business and wanted to start out right. The entrepreneur
adopted a planned and rational approach to business start-up. The 
feasibility study eventually took a year and a half to complete and was done 
mainly in Britain where soap production is a traditional industry and where 
they seem to have small plants in every town. Peggy Connolly generated a 
file of correspondence with supermarket chains, distributors and other 
interested bodies to elicit their views as to marketing strategy. She 
contacted suppliers of plant and raw materials for quotations on plant costs, 
plant requirements, market percentages and profit margins.
Demand for import substitution business
The feasibility study showed quite clearly that a gap in the market existed, 
since quite surprisingly, no Irish company was producing such a basic 
commodity item like soap. Unlike the saturated UK market, Peggy 
Connolly came to the conclusion that there was a constant and growing 
demand for soap in Ireland. It was generally felt that it was the right time 
to introduce an Irish-made soap. A ‘Buy Irish’ campaign was being given 
great prominence in the media. The recession was at full tilt and many 
people were quite emotional about it and wanted to see employment created 
for their families. As a result, there was a lot of goodwill present and 
people were receptive to irish made products. Supermarket buyers were all 
interested in the concept of an Irish made soap and had experience of 
another import substitution product, Fiacla, which had met with a 
favourable response in the marketplace. In spite of the fact that she would 
be competing against the multi-nationals in the FMCG (fast moving 
consumer goods) sector, who possessed a huge advertising budget and 
brand name equity, Peggy Connolly was confident that the ‘Irishness’ of 
the product would be a success factor. An Irish niche product stood a good 
chance of attaining considerable market success abroad. The founder 
believed that a quality product, promoted on an Irish platform, could 
capture the large ethnic market segment in the US.
Nature of industry
The Irish market was well catered for with several long established soap 
brands on sale. The three multi-nationals - Lever Bros., Colgate- 
Palmolive, and Procter & Gamble, were all involved in the Irish soap 
market. In Ireland at that time, all toilet soap was imported at a cost of £5 
million per year, representing 2,200 tons. Lux, Palmolive and Lifebuoy 
were the Irish bestsellers. The best selling brands were all well marketed, 
of high quality and were not highly scented. Advertising was largely on 
television for the main brands and was concentrated in the W oman’s press 
for the smaller brands. Immediately after the launch of the product, Lever 
Bros., objected to the name, probably anticipating the threat that ‘Irish 
Breeze’ posed to them. Peggy Connolly resolved this problem after 
considerable legal expense. The courts ruled in her favour and she was 
allowed to retain the original name. This was a foretaste of things to 
come, such was the nature of competition against multi-nationals. As a 
small fledging company, it was vulnerable to the activities of multi-
nationals, who had the resources to fight for the Irish market. The founder 
said that it was a hard battle against the multi-nationals who still ‘dump’ 
soap on the market.
Start-up strategy
In spite of fact that the product concept held out so much promise for the 
founder, she considered that it was not feasible to manufacture a soap in 
Ireland (due to the heavy capital investment involved) without having 
established a strong market presence first. Despite this initial set-back, 
Peggy Connolly was undeterred. She pursued her options further. She 
returned to the US in 1987 and persuaded an international company - Avon 
- to produce a prototype. A handmade brass mould was used to shape the 
soap into a distinctive saddle shape. She returned to Ireland and to 
overcome the problem, she sub-contracted the manufacturing to an 
established company in Dublin, Ireland. Fifteen people are employed in 
the production process. When she first started producing, an automatic 
finishing line was bought for £40,000. Again IDA grants covered 50% of 
the cost, she borrowed the rest. The equipment was installed in the 
subcontracting factory in Dublin. A small company wants to minimize the 
risks involved in investing in large capacity, so contracting out is 
preferable. The trend towards sub-contracting is emerging quite strongly 
and the manufacturing sector is an obvious choice. As a customer to the 
sub-contractor, the company has a certain degree of control over supply 
and quality control. Pegy Connolly did not have any background 
experience in manufacturing or production and was happy to sub-contract. 
Sub-contracting as a way of overcoming the entry barriers into the 
industry. With an established manufacturing base in hand, the founder 
approached the multiple stores in 1987, who were quite willing to give it 
shelf space. A distribution company (Gillespie & Co.) was instrumental in 
getting the company off the ground. They handled the marketing and 
distribution of the product. According to the managing director:
A small company like that could not have got off the ground unless 
they associated with a company like us. It could not have afforded 
to do what we do due to the logistics involved. We have 16 vans 
calling all over Ireland on a daily basis, often to small towns, as 
well as cities. A smaller company just would not be able to 
distribute on that scale of operation. Distribution is an expensive 
business.
In the words of the marketing manager,
In anything in Ireland, you need a distributor to sell into 
supermarkets because supermarkets like dealing with one company 
rather than 15 small Irish ones.
Subcontracting minimised the financial risk involved for the founder. The 
distributor claimed that she adopted a cautious and risk adverse strategy.
Her distributor believed that she was running a marginal business which 
merely supplemented her spouse’s earnings:
Her approach was very different to Fiacla. One person got involved 
in manufacturing, the other sub-contracted. I do not think that soap 
is particularly difficult to manufacture. My own view is that the 
capital equipment needed to manufacture soap cannot be that 
different from that needed to make toothpaste. There was no real 
financial involvement in the company. One person was committed 
to a production run, bought equipment, invested substantially in the 
business. I think Dick saw it as his livelihood, whereas Peggy not. 
Her husband had a very good job. She was doing this as an outside 
interest.
Role of the entrepreneur
Promoting the product on the ground was crucial to the success of the firm. 
The founder was described by the marketing manager as a driven person:
She was a lady with a lot of drive. She was not afraid of knocking 
on as many doors as possible. She did a lot of the promotion 
herself on the ground level. She spent hours and hours on 
promotion and the company was built up over the years to give her 
the turnover she was happy with. She was a very ambitious 
lady...W e find with an Irish product, there is an awful lot of 
pressure on the person who produced it to promote it because there 
is never enough money left to promote it. They invest so much in 
manufacturing it and getting it onto the market, that they do not 
have any money left to advertise it. They need to do a lot of 
ground work at store level.
This commitment and drive of Peggy Connolly led her to receive the 
‘Women in Enterprise Award’ in 1988. Peggy Connolly was a persuasive 
individual who was good at managing relationships with clients, customers, 
suppliers, and distributors. The success of business depended on her 
personality, which enabled her to generate funding, exploit publicity and 
persuade intermediaries to stock the product. She realised that it was 
important to build commitment, secure the assistance of outsiders and share 
plans. She understand her business and appreciated what sales and 
marketing could do for the business. She approached her distributors and 
asked them for assistance with the concept and with selling it into 
supermarkets in the first year of operation. They offered advice in terms 
of packaging, colour, fragrance and brand name. The product launch got 
great publicity, being widely covered on television and the press. The 
story had good appeal, that of a woman producing an import substitute and 
a basic household item. Peggy Connolly was at the forefront in the 
marketing of the soap to the extent that she later became synonymous with 
the name of the product.
Performance of the venture
It was recognised at an early stage that a significant percentage of the home 
market (5%) would have to be captured if the business was to be viable. 
Due to that fact that all operations were subcontracted, margins were being 
squeezed. The company went through a period of rapid growth and six 
weeks after the product was on the shelves, it started doing ‘extraordinarily 
well’. By 1988, within one year of production, the firm was producing 1 
million bars of soap, retailing at about 35p, competing well with imports, 
many of which sell at 39p. In the first year of sale, the company chalked 
up impressive sales, going from nowhere to holding 8% of the market in 
1988/89. This represented a £3.5 million share of the Irish soap market 
which up until now had been dominated by imports. By 1991, the product 
range was extended to include shower cream, value packs, a dermatology- 
formulated (sensitive) soap, soaps in three variants (white, pink and green) 
and cotton wool. By 1991, the company had captured 10% - 12% of the 
Irish market which is valued at £7m a year. At the end of 1991, a deficit 
of £17,000 was recorded. This was attributed to the conservative 
accounting policy of writing off costs as they occur. In 1992, the company 
had a negative net worth of £7,400 which was an improvement on the year 
before.
Critical episode
By 1989, the company was a small player in the Irish market. Strains in 
the manufacturer-distributor relationship began to appear at this stage.
Peggy Connolly was not content with this position and argued with her 
distributors that a far greater share of the Irish market could be secured 
with their co-operation. The distributors believed that the Irish market was 
too small to sustain growth and that the emerging Eastern European market 
was an attractive prospect. The founder, too, saw that the future for the 
product must lie abroad and exporting would be vital to the success of the 
company. The firm was quite capable of coping with large volume orders 
because of the subcontracting operation. The founder claimed that they 
could produce 120 bars a minute. Extra production would have helped cut 
unit costs. For personal reasons, the US was an obvious target to the 
founder. She had conceived of the original business idea while she was 
living there. In the words of the marketing manager:
The idea of Peggy selling the product in the United States was a lot
more appealing than the idea of Peggy selling to Hungary.
Future plans
The distributors believed that the US market was too vast and too difficult 
a market to break into; they tended to prefer markets that were closer to 
home. Irish Breeze had reached the stage where sales were starting to 
level off in the home market and it needed additional investment if it was 
to expand beyond the home market. The distributors became interested in
buying into the firm since it had carved out a successful name for itself in 
the home market.
Peggy Connolly made a few trips to Canada and the US and received a 
favourable reaction. She had some success in selling the product. She 
encountered problems in marketing there. She was unable to protect the 
brand name and was forced to register the soap under her own name. 
Personalised products were popular in the United States. The presence of 
L ’Oreal’s Sea Breeze skincare product delayed her export plans. In the 
US, the product was to be marketed as a more up-market, speciality soap 
product, being more heavily scented and more elaborately packaged than 
the Irish family soap version. Peggy Connolly expected to charge a higher 
price in export markets.
Peggy Connolly knew that in order to exploit the US market, a major 
injection of capital was needed. She was confident that she could secure 
the necessary funding. She had already established a sound marketing and 
financial base in the home market. She had high hopes for her soaps. She 
planned to sell her story to the American public and carry out plenty of 
promotional work to help her launch the brand. Margins were very tight 
and any profit was re-invested into the company and go towards marketing 
and developing new products. Peggy Connolly did not expect to make any 
profit in the near future but expected it to come in time. All these plans 
were in the pipeline when she was approached by her distributors who 
offered to buy her out.
From the founder’s point of view, selling out to them would entail 
advantages and dis-advantages. There are several issues which concern the 
founder. First, she proved herself capable of successfully starting her own 
business. Her achievement was in turning an idea of an import substitute 
into a reality. The brand was a household name and was gaining in value 
all the time. In the pantheon of Irish entrepreneurs, she is renowned. Her 
company is an example of how outsourcing, at the most fundamental level, 
can be the optimal strategy for business success and development. By 
targeting a niche market, she was able to ‘take on the soap giants and win. ’ 
This guarantees her status in business. Her business idea is proven. Other 
factors must be taken into consideration by the founder. The dilemma 
facing her was to sell out or grow the company - she believed that the 
company’s real future lay in the US market. It was a quantum leap to take 
a product from the Irish market to a more sophisticated one such as the 
US. Exporting demanded a level of expertise of which she had little and 
many barriers would have to be overcome. Very often, the demands and 
cost involved in exporting and the competitiveness of export markets are 
not fully appreciated. Peggy Connolly was convinced of the potential of 
the company and was optimistic that the bulk of profits would come from 
the US in time. She believed that a certain amount of goodwill existed for 
an Irish made soap that is as yet untapped. Yet, the threat of resource rich 
multi-nationals poaching sales has always been present. In both home and 
export markets, they can afford to sell soap very cheaply.
The take-over of the firm
On a personal level, a critical stage arose where Peggy Connolly started 
considering a take over offer from her distributors. However, she was 
faced with an unsatisfactory take-over bid from her prospective purchaser.
A price of £300,000 was offered which in the founder’s view was far too 
small. Her distributors argued that the company would be worth far more 
if the US market was established. Negotiating with distributors is a 
delicate process. Yet, the manufacturer-distributor relationship is a delicate 
one with the risk of a distributor not giving sufficient support to a product 
always present. The founder has a difficult course to steer to secure a 
profitable and stable relationship without becoming in danger of being 
swallowed up. It is in their interests to restrain from developing the 
business for fear that eventually they would have to pay a higher price. 
Peggy Connolly held a different vision for her company than the 
distributors and assessed the Irish market differently. Disagreements arose 
regarding the marketing strategy:
She believed that an 80% share of the Irish market could 
be obtained overnight. That does not happen. The FMCG sector is 
a very difficult, very tough market. The distribution was there.
The product was not as competitively priced as Fiacla.
Peggy Connolly was a sociable and articulate woman, with a flair for 
marketing. These skills were put to use at home in Ireland working in a 
PR role. In October 1990, her distributors established a new company 
whose aim was to assist companies in their marketing and sales activities, 
advise them in areas such as new product development, packaging, 
promotions, and exporting. They offered Peggy Connolly a position in the 
company to market Irish manufactured products. However, conflict arose 
between the managing director of Gillespies and Peggy Connolly. The 
Managing Director of Gillespies remarked:
We had a falling out over the Irish Products Company...She 
sold the company to Boyne Valley Foods. They used the name to 
manufacture cotton wool and made a profit out of that. We got on 
very well. I knew her for 5 or 6 years. It was a shock when she 
actually sold the company. Things got a bit acrimonious in the end. 
But such is life, it’s not all fun and games.
Irish Breeze faced many challenges and difficulties in developing beyond 
the home markets. In spite of her interest in growing the company, various 
issues influenced her decision to sell: the difficulties of entering the US 
market, conflict between family and work roles, the large financial 
commitment required. She was aware o f the risks and constraints upon her 
ambitions to expand. An attractive take-over price was offered to her by 
another distributor and she accepted. A pragmatic decision was taken by 
this entrepreneur. Peggy Connolly eventually refused the take-over price 
and decided to develop the US market further. Early in 1993, Peggy
Connolly signed a distribution deal with Boyne Valley Foods who took a 
minority stake in the company as part of the agreement. In 1994, the 
company was bought out. Boyne Valley Food is a large company whose 
main activity is in food manufacturing and distribution. It has a 
shareholding in Lakeshore Mustards and sells Irish Cereals. A subsidiary 
- Abdine Ltd.- saw the potential in using the brand name to manufacture 
cotton wool and a range of baby products. This was the main reason for 
the interest shown in the company.
Case company: BFK Design 
Introduction
BFK Design was established in April 1989 to provide design solutions and 
production management. The company has since completed a diverse 
range of projects in the graphic design arena, ranging from corporate 
image, brochure/literature design, packaging to annual reports and 
advertising. They employ 20 people, some on a part-time basis. Their 
client list includes well known Irish companies such as Waterfood Foods, 
Golden Vale, AIB and Fiacla, among others.
Role of founding strategists
The company was established by three well known personalities in the 
design and print industry. Kevin Barry, Johnny Frey and Howard Kent, 
worked for the same company and knew each other quite well. Pat 
McDonnell, the former managing director of the JD Hackett Group was 
appointed chairman of the company. He now works for the group on a 
consultancy basis. He played a key role in the success of the firm and 
helped establish core founding values. He was perceived as ‘the grey 
haired individual’, the mentor, and the founders knew that they would 
benefit from his business experience. The chairman instilled into the 
directors that they had to take a controlled, goal oriented approach to 
business:
You have to decide what you want to achieve, how you are going to 
achieve it, and go for those goals in a controlled way. There is no 
point in taking off like a rocket and getting nowhere...The most 
important thing I have done is to give them direction. That is what 
strikes me. If I was not there, there would certainly be a lack of 
direction. I have probably instilled into them that the bottom line 
is profit. You have got to make a profit. I have taught them all 
how to read a balance sheet.
The company was founded with a balance of skills, with one individual 
concentrating on the management side of the group, another provided the 
creative input and a third individual provided the sales and marketing 
expertise.
The development of design in Ireland:
In the 1960s, design was virtually non existent in Ireland, with the products 
of Irish traditional industry being mainly copies of British design. After 
membership of the EEC, a growing consciousness of design began to 
develop. In a more competitive environment, competing firms found 
themselves using similar manufacturing processes to produce similar goods, 
so the product’s packaging and visual impact became a strong selling point. 
The consumer became more discerning and this forced an upgrading of
design standards. Entry in to EEC heralded a sense of design 
consciousness within the educational and business communities at large.
By the 1980s, all the elements needed to develop design were present - the 
underlying demand for good design existed, so too did the technology, the 
education and the creative talent.
However, even in the 1980s, there was still a general reluctance from 
industry to use Irish designers. Irish business often looked for the 
perceived status, professionalism and high standards of British design 
firms; they were often willing to pay well over the Irish rate for that 
service. Many of the large institutions, including semi state bodies, went 
outside of the country for design expertise. The managers of BFK Design 
felt strongly about this issue and stressed that Irish design is as good if not 
better than the imported product. In the late 1980s, the design industry 
was relatively young. Some firms were ten years old, the majority were 
only two or three years in existence. Many design firms found it difficult 
to survive in the 1980s and management were aware that a number of 
design firms had gone into liquidation. The company modelled itself on 
two of their competitors, Dimension and Marketing Image. The former 
was taken over and and the latter has shut down completely. These design 
firms experienced problems due to diversifying into other areas too 
quickly.
The graphic design business was intensely competitive and was vulnerable 
to recessionary forces. Many competitors entered the industry and it has 
grown from about ten firms in the late 1980s to over 250 design firms by 
1996. BFK Design considered itself in the top ten category. The industry 
consisted of numerous small designers and a few medium sized firms. 
Smaller competitors consisted of designers who could set up in their 
kitchen, with few overheads. They were able to undercut their competitors 
and were willing to do speculative work, i.e ., carry out initial design 
proposals for free. In Howard Kent’s eyes, these competitors cheapened 
design by giving it away for free. A major problem they faced in business 
was that customers did not always value design. It became more and more 
difficult to earn money in this type of climate. Even though the economic 
climate improved since the late 1980s, clients maintained their price 
consciousness. They were demanding in terms of quality, turnaround, and 
performance of the supplier. The nature of the industry led the founders to 
carefully plan their entry strategy.
Company objectives
BFK Design decided to offer full design services - including packaging, 
graphic design, product design and advertising. The company had a vision 
of employing large numbers of people and of becoming a leading design 
group in Ireland, the UK and Europe. They decided to use the term 
‘group’ as part of the company’s name because they intended diversifying 
into associated design fields. They had a business plan and decided to 
position themselves in the top end of the market, the premium-priced, high
quality end of the market. It is very difficult to quantify and evaluate the 
worth of design in monetary terms. The cost of materials and services 
used during a project would be known upon completion as would the man 
hours taken to complete the project. However, it was the value of the 
creative work that was difficult to calculate. Designers normally resolved 
this dilemma by arriving at an hourly rate; the fee would also be influenced 
by beliefs on what the market would bear.
In the words of Howard Kent:
The profile we put out there is - we are big. We are expensive, but 
we give you value for money. We never, ever apologize for being 
expensive. It means we have got to meet those criteria. We have to 
deliver. Hopefully, we shake the tree, get rid of the deadwood and 
deal with the good stuff. That has been my policy all along.
According to the chairman:
One probable difference from other small firms is that BFK thinks 
much bigger. Projecting the professionalism, projecting the success 
of the product, projecting that it is good at what it does, is 
important. Instilling that into everyone here is important. They 
take pride in the place, pride in design, what they do, pride in how 
the whole company is presented, how people presents themselves, 
whether it is the receptionist, one of the designers or the directors.
Entry strategy
Regrading entry strategy, every aspect of the venture was carefully planned 
and assessed. The directors were very cautious and still are to a large 
degree. They were not, according to Kevin Barry, a company who would 
make rash decisions: ‘We go through decisions, like employing a single 
person, very, very carefully.’ The company possessed an extensive 
business plan, which, in retrospect, was of little use. Howard Kent 
claimed:
Financial people blinded us with science, led us to believe that we 
must have this colossal business plan. We were led down a blind 
alley. It was took months to prepare, whereas we should have done 
it in two weeks.
Today, any business plan spans a few pages and is very broad in scope. 
They implicitly know want they have to do on a daily basis in order to 
survive in the long term. They need to obtain a certain amount of sales 
and produce the design work no matter what happens. Their business plan 
today is very broad which gives them the flexibility to change.
The core service offered by BFK Design is graphic design. Graphics 
involves many elements, all geared towards presenting the corporation 
towards its public:
* Corporate identity (The logo, business card, name investigation, 
stationary, letterhead, etc).
* Packaging design (Style, type of material used, size).
* Audio visual Presentations (Slides, overhead presentations).
* Printing (Annual Reports, technical manuals, point of sale material, 
direct mail shots).
At an early stage, BFK Design geared itself towards becoming a customer 
oriented organization. Clients were encouraged to come and talk to the 
company directors with no commitment. They listened to their problem 
and then a written proposal on what they could do to help, how long it 
would take and its cost, was prepared. The managers knew that if they 
were going to win design assignments, the client would have to be 
convinced of the company’s ability to deliver. Initially they undertook 
‘speculative work’, (i.e. did initial design work for free in order to attract 
potential clients) but later discarded this marketing ploy. According to 
Kevin Barry:
Our attitude was, we are in the service business. If a client wants 
something, then we have to go and do it, no matter what it takes to 
do it. That always had been, and still is, out priority. It is one of 
the reasons why we are still here. I do not believe that you cannot 
be arrogant or aggressive. I do not believe that we have actually 
changed that much.
Howard Kent remarked that he was a firm believer that ‘if you think 
humbly about the market you are involved in it will pay off in the long 
run’. He saw competitors as being complacent; because they were large, 
they expected clients to know them and give them business.
Company ethos: emphasis on promotion
Traditionally, designers have never seen advertising as a way of generating 
business. The managers of BFK Design pointed out that advertising, either 
through the trade or print media, was ineffective and was not the way in 
which design was purchased. The most effective marketing strategy for a 
design consultancy was to produce high quality design which would 
stimulate referral and repeat business. In the words of one manager:
We obtained a lot of referrals. Any work obtained, was done well. 
We worked extremely hard and started to build up a name for the 
business.
Company ethos: a customer orientation
Direct selling was often frowned upon by designers, but for a new firm this 
tended to be the only method available to make the market aware of its 
existence. At that time, many clients went through advertising agencies for 
their promotional work, annual reports, corporate brochures, etc. The 
company was quite proactive in relation to securing clients and aggressively 
sought business. It was not unusual for them to go to their clients and 
offer suggestions on to improve their corporate image, packaging or 
product design. The chairman suspected that other design firms did not 
adopt this approach. The founders of BFK Design believed that a market 
existed for design services sold on a direct basis which was why the 
company was founded. Their attitude was ‘to go out and really sell the 
service and get sales.’ This strategy worked quite well for them. The 
sales manager believed that a combination of luck and a wide network of 
contacts helped establish the business.
A focused strategy
From the outset, BFK had a well structured company, with accounting, 
sales and production functions, as well as the core design function.
Unlike many design firms, management introduced basic organizational 
systems early on in the life of the company to ensure its survival. The 
strategy of combining high quality design with business professionalism 
was a crucial element in the firms’ success. A strong commercial ethos 
was maintained over the years. Management remarked that they ‘were not 
simply designers’. Many small design firms competed almost exclusively 
on design quality or price and were weak in terms of management and 
client orientation. According to Kevin Barry:
Designers tend to be very fickle, temperamental people. Many of 
them do not know how to run a business or would not have any 
interest in running a business. Clients see them as difficult people 
to work with.
Kevin Barry was attracted by the potential financial rewards of being in 
business. He later found that:
There was a lot more to running a business than I had expected. 
There was a problem in getting business, getting the sales in, then 
you have the problem of producing that work, and there is the 
problem of getting paid for it. Alongside all of that is the whole 
accounting side, the technology, the building.. .Everyday there is 
something new.
He remarked that technology was a problem in the graphic design business. 
It was difficult for them to keep abreast of technological changes. He 
found that they had to continually invest in new technology and it was very 
difficult to budget for it. As a service business, they had to pay full 
corporation tax. He added:
It was tough in the start, even getting an overdraft from the bank. 
We were watched like hawks. We relied on mentors, on people to 
give us good referrals. It was a lot, lot tougher that I 
expected...Sales struggled. Always does. You expect to get 
in so much, but do not. You get promised x, y and z, but in 
a lot of cases, it does not happen, for various reasons.
The sales manager also agreed that success came from hard work, from 
ambition, from being focused, and knowing exactly where the company 
was going. The chairman remarked that a focus on graphic design was 
there from the beginning:
I do not think the business would have been as successful as it was 
if that focus was not there. As far as we are concerned, we have to 
achieve design sales each year, each month. It does not matter what 
else happens, If we don’t get them, the we are not going to make 
profits. The focus has to be on sales.
Success factors
Personal contacts played a major role in the early success of the business. 
All had a background in the industry. It was difficult for the client to 
evaluate design firms because there was limited information available on 
which to make a confident judgement before the completion of the project. 
This stemmed from the nature of the purchase being made: a customised 
problem solving service, of an intangible nature, where the cost-benefit 
relationship was not readily perceptible or even understood. This placed 
the client in a situation of uncertainty and risk which they sought to reduce. 
Naturally, the client wanted the job done by people they could trust: there 
was no guarantee that the design team would create a satisfactory design 
and solve the design problem on time, on budget. The aim of BFK Design 
was to reduce this uncertainty in behalf of the client. To achieve this 
outcome, they built up a good design team and office facilities, used the 
most advanced technology available and offered a professional, customer- 
oriented service.
Crisis
The company experienced a period of solid growth. After start-up, a 
designer joined the company and became their first employee. However, 
in 1990, sales started to decline due to a recession. The slow down in 
business confidence in Ireland led to the deferral of design contracts.
These external forces had a hugh effect on a fledgling company attempting 
to grow. There was an imbalance in the structure of the company. They 
set up a company that had to support two non fee-earning directors. That 
situation contributed to their financial problems. They increased their 
studio staff and employed extra sales personnel, people they though had 
‘sales in their briefcase’ but found out to their cost that he did not. The 
business was built up in the anticipation of continued growth which was not
realised. When sales started to decline, they experienced financial 
problems, resulting in redundancies. The major problem was, in Kevin 
Barry’s eyes, that of growing the business too fast. One of the worst 
aspects of this period, for Kevin Barry, was making people redundant. 
Howard Kent (Sales and Marketing Manager) claimed that the company 
went through a number of traumatic situations. In the first year of its 
existence, the company experienced one major bad dept. That nearly broke 
them. Luckily they survived it. Howard Kent claimed:
Within our second year of business, we were trading unprofitably.
To use the words of our accountant, we were trading fraudulently. 
That was the most crucial period we went through. Within two 
years, we had overstepped our mark. We had to back peddle, start 
letting people go and re-focus in on the core product. We had to 
stop diversifying, stop looking at other things and start making 
money.
Kevin Barry also claimed that they were ‘desperately trying to look at 
different areas to increase business.’ Today, the company is much more 
settled and more focused. They have a reasonable level of business that 
will always be there. The company is no longer ‘as panicky’ on a day to 
day basis. They can afford to stand back a little and be more focused as to 
where the overall company is going. In the early days, the directors were 
too busy trying to survive, to resolve daily problems and get work 
completed and did not have the time to plan on an annual basis. Any 
disagreements that arose centred on how the market would evolve and 
where the best opportunities lay. The company had to keep adapting to the 
market.
Howard Kent claimed they developed a greater understanding of the 
dynamics of survival. The company survived this critical period because of 
the way in which they managed their cash flow. They succeeded in 
‘pulling back from it’. One of their first response was to re-locate from 
Dun Laoghaire to the city centre. That immediately increased their 
business. It saved both the directors and clients a lot of time lost to 
driving.
The development of the venture
The chairman saw the development of the business in terms of phases. He 
spoke of the learning curve involved in setting up a business. He talked of 
the early period where the company was young, where the objective was to 
establish the business. The financial institutions watched management and 
their actions carefully. They had to establish a track record with suppliers 
and in some cases pay cash up front for supplies. They had to struggle to 
increase sales, frequently attempting to do everything. They found, that 
due to lack of resources, they had to deal with diverse tasks, probably over 
extending themselves. The chairman believes that a key requirement of the 
firm was flexibility:
In the first five years the company must try to have flexibility. It 
should be able to change tack, to make changes in the organisation 
quickly. By flexibility I means staying in control of the 
organisation, staying small in terms of people. Not over committing 
yourself. Having some room to manoeuvre, some options.
After a few years, the company started to mature along with the people 
involved. It emerged from a difficult period, managed to build up a client 
base, the business became more stable and financial reserves were built up. 
The chairman spoke of other phases in the firm’s development:
They do not need to grab every bit of business. Suppliers and the 
financial institutions have more confidence as well, as it has been up 
and running for 2 or 3 years. They won’t have people asking for 
cash up front anymore. That is a phase. There is the more settled, 
consolidation phase, probably another 2 or 3 years, of building up 
financial strength. The next phase is diversifying slightly...
Although Kevin Barry did not feel that the company changed that much as 
regards marketing strategy, he spoke about the firm’s development in terms 
of phases:
We have been through the naive stage. We have been through the 
really hard times. Out of that has grown a confidence, but I do not 
think we have changed all that much.
The company no longer does speculative work, i.e. put out a design for 
free. They no longer work for free because it is uneconomical, 
unprofitable and just not viable. Today, because of their standing in the 
industry, they charge a rejection fee.
Howard Kent made the point that the company never stopped changing.
He remarked that ‘if we were to stand still, the company would not exist 
today’. When the company was founded, it never envisaged that they 
would have £150,000 worth of equipment. They set up with a few drawing 
boards whereas today they do not use them. Technology has changed and 
the company has changed as a result. Major capital investment decisions 
were made and agreed upon unanimously. Howard Kent believed that the 
core strategy of the company did not change. The company’s strategy 
always centred on targeting the larger, direct client and offering design and 
production services. The value of the contracts have increased. In the 
early days, jobs were worth £1-2,000, whereas now, they could obtain a 
government contract worth £50,000.
The sales manager stressed that the company became much more 
accounting oriented. Management accounts were completed on a monthly 
basis, which was unusual for a small firm. Another manager claimed that 
they should have anticipated bad debts that arose, but did not, due to the 
inexperience of the book-keepers employed. They were too busy, and too
eager for sales to fully check out customers ability to pay. The company 
learned a lot from its experience with bad debts. The sales manager 
remarked that there was a hugh learning curve involved in business start­
up, one that cannot be gained from taught courses:
You learn a lot, You learn to adapt. You learn to deal with 
different attitudes, to make decisions. People come to you looking 
for guidance. Suddenly you realise that you are no longer an 
employee, but an employer and a director. You learn to be 
responsible..
He believed that the ability to set up a company on his own and grow it 
was part of a great learning curve. He said:
My own attitude, personality and outlook has changed dramatically. 
People also have a respect for you. It makes you a better person, a 
responsible person. I have a totally different outlook in life. You 
look at things and say, is there an opportunity for me there, 
anything we can do better, can we gain something out of it. That 
might be selfish, I do not know...
Changes in managerial style and roles
The company moved to larger premises, occupying 3,500 sq. ft. and 
employed more people, 16 to 20, both full-time and part-time. 
Communication became crucial. Kevin Barry saw major changes in terms 
of management style. As the company grew, delegation became 
increasingly important:
A few years ago, we tended to hand-hold everything, every piece of 
communication was looked after. We tended to worry about 
everything. Now we have to stand back a little. We have 16 
wonderful people, all of whom work on their own initiative. Once 
a job goes through, it goes through on it’s own.
Howard Kent’s role changed to seeking new business and looking after 
these clients. He no longer made calls to prospective clients. A new 
salesperson was hired to bring in new business and deal with the smaller 
clients. Howard Kent dealt instead with the larger, more important clients, 
that would keep the company afloat. He too saw that the management style 
changed due to the size of the company and its growth: ‘It has changed. I 
do not always say it has changed for the better, but it has changed.’
The chairman said:
In the beginning, it was all one big happy family. Now it is 
different. There are two distinct design teams. The directors have 
become much more demanding. They pay people well, they expect 
them to perform. In the early days, it was not like that. The 
management style has certainly changed. They have become much 
more removed from their staff, which is a negative thing.
He advised them to adopt an open door policy and to avoid erecting 
barriers between the employees and employers.
Competitive advantages
(1) Good design capability.
(2) They possess a well structured, professionally run company.
(3) They are capable of targeting large and medium sized companies.
(4) The possess a solid reputation and are confident of their repeat and
referral business.
(5) City centre location
(6) A favourable working environment
(7) Young, energetic culture
Competitive disadvantages
(1) Being large means that they carry high overheads and cannot compete 
on price with smaller designers.
(2) Risk of losing touch with clients.
(3) More reactive that proactive
(4) Slow, cautious decision making style
Thrust of the company
Kevin Barry saw the company as being both reactive and proactive. In the 
early years, it was difficult for them to be proactive, since they were 
struggling. As the years past, they became more comfortable, structures 
began to ‘bed down’, and the directors had more time to think of the 
future. They aim to become more proactive than was previously the case. 
Howard Kent claimed that at board meetings the focus was on continuously 
looking for new opportunities, new business, new projects. However, risk 
and finance were the two restraining forces. He remarked:
We like to think of ourselves as proactive, but we are reactive, I 
feel. We put many things onto our agenda which we have never 
completed. Possibly, if the company was run by one person, rather 
than four people, we could be more proactive. That one person 
could make decisions quicker. There is a dis-advantage of having a 
number of people involved.
The company aims to diversify in the future, into areas allied to graphic 
design, such as packaging, PR, promotions, advertising, printing, multi- 
media, etc. Related diversification would cushion the company from the 
adverse effects of any downturn in the demand for graphic design. 
According to Kevin Barry, the company faces the following obstacles to 
growth:
(1) Outside forces over which they have no control, decline in demand for 
design services.
(2) The unlikely event of disagreements among directors over future 
direction of the company.
Howard Kent remarked that the future of the firm would lie in Europe.
They always hoped to establish a foothold in Europe, but the risk of 
jeopardizing the Irish operation, the financial commitment required, and 
attitudes of directors, blocked this move. The company achieved solid 
growth every year. The company’s aim is to concentrate on the graphic 
design business in the immediate future before diversifying into other areas. 
They eventually hope to offer the client a full service. The founders 
believed that if they did not consolidate existing business, they would very 
quickly lose everything. They fear uncontrolled growth; if they grew 
rapidly and moved into different, although allied, areas it could easily bring 
about their demise. They hope to avoid the mistakes of others. The 
attitude of the non-executive chairman has been:
To stick to their knitting until they have achieved a much firmer 
foundation.
He was confident that BFK would diversify and seek new markets,
‘through the frustration of not having done it already. ’ The only thing 
blocking the growth of the company were the directors themselves and their 
attitudes.
Future plans
Case company: Braycot 
Introduction
Braycot is a privately owned, indigenous Irish company. It supplies 
biscuits to the wholesale, retail and catering trade. Originally, a small 
family owned business, it underwent many changes in ownership structure. 
Gerald Crowley was appointed Managing Director of the company in April 
1995. Other managers include Chris Hancock the General Manager who 
has been with the company from the beginning and Jerry Weldon, the 
financial manager.
The start-up stage
Braycot was founded in 1979 by the Hunters, a husband and wife team. 
Chris Hancock joined the company shortly after it was founded and played 
a key role in developing new products and overseeing the manufacturing 
side of the business. The company grew out of humble beginnings, with 
the founders operating initially from their kitchen. They began making 
handmade biscuit products. Pleased with the favourable reaction from 
customers, they bought a small mixing machine, some racks, an oven, a 
few trays, in order to produce the product. According to the general 
manager:
They mixed the ingredients in the mixer, literally splayed it by hand 
onto the trays, baked it, cut it and ended up with the final product.
In spite of its humble beginnings, the company grew very quickly. By 
1982, the company employed 10 people. The company moved into a 
modem industrial unit in Lyons Industrial estate, Bray, Co. Wicklow.
They initially leased one unit (3,750 square feet) of industrial space but 
continued to expand into adjacent units until it occupied a total of 20,000 
square feet of manufacturing and warehouse space. The company 
concentrated on the home market selling mostly through multiples. At the 
time only one other Irish biscuit maker existed. This was Irish Biscuits 
Limited, whose Jacobs and Bolands brands accounted for more than 60% 
of the market. Braycot, as a niche firm, had no direct competitors in the 
home market.
The positioning of Braycot as a niche product meant that achieving a high 
market share in the home market was unlikely, so management turned its 
attention to export markets. They participated at ISM (International Sweets 
& Biscuits fair) in Cologne, one of the worlds largest confectionary trade 
shows. This was an excellent venue for meeting distributors, buyers and 
learning what the competitors were doing. They began exporting to France 
and the UK. In 1983, they increased production and began exporting to 
Germany, the US, Canada, Italy and Belgium. Half of their output was 
made for foreign markets. Management faced difficulties in expanding 
beyond the home market. They admitted that international distribution
arrangements were haphazard with the exception of France. France was 
the primary export market. In Italy and Germany, a mainstream food 
group distributed their products which yielded very limited results. In the 
USA and Canada, it proved uneconomic to ship to North America in small 
quantities. The product had a shelf life of 7/8 months and it was not 
feasible to ship by container load. Despite considerable efforts in seeking 
distributors for these markets, results were not encouraging. These 
markets are not served today.
The company also developed and expanded its range of biscuits. The 
company continued with seven of the original nine products (Tea Crunch, 
Hazelnut Crunchy, Fruit Oat Crunchy, Carob Half coated cookies, 
Mountain cookies, Luxury Ginger, Oat nutties) which are their stable 
product line. Other product development initiatives included cereal bars, 
shortbread, tins and gift packs mainly for the Christmas market. The 
company produced an organic product for their French agent Distriborg. 
This was in response to a request from their agent rather than the result of 
aggressive marketing. The organic product was marketed under the Bjorg 
brand name and was distributed through healthfood stores and the 
healthfood section of supermarkets. It was specially geared towards the 
more health conscious consumer. It was an expensive product to make 
with costly raw materials and higher labour costs. Distriborg were very 
pleased with the results and sales were very positive in France. Two own 
label products were also produced for the French supermarket chain 
Monoprix.
The company grew rapidly, achieving an amazing growth rate of 45% per 
annum from 1983 to 1986/87. The natural wholefood biscuit was one of 
the fastest growing sectors of the biscuit market. In 1987, levels of 
domestic sales peaked at £750,000. The company had the expertise to take 
people in and train them very quickly. Turnover increased from a few 
£100,000 to approximately £1 million in 1989. Of this, about 50% was 
exported. Within a decade, the company commanded one per cent of the 
Irish Biscuit Market, worth an estimated £80 million annually.
Crisis episode
1989 was a year of major upheaval for the company. The collapse of their 
distributor in the UK compounded the already severe weaknesses in the 
company. The Hunters retired from active management. Negotiations 
were commenced with a number of parties interested in a takeover.
The company was taken over by an importer and distributor of grocery 
food products.
Reasons for downturn in performance
There were various reasons for the firm’s decline in performance. The 
combination of the following five factors resulted in the sale of the 
company in November 1989.
(1) High overheads
(2) Collapse of UK distributor
(3) Changing industry conditions
(4) Significant losses (£1.2 million)
(5) Declining sales
According to Chris Hancock, the growth in the market just was not there 
any more. Sales levelled off after 1987, not because of lack of expansion, 
or failure to bring new products on stream, but because conditions in the 
industry had changed. The UK market, in particular, had become much 
more competitive. According to Chris Hancock, the independent sector 
(corner shops) looked for the product ‘for next to nothing.’ At the 
luxurious, top end of the market, Cadburys and Foxes Biscuits, were strong 
competitors. At the bottom end of the market, McVities produced cheap 
biscuits for the more price conscious consumer. According Chris Hancock, 
the product was quite a difficult one to sell, in a market that was pigeon­
holed strategically.
The company was very proactive in terms of new product development, but 
‘new products simply took up the loss on product that went down.’
Irish sales were declining by 10% per annum in spite of the expanded 
product range. There were several reasons for this but clearly the lack of 
promotional support was likely to have been a factor. Consumers were 
unaware that the biscuits were an Irish product. Biscuits were an impulse 
buy, so constant advertising and promotion was necessary to reinforce 
brand awareness in the consumer’s mind. There was more competition in 
the Irish market, with products like Kellys and Seery’s biscuits strongly 
marketing their Irish origins. Because sales were so low, margins were 
squeezed considerably.
The collapse of a UK distributor in 1989 was an major blow to the 
company. The company always had problems with distributors in the UK. 
They were either not up to the required standard, or too large to give 
sufficient attention to the brands. Eventually, management decided to open 
up their own office in the UK. With their own salesperson, they obtained 
a listing in Sainsburys and Tescos. However, sales were not high enough 
to justify a company controlled sales office in the UK. Scandinavian 
Suppliers approached the founder in 1988 and regained distribution rights. 
The distributer in the UK went into liquidation in 1989. Sainsbury’s de­
listed the products after the distributer went into liquidation. The company 
lost a fair amount of money from that event and never really recovered 
from that period. The company sought to recover lost business in the UK 
but failed.
The role of the founders
John Hunter was the Chief Executive and Principal shareholder in Hunter 
Advertising (now Satchi and Satchi), however he sold his interest in this 
company prior to the establishment of the company. He was well known
and respected in business circles in Dublin at the time. Jenny Hunter got 
her inspiration from flapjacks, a soft cereal based product - and realising 
that there was nothing else on the marketplace at that time, she expanded 
this product idea into a packet of biscuits. After much consideration, 
management opted to use the brand name Braycot, a derivation of Bray, 
where the biscuits were made and the cottage symbolizing the wholefood, 
home-made image of the product.
The founders played a significant role in the early formative years of the 
company. They came up with an excellent idea and possessed the drive 
and commitment to build the business. Chris Hancock sees the early era of 
the company as a very pro-active one and John Hunter was prepared to go 
out and actively sell the company. They were initially very successful in 
terms of securing business and very active in the new product development 
area. He believed that the original owner ‘was, I believe, a very astute
person. It was the Hunters’ original idea. Generally most businesses start 
with someone having a very good idea, the guts to go ahead, borrow 
capital, work hard.’ The present owner attributed the reputation of the 
company for a the production of a good product to the original owners:
Take this sports line bar. I am sure there are other people out there 
who could produce that. I am a great believer that you make your 
own luck too. Somewhere along the line, someone told them about 
the company, maybe try them. Who ever said that had a 
good experience with Braycot. That was not in my time. It was 
done before me.
The financial manager also praised the role of the Hunters in the area of 
promotion:
I think the Hunters did quite a good job in certain aspects of the 
business. They had a lot of good ideas about promoting the 
product.
The aim of the company was to develop a range of wholefood biscuits, 
using only top quality, natural ingredients. For instance carob was used to 
coat the biscuits rather than chocolate, raw sugar rather than processed 
sugar was used. It was a gluten-free, non carbohydrate product, made 
without preservatives, additives, or dairy products. There was a good 
balance of ingredients - fat, fibre and sugar - that made it suitable for 
diabetics and other individuals on special diets.
The founding values of the company were based on a quality consciousness 
which lingered long after the Hunters bowed out from the company. The 
niche strategy, based on a natural wholefood product, was a strong force 
for continuity. Chris Hancock remarked that their attitudes and thinking 
have not really changed: ‘We have faith in the products and believe that a 
market exists for them’. There was the suggestion that this strong founding 
ideology was not complemented by one that emphasised other
We have deliberately changed methods of operation and attitudes, 
and that has had a major impact on how we are now performing.
We have also had luck.
The Hunters failed to ‘unlearn’ the notion that a quality, branded biscuit 
product was enough to ensure the success of the company. The company 
seemed more concerned with producing a quality biscuit, rather than a 
quality product that made money. Under the previous management, a 
conscious policy decision was taken to concentrate purely on branded 
products, although own label business often helped small manufacturers fill 
capacity. In 1992, a decision was made to enter the own label business 
under new ownership. The climate in the late 1980s and 1990s demanded 
a shift in thinking. Braycot needed own label business to pay for its 
overheads by obtaining large volume orders. It made commercial sense to 
enter the own label market. The founding values of the company persisted, 
possibly to the detriment of commercial values, which were not cultivated. 
In retrospect, Chris Hancock (General Manager) claimed that managing the 
growth period was crucial for the survival of a company:
Finance is always a major problem. The whole issue of growth, 
how it is planned and controlled can bury a company. A company 
has to be very careful in it’s expansion plans. Managing cash flow, 
how much money is spent, how much is got back in, seeing that 
credit terms are adhered to, are all crucial...The most important 
functions in the company are cash flow/credit control, marketing 
and production...
There was a suggestion that a lack of marketing expertise contributed to the 
decline in Braycot’s fortunes:
Management must know the market, anticipate the market trends 
and know where the company is headed. A company has to start 
off small and stabilize the market before they try to expand. The 
marketing plan has to be very good. A company could be very 
busy but be in a position where they are losing a lot of
money To succeed demands hard work. You have to put a lot of
time into it. You have to know what you are about. At the end of 
the day, people pay money for a product if it gives them what they 
want. Biscuits are an impulse purchase. The person has to be 
attracted to taste it. If it does not give them what they want, they 
will not buy it.
A crisis in 1989, where a UK distributor collapsed and with it the market 
for their products, was a severe blow. Where the source of the crisis was 
dependency on a key distributor, and declining sales in the home market, 
this represented a failure of strategy. The Hunters played a vital role in the 
company’s success but did not the skills to tackle internal inefficiencies.
complementary values. According to the present owner:
As a natural food product, it was expensive to make and labour intensive. 
The founder found it difficult to adapt its cost base and pricing structures to 
changing industry conditions. They handled distribution themselves in spite 
of the cost involved. The new owner commented that:
...obviously, they were not doing things properly as they were not
really making a success of it we have done very deliberate
things.... We have changed methods of operation and 
attitudes....We called in the unions, told them the losses have to 
stop if the company is to survive. Told them a certain amount of 
pain has to be got through if we were to succeed. We got rid of 
products that were definite loss makers and concentrated on 
products that are money makers.
Problems in the company were traced back to a combination of 
mismanagement and faltering of a long term perspective. In retrospect, 
one director claimed:
Unfortunately, they did not sit back and think about things.
If they had organised it differently, they would have 
achieved more...
The fortunes of the company under new ownership
With a strong distribution capability and a well established presence in the 
multiples it was a logical step for the new owners to develop agency and 
physical distribution arrangements for other grocery products. The selling, 
distribution and administration of the company was integrated into 
Shamrock. The company went from having their own sales force (4 vans 
selling the product in Ireland) to a centralised, more professional 
distribution system.
The company did not fare very well under new ownership or several 
reasons. Although the company became part of a large public company 
with the resources to develop and expand its range of biscuits, minimal 
R&D and new product development took place. Chris Hancock believed 
that the company would not have been progressive enough to deal with new 
entrants to the market at that stage.
Problems in the aftermath of the take over: lack of synergy in 
acquisition.
The take-over was not successful. The company was making quite 
considerable losses (£2 million) in a very competitive industry. According 
to Chris Hancock, head office did not know or understand the business. 
They were not prepared to invest in the company. The new owner 
claimed:
It was, I suppose, becoming ‘a sore thumb’ in the group. They 
were not that interested in Braycot but did not want to shed 
assets...The group IAWS really did not get the return for their 
investment. The company was too small an operation within a hugh 
group and did not receive the attention it deserved...In a sense, it 
was a mismatch. But I can see how it happened. The group has 
grown by acquisitions... They were not really into the manufacture 
of biscuits. It was as simple as that. One cannot blame them for its 
failure. It just was not part of its core activity and as a result 
did not receive proper attention.
The products of the acquiring firm were strongly represented in the grocery 
multiples and had the advantage of a strong physical distribution operation. 
Braycot was bought on the basis that its distribution costs could be reduced 
considerably. The company believed that they could make considerable 
savings in transportation and, even if they did nothing else, would make a 
profit. However, 20% of the company’s turnover went to outlets that the 
acquiring firm could not access, such as institutions, schools, the AIB 
banking centre, universities, hotels. It was not possible to service this 
sector and this business was lost straight away. One fifth of turnover was 
lost and the company found itself in a much more serious loss making 
situation.
According to Chris Hancock:
Braycot was bought on a whim. It was very badly done, most 
unprofessional. They were just hoping that business would come 
back to making £1.2 million in a break even situation. This kind of 
scenario went on for five years. The most positive thing that 
happened since 1989 was that Braycot was sold this year. It was 
going nowhere. It would have folded without a doubt. There was 
an absolute mis-match.
He felt very stifled in his position as general manager, even though he was 
working for a large group. He was given more freedom when the 
company regained its independence.
Effects of crisis
The period of crisis endured by the company left its mark on management. 
It had serious repercussions. The general manager remarked:
It was very proactive in the beginning, then became very reactive in 
the IAWS situation. It was stagnant.. .It was quite conservative in 
the take-over situation. It is still conservative. We are prepared to 
take a risk if the opportunity comes up. It is a conservative risk. 
The negative aspects of going through a critical period is that you 
hesitate to bring in new products unless you are 100% sure. You 
need market surveys, which is expensive. There is a lot more 
research into prospective customers. We plan a lot more.
A new phased in the company’s history
The company went through a period where it was quite successful as a 
small operation. Management invested quite substantially and broke even 
for a period. In one year, they made a sizeable profit. A new phase was 
signified by the regaining of its independence in 1995. A new phase was 
marked by the sell out of company to Chris Crowley. New ownership 
attempted to rectify the mistakes made in the past. The strategic decision 
making process improved, and the marketing and financial weaknesses of 
the firm were addressed.
Industry factors
Much of the firm’s success was attributed to the wholesome nature of the 
product. Management aimed to target people who were prepared to pay 
that bit extra for a natural product. During the 1980s, the idea of healthy 
living increased in popularity, coinciding with the start up of the firm.
The industry was characterised by large companies who possessed 
economies of scale. Although Braycot was a niche firm, it suffered the 
disadvantages of being a small player in a market dominated by multi­
nationals. Branding and advertising support was crucial to boost sales of a 
product and promote customer loyalty. The company did not possess the 
resources to build a brand which led to a lack of brand name recognition in 
the home market. In the early phase of the firm’s development, contextual 
factors constrained the influence of the founder. Organisational members 
attributed the crisis of the firm more to external factors than any negligence 
on the part of founder. The general manager claimed that the industry 
climate totally changed in the UK. There was growth in the area of the 
luxury and economy biscuits with the result that the middle range was 
squeezed out. This circumscribed the founder’s ability to turn the company 
around in the aftermath of the crisis.
Role of state agencies
Under new ownership, the company benefited from the support of an Bord 
Bia. According to the financial manager, the food board made a concerted 
effort to promote Irish produce in export markets. He claimed:
That certainly is an element that would have helped us. It has given 
us more confidence to develop products and to open markets.
The ‘Irishness’ of the product
At the time of business start-up, most biscuits (with the exception of 
Jacobs) were imported and encouragement was given to Irish producers to 
enter markets where there was a high level of import substitution. Yet, the 
‘Irishness’ of the product was never fully exploited. Under current 
ownership, future plans centre on making consumers aware that the product 
is Irish made. New packaging and a new logo has been designed for the 
product range and a national advertising campaign is also planned.
Gerald Crowley - a profile
Gerard Crowley initially embarked on a career in Chartered Accountancy 
in the UK. After the first year he left and decided to work in the 
construction industry. He obtained his IPM (Institute of Personnel 
Management) exams by night and returned to Ireland. His career portfolio 
also includes the position of Rights Commissioner in 1988. He obtained a 
position with the group IAWS as a consultant in Personnel and Industrial 
Relations affairs. It was during his work with IAWS that he encountered 
Braycot, as it had been taken over by the group. The company was offered 
to him at a very attractive price. He believed that the firm’s potential was 
not being realised and decided to buy it out from IAWS. He became 
chairman of the company in April 1995. Shamrock Foods continued to act 
as distributor for the firm’s products in the home market. This was Gerard 
Crowley’s first foray into the manufacturing area. He saw it as a personal 
challenge to turn a loss making venture into a successful company.
Changes that new ownership has brought.
In April 1995 the company was bought out from Shamrock Foods, which 
was perceived as ‘the most positive thing to have happened to the company 
in its entire history’. The fortunes of the company were mixed due to a 
lack of a clear product line, weaknesses in distribution management, lack 
of synergy in acquisition, cost inefficiencies, and the absence of a 
marketing plan. The new owner, Gerard Crowley, was in a position to 
develop a strategy with little reference to the past. It was clear that major 
changes would have to be made to arrest the decline in Braycot’s fortunes.
He immediately appointed a Financial Controller (Jerry Weldon) to the 
firm. He had some fears about existing management that was presiding 
over a company that was ineffective, but these fears were groundless.
Chris Hancock was appointed director with options to buy shares. The 
new owner claims that the two directors were effectively managers of the 
firm. Gerard Crowley also managed another company that specialised in 
world class manufacturing principles. He introduced all of these principles 
to Braycot. He entered into discussions with the unions explaining the
changes that needed to be made in order to stem the losses of the company. 
A number of people were made redundant to cut losses, and were re­
employed at a later stage. The product range was rationalised, loss-making 
products were discarded and management decided to concentrate on 
products that had money making potential. Investment in new offices and 
new machinery was made. Plans for a new production line were to be 
financed with a bank loan. Management decided to develop the own label 
business since it was quite profitable and was a relatively easy product to 
sell.
A number of enquiries on the export side were followed through which has 
the potential to turn the company around. A new sports line bar was one 
of the most recent products developed by the firm, and was developed in 
response to a request from a UK company. It was distributed through 
healthfood stores, gyms, leisure outlets, and the health food section of 
supermarkets in Europe. It was a mixture of ingredients rather than a 
baked product. Management was very pleased with results and considered 
that the product had a pleasant taste as well as being a low fat, high energy 
product. The product was reasonably successful. The company also 
started producing for a company in California - Diana’s Cookies - and this 
firm became an agent for their organic biscuits in Canada. The company 
also targeted the own label business. At the end of the first year, the 
company broke even and achieved a turnover of £1.6 million. They 
recruited 15 extra people to cater for this development and may move to 
larger premises in the future. Gerard Crowley believed that their expertise 
in biscuit making enabled them to win important contracts in the face of 
competition.
Company sales developed with virtually no advertising support. Promotion 
concentrated on point of sale material and tasting demonstrations in 
supermarkets. Trade fairs and exhibitions was the main form of promotion 
used to increase exports. The company participated in IFEX 1996, an 
international food and drink exhibition held annually in Dublin. Gerry 
Crowley believed that the fact that the biscuits were Irish was an important 
reason for purchase, yet a high level of non-recognition of the brand 
existed. He aimed to remedy this. The company also appointed a new 
distributor in the UK called Streamline Foods. They hoped to increase 
distribution of their product range to all the Multiples including Gateway.
A non executive director was appointed to act as advisor on marketing/sales 
area. The owner said:
I took over an existing operation that was not going too well. I 
have spearheaded the surgery and was helped by Chris (General 
Manager) and Jerry Weldon (Financial Controller)....I would like to 
be remembered as the person who turned Braycot around, made it a 
success. I did that by a fairly humane and practical approach.
His goals for the future centre on achieving modest growth and keeping the 
firm as a family run company:
I would never wish to become hugh. We will always remain 
relatively small in a niche market if we are to succeed.
According to Chris Hancock:
It has taken us a long time to get to the position in which we are in 
at present. It was a very slow process. Under new ownership, the 
company is becoming a little bit more progressive....
The company employed a person from a Bakery School to assist in new 
product development. They are presently working on different projects, 
new products for different customers. Chris Hancock remarked:
We are still reactive. We sit back waiting for orders to come.
There are no marketing people at present. We need to go out and 
be active and aggressively go after business, push the company. 
Instead, we are manufacturing to an order book, which thankfully, 
is full. But we are becoming proactive. It is a question of 
changing....The company has become very active in new product 
development. We are not very well equipped for it, but we are 
very active in it.
The company intends approaching the IDA for capital grants, employment 
grants and technology transfer grants. In the meantime, the company has 
to being new projects on stream but require additional investment in the 
plant to make this a cost effective exercise. Gerry Crowley sees finance as 
the biggest obstacle to future growth. There has been no major capital 
investment since 1987:
There are things we would like to do a lot quicker than we will do 
them, but we are not in a position to do so. All we have is a track 
record for one year under my ownership and very few people are 
willing to listen to you on a one year track record....I would love to 
have half a million pounds to invest in the advancement of the 
company. Right now finance is the biggest barrier to growth.
New ownership brought about important changes in the decision making 
process. In the words of Chris Hancock:
They just stabilized things. Strategically, they pulled every aspect 
of the company apart, just to make sure that what was left worked. 
The whole decision making process is vastly more effective as well 
as being faster. In past situations, decision making was on a 
committee basis. It takes four months to do something that should 
have been done straight away. Today, if an opportunity arises, we 
can react very quickly.
The company made a decision to concentrate on its core business. After 
the collapse of the distributor in the UK, the firm became cautious about
breaking into that market. Instead they decided to focus on the Canadian 
and European market. Chris Hancock claimed that a ‘company can fall 
into the trap of being extremely busy without making money’. Planning 
and monitoring systems were overhauled. New ownership analyzed sales 
turnover and margins on that turnover. The company established objectives 
for future growth: to become a £3 to £4 million pound business within the 
next three years. This will mean increasing staff levels to 45.
Gerry Crowley claimed that:
the present management is far more focused. We are not there just 
to produce a quality biscuit. We are here to produce a product that 
will make money for us and I will do whatever it takes to achieve 
that. That is going to be done. I said right from the start, that the 
key ambition was to get rid of practices and general difficulties 
within the company, so that way we would get rid of the losses.
We have achieved that. With more ‘aggression’, certainly more 
focused marketing and more follow up with existing customers, we 
will put Braycot into the £3m turnover bracket for next year.
The company turned from a loss making situation in April 1995 to a break­
even situation in approximately four months. This was achieved through 
rationalization, through adoption of world class manufacturing principles, 
and by bringing new projects on stream. In addition to changes in strategy, 
there were changes in managerial style as well. Chris Hancock claimed:
I have always been in the driving seat. I have tried to manage 
everything. I have tried to hold on to all the ‘tentacles’ as it were 
but one day I had to let go.
Culture
The company moved from being part of a large, constrained, almost multi­
national type operation to a small, ‘family run’ type of business. The 
culture was perceived as being informal and open. Communication was 
very important. According to Chris Hancock, if employees made mistakes, 
they were encouraged to approach the manager instead of attempting to 
conceal errors. Instead of covering up problems or fixing blame, Braycot 
made problems visible so that solutions could be found quickly. The 
decision making process was both autocratic and democratic. All managers 
had a say in the future direction of the company but ultimate control rested 
with the Managing Director. The present owner saw major changes in the 
company’s culture:
Staff and management are mixing very well. This year was special. 
Even though the staff are working harder and maybe a little 
differently, they are happier in the sense that their work is achieving 
something.
Company strengths and weaknesses 
Strengths
(1) The company was a small, highly flexible and innovative company. 
Research and development was the primaiy strength of the company.
(2) The company was working towards world class manufacturing 
principles.
Weaknesses
(1) The major disadvantages were lack of finance and lack of capabilities 
relative to competitors.
Case company: Kestrel 
Introduction
Kestrel was established ten years ago in 1985. It employs 30 people and 
80% of its business is aimed at the export market. The company 
experienced major changes in ownership structure throughout its history.
The company survived the severe cash flow crisis of 1992 and it now aims 
to seek a strategic partner.
Start-up
Kestrel was set up in 1985 to design and manufacture electronic security 
products. Two business colleagues came together, Mr Brian Caulfield who 
has a background in electronics and Mr. McArdle who holds a degree in 
Commerce from UCD. He is a qualified accountant and it was decided 
that McArdle would handle the commercial side and his partner would be 
responsible for technical design. The major strength of the company was, 
and still is, product design. The company had a business plan which was 
used to raise a grant (£68,167) from the IDA as an EDP (Enterprise 
Development Program) company in 1987. It also managed to raise seed 
capital as part of the BES (Business Expansion Scheme).
It was very difficult to survive the first five years as the company was 
undercapitalized. Michael O Hara (Financial Accountant) claimed that the 
barriers to entry included the ‘intelligence’ of the product and need to have 
a range of products. A large amount of resources were needed for R&D, 
and it was only when the company had gone through the learning curve that 
it would be able to reap the benefits and obtain a return. Joe McArdle 
(Managing Director) claimed that they underestimated the amount of time it 
would take to bring the product to the market. It took them one and a half 
years to develop the product. The company moved very quickly into 
purpose built premises which increased their overheads during this period.
Crisis and new ownership
Since the process of developing and manufacturing a product took longer 
than was originally estimated, the founders decided to focus on installing 
alarm systems, instead of product design, in order to improve cash flow. 
The drawback of this strategic change in direction was that they ended up 
competing with their customers and had to underprice them to gain 
installation business. This situation was clearly untenable. McArdle knew 
that these firms would refuse to buy their security products in the future, 
which was intended to be the core competence of the business. By 1988, 
the company was faced with the following issues:
(1) It was undercapitalised.
(2) It had neglected its core business and the installation business 
accounted for 75% to 80% of turnover.
(3) Its product range was severely restricted.
(4) It possessed large overheads.
McArdle realised that independence could not be sustained. The company 
started looking for an investor who would build up the manufacturing side 
of the business in return for shares. This was part of the original founding 
strategy, but became an urgent issue in 1988. Ideally, they were looking 
for a strategic partner who would not demand a majority stake, but this did 
not happen. Joe McArdle approached Expo-Met whom he saw as 
attempting to grow in the security sector. In 1988, this U.K. company 
(Expo-Met) acquired 51% of the business, effectively taking full control. 
McArdle and his partner held the remaining 49% between them.
Resources were provided to remedy the crisis and invest in the future. The 
acquired company was valued at £1 million. The parent company invested 
£500,000. Part of this money was used to buy out existing BES 
shareholders since these minority shareholders could have a veto over 
decisions and wield great influence. A time frame of six years was put on 
the take-over deal with the UK company, whereby the parent company 
could buy out the remaining shares over a 6 year period, or, alternatively 
sell their shares back to the original owners. If the business grew and 
made reasonable profits, then the founders knew that they would benefit 
from this arrangement. McArdle remarked that he attempted to negotiate 
the best deal possible for the company.
Plans after the take-over centred firmly on designing and manufacturing 
security products. The installation side of the business was sold off in 
order to grow the company. The period post 1989 was one of turmoil and 
change. There were changes in personnel, with the sales manager leaving, 
and new people coming in. A person skilled in design electronics was 
employed full time. Some growth was achieved in 1990/91 when the 
company obtained an important contract in France.
A major re-assessment of short term objectives and long term strategy was 
clearly necessary, but this did not occur. No major capital investment took 
place. The cultures of the parent company and Kestrel did not merge. The 
parent group tended to be budget oriented and they had adopted 
management by objectives (MBO) techniques. The group consisted of a 
group of 40 companies and those who made the most profit were given the 
greatest say in the decision making process. According to Michael O 
Hara, they were looking for someone they could work well with, they were 
seeking some form of strategic alliance with Expo-Met, but no synergies, 
closeness or connections really developed. Kestrel did not experience any 
growth.
The year 1991 ushered in significant changes. The company became a 
small part of a larger multi-national and its future was dictated by group 
strategy. The UK company, Expo-Met International, made a change in 
strategy in 1991. For various reasons the parent group decided that the 
Irish company ‘was not a good strategic fit and peripheral to their 
requirements.’ It was perceived as being too small and too far removed 
from the European market. The group failed to recognise the research and 
development expertise of Kestrel or their knowledge of the European 
market.
In 1991 a management buy-out (MBO) occurred. In the opinion of 
Michael O’ Hara, the MBO was the single, biggest change experienced by 
the company. This transaction resulted in the formation of a new, privately 
held firm. McArdle and his partner raised money by leveraging the 
company (i.e. borrowing on company assets). A small shareholding went 
to other managers at the time, in order to retain their expertise and give 
them a greater interest in the company. The management buy-out entailed 
both advantages and disadvantages. Irish management now possessed full 
control, but on the other hand, it did not have the financial support of a 
large company. As a result of the MBO, there was a very high debt to 
equity ratio which reduced the strategic options open to management. The 
company badly needed investment for plant and equipment, office supplies, 
raw materials and marketing and sales.
The changes in the company after the management buy-out
Michael O Hara remarked that the single, biggest problem faced by an 
SME was lack of finance. The MBO had repercussions in terms of 
monetary constraints:
Growth has been quite slow slowly really. We have not achieved 
the growth we would have if we had stayed with Expo-Met or 
alternatively taken on board outside share-holders from day one. 
Coming out restricted us enormously in terms of growth. We are 
now looking at niche markets, taking away small, profitable 
business from large companies. We are steering away from 
anything large. We just could not afford it, or be able to finance it. 
Any other ideas we may have had for growth, we have steered clear 
of as we would not be able to fund it. We have not been able to 
maintain a presence on the ground which would certainly have 
benefited us.
The management buy-out gave an immediate psychological boost to the 
company. Michael O Hare believed that there was a better team spirit and 
more co-operation in the company. As part of a multinational, there was 
less cohesion since other staff did not have much contact with the parent 
group. The culture of the company changed dramatically after the MBO
Major change: management buy-out
deal. Michael O Hare moved from working in a multi-national 
environment to a small business setting. This was exciting. It was also a 
struggle. Being ‘out on their own’, according to the financial manager, 
gave him a great sense of achievement, much more so than from working 
in a multi-national. He also gained exposure to all areas of business. The 
managing director remarked that, as a small company, there was a lot of 
communication and interface between R&D, production and marketing. He 
saw this as one of the advantages of a small company.
A second crisis
About a year later after the management buy-out, at the end of 1992, the 
company endured a major crisis, due to a combination of factors:
(1) The business was undercapitalized
(2) They suffered because the business was highly geared.
(3) The 1992 currency crisis was completely unexpected.
The general state of the economy had a major impact on the company.
The currency crisis in late 1992 exacerbated their problems considerably. 
The cost of loan finance increased to 30% per annum. The Irish pound 
was overvalued which was penal to a major exporter like Kestrel. For 
twelve months, there was complete turmoil. They lost customers, they 
were unable to deliver on time, they were unable to obtain supplies due to 
lack of finance and lost business as a result. In the long term damage was 
done:
We had to claw back from these things, we have gone 
through that. It has been tough but not impossible.
We have also got back some of those customers. We told 
them the reason, that we were going through a bad time...
Delivery to the customer is a key thing. If they cannot 
rely on a supplier they will go to someone else.
According to the financial manager:
It was very rough. The punt went up to 108p, 109p. It was an 
extremely difficult time. There was a serious loss of margin...We 
got a bit of a shock. We lost a fair bit of money. We have got 
more cautious since then in our dealings. In markets we price back 
in our own currencies where possible and use forward buying 
contracts. We became more focused on day to day issues. If you 
cannot survive in the short term there is no point in thinking in the 
long term.
The crisis demanded a top-down management process in which the 
willingness to exercise power is essential. Resolving the crisis was 
uppermost on the owner’s mind with the result that relations with 
employees suffered. He believed that he became ‘more aggressive and
tougher’ in his dealings with people. Performance controls were put in 
place. Managerial attitudes and style of direction underwent a significant 
change as a result of the crisis. Sicne the crisis, McArdle had to learn 
learn to be a ‘little more inspirational’ and had to try to ‘bring people along 
with him’. Michael O Hararemarked that employee issues were important 
in a small company. He suggested that giving a greater return to staff, 
encouraging them to work better and so on would ultimately benefit the 
company in financial terms. It was a traumatic period for all concerned. 
The experience of crisis was an isolating experience. In the words of the 
managing director:
In a crisis it is easy to see who your friends are, to see loyalty and 
to see those who sit on the fence. It is down to yourself.
Crisis tests personal strengths and after having gone through a crisis, he 
knows that he could go through another one.
Having gone to the edge, I am comfortable being a little 
back from the edge.
Their financial problems were alleviated somewhat when a customer in 
France invested in the business and the IDA made a small investment by 
buying preference shares.
Ramifications of the crisis
The crisis had a significant effect on the management of the company in the 
long term. The comments of the managing director and the financial 
manager suggested that the company became overly cautious in their 
decision making:
I am a total optimist but it has been battered out of me. I am 
expansionist in outlook but you cannot get it to work with a lack of 
resources. One thing I have learned is that there is no long term 
unless you can finance it. We are a technology company and 
research and development eats up capital. It is very risky business. 
There are short product life cycles and we can get leapfrogged along 
the way. In manufacturing, more can go wrong that in service 
firms. There are more variables.
Michael 0  Hara suggested that the company became conservative in its 
approach because of its experience of crises:
I still believe, that we are a little too cautious, 
still a little too slow. Some one else may say we need to be 
cautious because we have to recuperate a costly R&D program. I 
would advocate that we be a little bit quicker in making decisions, 
that we be a bit bolder. But it is the principals who control the 
company at the end of the day.
On the positive side, they learned from their mistakes. The financial 
manager remarked:
It has been a hard slog. We have been ‘down in the dirt’ a phrase I 
have heard before. We have struggled and have got over it. We 
are very sharpened now as to the effort needed. We are not taking 
anything for granted anymore. We are constantly aware, we try to 
second guess what is happening. All in all, it has taken any 
complacency we might have had before out of us. When we were 
in Expo, we were all quite young. That complacency would have 
been due to our lack of experience.
In personal terms, McArdle remarked that the experience of a crisis could 
easily make one careful. He spoke about the great pressures placed on the 
individual in the event of a crisis and said that:
People can be destroyed if a company goes through a crisis.
Heavy personal guarantees are made and people can lose everything 
home, personal wealth, the company. Banks do not usually make 
the company bankrupt, but will wait for the company to come back 
up. So an individual can be in a cash minus position rather 
than starting from zero.
Part of the recovery plan involved reducing exposure to foreign currency 
fluctuations. According to Michael O Hara:
We have got more cautious since then in our dealings. In 
markets we price back in own currencies where possible, and use 
forward buying contracts. We became more focused on day to day 
issues. This thing could wipe you out. If you can not survive in 
the short term, then there is no point in thinking in the long term.
McArdle remarked that they had to grow the company carefully, on a 
controlled basis, to prevent them from running out of cash. He believed 
that the experience of a financial crisis could make a company 
conservative, risk adverse and would block growth in the long term. 
McArdle claimed that the company has not grown as fast as it otherwise 
might have done. He added that the company would be twice as big as 
they are at present if the crisis did not occur.
McArdle claimed that internal managerial information systems ‘became 
tighter’. Today, management analyze problems earlier on and respond 
much quicker. They put more effort into forecasting the future. The 
experience of a crisis helped them to focus more consciously on the need to 
be selective in the use of resources. McArdle claimed that before the 
crisis, they would grab whatever business was there. Now they respect 
scarce resources. They had to define their core business and concentrate 
on the products they could deliver well. McArdle remarked that they
The crisis exposed company weaknesses, that of over dependency on a few 
customers and a weak financial base. A broad objective was set to spread 
risk in terms of customers and export markets. Prior to the crisis episode, 
40% of their business came from a single customer and the company made 
plans to reduce this dependency. The nature of the product, a micro­
processor driven, intelligent product, demanded that a long term 
relationship is built up with the customer. A conscious policy decision was 
taken that UK sales should not exceed 25%. Sales are now divided 80% 
export and 10% in the U.K. Michael O Hare claims that they are trying 
to expand the customer base and number of long term contracts, but they 
have the problem of funding the sales/marketing area.
The company currently operates in three product areas: security alarm 
control systems, communicators and access control panels. Access controls 
is a rapidly growing area and the decision to target this area was fortuitous 
and opportunistic in nature. According to the financial manager, they:
...just stumbled onto the access control areas. We slowly went into 
that areas as we saw the extra value, and potential for more profits. 
Alarm controls is a difficult area, very cost competitive and margins 
are tight. You cannot afford to make mistakes and developing 
products is all about making mistakes, so we have fared better in 
access controls.
More resources were channelled into access control panels with less being 
devoted to alarm controls, so the company hopes to get phased out of that 
area eventually.
Degree of planning
The company was guided by a broad plan they did not ‘stick rigidly’ to the 
plan. According to the managing director, planning was a dynamic
process and done almost unconsciously as was the case in a lot of small 
companies. There were no formal meetings as was generally the case in 
large organizations. According to the financial manager, the company had 
no formal mission statement or strategy. Meetings were very informal and 
ad-hoc:
We discuss operational issues at meetings and talk about the 
future direction of the company but this does not pan out into 
anything formal.
became more strategic in their thinking, which was a positive outcome.
(1) To aim for higher margin/low turnover business
(2) To concentrate on niche business
(3) To foster close, long term relationships with customers
(4) Adopt a risk-adverse posture
(5) To exploit their strength in design
(6) To look for a strategic partner
Industry factors
The industry was very competitive and was dominated by large industry 
players such as DSC and Europlex. Kestrel’s competitive advantage was 
its flexibility. They were able to adapt the product and respond to 
customers needs more quickly that the large competitors. For instance a 
customer in France required a ‘listen-in’ facility where if the alarm went 
off, the police could listen in and hear movements in the premises. This 
meant that a microphone had to be designed in the unit. Kestrel 
successfully responded to the customer’s demand as a result they beat one 
of top five players in the world.
The company was however too small to worry about the larger players.
The fact that the market was large and growing was a a comfort to 
management. The company had to target niche areas rather than the high 
volume business because of their small size, lack of resources, and 
competitive pressures. The price of their products tended to be higher than 
competitors, because they were unable to emphasis cost efficiencies. As a 
small company, they did not benefit from economies of scale; they decided 
to offer slight variations of the standard product to suit customer needs. 
They were able to customize the product on site. They designed a general 
product the market, but allowed for different customer requirements. For 
instance, alarm ring time was programmable at either 4 minutes, 20 
minutes, or 30 minutes.
The lack of finance
The company at the moment is trying to become more pro-active, 
according to McArdle, as opposed to reactive. Pro-activity implies growth, 
aggressiveness, asking customers for ideas, developing contact with the 
marketplace, investing in new product development, investing in research 
and development, taking multiple risks, and being able to back this up in 
terms of finance. Being able to fund growth is, and always was a problem. 
According to the founder:
The core weakness of the firm is under-capitalisation.
Finance is a barrier to growth... It keeps coming back 
to finance. Have you sufficient to ride a number of storms?
Company objectives were as follows:
The lack of finance can create other problems such as disagreement and 
discord among managers and staff, especially as regards strategy and future 
direction. The partners of the firm seemed to adopt dichotomous 
approaches towards resolving the financial problems of the firm - one 
partner’s preference is for a cautious, risk adverse approach, and the 
preference of the other partner is for a high-risk, high reward strategy.
Company strategy over the next two years involves seeking strategic 
partnerships. The company needs a fresh infusion of capital. A strategic 
partner would give them this strength and possibly act as a stepping stone 
to the U.S. market. One manager remarked:
We have not spent enough time in souring investment or looking for 
a partner. Part of their logic is to keep a majority shareholding.
We have tended to go it alone since the MBO. We have to go a bit 
slowly, get a little more value before we go out for equity. We 
have slowly come round to the idea that we need to put more effort 
into looking for an equity partner, for BES funding, or a strategic 
alliance. We see ourselves at a crossroads. We are more focused 
in getting financial strength, taking a bit more risk, achieving more 
growth.
They need someone they can work with and enjoy synergies with, some 
one who will contribute to the marketing/distribution side and considerably 
increase their growth. They also need to fund the business better. Trying 
to fund R&D out of existing operations is difficult. A strategic partner 
would give them the start they need. McArdle remarked that the lack of 
resources spent on R&D was, and still is, a problem. Irish companies tend 
to spend a very low percentage of turnover on R&D, in contrast to 
companies in the US, Japan, and Europe.
Company strengths and weaknesses are as follows:
According to the financial manager, the company is slow and cautious in its 
decision making, is risk adverse, reactive and weak in terms of its 
marketing, manufacturing and financial base. Another weakness of the 
company is bringing the product to the market too early and forcing it onto 
customers too quickly. The major strength of the company is its research 
capability, the product itself and their knowledge of the customer.
(1) Its ability in niche marketing, finding customers offering solutions.
(2) Margins are reasonably good in the security products business.
(3) The company has a mature, diversified product range.
(4) The company has a strong export ethos.
(5) The company has installed a computer network and management 
information systems.
(6) The company is no longer a single product/market company.
(7) The company’s R&D capability.
Weaknesses
(1) The company is undercapitalised.
(2) The company has a high level of borrowings.
(3) The company lacks economies of scale.
(4) The company is located at the edge of Europe.
(5) The company has high labour costs relative to competitive firms.
Strengths
Case company: Caraplas 
Introduction
Caraplas was set up to produce a revolutionary new plastic sheet product. 
Hoescht, a giant chemical corporation, bought the assets of the firm in 
February 1995. Future marketing strategy entails selling plastic sheeting 
direct to large multi-national companies on a world wide basis. Hoescht 
has a strong distribution network which means markets will be global in 
nature. They will also supply the raw material for the product so they can 
buy it at a competitive rate and formulate the raw material to suit 
themselves. Hoescht’s aim is to reach a turnover of DM 100 million (£38 
million) in five years. They plan to set up a few manufacturing plants 
around the world in order to achieve their objectives.
Role of founders and start-up of company
Caraplas was founded by a sales manager and a colleague who was a 
technical manager in the same company. Their objective was to produce a 
thick version of PET to rival other plastic products on the market. He 
presented his ideas to ICI but they were rejected by the company.
Although conventional wisdom dictated that this idea was technically 
impossible, ICI’s sales manager decided he was not going to stop trying. 
Together with his ICI colleague, the founder left to set up his own 
company. The founder admitted that it was a struggle to get the funding 
together. The IDA and financial institutions needed to be convinced that 
the technology would work. The founder tested his theory with the Irish 
signage manufacture Robin Rennicks, who eventually produced a 3 
millimetre road sign using PET. As a result, the IDA decided to support 
what was a high risk venture. The IDA backed a two year feasibility study 
and took a 15% equity stake in the firm. The equipment to make the 
product was not available on the market at that time. The founder 
collaborated with Breyer, a leading German manufacturer of extrusion 
machinery. On payment of a small deposit, they agreed to finance the cost 
of building the machine on condition that it would be repaid on 
commissioning. The company had the use of £2 million in equity.
Caraplas was half owned by the promoters, with the balance split between 
the IDA (15%) FBD Insurance (15%) and BES investors (20%) The 
company was formally registered in February 1991. Ulster Bank agreed 
to provide overdraft facilities of £1.2 million. So, after five years of 
research and development, they started producing the revolutionary sheets 
in January 1992. They moved into Ballymount Business Park.
The product
The plastic material could be cut, formed or drawn into different shapes. 
Virtually unbreakable, it could be stamped, drilled or engraved, yet it was 
still shatter proof, vandal proof and crack resistant. This was its major
competitive advantage since other plastics on the market were quite brittle. 
The founder saw wide ranging applications for the plastic sheets in the 
retail point of sale, automotive (including caravans), telephone kiosks, roof 
lights, signage, bus shelters, bathroom showers and machine guards.
Exactly 50 years after PET was discovered, the founder believed that 
Caraplas sheet would create a similar revolution during the 1990s in the 
plastic field as it did in the fibre and packaging industry since the 1950s.
He took pride in the fact that a small Irish company, after severe 
difficulties, eventually made a technological breakthrough which had 
defeated some of the world’s biggest petrochemical companies. Caraplas 
became the only firm in the world to produce extremely thick sheets of 
transparent plastic.
The industry
Multinationals such as ICI and others had looked at the possibility of 
extruding PET (best known as the material for soft drinks bottles) as thick 
sheets. PET revolutionised the packaging industry, giving companies an 
alternative to glass bottles. PET, though, was used mainly for ‘thin sheet’ 
applications. ICI gave up after five years because of technical reasons such 
as difficulties with the viscosity of the material and its tendency to 
crystallise. The firm faced problems in gaining credibility and trust due 
mainly to the ingrained conservatism in the industry. The founders of the 
company underestimated the reluctance of customers to adopt a new 
innovation. From the viewpoint of customers, the small size of the 
company, its lack of trading experience and reputation, was not reassuring. 
The fact that the product would compete against those of the multinationals 
led to scepticism by many. The advanced technical feature of the product, 
combined with a major price differential of 20%, convinced the founder 
that they ‘could walk in and just take over some markets.’ This did not 
happen.
Crisis
The founder remarked that he could write a book about the traumas which 
he experienced in developing the product and establishing the company.
The marketing strategy was two pronged in its focus. The promoters 
decided to sell through some of the major plastic stockists (eg wholesales 
who cut the plastic into smaller panels and sell on to manufacturers), and 
direct to the smaller manufacturers, at least until they were big enough to 
do more on their own. This marketing strategy has since been reversed 
when Hoerscht bought the assets of the company. They were able to 
provide the technical, financial and marketing resources to change the 
future of the firm. The former management knew that large manufacturers 
would be tied in to supply contracts with the multi-nationals and would 
remain loyal to them. The smaller customers should be more receptive to a 
similar sized company approaching them. Had the company not targeted 
the smaller customers, it would never have got off the ground. Potential 
customers were already supplied with plastic sheet products by large multi-
nationals such as ICI, Eastman Kodak, and General Electric. These
suppliers were well established in the market, and had the advantage of a
proven product, a strong financial base, and technical support services.
The following four problems led to the demise of the company:-
(1) Lack of credibility
(2) Customer mistrust of a new product
(3) Technical limitations of the product
(4) Errors of management
It was a struggle for the firm to break out of this straight jacket. When 
they finally started making inroads into some markets, technical problems 
arose which were not anticipated. Problems arose with their raw material 
supplier which drove the final nail into the coffin. According to the 
Technical Manager: ‘It was a combination of bad luck and missed 
opportunities. ’
Management believed that the product was suited to a wide range of 
applications, but quickly discovered to their cost that this was not the case. 
The product was used in some applications and failed. This created an 
immediate lack of confidence in the product. The single, biggest crisis 
occurred in 1992/93, when the company received very significant levels of 
rejections of the sheet from customers. The company was flooded with 
customer complaints since the transparent sheet became contaminated, (i.e. 
covered with black spots dotted throughout the plastic panel). This resulted 
in the company ceasing production for five months. The problem was 
traced back to the raw material suppliers. Since their financial resources 
were stretched, they had used cheap, sub standard raw material rather than 
premium grade raw materials. Although their supplier was one of the 
largest plastic raw material suppliers in the world, they were at fault. They 
refused to admit liability yet the firm received a large amount of financial 
compensation from them. In an industry where ‘bad news travels fast’, the 
firm’s credibility was obliterated and it never recovered from this period.
In retrospect, the technical manager said that the company went into some 
markets that they should never have entered. The company should have 
fully researched the product’s technical limitations and the range of suitable 
applications. He remarked:
For financial reasons, even if we got an order and had our doubts 
about it, and our ability to supply, we made the product, shipped it 
and then tried to collect the money. We decided to worry about a 
problem if and when it arises. Had the initial applications been 
chosen more carefully, then after 12 months we would not have 
needed to grab business. In the first year, the technical problems 
were unanticipated. We should have grabbed 50% of the market in 
the first six months, but after 8 months we were out of it. We were 
desperately looking for sales in other areas and we should not have 
had to chase business at that time...
The year 1992 was a very anxious time for the directors. They endured a 
period of five months without producing and carrying high overheads, and 
realised that the involvement of a big international group was needed to 
bring their technological achievement to fruition. Negotiations started with 
a number of parties interested in take-over, among them Eastman Kodak 
and Hoechst. Discussions went on over the next two years and the 
company ran production one week out of every four. In February 1995, 
the firm was taken over by Hoechst. The technical manager saw the take 
over as a major change in the company’s history; Hoescht had the capacity 
to launch the product worldwide. The acquiring company learned from the 
mistakes of the original owners:
The new owners conduct extensive technical evaluation of the 
product before entering markets and accepting supply contracts. 
There are more cautious on the technical side and have to be, 
because they have a reputation to consider. They can afford to be 
more cautious. They conduct planning on the marketing side, there 
is more technical certification of the product.
Hoechst bought out the firm’s assets and technology. The deal resulted in 
the original owners being retained as consultants and the deal was 
structured in such as way that they would share in the product’s future 
success. It was agreed that the sheets would be marketed under the name 
Hostaglas. Production was to continue at the production facility in Dublin. 
The twenty workers in the Ballymount factory were retained by Hoescht. 
Hoechst installed its own people to manage Hostaglas in keeping with the 
multi-national’s practise on acquisitions. The small company offered 
Hoescht an invention that would create international business with a 
turnover of at least £38 million and a product marketed around the world 
by the turn of the century.
New ownership and change in strategy
